Helsinki
Committee for Human Rights in Serbia
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SHADOW OF NATIONALISM
Serbia 2002
Publisher:
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia
For publisher:
Sonja Biserko
* * *
Translated by:
Ivana Damjanović
Dragan Novaković
Ivan Obradović
Layout by:
Nebojša Tasić
Cover designe:
Ivan Hrašovec
Printed by:
"Zagorac", Belgrade 2003
Number of copies: 500
ISBN - 86-7208-073-4
This book was published thanks
to the support
of the Swedish Helsinki
Committee for Human Rights
Introduction
The
year 2002 is regarded by many as a year lost because nearly all of the
political capital gained on 5 October 2000 was squandered: the coalition which
had brought about the downfall of Slobodan Milošević bogged down in futile
infighting and was becoming its own chief obstacle. Having been established for
the specific purpose of ousting Milošević, the Democratic Opposition of
Serbia (DOS) nevertheless went on to shoulder the formidable task of
transition, a burden its heterogeneous political makeup proved ill-equipped to
bear. For all the enthusiasm which characterized the political situation in
2001, it became clear that the prevailing concept of democracy as a multi-party
system devoid of proper institutions and the rule of law alone could not change
the general political atmosphere in the country weighed down by the
Milošević legacy, institutions mired in old attitudes and methods, and
resistance to reform. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – now Serbia and
Montenegro – was not admitted to the Council of Europe, nor did the DOS
leaders’ promises of an association agreement with the EU materialize.
Consequently, there was no appreciable headway in the domain of human rights.
The
intrinsic limitations of the DOS surfaced in 2002, and the general credibility
and influence of political parties suffered as a result of numerous affairs,
scandals and indiscretions. The political parties’ aversion to transparency was
adopted as a model of behaviour in other spheres. The failure of two rounds of
presidential elections through voter abstention indicated a determination on
the part of the citizens to punish the politicians for their conduct, as well
as that a political pattern which had dominated the whole of the last century
had come to an end. At the same time, it was disturbing to see no alternative
political model to re-formulate the interests of the citizens and generate
reforms accordingly.
The
political environment was unfavourable and discouraging, particularly for
private enterprise for want of political encouragement. The region’s long
isolation, high unemployment, and absence of economic progress were conducive
to a resurgence of populism hostile to reforms. The forces behind this, which
could easily prevail at the next elections, were spearheaded by the Socialist
Party of Serbia (SPS), the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), the Democratic Party of
Serbia (DSS), and some smaller political parties. With regard to the direction
and speed of reforms, a ‘pro-reform’ and a ‘legalist’ bloc became firmly entrenched
in 2002. The differences of the two blocs personified by Zoran
Đinđić and Vojislav Koštunica first came to public notice
through the media and then divided society as a whole.
The
republican parliament went through a stormy period marked by numerous scandals,
a chronic absence of quorum (notably during the 2003 budget vote at the end of
the year), and obstruction by deputies and especially political parties such as
the DSS, SRS, and SPS, all of which made it necessary to amend the rules of
procedure in the first half of the year. In spite of the obstruction, the
parliament succeeded in adopting 47 news laws and 17 decisions and other
enactments; this, however, was only a small quota of legislation required for
accession to the Council of Europe.
In
the first half of the parliamentary year two laws were adopted: an ‘omnibus’
law which restored certain powers to the Vojvodina provincial parliament and a
law on local self-government under which municipalities too were given back
some powers. The two laws are designed to facilitate the decentralization of
Serbia and certainly the harmonization of domestic legislation with that of the
EU. The law on local self-government, passed on 14 February, is intended to
promote democracy at ‘lower levels of government’ and forms part of a project
to reform local self-government. The programme is to be implemented in 50
municipalities in Serbia over four years with the assistance of experts from
East Europe and the USA, i.e. the international consulting firm Development
Alternatives Incorporated (DAI) and the US Agency for International
Development. Under the Law on the Security-Informative Agency, another law
adopted by the parliament, the state security department was detached from the
Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) to allow better control of police
and state security work. Another step towards European standards was the
amendment of the Penal Code abolishing the death penalty.
In
February, the DSS first walked out of the republican government and then left
the DOS. In May, the DOS presidency decided to remove from the republican
parliament 50 deputies (including 23 from the DSS) who had been obstructing the
adoption of major laws by ‘jeopardizing the work of the Assembly of Serbia by
their irresponsible absence’. The frequent clashes between the two blocs met
with strong public disapproval and further damaged their legitimacy, which was
later borne out by the election results.
