POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF THE ROMANI MINORITY

IN POST-COMMUNIST SLOVAKIA AND MACEDONIA*

Eben Friedman†

Introduction: Roms as a hard case

The puzzle

Within post-Communist Eastern Europe, the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Macedonia seem to hold down the ends of a continuum in the treatment of Roms (‘Gypsies’). In Slovakia, bureaucrats have repeatedly drafted what they present as new policy priorities for dealing with (what they call) ‘the Romani problematic’, each time commissioning new pilot projects to reflect the new priorities. Additionally, there has been frequent talk of the Gypsies as a national threat, with former prime minister Vladimír Mečiar only the best-known Slovak official to express publicly his concern that Roms might come to outnumber Slovaks if the ‘population explosion’ among the former is not contained (Kamm 1993; cf. Crowe 1998: 52). Further, although Roms are the only group identified by ethnicity in crime reports, standing legislation on racially motivated violence has rarely been applied in cases of skinhead attacks on Roms, with the President of the Association of Judges of Slovakia defending another judge’s decision in one such case with the argument that “[f]rom an anthropological standpoint it is evident that Roms, and in this case also the skinheads, come from an Indoeuropean race” (Slobodníková 1999). Finally, Slovak authorities at the local level have taken actions against Roms ranging from passing ethnically specific curfews, to prohibiting Roms from settling, to advocating the selective killing of Gypsies as a remedy for the social ills they allegedly cause (Borszék 1999; Havrľová 1999; Hušová 2000; Kamm 1993; Koptová 1999: 26-30; Open Society Institute 2001a: 452; Towers 1993).

In contradistinction to the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Macedonia has not issued policy aimed specifically at the country’s Romani population, and no municipal authority in Macedonia has taken aim at local Roms. Also distinguishing Macedonia from Slovakia (as well as from all other countries) is the explicit reference to Roms as a nationality[1] in the Constitution of 1991, placing them in the same legal category as the Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, and “other nationalities” which live in Macedonia.[2] Moreover, former president Kiro Gligorov spoke favorably of Macedonia’s Romani population before various audiences (including the General Assembly of the UN) and sponsored Romani cultural festivals (Barany 2002: 285-286; Poulton 1993: 43; 1995: 195), with a 1997 publication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1997: 3) stating that “[t]his minority is characterized by a high degree of integrity and a clearly expressed feeling of belonging to the Republic of Macedonia.” Whereas ethnic Macedonians often express fears of the country’s Albanian population in terms of population growth or the disintegration of the state, neither of these concerns are generally applied to Roms.[3] Additional characteristics which distinguish Macedonia from Slovakia are the extremely low incidence of racially motivated attacks on Roms and the absence of skinhead groups organized to carry out such attacks.

Organization of the paper

The differences between Slovak and Macedonian treatments of Roms beg the question as to what accounts for these variations. In this paper, I propose to explain the granting of rights to the Romani population of Macedonia in terms of political competition within the Macedonian majority on the one hand and between the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority on the other. In similar fashion, I attribute the low level of Romani political integration[4] in Slovakia to the dominance of the political scene by a single party and the relative quiescence of the country’s smaller Magyar minority. I begin by demonstrating the inadequacy of standard accounts of minority political integration in explaining the treatment of Roms: in addition to being inexplicable in terms of Roms’ ability to upset domestic political stability or as a case of successful homeland nationalism, the differences between Macedonian and Slovak treatments of the countries’ respective Romani populations cannot be attributed to cultural proximity or even to the different legacies left by Yugoslav and Czechoslovak socialism. In the remainder of the paper, I examine evidence in support of my thesis that the political integration of Roms is a function of their political usefulness for other ethnic groups.

Classical explanations of minority political integration

Domestic political stability

The link between minority rights and domestic political stability is perhaps best developed in the work of Arend Lijphart (cf. Heisler 1991: 41). According to Lijphart, “in a political system with clearly separate and potentially hostile population segments, virtually all decisions are perceived as entailing high stakes, and strict majority rule places a strain on the unity and peace of the system” (Lijphart 1977: 28). Further, Lijphart (1984: 22-23) claims, the feelings of exclusion generated by continual denial of access to power result in a loss of allegiance to the regime on the part of the excluded minorities. Pointing to the need for British military intervention to maintain stability in Northern Ireland as a result of the exclusion of Catholics from power for half a century, Lijphart suggests that majority rule in plural societies is extremely likely to result in civil strife (Lijphart 1984: 23).

In order for a concern with maintaining domestic political stability to explain the political integration of Roms, authorities must see Roms as capable of upsetting such stability. Falsifying the proposition that Romani political integration is a matter of bolstering domestic political stability therefore requires evidence that Roms do not organize resistance to the regimes under which they live. Forms of resistance to a regime in power range from rebellion through terrorism[5] to peaceful demonstrations for additional political rights. While neither Roms in Slovakia nor Roms in Macedonia have engaged in rebellion or terrorism, Roms in both countries have occasionally been involved in demonstrations. Nonetheless, the character and handling of the demonstrations suggests that Roms neither present themselves as a threat nor are perceived as such by relevant authorities.

Roms in Macedonia have organized and executed fewer than ten demonstrations of any kind. Moreover, while precise numbers are not available, it appears that most demonstrations by Roms were organized in preparation for the local elections of September 2000 by the United Party of Roms of Macedonia, which seeks primarily to improve Romani living conditions rather than to secure additional political rights for Roms (Partija na Romite od Makedonija 1998). Earlier demonstrations by Roms include a protest against police brutality in Štip, a political rally in Prilep in preparation for the local elections of 1996, and a 1999 demonstration in Skopje demanding that more attention be paid to Romani refugees from Kosovo. In light not only of the themes of these demonstrations but also of the fact that Macedonian authorities responded to none of these demonstrations (with repression or with concessions), there is ample reason to believe that Roms in Macedonia are perceived as harmless by Macedonian authorities, such that their relatively high degree of political integration cannot be explained in terms of their apparent ability to upset domestic political stability.

