Minority Languages in
The Role of Euskera and
Catalan in Creating Alternative Nationalisms
by
Alison McMillen
International Affairs
The
School for International Training
International
Studies, Organizations and Social Justice
Independent
Study Project
December
3, 2001
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Acknowledgements
I
would like to acknowledge and thank first and foremost my wonderful friend, the
magnanimous Basko Ivan Tellaexte, the inspiration for this project, for his
unending patience, guidance, support, and translation of numerous
spanglisms. This endeavor would have
been unthinkable without him. I also
want to express my gratitude to all the people who gave me a few hours of their
lives in the form of interviews; Antoine Maurice, Kuo Kwan Lung, Onno Seroo,
Marc Leprêtre, Rodolfo Ormazabal, Igor Mendizabal, Belen Uranga, Nerea
Arizabalaga, Txema Uriarte, Estibaliz Sarria, and Pau Puig. I would like to thank Gyula Csurgai, for
reminding me not to forget about territory and geopolitics, and for enjoying
himself this weekend as I slave away, and Earl Noelte for his practicality,
encouragement, and mischievous understatements.
I would like to thank the Demaurex family, Laury for her singing and
diner de cheval, Patrick for brining me mandarines and news from the world
outside my bedroom, Line for her camera, Joel for his vow to never go to
college if it means writing a thirty two page paper, Yan for his interminable
stomping, and Plume for causing chaos with the plants. I would like to thank my own darling John,
for loving me even though I left him for three months to come to
Preface
The people of the Basque
Country have learned how to live with regular terrorism. In the short nine days that I was there, a
bomb in a park two blocks away from where I was staying nearly killed two local
policeman, and two traffic inspectors, both with spouses and children at home,
were killed by ETA terrorists fighting a war of secession against the Spanish
state. Ignorantly, I believed that this
problem could be somewhat ameliorated, or perhaps transformed, by a cultural
revival that focused on the unique Basque language, Euskera. Catalonia, another autonomous region in
Spain, has created a strong cultural nationalism based on their language,
Catalan, that has allowed them peaceful relations with Madrid, guidance for the
people’s identity, and a way to incorporate immigrants into the society. I went to
What I found was that nationalism cannot
simply be transformed at will. It is
wholly dependant on historical and political factors. In the Basque Country these factors have
practically paralyzed cultural revival, as no aspect of the culture can be spoken
about without considering the political baggage that they carry. I intend to explain what I see as the
evolving processes of political nationalist ideology in the Basque Country, and
how it has manipulated and in many cases hindered cultural nationalism, with
language as its key hostage.
Furthermore, I intend to explain why I no longer believe that the
Catalan model is remotely feasible for the Basque Country, whose current state
needs to be analyzed by itself, and given serious considerations for creative
solution unique to the situation, if my new found Basque friends are to know
peace in their lifetimes.
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Table
of Contents
I. Introduction:
Languages, History and Inclusive Nationalisms Page 1
The Basque Country: A Country in
Transition? 1
Liberation Through Language? Not If Language is a Prisoner Itself 3
The Significance of Language in
Nation Building
5
II. Evolution of Language in Nationalism in the
Basque Country and
Ancient Identities
8
Turn of the Century
9
The Franco Era and The ETA
12
Transition to Democracy and the
Expansion of Violence 17
The Present, Held Captive by the
Past 22
III. Conclusion, To Be Continued....
27
Regional Conflicts Within the
Context of the EU 27
Globalizations’ Paradoxical Forces
in the Basque Country and Beyond
29
Bibliography
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I.
Introduction: Language, History, and
Inclusive Nationalisms
The
Basque Country: Country in Transition?
Only a short five years ago,
Yet the desire of many in this
newly beautified city to integrate themselves into the modern world is
overshadowed, if not obscured, by the violent terrorism of the radical Basque
nationalists, the ETA, who just last week killed two Spanish policemen who were
conducting routine traffic checks, in another act of what many Basque citizens
feel has become the groups attachment violence for its own sake. In what journalist Antoine Maurice calls a
“low intensity civil war”[3], the transition of the region to a modern economic
stronghold in a greater Europe is stunted by the centuries long political
battle for independence from centralized rule that is firmly rooted in the
Basque history of self rule.
Much as the transition of the
Basque Country is obstructed by politics, so to has the movement to revitalize
the Basque language to a position of widespread understanding and use in
everyday life been held hostage by the politicization of all expression of Basque
culture. Euskera, the only language in
The extreme political tensions that
color all aspects of life in the Basque Country are increasingly important to
the well being not only of the Spanish state, but of the whole of
I traveled to the Basque
Country searching for a way in which the language could be transformed into a
remedy for unifying the divisions both within society, and between the regional
Basque and central Spanish governments, much as it has been able to do in
another autonomous region of Spain, Catalonia.
I
was wrong.
When I suggested the possibility of
the Basque Country adopting a new form of nationalism based on the symbol of
language, and instituted through the educational system[8] to people in Bilbao,
I was met with empty stares, followed by simplistic responses pointing to the
difficulty of learning language, and the significant proportion of the
population in the Basque country who were ethnically Spanish and had no
incentive for investing the extensive time and money that would be required to
learn to speak Euskera. They pointed out
to me the contrast between the difficulty of Euskera, and the ease with which
Castilian speakers can learn Catalan, which has shared roots with Spanish as a
Latin based, romance language. Although
these were all just reasons, they seemed to easy ways to dismiss a possible
solution to a very significant problem, and obstacles that could be overcome
with time and commitment.
The real reason why Basque nationalism can not be transformed to
an inclusive nationalism based on language, while hidden in front of me in the
mountains of documentation and interview notes that I had been collecting in
the process of my research, only became apparent to me at the end of my stay in
Bilbao, in a discussion with Txema Uriarte, a professor of Euskera at Gabriel
Aresti, a university for adults to learn the ancient language. He told me that language is not only about
language. It has been politicized into a
nationalism that is ravaged by radical terrorism.[9] It cannot be promoted on a government level,
and has significant problems being promoted at a societal level, because its
promotion invariably carries a message of secessionist ideals and exclusive
ethnocentrism I see now that, not only
is language currently rendered immobile as a nationalizing force by political
agendas that overcome cultural symbols, but it has never been in a position to
be a catalyst for an inclusive national identity as it has in Catalonia. Conversi states that,
“Catalan nationalism remained
moderate and broadly untied around a cultural platform. Basque nationalism kept its radical
separatist posture and its internal
fragmentation. If anything Basque
nationalism increased its radicalism, thanks to state repression”[10].