Serbia
and Montenegro signed their agreement on the initial steps for establishing
their state-union in Belgrade on 14 March. Already the first reactions to the
‘Belgrade agreement’ bore out the fundamentally different visions of the new
state-union: while Belgrade strove to project it as a modern federation,
Podgorica saw it as two sovereign states. These differences inevitably slowed
work on the Constitutional Charter and affected its content. In spite of
enormous pressure from many European governments, members of the Venice
Commission and Xavier Solana himself, who acted as mediator, Montenegro managed
to defend its case. The victory of Milo Đukanović at the October 2002
extraordinary parliamentary elections strengthened his hand vis-ŕ-vis Belgrade
and the international community; it amounted to a referendum at which the
citizens of Montenegro manifested their maturity and deprived Serbia of yet
another illusion that it could keep Montenegro under its patronage. However,
the talks on the Prevlaka peninsula dragged on until the year’s end, their
uncertain outcome being a major obstacle to reform. Amid all-consuming
negotiations on the Constitutional Charter, and in spite of clear signals from
Montenegro, and even from Serbia, that the future entity stood slight chance of
survival, the nationalistic forces insisted on treating Prevlaka as a priority.
This was hardly an atmosphere conducive to economic activity and it certainly
threw doubt on some initial transition successes.
The
DSS insisted on, among things, constitutional reform although the conditions
for such an undertaking were not ripe considering the uncertain status of
Kosovo and Vojvodina. Given the position of the DSS and similar parties on
regionalization as a state framework, the insistence on constitutional reform
as a key precondition of overall reform is fraught with pitfalls. The object of
regionalization (whereby Vojvodina itself would consist of three regions) is to
modernize a centralist concept and, basically, to prevent the question of
Vojvodina’s autonomy from being raised. A constitutional reform would, in the
absence of a social consensus, create a constitutional crisis and thus fuel
tension between Belgrade and Novi Sad and, of course, between Belgrade and
Priština. The Constitutional Charter for Serbia and Montenegro had already
shown that such a process was unstoppable. The debate on constitutional reform
forced in this way, i.e. without a proper explication, confused the public and
made it possible to manipulate the potentials for reform. The fact that the
question of the state was being kept open indicated that the project which had de facto been defeated was still
regarded as an option, as well as that the two principal holders of power, the
DSS and the Democratic Party (DS), were at a deadlock. To break this deadlock
and gain supremacy, something the election failed to provide, they were moving
towards another poll by espousing ‘elementary constitutionalism’.
The provisorium in which the state existed and the permanent political crisis
were creating the conditions for deeper commitment by the international
community determined to both stabilize and integrate the region. The question
of constitutional reform is imperative for political as well as legal reasons.
Cooperation
with the Hague Tribunal had become a key issue of Serbia’s relations with the
international community. It was also crucial for the crystallization of the
political scene in Serbia. Except for extraditing Slobodan Milošević,
Serbia made no substantial headway in its cooperation with the Hague Tribunal
in spite of numerous pressures including visits by Carla del Ponte and UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Those who went ‘voluntarily’ to The Hague in 2002
were Dragoljub Ojdanić, the former chief of the General Staff, Nikola
Šainović, the former federal deputy prime minister, and Milan Martić,
a leader of the so-called Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) who had been hiding in
Serbia for many years. Another indictee, former interior minister Vlajko
Stojiljković, shot himself on the steps of the federal parliament building
on 11 April 2002. No doubt under great pressure from his SPS party, he accused
in his farewell letter the DOS of breaking up the FRY ‘with the participation
of the greatest enemy of our people, Xavier Solana’, and of ‘ruthlessly
trampling on the Constitution and the law, pursuing a policy of treason and
capitulation, betraying the national dignity, destroying the economy and
driving millions of citizens into penury’. He blamed his death on ‘Zoran
Đinđić, Vojislav Koštunica, Dušan Mihajlović, Vladan
Batić, Miroljub Labus’ and others.
The
federal law on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, passed after much
wrangling, was more a sign of political impotence then proof that the matter
was now legally regulated, because the FRY and/or Serbia is bound to cooperate
on other accounts, i.e. by virtue of its membership of the UN. The law reflects
the balance of forces within the political elite because, by virtue of its
Article 39, it relates only to persons already indicted, which is at variance
with the Hague Tribunal Statute. The law was strongly criticized by the Serbian
academic law community: as many as 51 professors and lecturers of the Belgrade
Faculty of Law urged the Federal Constitutional Court not only to declare the
law unconstitutional but to stay the execution of all individual acts under the
law pending the Court’s final ruling.
Throughout
2002 the trial of Slobodan Milošević was a major source of controversy in
the country, the reactions showing that Serbia had not broken with his policy
and was not ready to confront the warlike policy and war crimes. For instance,
the Serbian media portrayed Milošević’s exchanges with witnesses in
connection with the Kosovo indictment as a TV duel which he invariably won.
Nearly all of them omitted to give the wider context in which the crimes had
been committed and chose to present the facts highly selectively. The
prevailing impression was that Milošević was master of the situation who
had debunked the Tribunal by his defence. However, the initial stages of the
Croatia war crimes trial brought about a substantial change of attitude towards
the Tribunal because the witnesses were much better prepared and proved a match
for Milošević. In particular, testimony by Milan Babić, the Serb
leader from the RSK, and Slobodan Lazarević, a member of the
Counter-Intelligence Service (KOS) – both active participants in the Greater
Serbia project – threw clear light on Belgrade’s prime responsibility, the
chief protagonists, and the strategy. The establishment of a chronology of
events and of the context in which the war started greatly expedited the
proceedings and underlined the Tribunal’s indisputable relevance for the
region.