The similar (in fact slightly higher) number of demonstrations by Roms in Slovakia (relative to the number of comparable demonstrations in Macedonia) provides further support for the contention that a concern with domestic stability does not underlie the higher degree of political integration of Roms in Macedonia. Of the eleven demonstrations by Roms in the Slovak Republic recorded in the Romani newspapers Sam adaj – Sme tu and Romano nevo ľil from 1993 to 2001[6], five were directly concerned with racist violence against Roms (two were in direct response to murders committed by skinheads) and five focused on various aspects of the economic and living conditions of the Romani population. Whereas demonstrations by Roms in Macedonia were consistently ignored by Macedonian authorities, there has been somewhat more variation in the handling of Romani demonstrations in Slovakia. In February of 1997, for example, an anti-fascist demonstration held in the Central Slovak town of Prievidza ended in the arrest of some of the Roms and (ethnic Slovak) anarchists who organized the demonstration, as well as the apprehension of a smaller number of the skinheads who staged a counterdemonstration. On the other hand, a demonstration of approximately 200 Roms in Žilina in August of 2000 against racism in general and demanding the arrest of those responsible for the recent murder of a Romani woman was attended by several (Slovak) members of parliament as well as approximately 100 ethnic Slovaks from Žilina. Finally, the one demonstration which does not fit neatly into either of the categories presented above seems to have been perceived by local authorities as a real threat: organized in January of 1997 by sometime Romani politician-turned-activist Marek Baláž, a march of 20-30 baseball bat-wielding members of the “Romani Home Guard” created in response to skinhead attacks in Prievidza was terminated by police, who arrested five members of the group for carrying weapons without a permit and disturbing the peace. Insofar as not even this demonstration brought about measures to improve the situation of the Romani population in Prievidza, there is no evidence that threats yield rights in the case of Roms, such that a concern with domestic political stability fails to explain policy toward Roms in either Slovakia or Macedonia.

Homeland nationalism

In contradistinction to the many works on nationalism which address separatist movements (see, for example, Deutsch 1961; 1966; Hechter 1975; Gourevitch 1979; Gellner 1983; Rokkan and Urwin 1983; Horowitz 1985; Anderson 1991; Hardin 1995; Laitin 1995; 1998), Rogers Brubaker’s Nationalism Reframed treats the rights-seeking nationalisms resulting from the nationalization of political space in post-Communist Eastern Europe (Brubaker 1996: 4). While Brubaker is not the only recent theorist of nationalism to examine the strategic interaction among leaders of states in the process of consolidating their authority, ethnic minorities in those states, and the leaders of states with ethnic diaspora in other states (see, for example, Laitin 1996), Brubaker’s account of this interaction is the most comprehensive thus far. Holding that European history is returning to rather than moving beyond the nation-state, Brubaker describes a triad of distinct nationalisms at work in the new states of post-Communist Eastern Europe. “Nationalizing” nationalism exists where the titular nationality of the state in question views that state as an unrealized nation-state, using state power to promote the interests of the core nation in order to remedy this perceived defect (Brubaker 1996: 4-5, 63). “Homeland” nationalism, on the other hand, exists where the political and cultural elite of one state “define ethnonational kin in other states as members of one and the same nation,” asserting the right to protect non-citizen members of the nation’s diaspora (Brubaker 1996: 4-5, 58). Thus, “[n]ationalizing and homeland nationalisms are diametrically opposed and directly conflicting,” as nationalizing states and external homelands advance competing claims on the same set of persons (Brubaker 1996: 111). Finally, “minority” nationalism reflects the precarious situation of national minorities between nationalizing state and external homeland, with minority nationalism both reflecting and reflected in the interaction between nationalizing and homeland nationalisms (Brubaker 1996: 4-5, 111).

By Brubaker’s account, minority rights are presumably the result of successful homeland nationalism. As a result, while Brubaker’s theory may explain the political integration of many minorities in many states, it is not applicable to stateless minorities, for homeland nationalism requires a homeland state. Insofar as Roms everywhere constitute a stateless minority, homeland nationalism cannot explain Romani political integration anywhere (cf. Stokes 1993: 208). Consequently, an account of the existing variation in state policy toward Roms in post-Communist Eastern Europe must rely on other factors.

Macro-social explanations of minority political integration

Cultural proximity

Defining a civilization as “the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species,” Samuel Huntington warns that intergroup conflict after the Cold War will be fought in large part between groups belonging to different civilizations (Huntington 1993: 22, 24). While civilizations encompass a wide variety of characteristics, the most important of these is religion (Huntington 1993: 25). Additionally, although Huntington’s article appears in Foreign Affairs and deals primarily with interstate conflict, Huntington is careful to point out that his theory applies equally to domestic conflicts between ethnic groups: “At the micro-level, adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and each other” (Huntington 1993: 29).

If Huntington is correct in thinking that “[t]he fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future” both between and within states (Huntington 1993: 22, 29), then we can expect that minorities which belong to the same “civilization” as the titular nationality of the state within which they live will exhibit a higher degree of political integration than do minorities which belong to a civilization different from that of the titular nationality. Given the primacy of religion in Huntington’s account of civilizations, the proposition that cultural distance accounts for differential Romani political integration can be tested by comparing the religious affiliations of Roms on the one hand with those of ethnic Slovaks and ethnic Macedonians on the other. Thus, insofar as Roms are better integrated in Macedonia than they are in Slovakia, Huntington’s central hypothesis leads us to expect that the religion of Roms in Macedonia should have more in common with the religion of the ethnic Macedonian population than does the religion of Roms in Slovakia have in common with that of the ethnic Slovak population. In fact, however, the state of affairs is the opposite of what Huntington would predict, as the religious difference between Roms and ethnic Macedonians is greater than that between Roms and ethnic Slovaks.