After thousands of years of fending off
advanced and attempts to control the Basque country, and most recently in the
struggle to fend of the centralized Spanish state, with the atrocities of the
Franco dictatorship, and the state sponsored terrorism of the post Franco
republic, expressions of Basqueness, be they cultural or political, have become
aspects that define the in-group, and exclude outsiders. It is for this reason that the Basque country
can not now, and probably could not at any point in their recent history,
simply transform political nationalism into a cultural nationalism based on
language as has been done in Catalonia.
The
Significance of Language in
While there are many ways to
analyze nation building and nationalist movements, language is a significant
and effective factor in the case of nationalism in
Language is also significant as a
representation of
However, the main purpose of this
report is to show that language as the focus of nationalist programs is
dependent on the political context in which it takes place. In the Basque Country, language is very
important to a majority of the society.
Igor Mendizabal, a native speaker of Euskera says that knowing the
language can help a people to know their community, and to understand its’
myths and history. He recognizes that
his fellow countrymen’s inability to speak
the Basque language is a hindrance to the development and maintenance of
their culture, saying, “It is like running a race with one leg not ready to go;
you can do it, but certainly not as well”[15].
His sentiments are echoed in the goals of the Basque government
officials, who are trying to create policies to support the revitalization of
the language. Jose Antonio Ardanza, the
president of the Basque Country, says that the language is a crucial part of
the Basque identity, an invaluable “legacy inherited from our
ancestors”[16]. And yet, the process of
revitalizing the Basque language slow and inconsistent at best, and the cause
of cultural nationalism in the Basque country is beset with the overflowing
problems of Basque political nationalism, from which it cannot separate itself.
In sum, national identities are in
a constant state of being reworked.
Identity in general is an evolving and dynamic process, not a static
phenomenon. It is made up of composite
and multilayered ways of knowing one’s
self, one’s group, and that group’s place in the world. Because of identity’s vulnerability to
change, it can not be overlooked that “Propaganda and myth building play an
important role in the formation of collective identities and
cultures”[17]. The Basque situation
epitomized the consequences that these forces can have on not only their
collective identity, but on their political goals as well. Onno Seroo of the Unesco Centre de Catalonya
characterized the Basque identity as a “living mythology”[18]. Added to this mythology is the crucial aspect
of historical relations with the outside world, which have combined to produce
a nationalism replete with cultural symbolism, and yet held captive by
political aspirations and militant terrorism.
II. Evolution of Language in Nationalism in the
Basque Country and
Ancient
Identities
Historian Roger Collins has said of
the Basque people, “For few peoples of the world, and surely no other in
During this time period, the
Basques have repeatedly driven back attempts by outside groups aimed at
conquering their territory, fending off the Romans in the Third century
B.C., the Moors in the 7th century A.D.,
and they even maintained their independence from the Moslem Occupation of the
Turn
of the Century
The creation of modern Basque
nationalism came about at the end of the 19th century, when the
The father of modern Basque
nationalism was a ***** descendant of Carlist parents named Sabino Arana. In his efforts to revive Basque nationalist
feelings, he invented a flag and a name, Euskadi, for the Basque
Country[26]. He also created the PNV,
the Basque Nationalist Party in 1895, which is still the majority political
party of the Autonomous Basque Community today[27]. While Arana did not speak Euskara, he
included its revival in his nationalist doctrine as he believed it was an
essential component of Basque identity.
However, he used language not as a way to create community, but as an
“ethnic border, to divide the autochthonous population from the
newcomers”[28]. He even went so far as
to say, “If our invaders were to learn Euskera, we would have to abandon
it”[29]. It is evident from this
statement that he valued the Basque language not because it held great cultural
value and was key to the reestablishment of a national Basque identity, but
because it drew a clear path between the Basques and outsiders.
This early focus on language as a
dividing force has remained a part of Basque nationalism, and is perceived to
this day by people both within and outside of the Basque community. Furthermore, it epitomizes the difference
between the Catalan nationalism, which focuses on language as a tool of
integration rather than division. In
addition, because Euskera was sparsely diffused, and was difficult to learn,
Arana chose to base his nationalism on race and religion, which has tainted
Basque nationalism with fragmentation, and instill in it a “messianic
character”[30] which is clearly evident of modern radical Basque
nationalism.
An important characteristic of the
status of Basque language at the turn of the century was the diglossia between
Euskera and Castilian. This refers to
the fact that there was a societal perception of Castilian as a “high variety
language”, which was used in public and formal domains, and had a developed and
standardized written form, while Euskera was considered a “low variety
language”, spoken only in informal situations, among friends and family[31] and
had a very weak written tradition. The
result of this societal division meant that Euskera held very little prestige,
and therefore its revitalization was of little value to the general public.
While Euskera floundered under the
attitude that it was only a language of the countryside, and of little use to
modern life, Catalan enjoyed a high level of prestige within society. Building on strong literary tradition of the
language that had existed since the middle ages, the Catalan Renaixença was
created as a linguistic and literary movement in the late 19th Century. It had great influence in conveying prestige
and status on the Catalan language through the publication of original
literature in Catalan, and large manifestations to draw society’s attention to
their cultural and linguistic heritage[32].
The result was that, while Basque nationalism focused on race and
religion, a feature common to all Basques at the time, early Catalan nationalism
was able to center on the common feature of language, which was widely spoken
and revered.
The
Franco Era and the ETA
Both the Basque and Catalan
regions were given regional autonomy under the Spanish Republic in the early
1930’s. This autonomy was short lived,
however, as General Franco’s armies set siege to the country in 1936 in a bid
for power that became the Spanish Civil War.