Biljana
Plavšić’s guilty plea on count 3 of the indictment (incorporating all the
elements of genocide) was received with consternation by the Serbian public and
viewed mostly as treason. Kosta Čavoški said that by pleading as she did,
Plavšić had ‘betrayed her own personality’ and turned herself into a
‘doormat’. He also said that whereas Babić and Plavšić ‘deliberately
sent their people to their death’ they themselves were ‘unable to look death in
the face’.
As
the layers of the Serb project were laid bare in The Hague one after another,
its ideologues were increasing their efforts to disprove or depreciate witness
evidence while awaiting each new witness with considerable apprehension. The
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) organized an international
conference on the topic ‘Greater Serbia – Truth, Fallacy, Abuse’ with the
object of minimizing the significance of the Memorandum, which was being increasingly referred to in The Hague
as the programme Slobodan Milošević. On the other hand, those who had
acknowledged that crimes had been committed, sought to rationalize them by
blaming them on the Communists. They and the services behind the war project,
especially the State Security Service to which the Memorandum was being
increasingly attributed, disowned Slobodan Milošević and his aggressive
policy.
It
was no coincidence that a report on Srebrenica was made public in Republika
Srpska at a time when Milošević was confronted by charges of genocide in
Croatia and Bosnia. If the Serb nationalists were to succeed in relativizing
the Srebrenica tragedy and divesting it of its ethnic background, they would
both prevent the ‘collection of war dues’ and help Belgrade’s strategic
objective of swapping Kosovo for Republika Srpska. The statement by President
Vojislav Koštunica that ‘the Drina only temporary separates our family’ was a
trial balloon to test the reaction of the international community. It was to
cost him dearly as an indiscretion widely condemned by the international
community, especially the United States.
The
pressure of the international community to place the Yugoslav Army (VJ) under
civil control, and to remove General Nebojša Pavković from the post of
chief of the General Staff, led to a rift in the state leadership. The gap
widened particularly after Pavković sided with Prime Minister
Đinđić and accused Koštunica and his office of engineering a VJ
raid on the Serbian government’s Communications Bureau over alleged bugging on
his office. Koštunica next sacked Pavković by decree and installed General
Branko Krga, the chief of KOS, as his successor. The scandal over arms sales to
Iraq brought Serbia back into international focus as a collaborator of Saddam
Hussein. However, in Serbia the numerous details disclosed by the International
Crisis Group were publicly minimized or presented as something normal.
President Koštunica declared that the arms sales to Iraq were a matter of
legacy and a product of 10 years of sanctions, a manufactured affair, and that
he found it ‘base and hypocritical that anyone should now feign surprise that,
in all likelihood, someone somewhere – in this case Jugoimport – has violated
UN sanctions and sticks to his old ways’. Such a response to grave US warnings
betrayed lack of recognition that the accusations over the latest scandal were
based on facts that would be used against Serbia to make it toe the line and
sever its links with Iraq. This was the first scandal to moot the
responsibility of the ‘untouchables’ and their part in the wholesale plunder
and corruption.
The
arrest on 15 March of the Serbian Deputy Prime Minister, Miodrag Perišić,
in a secret operation by military security forces over his alleged
collaboration with the CIA attracted much public attention at home and abroad.
Perišić was having dinner with a US embassy secretary in a motel on the
Ibar highway when he was apprehended allegedly in the act ‘taking out video
tapes from under his tracksuit’ to hand them over. Perišić was forced to
resign and the affair is yet to be officially resolved before a court of law.
So far as could be made out from the vague media statements, the chief actors
in this scandal were Koštunica’s security adviser, Rade Bulatović, and
General Aco Tomić, both of whose names had figured in connection with
every single affair over the previous two years. This incident, as well as
others, was a clear signal that the VJ was not under civil control and wished
to arbitrate in key political developments.
The
efforts to establish the rule of law and an independent judiciary bore the
stamp of a confrontation between Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić and
Minister of Justice Vladan Batić on one hand and representatives of the
judiciary on the other. The clash bore out the fact that the principle of the
separation of powers continued to be violated; also, as the Law on the Judiciary
showed, that the executive strove to control the judiciary. In practice no
judge was relieved of office during 2002 and some who stood up against the
executive were ‘kicked upstairs’. The judiciary lacked the strength –
apparently due to the absence of political will – to try war crimes in a
professional manner; a case in point was the trial of Cvjetan Demirović of
Prokuplje, which had to be transferred to Belgrade owing to lack of evidence
and witnesses, and because of the hostile atmosphere in Prokuplje.