In Slovakia, where 68.9% of all citizens declared themselves Roman Catholic at the 2001 census, available information indicates that most Roms are also Roman Catholic.[7] Applying Huntington’s (1993: 25; 1996: 45-47) civilizational categories, most Roms in Slovakia are therefore members of the same “Western” civilization to which most Slovaks as well as most Magyars belong, yet Slovak-Romani relations are consistently poor (see, for example, Bačová 1992: 30; Benkovičová 1995: 391-392; Bútorová, Gyárfášová, and Velšic 2000: 309; Frič and Gál 1995: 22; Paukovič et al. 1990: 48; Smelz et al. 2000: 144; Vašečka 2001: 236). In Macedonia, on the other hand, where 94.8% of ethnic Macedonians declared themselves Orthodox Christians to census takers in 1994, 91.6% of Roms declared themselves Muslims.[8] Thus, whereas the vast majority of ethnic Macedonians, Serbs, and Vlachs belong to what Huntington has called “Slavic-Orthodox” civilization, a similarly overwhelming proportion of Roms in Macedonia belong to the “Islamic” civilization shared also by the country’s Albanian, Turkish, and Macedonian Muslim (‘Torbeš’) populations. Although most Roms in Macedonia are Muslim, however, their relations with the Orthodox ethnic Macedonian population (as well as with the state as a whole) are considerably better than are relations between Roms and the largest Muslim population in Macedonia, the Albanians (see, for example, Kanev 1996: 242-243, 247; Najčevska 2000: 6; Najčevska et al. 2000: 6). Thus, cultural proximity fails as an explanation of Romani political integration.

The Communist inheritance

Stressing the need for analyses of post-Communism to “com[e] to analytical grips with the cultural, political, and economic ‘inheritance’ of forty years of Leninist rule,” Jowitt argues against those who would characterize the end of Communism as entailing an immediate transition to democracy (Jowitt 1992: 286-287). According to Jowitt (Jowitt 1992: 286), “[a]ll cultural and institutional legacies shape their successors.” Consequently, just as pre-Communist societies shaped the regimes which transformed them, post-Communist societies can be expected to display a degree of continuity with the regimes which raised them. Arguing that the historical differences among the post-Communist states and the specific events which brought about the end of Communism are less important than are the similarities among them, Jowitt further asserts that “[t]he Leninist legacy is currently shaping, and will continue to shape, developmental efforts and outcomes in Eastern Europe” (Jowitt 1992: 286, 299).

Applied to the case at hand, Jowitt’s theory would lead us to believe that differences in Communist Gypsy policies will be evident in the policies of post-Communist regimes toward their respective Romani minorities. More specifically, differences between Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Communisms should account for the differences in post-Communist treatment of Roms in Slovakia and Macedonia.[9] This hypothesis can be tested by comparing Romani political integration in Slovakia and Macedonia with the political integration of Roms in the other constituent republics of the new-defunct federal states of which each country was once a part. Thus, the extent to which the legacy of Czechoslovak Communism accounts for the political integration of Roms in post-Communist Slovakia can be verified by comparing the political integration of Roms in the Slovak Republic with the situation in the Czech Republic. In similar fashion, the extent to which the legacy of Yugoslav Communism accounts for the political integration of Roms in Macedonia can be verified by comparing the political integration of Roms across the former Yugoslav republics.

The Czech Republic

In the Czech Republic, while the day-to-day problems of Roms are generally similar to those experienced by their counterparts in the Slovak Republic, Czech policy toward the Romani population has since 1994 exhibited a degree of consistency lacking in Slovakia. Further, even before 1994 there were some indications that Czech authorities had taken a more benevolent view of Roms than had their Slovak counterparts. Two early indications come from the Czech Constitution, the Preamble of which mentions only “citizens of the Czech Republic”; the Preamble of the Slovak Constitution, on the other hand, gives “the Slovak nation” pride of place.[10] Additionally, the Czech Constitution and other official documents include only the category “national minority,” such that there is no room for the Romani population to be placed in a lower category of “ethnic group,” as has been the case in Slovakia (cf. Davidová 1995: 224; Kľučka 1995: 43; Mann 1995: 38-39). Another indication of the Czech state’s unequivocal classification of the Romani population as a national minority is the inclusion of three Roms on the Government’s “Council for National Minorities,” established in 1994.[11]

While these early measures serve to distinguish the Czech Republic from the Slovak Republic, it is important to note that little in the way of concrete policy toward Roms was enacted before 1995. Moreover, the Czech citizenship law of 1993 seems to have been designed in order to prevent Romani residents of the Czech Republic with Slovak citizenship from becoming Czech citizens following the division of Czecho-Slovakia into its constituent republics.[12] On the other hand, it is also significant that in 1995 Czech authorities responded to a growing problem with racially motivated violence by passing an amendment to the Criminal Code providing an additional one to two years imprisonment for criminal offenses committed “due to a person’s race, national identity, political orientation, religion or the fact that such a person has no religion” (Council of Europe 1999: 11; cf. Czech Helsinki Committee 2001; European Roma Rights Center 2001; Human Rights Watch 1996).[13] These new provisions to the Criminal Code were first applied on 23 May 1996, when an appeals court in Olomouc overturned a lower court’s December 1995 decision that the murder of a Rom by four skinheads who had never met their victim prior to breaking into his house and beating him with a baseball bat was not racially motivated (Human Rights Watch 1996: 9).