Because both provinces fought on the side of the Republic to defend
their newly conceded autonomy, Franco labeled them “The Traitor Provinces”[33]. He repealed the Basque Statute of Autonomy
and targeted them for particularly severe measures, including the highly
symbolic bombing of Guernika in 1937, which was the home of the independent
Basque Foral Government. José María
Garmendia, in his history of the ETA, points out that, “If Sabino Arana
considered Euskadi to be an occupied country, Francoism made that occupation
real and effective”[34]. Franco’s harsh
policies towards the Basque Country served to deepen sentiments of nationalism
among all levels of Basque society,
whereas previously they had only existed among relatively small groups of
intellectuals in the urban populations.
Franco’s attacks on the Basque
Country were not limited to military action.
He prohibited any displays of the Basque culture, outlawing any use of
the Basque language, forbidding education in Euskera, even forcing the people
to drop their Basque surnames. A
government decree stated that, “any manifestation of separation constitutes a
crime which we will not tolerate”, and his police forces ensuingly imprisoned
many Basque nationalist politicians and their supporters[35].
By targeting Euskera, an obvious
symbol of Basque identity to nationalist and apolitical Basques alike, the
Franco regime gave credence to the peoples’ fear of cultural annihilation, that
had previously been perceived only by intellectuals and nationalists who were
reacting to the centuries long decline of Euskera that had been brought on by
industrialization and immigration before the Civil War. Historian Daniele Conversi says that Franco’s
cultural homogenization policies,
“Added a powerful element of
accusation against the centralist regime which was identified as bearing the main
responsibility for cultural assimilation and loss. Basques perceived themselves as a
people on the verge of extinction. Only
drastic counter measures such
as mass insurrection could save them from their doom”[36].
Given the urgent desire that took
hold of the majority of the Basque population to save their culture from dying
out under Franco’s oppression, it is not at all surprising that a radical group
of nationalist students were able to take the lead in the underground nationalist movement.
As a reaction against the Franco dictatorship, ETA, or Euskadi Ta
Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Liberty) began as a student group in 1953,
enjoying the widespread support of a large sector of Basque society and even a
significant social sector in the rest of Spain for their nationalist
cause[37]. At the beginning, ETA was a
cultural nationalist movement. It’s
early intellectuals espoused the importance of maintaining Euskera as a
national symbol. Federico Krutwig, who
later became known as the “military soul” of Basque nationalism, was a fierce
supporter of the revival of Euskera, claiming that language was the “crucible
of conceiving Basqueness”[38]. However,
while these political activists revered Euskera for its symbolic value in promoting
their nationalist programs, they disregarded it as a viable option for
communication in the modern world, which perpetuated the diglossia that had
characterized the use of Euskera for centuries[39]. In sum, while nationalists exhorted the value
of the Basque language, their rhetoric had little real effect on revitalizing
the language.
While cultural nationalism could
have possibly led to the formation of a Basque national identity based on
shared cultural values, such as language, the singular focus on culture in
Basque nationalism was short lived. The
“Pavlovian response of the Spanish State” to ETA’s activities served to
radicalize and politicize the nationalist movement. In the later years of Franco’s rule, he kept
the entire Basque Country “under a virtual state of siege for months on end
after ETA attacks”[40]. The cycle of
reprisals for aggressions from both the ETA and the Spanish government
entrenched the nationalist movement as a primarily political movement. Given the focus of nationalists on battling
against human rights violations perpetrated by the dictatorship, it is
understandable that their early goals of language revitalization were largely
neglected.
It is however, important to note
that there were movements from within society to revitalize Euskera’s use among
Basque people. Ikastolas, schools that
taught in Basque, were started under Franco.
They were based on the historical cooperativist movement which
characterizes Basque civil society still to this day. They were collectively owned and operated by
members of the community. While they
managed to keep the language alive in certain pockets of the Basque Country,
they were illegal and out of necessity, highly secretive[41]. In addition, Euslaltzaindia, The Royal
Academy of the Basque Language, which had been formed in the 1920’s, created a
standardized form of Euskera, “Euskera Batua”, in the 1960’s, when Franco’s
cultural restrictions were eased to a slight degree.[42]. Despite these advances, the effects of
Franco’s policies outlawing the use of a language, one that was already in
serious decline, had the effect of nearly wiping out the Basque language.
Further adding to the decline of
the Basque language was the huge numbers of immigrant that poured into the
Basque country, looking for work in the heavily subsidized industrial economy
in the later years of Franco’s rule. The
great “wave of Spanish immigration” from 1955 to 75 saw the most rapid growth
in all of Spain, with the population nearly doubling from 1.3 million people to
2.56 million, and industrial centers growing up in the previously rural,
Basque-speaking countryside[43]. Many
Basques believe that Franco’s policy of subsidizing Basque industry was an
intentional effort to attract immigrants to the area, thereby dilute the Basque
population and subsequently diluting the nationalist demands[44]. Whether or not this was the case is
indiscernible, and secondary to the fact that it is believed by many to be
true. It is also significant in
explaining the Basque peoples’ resistance to the Spanish immigrants, who were
seen to be an additional threat to the survival of the Basque culture.
While Catalonia experienced the
same sort of Francoist oppression in the form of prohibition of language
expression, and education, the Catalan language enjoyed significantly more
widespread use before the dictatorship, and the language was able to survive
through use in private spheres such as the home, and among friends. In addition, when Franco’s restrictions on
language use were eased in the late 60’s, the majority of the Catalan people
still used the language daily, and civil society movements to reinstate its’
use were met with widespread approval and support[45]. Whereas the Basque language had been nearly
wiped out during the time of Franco, both because of his policies, and because
of its previously denigrated status among Basque society, the Catalan language
was largely able to withstand those same policies because it had previously
been spoken by such a large proportion of the population.