The
killing of the Assistant Chief of the Department of Public Security, Boško
Buha, bore the hallmarks of the relationship between the mafia and the
authorities. Many attributed the murder to the fact that Buha had for some time
been publicly referring to five well-organized mafia groups in Serbia and
warning that new close links were being forged between them and some people in
government. Corruption was the chief problem of Serbia (and of the whole
region); it had taken deep roots over the previous 10 years because it was
‘systemically and systematically projected by the key power centres’.
The accomplishments of the Anti-corruption Board set up by the government were
negligible. The two draft laws it submitted to the Serbian government – the law
on preventing the clash of public and private interests in the exercise of
public functions and the law on the financing political organizations – have
not reached parliament yet.
The
crisis of identity, a problem facing all transition countries, was augmented in
Serbia by the need to confront the warlike policy and war crimes. The
reluctance of the Serb elite to come to terms with these problems gave rise to
a spate of recriminations in an atmosphere of intolerance, anti-communism,
xenophobia, and anti-Semitism. In the aftermath of 5 October, the Serb elite
put a rehashed version of Serb nationalism across to the world in the form of a
‘civil or liberal nationalism’, something the West temporarily swallowed as a
moderate nationalism. However, two years later the West too began to call the
thing by its real name, increasingly referring to the October revolution as
‘so-called’ or ‘nationalistic’. The book by the journalist Tim Marshall, Shadowplay, was the first to raise the
question of the character of the October 5 changes; unfortunately, in Serbia
the questions posed by Marshall were simply ignored.
The
absence of any modern vision of Serbia was fertile ground for the resurgence of
the Chetnik movement and Serb conservative thought and renewed emphasis on
their common dominator: insistence on the territories defined by the Serb
national project and propagation of the Serb organic thought as the determinant
of the values of Serb society. The revival of the Chetnik idea negated the
anti-fascist tradition of the partisan movement which brought the Communists to
power and, consequently, all the decisions of the Anti-fascist Council of the
National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), notably those laying down the
republican borders. Literature of all kinds popularizing the Chetnik idea and
movement abounded.
Although
the pressing minority question remained a key issue of Serbia’s internal
organization, its solution was nowhere in sight. Serbia does not accept its
minorities as equals; its Law on Minorities, a requirement for accession to the
Council of Europe, was more a result of international pressure than of sincere
belief. The fact remains that a number of newly-adopted regulations were in
operation although they were incompatible with this law. The radicalization of
the minorities was a response to a strategy pursued at their expense for over a
decade. The putting forth of maximum demands was in anticipation of the final
agreement on Serbia’s internal organization. Disappointed with the results of
the last population census in March 2002, the nationalists were increasingly
demanding that persons belonging to minorities ought to designate themselves
Serbian citizens with full individual rights. Because the minorities,
disconcerted by the absence of a proper state and by what the authorities had
to offer them, began searching for an identity on other accounts, the pursuit
of an abortive strategy may rebound on Serbia. This had already happened in
relation to the Albanian minority in southern Serbia, where the international
community had to intervene through its mechanisms. The tensions subsided also
thanks to a great many confidence-building projects and investment in that very
underdeveloped region.
Sandžak
was another tense region because of all that had happened during the preceding
10 years, notably the unclarified murders and disappearances of Bosniaks in
incidents such as those at Štrpci and Sjeverin. The information gathered so far
leaves no doubt that the murders were organized with the knowledge of the state
as part of a wider project connected with the war in Bosnia. The areas adjacent
to Bosnia were ‘completely cleansed of Muslims-Bosniaks’ with the inhabitants
of the bordering villages still prohibited from going back. The incident which
occurred after Yugoslavia had won the world basketball championship threatened
to deteriorate into an open conflict and alerted the public to the possibility
of a serious confrontation as a result of marginalizing the region for many
years.
Population
censuses in countries like Serbia (and all others in the region) have
exceptional political implications especially in view of the fact that nation
states in the Balkans are experienced as ethnic states. A population census is
an important state undertaking and an instrument of politics particularly
following war and large-scale population displacement, something all the newly
established states of the former Yugoslavia have gone through. Considering that
ethnic cleansing was a tool in the creation and consolidation of ethnic states,
a census is of great political importance in that is has to confirm the success
of demographic engineering. In addition, the minority question carries much
weight because such states strive to render minorities as small as possible in
order not to grant them special status. Considering that Serbia now has its
first law on minorities that guarantees their collective rights, the question
of numbers has become important also for the minorities themselves.
The
last population census in Serbia, whose integral results have not been made
public yet, paints a terribly disappointing demographic picture as far as the
nationalists are concerned for all the irregularities registered at the time.
According to the preliminary results, the population of Serbia is among the
‘ten oldest populations in the world’. The report notes that the ‘biological
decay is far advanced indeed: the average age in Serbia is 40 years; underage
persons make up 19.7 per cent of the population; there are more people over 60
years of age than young people under 15’.