Another important piece of policy toward the Romani population of the Czech Republic was the creation of the “Inter-ministerial Commission for the Affairs of the Romani Community” in 1997.[14] Created as an advisory body which “advises, initiates, and co-ordinates the policy of the Czech Government regarding the status of Romas in the Czech society,” the Commission consists of twelve Roms (including two Vlach Roms) and twelve deputy ministers, working in cooperation with the Council for National Minorities and the Council for Human Rights (the Commissioner of which is also chairman of the Inter-ministerial Commission for the Affairs of the Romani Community). Among the concrete tasks of the Commission is the compilation of at least yearly reports, with the first “Report on the Situation of the Romani Community in the Czech Republic and on the Current Situation in the Romani Community” released in October of 1997 and hailed even by critics of Czech policy toward Roms as a significant accomplishment (Guy 2001: 301; Open Society Institute 2001b: 123, 128; Sobotka 2001).[15] While the Inter-ministerial Commission seems to have been created in response to a wave of asylum applications (mostly to Canada) in the year of its creation (European Roma Rights Center 1999: 9; Guy 2001: 300; Open Society Institute 2001b: 128; Perlez 1997a; 1997b; Schneider and Spolar 1997; Sobotka 2001), it is nonetheless significant that the Czech government responded through the creation of an advisory body to the government rather than by launching a criminal investigation aimed at uncovering the organizers of the migrations, as was done in response to a similar wave of asylum applications by Roms from the Slovak Republic (cf. Angelovič 2000; Vašečka and Pišutová 2000: 144). Further, unlike its Slovak counterpart, the “Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Solving the Problems of Citizens Who Need Special Care”[16], the Inter-ministerial Commission has played a consistently active role in the design of government policy.

While some Czech politicians have made anti-Romani statements, it appears that most such statements at the national level have been uttered by the same Miroslav Sládek, who heads the far-right Assembly of the Republic-Czechoslovak Republican Party (SPR-RSC) (cf. Lemon 1996b; Pehe 1996). Sládek’s statements also seem not to have been received as well as comparable utterances by Slovak politicians, as the Republican Party won less than the number of votes needed for representation in parliament in the elections of 1998. That discrimination against Roms is considered less acceptable in the Czech Republic than in Slovakia seems to be demonstrated also by the demotion of Rudolf Baránek on the ballot of the Free Democrats-Liberal National Social Party (SD-LSNS) for southern Moravia in reponse to public outcry over a sign barring Roms from Baránek’s hotel in Břeclav. In addition to reducing Baránek’s own chances for election, the change in electoral position placed Baránek below Romani candidate Karel Holomek (Lemon 1996a). Some major shortcomings notwithstanding, then, the Romani population of the Czech Republic is better integrated than is the Romani population of Slovakia.

The Yugoslav successor states

Insofar as former Yugoslav republics other than Macedonia with numerically significant Romani populations experienced war in the 1990s, measurement of Romani political integration in the successor states of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is problematic. Nonetheless, available evidence suggests that Roms have gained rights in post-Communist Macedonia and lost rights elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. Relevant evidence includes constitutional recognition of Roms as a national minority, official use of the Romani language, and racially motivated violence. Despite its fragmentary nature, this evidence is sufficient to establish that the Republic of Macedonia has been exceptional in its extension of rights to the country’s Romani population.

While the legal status of Roms in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its constituent republics is a matter of some controversy,[17] it is clear that the Republic of Macedonia is the sole former Yugoslav republic to recognize the Roms as one of the country’s nationalities in its Constitution, but it is also the only country in the world to extend such recognition to its Romani population. Thus, whereas the Preamble of the 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia mentions “Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Roms, and other nationalities,”[18] the Preamble of the 1995 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina refers to “Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others),”[19] while the Republic of Montenegro’s 1992 Constitution guarantees to members of “national and ethnic groups” protection of their “national, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and confessional identity” but neither distinguishes between the types of groups nor enumerates the members of each category.[20] In Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia, on the other hand, the legal status of Roms is that of an ethnic group.[21]

The fragmentary data available on state support for Romani culture in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia suggest that Macedonia is unique in this regard as well. While there is no evidence of the use of the Romani language in conducting state business in any of the former Yugoslav republics save Macedonia, Romani has been used in the media in the Republic of Serbia as well as in Macedonia (Kenrick 2001: 417; Rakić-Vodinelić 1998: 103, 114-115; cf. Cabada 2000: 253; Djurdjevic 2001: 9). However, although the absence of state support for Romani culture in former Yugoslav republics other than Serbia and Macedonia as well as the use of Romani in Serbian state media following the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia suggest continuity with Communist policy toward Roms, the emergence of mass violence against Roms in Serbia is indicative of a deterioration in Roms’ status not observed in Macedonia (Hedges 1997; Human Rights Watch 2001; Latham 1999: 208-209; Liégeois and Gheorghe 1995: 18; cf. Mitrović and Zajić 1998: 54; Sudar 2002; Sunter 2001; U.S. Department of State 2001). Moreover, the fact that the number of hours of Romani programming on Serbian Radio and Television in Kosovo far exceeded the number of hours broadcast in Serbia proper and Voivodina combined (which together were home to over twice as many Roms as Kosovo) suggests that the broadcasts have been motivated by a concern with the growth of Albanian influence over the Romani population in Kosovo (Rakić-Vodinelić 1998: 103).

Jowitt’s theory that the legacies of Communist policies manifest themselves in post-Communist policies provides a more plausible account of the treatment of Roms in post-Communist Slovakia and Macedonia than do the other hypotheses treated thus far. Still, although post-Communist policies in both countries exhibit some degree of continuity with the policies of their Communist predecessors, the absence of a consistent relation between the previous and current situations of Roms in the successor states of the former Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia presents a problem for Jowitt’s hypothesis. By way of contrast, a concern with the growth and activism of the ethnic Albanian population goes a long way toward explaining policy toward Roms in Serbia[22] as well as in Macedonia. In similar fashion, Slovak governments’ success in ignoring the demands of Slovakia’s Magyar population accounts in large part for Slovak authorities’ lack of interest in the Romani population.