The effects of immigration into
Catalonia were not nearly as significant as they were in the Basque
country. Although the absolute number of
immigrants from other parts of Spain into Catalonia, 1.5 million, was higher
than that of immigrants into the Basque Country, they accounted for a much
smaller percentage of the overall population of 6 million[46]. This is a striking contrast to the Basque
Country, where, at the end of Franco’s regime nearly half of the population was
from outside the Basque Country. Furthermore,
because the Catalan language is relatively similar to Castilian, it was a
significantly smaller task for immigrants to learn the local language, and the
pervasive use of Catalan in everyday life gave them ample incentive to learn
it. While immigrants to the Basque
Country served to thin the population of Basque speakers, they had the reverse
effect in Catalonia, where they actually added to the numbers of Catalan
speakers[47].
The
Transition to Democracy and the Expansion of Violence
When Franco died in 1975, and his
regime came to an end, the Spanish State embarked on what is gratuitously
called the Transition to Democracy. In
1978 a new Constitution was established which gave the historical regions of
Spain autonomy under the central rule of the government in Madrid. However, while the Catalans were satisfied
with the limited autonomy promised to them in the Constitution, only one third
of the Basques voted to approve the new document. From the very beginning of the new
government, the majority of the Basque people were not satisfied, creating
fault lines along which many of today’s political problems rest[48].
In 1979 the Statute of Autonomy for
the Basque Country was established, giving the Basques even greater autonomy
than the Catalans. Yet its’ democratic
value is contested, as it was not the agreement draws up by the regional
parties at Guernika, but was a modified version called the Moncloa Statute
created by the moderate nationalist party, the PNV, and the Spanish
government. The new Statute favored the
bourgeoisie who controlled many of the provincial governments and the
leadership of the PNV, and served to effectively exploit and radicalize the
division between the resistance movement and those in power[49]. Many of the bourgeoisie business interests
did not want independence because they would loose their markets and financial
security, and their influence within the PNV ensured that the ruling party
would not form any alliance with the radical nationalists. This created a sharp division within the
Basque country, and many of the nationalist began to direct their animosity
towards the new Basque government, whom they believed had co-opted the ultimate
good of the Basque people for the sake of the moneyed interests[50]. The battle lines were drawn between moderate
and radical nationalist, and the focus of this nationalism became fully
entrenched in politics, leaving little room for cultural and linguistic revival
on the nationalist platform.
While Basque society was beginning
its decent into the abyss of polarization in which it is still embroiled, the
newly autonomous Generalitat de Catalonya set about reaffirming a nationalism
based on a strong sense of identity which centered on the Catalan
language. As Jordi Pujol, the president
of the Catalan government said, “Catalonia did not want autonomy for political
or administrative reasons, but for reasons of identity”[51]. By emphasizing language in the project of
nation building, Catalonia found an “instrument both for the consolidation of a
coherent nationalist ideology and for a slow integration of the
immigrants”[52].
A significant factor that
legitimized the Catalan governments focus on language came from the fact that
the incentive for widespread language recovery came from the Catalan society. La Crida was a civil society organization
comprised of roughly 300 different individuals and organizations that lobbied
the government for linguistic policy measures to strengthen the regional
language. The government responded by
instituting the Llei de Normalització Lingüística (Law of Linguistic
Normalization) in 1983. This law
extended the official use of Catalan, and effectively recovered the status of
the language from the pre-Franco era, and in many cases improved upon
it[53].
One of the most apparent effects of
the governments’ efforts at language revitalization has been made through the
use of the education system, which educates all of its students in
Catalan. This has resulted in the nearly
universal ability of the population to at least understand the language. In addition, and perhaps more significantly,
it has decreased friction between the immigrants from other parts of Spain by
giving them the incentive as well as the institution to integrate into Catalan
culture. Furthermore, because the
government has insisted on the adoption of the local language in all places of
business, immigrants and Catalans alike have a vested need to learn the
language[54]. However, it is critical to
note that all parties of Catalan society have been able to learn and adopt the
language with relative ease because of its similarity to Castilian.
While Catalonia has been able to
develop a strong national identity, as well as a complacent society that
approves of the centralized rule of the Government in Madrid over the past
thirty years, the Basque Country’s nation building program and its relationship
with Madrid have been largely paralyzed by continued ETA terrorism, and the
ensuing actions of the Spanish Interior Ministry. In what Paddy Woodworth calls the “Dirty War”
of the 1980’s, the Spanish government
has become embroiled in a form of state sponsored terrorism that served to
mobilize many Basques for the cause of self determination, even if they do not
support ETA’s violent tactics. Between
1983 and 87, the GAL, Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación, killed 27 people,
most of whom were exiled in the French Basque Country, and have encouraged the
government in their policy of dispersal, wherein political prisoners have been
spread around the country to cut their ties to their supporters at
home[55]. The Basque government has
hardly enjoyed the peaceful relations with Madrid, nor the consensus of its
deeply divided population that the Catalans have, that might allow them to
embark on a program of nation building around language, or other inclusive
cultural symbols in the mold of the Catalan programs.
Although the government has not
been able to build any consensus around forging national identity around non
political factors, civil society has pushed forward with its own policy of
language revival. Beginning immediately
after Franco’s death in 1975, there was
a strong popular movement to reinstitute, largely through education, Euskera as
a living language. Night schools, or Euskaltegi,
were established to teach adults how to speak the Basque language[56]. The function of Ikastolas, schools that teach
students all subjects in Euskera have been strengthened by the involvement of
the community. In all provinces of the
Basque country the schools hold festivals called Korrika to raise money for the
schools. Typically a large portion of
the population turns out for the festivities, which include popular Basque
music, and group activities such as races.
They are the main sources of funds for the schools that are run
independently of the government[57].
The government’s educational system
in the Basque country, while supporting the Ikastolas, has done very little to
integrate the divided society. They have
established a system wherein the population can choose from three models of
education; Model A, which uses Spanish as the language of education and teaches
Euskera as a subject, Model C, which teaches in both Spanish and Euskera, and
Model D, the Ikastolas, which use Euskera as the language of education and
teaches Spanish as a subject. This
system is, however, conducive to “ghettoization”, as it furthers the divide
among society by producing different segments of the population that are drawn
along language lines[58]. In contrast to
the ability of language to integrate Catalan society, language in the Basque
country has had the effect of reinforcing the divisions that already existed
between the Basque population and the immigrant population.