The data on the national or ethnic structure of the population show a
significant increase in the number of Vlachs and Roma, which the Statistical
Office sees as a result of choice not natural increase. Minorities accounted
for over 20 per cent of the population.
Vojvodina
was the battleground of two opposite kinds of rhetoric – nationalist and
autonomist. There are, of course, deeper conceptual differences behind such
avowals of ‘affection’ for the province: the nationalists, who regard Vojvodina
as an exclusive Serb domain although they grant that it is specific in terms of
its ethnic heterogeneity, view the autonomy demands as a desire to insulate the
province from the rest of Serbia; the autonomists, on the other hand, argue
that greater autonomy would enhance Vojvodina’s transition potentials and that
its greater openness vis-ŕ-vis neighbours would benefit not only Vojvodina’s
citizens but all in Serbia.
The
political life of Vojvodina played out between these two extremes: Belgrade’s
efforts to keep its monopoly of the province’s economic and financial
resources, and Vojvodina’s endeavours to move towards Europe through
participation in regional initiatives. In addition, Vojvodina’s minorities were
increasingly aware of the need to improve their own position and that of
Vojvodina as a region. The international regional initiatives operating on a
broader plane helped the crystallization of Vojvodina autonomy.
Throughout
the preceding decade, the question of refugees in the former Yugoslavia was
manipulated solely for the purpose of establishing ethnic states, this being
particularly evident as regards their repatriation. As it turned out, the
enormous funds set aside by the international community for humanitarian aid to
ensure the survival of this most vulnerable group of population in all the
parts of the former state gave the authorities of the new states an opportunity
for endless manipulation. Throughout the decade, the Belgrade government abused
the refugees in two ways: on the one hand, it paraded them before the world as
Serb victims; on the other, it encouraged their integration into Serbia and
discouraged their repatriation. This policy proved disastrous primarily for the
refugees themselves because it merely added to their confusion as to whether
they should stay or go back. Aware of the constant abuse to which they are
subjected, the refugees have developed a hypocritical attitude towards the
present government as their only chance of survival and adaptation.
Other
than somewhat expediting the granting of citizenship to those who apply, the
DOS continued the policy of the previous government. Its strategy of heavy
reliance on foreign donations from one year to the next proved unrealistic.
Rather than seek a viable and comprehensive solution to the problems of the
refugees, the present authorities were merely interested in their permanent
integration in Serbia. They made no serious effort to arrange for their
repatriation with their countries of origin because this was the least of their
worries.
In
view of Serbia’s transition potentials, the prospect of an adequate solution of
the refugee problem is slight. The issue is further complicated by the fact
that the status of Serbia as a state is still uncertain; therefore the vague
messages addressed to the refugee population merely add to its already deep
confusion as to the choices left to it. Their status as ‘innocent victims’
having been refuted by numerous witness accounts at the Hague Tribunal, the
refugees are now resented both in their countries of origin and in Serbia,
whose population wishes to shuffle off the blame for the wars in Croatia and
Bosnia onto them.
The
problems manifested in the sphere of the media in 2002 sharpened and became
much more transparent. There was no legal framework to ensure the unhindered
operation of the media and to enhance the standing of the profession. The Law
on Broadcasting passed in July 2002 was not applied even after six months.
Furthermore, the sharp polarization within the DOS into two groups clustered
around the DS and the DSS had its effect on the media, which backed one or the
other as their editorial policies were more or less influenced by the two
largest parties. The variegated media scene became a battleground on which
feuding political parties crossed their swords.
The
conflict overshadowed a host of vital topics such as the character of economic
reforms, privatization, corruption, the economic crimes perpetrated under
Milošević which enormously enriched some of its members, the necessity of
cooperating with the Hague Tribunal, the war crimes, Kosovo, the relations with
Montenegro.
The
relations with neighbours were maintained and improved mostly under pressure from
the international community and the conditions it imposed. The region continued
to be distrustful of Belgrade over its ‘vague national policy’, that is, the
fact that the Milošević policy had not been repudiated. The presumptuous
utterances about Republika Srpska, Kosovo, and Montenegro, the refusal of the
Serbian Orthodox Church to recognize the Macedonian Orthodox Church as
autocephalous, fuelled doubts about Belgrade’s long-term policy goals. The
attitude towards the Hague Tribunal and to the International Court of Justice
in The Hague, as well as the refusal of the DOS government to confront the
recent past, was another obstacle to genuine normalization in the region. At
the same time, because of all this, the international community kept the whole
of the Western Balkans at a distance and showed no desire to commit itself
deeply on account of crime which permeated all pores of society, lack of
political will to come to terms with the past, trafficking in people,
narcotics, and arms.
For
all the changes made, human rights were insufficiently respected because the
prerequisites for improvement were lacking. The state of affairs was
particularly disturbing in the judiciary because no reforms were launched
during 2002 to ensure its independent professional operation. In the sphere of
human rights, the rights of both national minorities and other minority groups
such as religious, gender, and other groups suffered from the radicalization of
society. The atmosphere of intolerance (racism) was most drastically manifested
in the attitude towards the Roma population.