Political competition as an explanation for Romani political integration

Thesis

My working hypothesis is that the difference between Slovak and Macedonian official treatments of Roma has stemmed from political divisions in Macedonia not salient in Slovakia. In the Republic of Macedonia, the refusal of one of the two largest parties of the titular nationality to participate in a governing coalition with the other has combined with the strong showing of the ethnic Albanian voting bloc at elections to result in the inclusion of ethnic Albanian parties in all governments formed since the first multi-party elections in 1990. Additionally, agitation by the Albanian diaspora in and around Macedonia as well as official statements of the Albanian government led ethnic Macedonians to view the threat posed by Albanian mobilization as real even well before events in Kosovo created a refugee crisis in Macedonia (Blazevska and Mehmeti 1998: 20; Netherlands Helsinki Committee and the Norwegian Helsinki Committee 1998; Poulton 1995: 130, 136, 141; Poulton 1998: 19, 33; cf. Bogoev 1985; Bubevski 1985; Reuter 1987: 139-140). In the Slovak Republic, on the other hand, the domination of the political scene by a single Slovak party and the relatively small share of the popular vote won by the Magyar minority’s political parties combined to allow the Magyars’ exclusion from government from 1992 until 1998, while Slovak-Magyar relations remained cordial in comparison with Macedonian-Albanian relations (Bútorová, Gyárfášová, and Velšic 2000: 305; Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1997; Fisher 1995: 63; Kusý 1998: 65-66; Lord 1993: 9). In what follows, I propose to link this difference between the status of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia and that of Magyars in Slovakia to the difference in the political integration of Roms in these two countries in terms of ethnic Macedonian political parties’ perceived need to secure loyal allies against both the other major segment of the titular population and against the ethnic Albanian population.

Macedonia

The stances of Macedonia’s two largest political parties provide evidence that political parties of the titular nationality view ethnic Albanians as a threat and that they see the Romani population as a potential ally in both inter- and intra-ethnic political competition. Whereas the program of the ruling Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonia National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) mentions the potential for the activities of national minorities to have adverse effects in all spheres of life and contains a section on “Population and Demographic Policy” aimed at reducing both Albanian natality and Albanian migration (Vnatrešna makedonska revolucionerna organizacija-Demokratska partija za makedonsko nacionalno edinstvo 1998: 16, 73-74), a representative of VMRO-DPMNE’s main rival, the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), made explicit reference to the threat to the constitutional order posed by the Albanian political parties, also mentioning the dream (and the danger) of a Greater Albania.[23] The same interview revealed a view of Roms as politically relevant and wielding “an important influence” in addition to being among Macedonia’s most loyal citizens (in contradistinction to ethnic Albanians, for most of whom Macedonia is only a “reserve fatherland”). An interview with a representative of VMRO-DPMNE, on the other hand, revealed that as a result of the polarization between VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM, the Romani population often decides which candidate wins local and national mandates.[24] Statements by representatives of SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE about Roms’ political relevance are supported by these parties’ demonstrated interest in Romani support, as both parties campaign in Romani settlements.[25]

Further evidence of Macedonian interest in Romani support against the ethnic Albanian population comes from the design of the1994 census and from the Law on Territorial Division of 1996. Since the breakup of Yugoslavia, it has reportedly become common for Roms in Macedonia to be offered bribes by ethnic Macedonians as well as ethnic Albanians in exchange for their declarations to census-takers, with both groups also making use of threats and physical violence to ensure Romani collaboration (European Roma Rights Center 1998: 36-37; cf. Duijzings 1997: 212-213; Friedman 1995: 179; Poulton 1989: 27; 1991: 90; 1995: 130, 141; 1998: 15). Additionally, Nevzat Halili, founder and president of what was then Macedonia’s largest ethnic Albanian party (the Party for Democratic Prosperity, or PPD) appealed to Roms and other Muslims to declare Albanian nationality in the census of 1991 (Andrejevich 1991: 27; Bugajski 1994: 115-116; Poulton 1995: 139). In this context, the introduction of documents in the Romani language during the census of 1994 despite the fact that few (if any) Roms in Macedonia read and write Romani better than Macedonian, Albanian, or Turkish suggests a concern on the part of Macedonian authorities with preventing Roms from heeding Halili’s appeal (cf. Friedman 1996a: 96, 99; 1996b: 98; 1999: 334; 2001: 149). The fact that administrative redistricting in 1996 had the overall effect of making cities with the largest Albanian populations less Albanian, more Macedonian, and more Romani also suggests that Macedonian authorities see Roms as harmless in contradistinction to Albanians (cf. Maleska 1998: 163; Popovski and Panov 1998: 60-65).[26]

Slovakia

While Slovak-Magyar relations have often been strained at the level of high politics, absent in Slovakia are the kinds of tensions which exist between the Albanian and ethnic Macedonian populations in the Republic of Macedonia. Also largely absent is Magyar pressure on Roms to declare Magyar ethnicity at the census or to vote for Magyar political parties. Moreover, with the exception of several months in 1994, Vladimír Mečiar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) controlled the government of the Slovak Republic from 1992 until 1998. There is accordingly little evidence that political parties of the Slovak majority view Magyars as a threat or that these parties see Slovakia’s Romani population as a potential ally. Thus, in my interview with a representative of the ruling Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), I was told that talk about a Magyar threat is mere “political demagogy,” and that the party makes no distinctions on the basis of ethnicity.[27] Similarly, a representative of the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) told me that while many Magyars lack a feeling of belonging to the Slovak Republic, no minority in Slovakia constitutes a danger to the state, and that “[t]he Party of Civic Understanding […] must behave the same toward the Romani citizen and toward the Slovak citizen.”[28] Finally, my interview with a representative of the Party of the Democratic Left (SDĽ) revealed that “we do not think that any minority whatsoever can be dangerous,” with SDĽ’s interest in Romani support no different from that of all other political parties in the Slovak Republic – including the Slovak National Party (SNS) – in the support of all national minorities.[29]