In recent years the moderate
nationalists, led by the PNV, have largely changed their ideologies, focusing
less on exclusive factors such as race and religion, and more on cultural
factors and collective identity[59].
Yet, this transformation has not had the effect of creating a more inclusive nationalism. The Basque society as a whole, be they
Spanish or Basque, has been polarized by the continued violence of the ETA, and
the Spanish state, and this polarization has given all cultural manifestations,
from language to traditional customs, a political meaning.
The
Present, Held Captive By The Past
The Autonomous Catalonian Community
is largely considered a success. Among
the population, 93.8% can speak and understand Catalan, and 40% can write
it[60]. The integration of immigrants
has been largely successful, and 55% of the people say they feel equally
Spanish and Catalan. They can say “Somos
Catalanes” in Spanish, which represents a new wave for Catalan identity, one
that is built around the distinct Catalan culture and language, and yet
simultaneously accommodates newcomers from other parts of Spain, and more
recently, from other parts of the globe[61].
Pau Puig, an advisor to the Catalan government, says that the nation is
in the process of reworking their Catalan identity, to focus on modern issues
such as the accommodation of immigrants, and tolerance for other ways of
life[62]. Daniele Conversi supports this
idea when he says, “It is a phenomenon of displacement and identification that
leads Catalans to champion the cause of minority groups other than their
own”[63]. It appears as though Catalonia
is an example to other states and regions in the process of nation building of
the possibility of effective identity cultivation centered on inclusion,
accommodation and acceptance.
Yet it is important to notice that
there is continued debate between the Catalonian and central Spanish government
regarding the official recognition of the Catalonian language. While the Spanish constitution recognized
nationalities in general, it does not specify where, or who, these
nationalities are In addition, there is growing concern about official
recognition of the Catalan nation within the European Union. As the EU is considering including such new
nation states as Malta or Lithuania, many Catalans are demanding recognition of
their own nation. Just last week Jordi
Pujol was pointing out the inherent imbalance in the EU that would not
recognize the Catalan language, spoken by 6 million people, while giving
official status to the language of Malta, which has only 400 thousand
speakers. Yet, if Spain does not
recognize Catalan as an official language, neither will the EU, a
representation of state, not supra-state actors, and so the contest for recognition
by the Spanish government will go on.[64].
In addition, many argue that it is
not the idealistic policies of language revitalization and cultural integration
that pacify the Catalan people towards the central government in Madrid, but
rather strong economic growth. As Grazyna
Bernatowicz says, “Catalonia’s thriving middle class is doing to well out of
economic prosperity to be interested in separation”[65].
Nor are the prospects for language
revitalization in the Basque Country so grim.
The status of the language is increasing as it becomes a larger part of
public life through the media, education, and through necessity in the job
market. It has also seen a revival of
its importance as a symbolic representation to culture. “The Basque people are aware of having lost
something, and the recuperation of language can allow people to refind
themselves”[66]. Renewed interest in
Euskera is evident in the education system, where 33% of parents chose Model D,
education in Euskera, in 2000, compared to 12% choosing it in 1985[67]. Estibaliz Sarria, a teacher at Lasalle
Ikastola in Bilbao, says that parents are choosing Model D more than ever, both
because they speak it at home and want their kids to carry on that tradition,
because they want to maintain in their children a value of Basque culture, and
because the language is of growing significance in the job market[68].
Despite these strides, the Basque
language is largely held hostage by the political values that have been
bestowed upon it in the past century. As
Ferdinando Albanese points out, often what counts is not the official legal
status of a language, but its actual situation[69]. This conflict is epitomized by the statement
of Miguel Angel Ariño, the mayor of the Basque city of Leoia, who says that the
aim of the Basque government’s language policies “is not to maintain a relic,
but to have a live efficient means of communication; one of our own, but not
excluding; without this becoming a cause of isolation under any
circumstances”[70]. How are the Basque
government, and the Basque people to accomplish this goal when nearly half of
the population does not want to invest the time and effort required to learn a
language that has no known ancestors, and one that has been used to identify
them as outsiders for the good part of a century? How can the value of the language be
transformed from one that has served to identify differentness to one that
includes and represents all the factions of the Basque society?
The case for language as an
inclusive basis for nation building is further hindered by the fact that its
preservation has recently come under the direct manipulation of both moderates
and radicals alike. The PNV publishes
statistics about the current ability of the Basque population to speak Euskera,
but many people discredit these purported advances, claiming that the
government exaggerates the numbers to appease voters with the appearance that
they are effecting cultural preservation[71].
On the flip side, many radicals today identify Euskera with the
PNV. They see the language as a symbol
of the government’s co-opting cultural aspects of Basque identity to further
their political goals, and they will not speak Euskera or send their children
to Ikastolas that have been absorbed into the government controlled public
school system[72]. This position is
striking in its’ similarity to Arana’s claim regarding abandoning Euskera
if “our invaders were to speak it”. The radicals have begun to identify other
Basques as the enemies of their own nationalist programs.
Much as the advancement of the
Basque language on a nation wide level is stuck between competing interest
groups, so too have Basque politics become paralyzed by the polarization of the
nationalists against those who wish to work within the existing Spanish
framework. On the side of the
nationalists, Paddy Woodworth calls this a “catastrophic view” of possible solutions. He says, “Anything less than full
independence, many Basques are convinced, would spell the end of their
cultural, linguistic, and national identity within a very short time”. He points out the democratic deficit of the
Spanish state, which many Basques consider to be only a “pseudo-democracy”. They believe that without the fundamental
right of Basques to decide their own future independently of Madrid, other
freedoms, such as the autonomous government’s control over cultural matters of
education, the media, and language promotion, control of the local police
force, and considerable economic independence, seem meaningless[73].