PART ONE
Character
of "New" Serbian Nationalism
Identity Crisis and Renewal
of Conservative Nationalism
The
defeat and absence of a balanced account of what has happened, persistence on
the project of Greater Serbia despite clear signals from the international
community, an identity crisis and overall confusion, all these are blurring the
political and social scene in Serbia. In a nutshell, the new political elite is
incapable of creating a crystallization point by facing with the crime and thus
releasing a fresh source of energy. In its unwillingness and insincerity when
recent past is concerned and by reviving the Kosovo question on utterly
illusory foundations, the elite set the course for a retrograde process which
isolates Serbia from the rest of the world and at the same time enthroned a new
system of values: Serbdom and Orthodoxy. The incapability of facing the truth
led to a specific “rationalization”: from a denial of crime and the very
existence of a Serbian national project to a shift of all responsibility on the
communist regime.
The regime of Slobodan Milošević is being treated as a mere continuation
of the communist regime, whilst ignoring the fact that at the point when
Milošević obtained a plebiscitary support for the execution of the Serbian
national project, anti-communists stood side by side with the communists.
In
the absence of a modern vision of Serbia, the Chetnik movement and the Serbian
conservative thought were revitalized, with two main features: persistence on
territorial claims articulated by the Serbian national project and a promotion
of a system of values based on anti-Western feelings. While the Chetnik
movement is being rehabilitated, the anti-fascist tradition of the partisans
which led to the raise to power of the communist regime is being annulled, and
in the same milieu, all decisions made by the AVNOJ, borders of the republics
in particular. All of this is accompanied by an abundant production of
appropriate literature and a wide media campaign. A TV series “The Ravna Gora
Reader” (“Ravnogorska čitanka”), filmed by the RTS, promoted the movement
of Ravna Gora (Chetnik), with the idea to present it as an anti-fascist
movement (ignoring the fact that anti-fascism is in its nature
anti-nationalistic). New high school textbooks are also trying to marginalize and
disparage the importance of the partisan movement, and to provoke sympathy for
the Chetnik movement, always with an understanding for all its flaws. The
essence of this approach lies in the explanation that the wars of 1991-1999
were a sequel of World War Two, namely that the “unfinished war continued after
precisely fifty years”.
Through confusion and deep frustration,
Serbian nationalism only acquired a new face and turned to fresh ideological
sources, in the first place to the organic i.e. conservative thought – Nikolaj
Velimirović,
Justin Popović,
Dimitrije Ljotić,
and to the collaborationist regime of Milan Nedić, a quisling who embraced
the above ideology as his system of values.
It
is often being stressed that the organic thought is “our national thought” and
hence the most valuable one in the national heritage. The formulae it uses in
its interpretation of the society are very simple, this simplicity being their
main strength. In principle, this line of thought discards the rationalistic
and analytical tradition of the Century of Enlightenment and turns back to the
society as an organism. Ideas of both the new and the old Slovenophile
intellectual elite became the matrix of the nationalistic myth. One of their
key arguments is the inevitable “fall” of the West and the Western
civilization. In the beliefs of Russian organicists there is a sort of common
place about the nation “which in its gigantic, continental soul” keeps the
greatest and ultimate truth. These formulae are especially attractive for the
young generations, which in absence of any alternative easily accept all
simplified solutions.
The
actualization of the stereotypes and clichés of organic thought and their
instrumental use in politics in a populistic-nationalistic “key” has been
initiated on the Serbian political scene in the 80’s, and is recently getting
an ever growing impetus. Dobrica Ćosić sees the disruptions in the
contemporary society as a consequence of the chaos created by the French
revolution born from the spirit of Enlightenment, which is a variation of the
classical organic thought, but also induced by ideological-political motives.
Čosić’s statement that "the state and the church must unite in
their concern for the Serbian nation” is the old formula Nikolaj Velimirović
uses for the relation between the church and the state. In his book Srpsko pitanje (The Serbian Question)
(1992), Ćosić states that “the advantages of backwardness must be
optimally used” because they are “our initial intellectual asset”. He believes
that “the advantages of backwardness in civilization development have to be
realized and named, since they do exist, especially in the area of economy and
urbanization. Our development policy to date did not realize this fact.”
Putting organic thought in such a function in an atmosphere of closed
community, ends in disastrous consequences on the modernization and transition
of the society.
Metropolitan
Amfilohije Radović offers yet another formula: “Since ancient times Serbs
have solved all questions in conventions… and this is why it would be good to
renew the ‘convention’ consciousness of the nation. Political parties are
something of a more recent date and they have been imported among Serbs from
the West, which can be perilous for us who approach everything from a
metaphysical position. Decisions have to be made from the head of the whole
nation – only these decisions are farsighted and far-reaching”. This
"convention spirit" (sabornost)
is an ideological cover for modern collectivism, be it of the leftist or the
rightist origin. Serbian populism and nationalism in the 80’s have been amply
nourished from similar sources.