Whereas representatives of SDK, SOP and SDĽ were categorical in their denial of a Magyar threat, my interviews with representatives of the recently founded party SMER (“Direction”) and of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) revealed more ambivalent views of Slovakia’s Magyar population and of its political representatives.[30] On the one hand, representatives of both parties stated that no minority in the Slovak Republic constitutes a danger for the state. On the other hand, the representative of SMER stated the possibility for minority politicians “to pick up some negative tendencies,” and the representative of HZDS indicated that the policies of the Magyar Coalition Party are sometimes dangerous. On the whole, while SMER and HZDS express concern for the activities of Magyar politicians, their concern is mild in comparison with that expressed by the representatives of mainstream Macedonian political parties about the entire Albanian population. At the same time, both representatives claimed that their respective parties do not target Roms as such.[31]

The strongest view of Magyars as a threat to the Slovak Republic came from a representative of the Slovak National Party (SNS).[32] Even this view, however, was more moderate than the views expressed by Macedonia’s largest political parties about ethnic Albanians. Stating initially that Magyars in Slovakia constitute a threat to the maintenance of the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic, my informant quickly added the disclaimer that Slovakia’s Magyar minority has the potential to pose such a threat through its international-organizational component. Moreover, SNS’s program contains the statement that “Slovakia threatens no one and does not feel itself threatened by anyone” (Slovenská národná strana 1998). Further, like the other parties discussed above as well as the Magyar Coalition Party (MKP),[33] SNS makes no claims about a specific interest in Romani support.

Conclusion

In the end, political competition provides a fuller and more convincing account of the difference between Slovak and Macedonian treatments of Roms than do the other hypotheses examined here. Whereas the nonexistence of a Romani homeland state rules out homeland nationalism as an explanation for Romani political integration, the form and content of Roms’ demands on the states in which they live combines with the reception of these demands by state authorities to rule out a concern with domestic stability as a viable explanation. Cultural proximity fails as an explanation of the variation in policy toward Roms because whereas the Romani population of Slovakia shares the Roman Catholicism of the country’s titular nationality and Roms in Macedonia are members of a religion different from that of ethnic Macedonians, Roms are better integrated in Macedonian society than in Slovak society. More convincing than explanations in terms of homeland nationalism, domestic political stability, and cultural proximity is the hypothesis that Romani political integration is a function of Communist policies toward Roms, but this explanation fails, too, when the absence of a consistent relation between Communist and post-Communist policies becomes apparent. Thus, whereas Macedonian authorities have granted rights to Roms in the hope of securing loyal allies against both other segments of the titular population and the largest ethnic minority, the low level of Romani political integration in Slovakia can be explained in terms of one party’s success in ignoring its opposition, both Slovak and Magyar.

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* This paper is a revised version of the one delivered at the 7^th Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities (Columbia University, New York, USA, 11-13 April 2002), and draws heavily on the author’s Ph.D. dissertation, “Explaining the Political Integration of Minorities: Roms as a Hard Case” (University of California, San Diego, 2002), the completion of which was made possible by fellowships from the American Councils for International Education; the American Council of Learned Societies; the Center for German and European Studies; the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board; the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation; the University of California, Berkeley; the University of California, San Diego; and the University of Pittsburgh. Field research for the project was facilitated through affiliations with the Institute of Social Sciences of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Košice and the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research in Skopje.

† Research Associate, European Centre for Minority Issues, Flensburg, Germany. E-mail: friedman@ecmi.de.

[1] As was the case in the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe, recognition as a “nationality” as opposed to an “ethnic group” by post-Communist regimes generally constitutes a group the members of which are entitled to enjoy certain rights not extended to the members of ethnic groups.

[2] “Ustav na Republika Makedonija,” Služben vesnik na Republika Makedonija 52/1991.

[3] I am grateful to Sašo Klekovski of the Macedonian Center for International Cooperation for pointing this out. Also see Barany (1995: 527) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia (1997: 2).

[4] Evidence used to measure Romani political integration falls into two broad categories: legal regulations and observed trends in state practice. Within the first category fall measures which directly fix the position of Roms in a state, including mention of Roms in the constitution, the place of Roms in an official hierarchy of categories ranging from “ethnic groups” at the bottom to “nations” at the top, and provisions for Romani representation in parliament. Also included in the category of legal regulations are measures which deal with the representation of Roms in public life, such as state funding for Romani political parties, education in the Romani language and on Romani history and culture, Romani programming on state radio and television, support for Romani print media, and the use of the Romani language in official documents. Laws enforcing or prohibiting discrimination against Roms constitute the final subcategory of legal regulations used in measuring Romani political integration. Trends in the official treatment of Roms constitute the second general category of evidence. One indicator in this category is the presentation of Romani perpetrators in crime reports (i.e., Do state organs routinely single out Roms for identification by ethnicity? Is ‘gypsy’ itself a criminological category?). Another indicator of trends in state practice is the application (or non-application) of standing legislation on racially motivated crime in particular and on discrimination in general to cases in which the victims are Roms. Finally, public statements about Roms uttered by political representatives of the titular nationality and the reception of these statements by the national political elite provide a gauge of the country’s broader social climate.

[5] By ‘terrorism’, I mean acts of violence committed against putative symbols of oppression undertaken in order to draw attention to the plight of the putatively oppressed (cf. Perry 1988: 206).

[6] Whereas Romano nevo ľil has been published since 1991, Sam adaj – Sme tu began publication in 1998, ceasing in May of 2001 for lack of subsidy. Both newspapers paid more attention to demonstrations by Roms than did newspapers of the Slovak majority during the same period.

[7] Sčítanie obyvateľov, domov a bytov 26. mája 2001: Základné údaje (Bratislava: Štatistický úrad Slovenskej republiky, 2001). While 68.9% of all citizens of the Slovak Republic declared themselves Roman Catholic, the proportion of the total religious population of Slovakia declaring the Roman Catholic faith was 82.0%. Data on religious confession broken down by nationality is not available in Slovakia.