While a majority of Basque people
support the moderate nationalists, and believe in the necessity of an
independent Basque state, and a significant minority support the radical
nationalists, with 12% of the vote in the last election going to the Herri
Batasuna party, who many believe to be the political wing of the ETA[74], the
governing party in Madrid have positioned themselves on the opposite side. The Partido Popular, PP, now believes that
even nonviolent nationalisms in the Basque Country must be discredited if ETA
is to loose ground[75]. By grouping all
nationalisms together, the government in Madrid runs the serious risk of
further polarizing the dispute with the Basque country, if that is even possible. In sum, the result of these extreme political
positions is that the Basque Country is stuck in what Pau Puig calls a “zero
sum game” with the Spanish government.
He asserts that they need to find a way to transform the conflict, and
that both sides must be willing to concede something to accomplish this[76].
But with both sides seemingly unwilling, and possibly even unable, to budge
from their restrictive positions, this transformation appears highly allusive
at best[77].
III.
Conclusion, To Be Continued...
Regional
Conflicts Within The Context Of The EU
The conflict in the Basque Country,
as well as the present peace enjoyed in Catalonia, are significant not only to
their populations and the Spanish government, but are of consequence to the
evolving relations in the European Union.
As has already been mentioned, the EU’s proposal for expansion has
renewed the demands from within Catalonia for primarily a national recognition
of their language as official, and ensuingly and European recognition of the
language, which is spoken by a much greater number of people than many of the
languages that would become official languages of the Union if the plans for
expansion were to go through.
In terms of the Basque Country, the
conflict, and its possibility of spreading into the French Basque Country,
exemplifies the claim that “Some observers believe it [the EU] is paradoxically
encouraging centrifugal and disintegrative tendencies”[78]. Most political exiles of the Basque
nationalist movement have lived in France, and the French version of Herri
Batasuna political party, Abertzaleen*** Batasuna have been gaining ground in
recent local elections[79]. With the
introduction of the Euro, and within the greater context of the free
circulation of goods and peoples across national borders, many believe that the
two politically separate halves of the Basque Country will become increasingly
integrated even if it is only on a cultural level for the time being. Alain Lamassoure, the European Deputy of
France, has gone so far as to say that, “Europe is going to reunify the Basque
Country”[80], which could have critical influence in legitimizing the radical
nationalists claims to their fatherland, Euskal Herria.
This centrifugal unification of the
Basque Country would be accompanied by a disintegrative threat to the existing
state autonomy of both France and Spain.
Perhaps this would create what is perceived as a more legitimate
nation-state, as the Basques may be able to take advantage of the emerging
possibility of “Independence within Europe”, a form of conditional self
governance within the bigger Union, hypothesized by Mc*****. He points out that the conflicts currently
gaining ground in stateless nations**** are suggesting that the traditional
idea of sovereignty of a nation state was just a “trick of the eye... A claim
to, rather than the reality of, ‘national statehood’”[81].
In addition, perhaps the conflict
over languages and plurilingualism in Spain will draw Europe’s attention to the
fact that, while its intellectuals and politicians criticize the African states
as being artificial states, they have long been blind to their own
multilingualism, as in fact, all European states, save Portugal and Iceland,
are[82]. While Spain may have the last
remaining terrorist group in the ETA for the time being, linguistic minorities
constitute a huge proportion of the European population, and their claims for
official recognition of those languages may follow in the steps of the Catalan
demands, and may erupt at some point in much the way the Basque conflict has
over the past twenty five years. In addition, as Pau Puig points out, a problem
for both Catalonia and the Basque Country is that there is no international
consensus on who has the right to self determination, or what that even
means[83]. Within this ambiguous
context, all peoples who feel themselves to be a state-less nation may find
justification for their claims to self determination in the example of the
Basque Country, and even Catalonia.
In General, regionalisms often pass
the stage of cultural revendication to that of a movement for autonomy or
political independence[84], as Basque nationalism has certainly done. In the context of Europe where newly formed
nation-states such as Latvia, Slovenia and Lithuania are vying for membership,
and where Scotland may be in the process of detaching itself from the long
established state of England, other governments may do well to take the
problems in the Basque country to heed when forming their own internal
policies.
Globalization’s
Paradoxical Forces In The Basque Country And Beyond
The Basque and Catalan examples are
also relevant to nationalisms outside of Europe, as globalizing forces are
increasing the exposure of all corners of the world to the internal affairs of
not so distant neighbors. The cultural
forces within the Basque Country, which are calling both for the revitalization
of historical traditions such as the language and for the opening of the
society to the realities of global infrastructure, capture the paradox of the
modern world wherein cultural differences are becoming simultaneously more, and
less important[85]. Basques see that
they must open up to the rest of the world not only for reasons of economic
survival, but also to make their problems known to a wider audience[86].
Indeed the forces of globalization,
such as increased literacy, human and capital mobility, and advancements in
transportation and communication, have made this opening a necessity, not a
choice, as they “have dissipated the possibility of cultural isolation, and correspondingly
have rapidly propagated national consciousness”[87]. Just as cultures such as the Basques have had
to accept the inherent connections to the outside world that are brought about
by globalization, they have also been exposed to nationalisms across the globe
that serve to reassert their own claims.
Basque and Catalan nationalists have been emboldened by the example of
nationalist movements in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the past decade. Jordi Pujol has compared the Catalan
nationalism to these outside examples by stating, “We have the same rights as,
for example, the Lithuanians, thought we have chosen different ways of seeking
to assert them”[88]. Surely in the
future, just as Basque and Catalan nationalists have relied on outside examples
to justify their own agendas, so too will nationalisms of the future use the
Spanish regional nationalisms to defend their moves for self
determination.
The contradiction of globalism is
that while it erodes boundaries between nations, cultures and events, thereby
threatening to disintegrate traditional social values and modes of
identification, this very erosion strengthens parochial tendencies such as
tribal, ethnic, and other micro-cultures[89].