Various
protagonists of conservative politics, such as Patriotic Movement Obraz (Otačastveni
pokret Obraz) and Saint Justin
the Philosopher (Sveti Justin Filozof), Patriotic Party of Serbian Youth
Skinheads (Patriotski deo srpske omladine Skinheds), Gathering (Zbor) (a name picked up from an organization by D.
Ljotić), have been working on the rehabilitation of bishop Nikolaj
Velimirović, Dimitrije Ljotić and Milan Nedić. Serbian
“geopoliticians” are gathered around the journals “New ideas” (“Nove ideje”),
“Serbian organic studies” (“Srpske organske studije”) and “Reality” (“Zbilja”).
The journal “Spark” (“Iskra”) is busy with emigrant ideology, and they all are
radical critics of the new world order, capitalism as the “undertaker of
tradition” and the cause for “westernization of the society”.
Prominent on the orthodox scene are Momir Lazić, editor of “Reality”
(“Zbilja”), Predrag Dragić Kijuk, Veselin Đuretić, professor
Kosta Čavoški, Miroslav Toholj, Radovan Karadžić, the “Voice of the
Right” (“Glas desnice”), a journal were the ideology of the new Serbian Right
is being built, as well as a series of books, among them Milovan
Danojlić’s “Liberators and traitors” (“Oslobodioci i izdajnici”) as well
as the “Protocols of Zion sages” “Protokoli sionskih mudraca” and others.
In
view of such an ideological background various racist, anti-Semite,
anticommunist and anti-West campaigns, intensively led during 2002, do not come
as a surprise. It is fair to say that the past year was marked by offensive and
aggressive nationalism, which has set the tone for the overall public social
life in Serbia. The historical defeat followed by the transfer of Milošević
to the Hague and a chronological reconstruction of events in the Hague
courtroom exposed the strategy of war and the war politics led by Belgrade in
full light.
The identity crisis, which is a general
problem of all countries undergoing transition, is additionally burdened in
Serbia by the question of facing the war politics and war crimes. The
unreadiness of Serbian elite to face the responsibility inevitably led to a
shift of this responsibility to others, and in such a context, the public discourse
became abundant with intolerance, anti-communism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism.
After October 5 the Serbian elite offered a “recycled” version of Serbian
nationalism in the form of “bourgeois and liberal nationalism”, which has been
treated by the West for some time as moderate nationalism. However, two years
later the West started calling things by their own names, and thus the “October
revolution” became more and more qualified as “so called” or “nationalistic”.
Tim Marshal’s book “The Shadow Game” (“Igra senki”) was the first one to open
the question of the character of changes on October 5, but was unfortunately
not accepted in Serbia as the grounds for a debate on this topic.
In
addition to this, the views of Ljotic and Velimirovic are being relativized by
placing their activity in the context of their anticommunism. Thus, for
example, Desimir Tosic, a publicist explains that in the case of Ljotic one has
to bear in mind the “enormous fear the middle class had after the Bolshevik
revolution and the intention to suppress Bolshevism by force”. Bojan
Dimitrijević, a historian specialized in the Chetnik movement states that
the “circumstances after the occupation of 1941 were perhaps the harshest
period in Serbian history. The moves made by Dimitrije Ljotić and Milan
Nedić cannot be viewed outside the historical context.
The
Commission for monuments and names of places and streets of the Belgrade city
council is another expression of the atmosphere in which the unscientific
revision of history is done. A propos the suggestion of the Commission for an
attribution of street names to prominent members of the Serbian pro-Fascist
right, the former president of this Commission said that she had “no intention
of altering the history, but is rather trying to rectify something which has
been imposed in a grotesque way after World War Two”.
This
orientation in the society is also accompanied by political radicalism. Far
from being marginal, conservative and extremist political forces are becoming a
power supported by established national institutions such as the Army, Serbian
Academy of Sciences (SANU), Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC). The negation of
democratic values extends to the concept of human rights, which often turns
into violent acts against minority groups, especially Romas (Gypsies),
homosexuals and the like. The incident that happened on Christmas Eve when a
group of followers of the Anglican church lead by the English ambassador
Charles Crawford was deterred from carrying out the Christmas service in the
Patriarchate
(which, by the way, has a long tradition), attracted for the first time genuine
attention of the international community on the ever more frequent incidents
characterized mostly by anti-western feelings.
The
Serbian Orthodox Church holds a very important place in the promotion of Serbian
nationalism, which is definitely gaining strength as the new dominant ideology.