[8] The 1994 Census of Population, Households, Dwellings and Agricultural Holdings in the Republic of Macedonia, Book I: Population according to Declared Ethnic Affiliation, Religious Affiliation, Mother Tongue and Citizenship (Skopje: Statistical Office of Macedonia, 1996), page 50.

[9] For a comprehensive analysis of Czechoslovak Communist policy toward Roms, see Jurová (1993). No comparable work exists for the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

[10] Ústava Slovenskej republiky č. 460/1992 Zb.; Ústavní zákon České národní rady ze dne 16. prosince 1992 č. 1/1993 Sb.

[11] Created by Government Resolution 259/1994, the Council for National Minorities was reorganized in accordance with Government Resolution 580/1998. Functions of the Council for National Minorities include participating in the preparation of legal measures, compiling summary reports about the situation of minorities, and providing feedback on as well as aiding in the implementation of relevant policies at state and local levels. In addition to three Roms, the Council includes three Slovaks, two Poles, two Germans, one Magyar, and one Ukrainian.

[12] See Law 40/1993: Zákon ze dne 29. prosince 1992 o nabývání a pozbývání státního občanství České republiky. Human Rights Watch (1996: 2) reports that some Roms who met all requirements under the Law on the Acquisition and Loss of Czech Citizenship were nonetheless denied citizenship. Statistical information on the number of Roms affected by the Law on the Acquisition and Loss of Czech citizenship is not available, but it is clear that application of the Law resulted in deportations to Slovakia and, in rarer instances, statelessness (Human Rights Watch 1996: 18, 26-27). Amendments to the citizenship law in 1996 and 1999 have done away with the law’s discriminatory provisions: see Law 139/1996: Zákon ze dne 26. dubna 1996, kterým se mění a doplňuje zákon České národní rady č. 40/1993 Sb., o nabývání a pozbývání státního občanství České republiky, ve znění zákona č. 272/1993 Sb. a zákona č. 140/1995 Sb.; and Law 194/1999: Zákon ze dne 29. července 1999, kterým se mění zákon č. 40/1993 Sb., o nabývání a pozbývaní státního občanství České republiky, ve znění pozdějších předpisů.

[13] See Law 152/1995: Zákon, kterým se mění a doplňuje zákon č. 140/1961 Sb., trestní zákon, v znění pozdějších předpisů, zákon č. 141/1961 Sb., o trestním řízení soudním (trestní řád), ve znění pozdějších předpisů, zákon České národní rady č. 283/1991 o policii České republiky, ve znění pozdějších předpisů, zákon č. 189/1994 Sb., o vyšších soudních úřednících, a zákon č. 59/1965 Sb., o výkonu trestu odnětí svobody, ve znění pozdějších předpisů.

[14] See Usnesení vlády České republiky ze dne 15. října 1997 č. 640 o Statutu Meziresortní komise pro záležitosti romské komunity. Also see Usnesení vlády České republiky ze dne 9. září 1998 č. 580 o odvolání a jmenování předsedy Rady pro národnosti vlády České republiky a předsedy Meziresortní komise pro záležitosti romské komunity a o změně statutů těchto orgánů.

[15] See Usnesení vlády České republiky ke Zprávě o situaci romské komunity v České republice a k současné situaci v romské komunitě. Government Resolution 686/1997.

[16] The Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Solving the Problems of Citizens Who Need Special Care was closed by the Slovak government formed after the parliamentary elections of fall 1998 and replaced by the “Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Solving the Problems of Citizens Belonging to the Romani Minority” in early 1999. After the person of the Government Plenipotentiary changed again in June of 2001, the Office also changed its name, this time to “Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Romani Communities.” While the new Government Plenipotentiary, Klára Orgovánová, has arguably accomplished more since her appointment than did her predecessor in more than two years on the job, the long-term effects of her efforts depend in large part on a measure of continuity thus far absent.

[17] Perhaps most commonly cited on this issue are Hugh Poulton’s claims that Roms were first recognized as a nationality at the federal level in 1981, with the Socialist Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the one hand and Montenegro on the other unique in granting this status at the republican level (Poulton 1991: 87; 1993: 42; 1999: 119; cf. Crowe 1996: 228). By way of contrast, Donald Kenrick (2001a: 409) reports that Roms enjoyed nationality status in Bosnia and Herzegovina as early as 1945. However, my own reading of republican and federal constitutions from Yugoslavia indicates that neither the term ‘Roms’ nor the term ‘Gypsies’ appears in any constitution promulgated in Yugoslavia or in any amendments to these constitutions from 1946 to 1989. Moreover, according to the Serbian legal scholar Vesna Rakić-Vodinelić (1998: 113), the term 'ethnic group' appears only in the 1974 Constitutions of the Socialist Republics of Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia. I am grateful to Ellen Comisso, Victor Friedman, Robert Hayden, and Mirjana Najčevska for their help in making sense of this debate.

[18] “Ustav na Republika Makedonija,” Služben vesnik na Republika Makedonija 52/1991.

[19] Available online at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/bk00000_.html.

[20] Ustav Republike Crne Gore, Article 67. Available online at http://www.montenet.org/law/ustav.htm.

[21] See Ustava Republike Slovenije (available online at http://www.us-rs.si/si/basisfr.html); Croatia – Constitution (available online at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/hr00000_.html); Ustav Republike Srbije (available online at http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/cinjenice/constitution). The Slovenian Constitution of 1991 promised that Slovenia would become an exception in this regard by promising (in Article 65) a law (not issued at this writing) to regulate the status and rights of Romani communities residing on Slovenian territory, but guarantees the rights of only the “autochthonous Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities” (Article 5). Also worth mentioning is that Article 11 of the 1992 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia guarantees the “rights of national minorities to preserve, foster and express their ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and other peculiarities,” but makes no mention of specific minorities (available online at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/sr00000_.html). As the Serbian legal scholar Vesna Rakić-Vodinelić puts it, “the legal status of national minorities is insufficiently defined, and it cannot be reliably concluded which ethnic groups have the status of a national minority nor what are the basic elements of their legal status” (Rakić-Vodinelić 1998: 106).