This process is obvious in the centuries long efforts of both Basques
and Catalans to reestablish their distinct cultural heritages. While many people consider this reaffirmation
of the local experience, or “ethnic revitalization”, to be a relatively new ideological
and political current that has taken hold in recent decades[90], the regional
minorities of Spain have been inextricably immersed in this process for the
entire 20th century, and the Basque problems shows no signs of letting up. The study of these two cases is extremely
relevant to the emerging ethnic crises of the rest of the world as perfect
examples of the interminable struggles that can result from identity
conflicts. They demonstrate the extreme
reactions that appear when “one feels not only dispossessed of a territory, but
more gravely because one feels dispossessed of his right to live, his identity
and his specificity”[91]. The Basque
struggle in particular testifies to the need to solve conflict by choosing and
creating, wherever possible, identities that are multiple and changeable so as
to be compatible with political and social realities, while it also serves as a
cautious reminder that the process of nation building is highly dependent on
those very socio-political realities, and that a solution that may work for
certain situations, when artificially imposed on others, will not have a
positive outcome.
Catalonia has successfully
established a collective identity, one based on the unique regional language
that has served to integrate newcomers, instill pride in the population for
their distinct cultural and linguistic heritage, and work within the confines
of the Spanish state structure. The
Basque country, for reasons both of centuries old cultural isolation, of
prolonged political and military struggles with outsiders, and of the paralysis
of its current society, deeply divided along political lines, has never had any
real hope of creating a nationalism based solely on cultural values such as
language revitalization. Their nation
building effort have been swept along in a torrent of radical political
positioning, to the effect that cultural symbols cannot in any way be divorced
from their politicized meaning. Països
Catalanes, a term which means literally Catalan Country, has had the luxury of
being only a cultural reference, while Euskal Herria, or Basque Country, has
always been, and seems destined to be for quite some time to come, a political
goal.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] Ivan Tellaetxe, Personal Interview. Bilbao, Basque Country. Nov. 24, 2001.
[2] The two provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa
are second and third, respectively, in terms of per capita
national income, following only the
state’s capital, Madrid. See,
Bernatowicz, Grazyna. National
Minorities in Spain, Polish Quarterly of International
Affairs. Vol. 1(1/2), 1992. p. 147.
[3] Antoine Maurice, Personal Interview. European Institute, Geneva. Nov. 7, 2001.
[4] Linguists have shown that Euskera is the
descendant of the ancient language of Acquitania. It means,
literally a “way of saying”, from the
older term enusquera, a composite of the words enautsi, or say,
and kara, or way. See, Larry Trask’s Basque Page. http://www.cogs.susx.ac.uk/users/larrt.html.
[5] Nerea Arizabalaga, Personal Interview. Gabriel Aresti University, Bilbao, Basque
Country. Nov. 21,
2001.
[6] Woodworth, Paddy. Why Do They Kill? The Basque Conflict in
Spain, World Policy Journal. Vol. 18
(1), 2001.
p. 3.
[7] Conversi, Daniele. The Basques, The Catalans, and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist
Mobilization. London:
C. Hurst, 1997. p.162.
[8] This idea was also expressed by Onno Seroo,
in a Personal Interview, at UNESCO Centre de
Catalunya, Barcelona on Nov. 13, 2001, who
suggested to me that the Basques might do well to
implement an educational system like that
of the Catalans as a way to produce a more united citizenry
that had all been educated, not only to be
sensitive to Basque nationalism, but to pluriculturalism in
general.
[9] Txema Uriarte, Personal Interview. Gabriel Aresti University, Bilbao, Basque
Country. Nov. 23, 2001.
[10] Conversi, p. 158.
[11] Luna, Anna and Francesc Villa. Linguapax:
Arriving and Shaping, Linguapax
IV (Report of the
Proceedings of the International Linguapax
Committee, February 24-27, 1994).
Barcelona: Centre
UNESCO de Catalunya. pp. 49.
[12] Translated from the French, “On n’habite pas
un pays, on habite une langue”. Renard,
Raymond. Une
éthique pour
la francophonie: questions de politique linguistique. Paris: Didier Érudition, 2000. p.28.
[13] Poole, Ross.
Nation and Identity. London: Routledge, 1999. p. 14.
[14] Seroo, Interview.
[15] Igor Mendizabal, Personal Interview. Markina, Basque Country. Nov. 18, 2001.
[16] Ardanza, Jose Antonio, President of the
Basque Country. Linguistic Policy: Its Contribution to
Cohabitation, UNESCO Linguapax: Artaza, (Reports and Proceedings from the
International Seminar
on Language Policies, March 11-14, 1996). Bilbao:
UNESCO Extea. p. 57.
[17] Hunter, Shireen. New Global Trends in Culture and
Identity, International Spectator. Vol. 30 (4),
1995.
pp. 36.
[18] Seroo, Interview.
[19] quoted in Woodworth, p. 3.
[20] Bernatowicz, p. 150.
[21] Woodworth, p. 3.
[22] Mendizabal, Interview.
[23] Rodolfo Ormazabal, Personal Interview. Guernika, Basque Country. Nov. 19, 2001.
[24] The Fueros were civil, penal, and
processional laws that are considered to be a precursor to democracy
in Europe.
They were built within a system of Hidalguía Universal, in which the
señorial powers of
the provincial leaders could be checked by
the members of his community, who had legal rights to
arbitration. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the intellectual
leader of the French Revolution, was struck by the
system, and incorporated the Basque ideas
into his own vision of democracy for the French people.
Information from a visit to the Guernika
Museum, La Casa de Juntas de Gernika, Nov. 19, 2001.
[25] Bernatowicz, p.153.
[26] Woodworth, p.4.
[27] Conversi, Daniele. Domino Effect or Internal Developments? The Influence of International Events
and Political Ideologies on Catalan and
Basque Nationalism, West European
Politics. Vol. 13 (3),
1993.
pp. 252.
[28] Conversi, The Basques..., p.173.
[29] ibid, p.173.
[30] Solé, Carlota. L’identité nationale et régionale en
Espagne, Relations ethnique et éducation
dans les
sociétés
divisées: Quebec, Irlande du Nord,
Catalogne, et Belgique. eds. M. McAndrew and F.
Gagnon.
Paris: L’Harmattan, 2000. pp.
48.
It is important to note that the theory
that Basques are genetically different from their European
neighbors does have credibility, as
geneticist Luiga Luca Cavalli-Svorza has found that 25% of
Basques have rhesus negative blood (the
highest proportion in Europe), and 55% have type-O blood
(one of the highest percentages in
Europe), and for much of the early part of this century, having O
negative blood was one of the key
requirements for being concidered Basque.
See, Larry Trask.
[31] Eriksen, Thomas H. Linguistic Hegemony and Minority
Resistance, Journal of Peace
Research. Vol. 29 (3), 1992. pp.331.
[32] Although there was a movement in the Basque
Country to preserve Euskera, Asociación
Euskara
(1877-1883), it was limited to
intellectual circles who wished largely to document the language rather
than promote its active use. See,
Conversi, The Basques..., p.168.
[33] Bernatowicz, p. 149.
[34] Quoted in Woodworth, p.5.
[35] Bernatowicz, p. 151.
[36] Conversi, The Basques..., p. 265
[37] Funes, Maria J. Social Responses to Political Violence in the
Basque Country, Journal of Conflict
Resolution. Vol. 42 (4), 1998. pp. 494.
[38] Another early ETA intellectual Txillardegi,
who was the founder and early leader of Ekin, the
precursor to ETA, “extolled the revival of
Hebrew as an admirable example and praised the views of
Eliazar Ben Yehuda (1808-1992) on the
central importance of language in the building of the Israeli
nation”. Txillardegi later broke away from
the ETA specifically because it lost its’ original focus on
cultural nationalism. Conversi, Domino Effect..., p. 254-5.
[39] Conversi, The Basques..., p.175.
[40] Woodworth, p.6.
[41] Arizabalaga, Interview.
[42] Although this development had little
immediate effect, it has been significant in advancing the cause of
language revitalization recently, and many
historians have cited the earlier dialectical variations of
Euskera as a significant cause in the
earlier decline of the language. See, Gadelii, Karl E. Language
Planning:
Theory and Practice, (Report for the Languages Division, Education
Sector of UNESCO).
Paris: UNESCO, 1999. p. 21.
[43] Basque Country Journal. Southern Basque Country During
Francoism: The Basque Resistance.
Http://www.contrast.org/mirrors/ehj.html.
[44] Tellaexte, Interview.
[45] Seroo, Interview.
[46] ibid.
[47] Woodworth, p. 8.
[48] Maurice, Interview. Evidence of the Basques’ dissatisfaction with
the Constitution was present even at
the signing of the new document. Echoing Aranist nationalism, a PNV leader at
the signing of the
new constitution protested that “our
historical autonomous rights (fueros) are our constitution”.
Bernatowicz, p. 155.
[49] Basque Country Journal, online.
[50] Uriarte, Interview.
[51] Quoted in Conversi, The Basques..., p.172.
[52] ibid, p. 185.
[53] Marc Leprêtre, Personal Interview. Institute of Social Linguistics, Government
of Catalonia, Barcelona.
Nov. 14, 2001.
[54] Seroo, Interview.
[55] These allegations of human rights violations
have been endorsed by Amnesty International and the
Council of Europe’s Committee for the
Prevention of Torture(p.1). In Amnesty’s
January 29, 2001
Report, they accuse the Spanish government
of “favorable treatment to those who kill and torture on
behalf of the state”, quoted from
Woodworth, p.11.
[56] Belen Uranga, Personal Interview. UNESCO Extea, Bilbao, Basque Country. Nov. 20, 2001.
[57] Arizabalaga, Interview.
[58] Seroo, Interview.
[59] Urmazabal, Interview.
[60] Reniu, Miguel. The Language and National Identity of
Catalonia: Language Planning in Catalonia,
UNESCO Linguapax: Artaza, (Reports and Proceedings from the
International Seminar on Language
Policies,
March 11-14, 1996). Bilbao:
UNESCO Extea. pp. 168.
[61] Leprêtre, Interview.
[62] Pau Puig, Personal Interview. Direcció General de Relations Exteriors,
Government of Catalonia,
Barcelona. Nov. 25, 2001.
[63] Conversi,
Domino Effect..., p.258.
[64] Puig,
Interview.
[65] Bernatowicz,
p. 154.
[66] Uranga,
Interview.
[67] Leprêtre,
Interview.
[68] Estibaliz
Sarria, Personal Interview. Lasalle
Ikastola, Bilbao, Basque Country. Nov.
23, 2001.
[69] Albanese,
Ferdinando. European Regional or
Minority Languages, The Courier. No.
122, 1990. p.
47.
[70] Ariño, Miguel Angel. Address to the Committee, UNESCO Linguapax: Artaza, (Reports and
Proceedings from the International Seminar
on Language Policies, March 11-14,
1996).
Bilbao: UNESCO Extea. p.62.
[71] Txema Uriarte says that while the government
reports say that 22% of Vizcaya speaks Euskera, the
actual number is more like 14%, and for
Guipuzcoa, the reported 65% is actually only 50%, Interview.
[72] Sarria. Interview.
[73] Woodworth, p. 8.
[74] Sarria, Interview.
[75] Woodworth, p.8.
[76] Puig, Interview.
[77] I say unable because the Basque government is
largely unable to give up their position in favor of
autonomy for fear of violent reprisals
from the ETA, while the Spanish government is unable to
concede any more autonomy for fear that
the other autonomous regions will demand similar
concessions.
[78] Hunter, p.41.
[79] Conversi,
Domino Effect..., p.256.
[80] Garicoix,
Michel. Les Basques français hésitent à
se rapprocher de leurs ‘freres’ du Sud, Le Monde.
4-5 Novembre,
2001. p. 9.
[81] McCrone, David. Neo-Nationalism in Stateless Nations, Scottish Affairs: Stateless Nations in the
21st Century. Special Issue, 2001. pp. 3.
[82] Eriksen, p.314.
[83] Puig, Interview.
[84] Thual, François. Les Conflits Identitaires. Paris: Edition Marketing, 1995. p.147.
[85] Eriksen, p.314.
[86] Tellaexte, Interview.
[87] Conversi, Domino Effect..., p, 248.
[88] Quoted in Bernatowicz, p.159.
[89] Hunter, p. 46.
[90] Eriksen, p.316.
[91] Thual, p.6.
Translated from French.
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