[22]The Socialist Republic of Serbia introduced broadcast and primary school instruction in Romani in Kosovo in the 1980s, at a time when the activism of the province’s Albanian majority was on the increase. After the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Serbian government appealed to Roms through measures including subsidy for Romani publications, as well as radio and television broadcasts in Romani (cf. Kenrick 2001: 417). The effective removal of Kosovo from Serbian control seems accordingly to have brought a reduction of official interest in the Romani population concentrated there, as suggested by the recent elimination of Romani broadcasts at Radio Niš (which can be heard in Kosovo; see “Ukinut romski program Radio Niša,” B92 Vesti, 3 January 2002). Finally, Milošević’s inclusion of Roms and Egyptians in Serbia’s delegation to the February 1999 Rambouillet negotiations over Kosovan autonomy, like his expression of concern for the status of Kosovo’s Goran minority (Muslim Slavs living in the hills above Prizren) (cf. Poulton 1998: 16) and his insistence that any national group represented in the parliament of an autonomous Kosovo be allowed to block any decision contrary to the group’s (undefined) “vital interest” further suggests that the extension of rights to stateless minorities in general and to Roms in particular stems from a concern with the potential costs to the state of political mobilization by a country’s largest ethnic minority.

[23] Interview conducted 29 January 2001 in Skopje.

[24] Interview conducted 6 December 2000 in Skopje.

[25] Most of the time, the campaigning involves the distribution of basic foodstuffs (e.g., flour, oil, sugar) to potential Romani constituents, as well as promises of infrastructural improvement and employment. Less frequently, campaigning in Romani settlements involves the distribution of money, in relatively rare cases in combination with physical coercion. This interest in Romani support seems not to be shared by the Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity (PPD) and the Democratic Party of Albanians (PDSH): in contradistinction to SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE, these parties do not campaign in Romani settlements. While representatives of PPD and PDSH told me in interviews (conducted 21 and 23 November 2000 in Skopje) that their respective parties appeal to Roms, both also admitted that they derive little support from Macedonia’s Romani population. Here, however, it should be noted that Macedonia’s Albanian parties campaign relatively little, presumably because they know which votes they can expect (Krause 1999).

[26] Table 1: Ethnic composition of selected municipalities in Macedonia before and after the Law on Territorial Division of 1996

Municipality	% Albanians before -> after redistricting	% Macedonians before -> after redistricting	% Roms before -> after redistricting
Gostivar	64.30 -> 55.06	18.20 -> 29.35	1.97 -> 4.12
Kičevo	49.60 -> 26.12	39.30 -> 58.55	2.65 -> 5.09
Kumanovo	36.91 -> 24.87	50.48 -> 60.05	2.44 -> 3.30
Struga	44.70 -> 36.63	45.40 -> 56.06	0.20 -> 0.30
Tetovo	74.90 -> 59.35	20.50 -> 31.74	1.41 -> 3.48

Source: The 1994 Census of Population, Households, Dwellings and Agricultural Holdings in the Republic of Macedonia, Book I: Population according to Declared Ethnic Affiliation, Religious Affiliation, Mother Tongue and Citizenship; Book XIII: Total Population, Households, Dwellings and Agricultural Holdings according to the Administrative-Territorial Division from 1996 (Skopje: Statistical Office of Macedonia, 1997), page 26 and pages 64-66 (respectively). For the text of the law on redistricting, see “Zakon za teritorijalnata podelba na Republika Makedonija i opredeluvanje na podračjata na edinicite na lokalnata samouprava,” Služben vesnik na Republika Makedonija 49/1996.

[27] Interview conducted 7 February 2000 in Košice.

[28] Interview conducted 26 January 2000 in Bratislava.

[29] Interview conducted 10 July 2001 in Bratislava.

[30] Interviews with representatives of SMER and HZDS conducted 10 and 11 July 2001 (respectively) in Bratislava.

[31] Although inconsistent with the claims of its representative that HZDS makes no distinctions among voters, HZDS’s attempts to attract Romani support during the campaign preceding the parliamentary elections of 1998 suggest that the party’s leadership was aware of the possibility that it would lose the elections to the newly-formed SDK and that it may also have thought that HZDS could take votes away from the Magyar Coalition Party by including Slovakia’s best-known Magyarophone Rom, József Ravasz, on the HZDS ballot. Despite the fact that its leader (i.e., Vladimír Mečiar) and its deputies in parliament (e.g., Roman Hofbauer) had spoken repeatedly against Slovakia’s Romani population, HZDS placed two Romani candidates on its ballot for the 1998 elections. Whereas Ján Kompuš was assigned sixty-first place on HZDS’s ballot, József Ravasz was placed at position 88. Given the total number of seats in the Slovak Republic’s National Council (150), in the absence of preference voting HZDS would have had to secure at least 40.67% of seats in parliament for Kompuš to be elected and a minimum of 58.67% of parliamentary mandates for Ravasz to join him. Compared with the results of past parliamentary elections in the Slovak Republic, HZDS would have needed to match its showing in 1994 for Kompuš to be elected and would have had to do better than ever before for Ravasz to become a member of parliament. Whereas Kompuš’s death in a car accident in September of 1998 prevented his election to parliament, Ravasz’s election may have been precluded by many Roms’ lack of knowledge about preference voting (Vašečka 1999: 292). Assuming that HZDS’s leadership was aware of the general political landscape and of the Romani population’s limited political education, it seems to have done what it could to cut its losses in the upcoming elections by appealing through means material (e.g., tee-shirts, food, drink) as well as political to the population least likely already to be committed politically.

[32] Interview conducted 25 January 2000 in Bratislava.

[33] Interview with MKP representative conducted 27 January 2000 in Bratislava.