The central place within is taken by ideas and system of values of Nikolaj
Velimirovic, Dimitrije Ljotic and Justin Popovic. This ideology and system of
values have already found their place in textbooks. Promoters can be found even
amongst university professors and some of them advocate these ideas in their
lectures. For example, a professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences who
often contributes to the SPC’s journal Orthodoxy
(Pravoslavlje) teaches his
students that: “The ongoing goal of every nationalist is to obtain more power
and respect, not for himself, but for the nation or some other entity he
decided to submerge his individuality in”.
The
Church is supported by highest state officials and the Army. Instead of the
pastoral activity of the church – says the letter by the group of intellectuals
– the influence of the “para-clerical formations” (this phrase was used by
bishop Atanasije Rakita) is more present in public, and it is being supported
through activities of organizations like Obraz,
groups of followers of Miletic, Velimirovic and alike, which seriously
endanger the best traditions in Serbian culture. In a very short period of
time, the Church conquered schools, the army, hospitals and other institutions.
Religious education entered into the state schools through the backdoor,
contrary to existing constitutional barriers, without any serious preparations,
either of textbooks or personnel. Not even the faintest attempt has been made
by the authorities to evaluate religious education in schools.
Representatives of the
Church themselves gave unbefitting statements which may be qualified as hate
speech. The priest (protojerej) Zarko Gavrilovic
is probably the most striking example, and Patriarch Pavle’s Christmas epistle
will also be remembered by the offensive criticism of parents who did not send
their children to religious education classes as well as of human rights
activists. SPC also raises its voice against the visit of Jovan Pavle to
Serbia, and the bishop Irinej did not allow the president of the Assembly of
Vojvodina, Nenad Canak, to speak on the commemoration to the victims of the
Novi Sad raid. The Serbian Monarchist Movement, expressing its anti-Hague stand,
decided to “endorse and proclaim Dr. Radovan Karadzic as the regent of Serbia
on its behalf”. No wonder that in these spiritual circumstances the Federal
Ministry for ethnical minorities and ethnical communities initiated a campaign
named “Tolerance”. The campaign was obviously in the function of a return of
the FRY in the membership of the Council of Europe. One of the key criteria of
this organization is a non-discriminative attitude towards minorities.
Many research results
point out that high school students accept religiousness “relying on their own
culture and tradition, as the only genuine and good thing that will not fail
us”. This tradition, patriarchal in its essence, presupposes the inequality of
sexes, which gradually leads to a degradation of women’s position in the
society.
This tendency is supported by official education, and due to a lack of an
appropriate response from the parents this tendency passes almost unnoticed.
The church, which leads in the promotion of this attitude towards women, often
relies on the teaching of Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic. On a meeting that
discussed the question of women’s position in the society the priest
(protojerej) Dejan Dejanovic said that the most important mission for the Serbs
was to “turn to God, concur and reproduce”. He explicitly warned that “any
relationship between man and woman outside marriage is fornication”. At the
same time, there are numerous cases of debauchery and sexual delicts,
especially pedophilia, amongst the clergy.
In spite of the proclamations by the Church of the honorable and high place of
the women in the society the message it sends in practice are quite the
opposite, as for example in the book “What every orthodox girl should know”
published by “Svetigora” (“Holy Mountain”). The book was translated from
Russian and gained great popularity amongst Orthodox youth. The book, among
other things, states that the TV “has a devastating and fatal impact on health”
and hence should not be in the household. Computer games “result addiction and
obsession” the player “becoming a slave of the powers of darkness”.
The
new Serbian Right penetrated the Belgrade University (BU) as well, where it
appeared in an organized form for the first time through the initiation of a
national student publication “Dveri”
at the Faculty of Philology in 1999. From the very beginning the “Dverists”
characterize themselves by Orthodox and national activism. They open cultural
taboo themes (from the history of Serbian language, literature, and politics).
They confront the penetration of “anti-Serbian” NGOs. They are the first
critics of “Resistance” (“Otpor”) as
the American SKOJ (communist youth). They call themselves Christian
nationalist. They have printed 15 issues of magazines and bulletins, held over
30 panels on BU and throughout the country, and they have their own web-site (www.dverisrpske.com).
At the end of 2001 the “First convention of Orthodox-national Serbian
youth on BU since the 1944” was organized on the Faculty of Philosophy by
“Saint Justin the Philosopher” and the Serbian Convention Dveri, where
conservative ideas of “convention” and patriarchal spirit were promoted. The
main topics were Orthodoxy, nationalism, monarchism, anticommunism and anti-globalism.
One
of the most striking representatives of the new Serbian Right is the Patriotic
movement Obraz (Otačanstveni pokret Obraz). The founding convention of the
movement was held on the January 16, 1999 in Leposavic. The movement was
registered in 1999. Obraz first
appeared back in 1993, when a national-patriotic magazine with the same name
was first published. The majority of its members students of history on the
Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade. The ideological “Bible” of this organization
are the works of representatives of the Serbian Right- from Nikolaj Velimirovic
and Justin Popovic to Dimitrije Ljotic, who long before became cultic
personalities of the organicist understanding of the Serbian “national
thinking”. Even the acting ambassador in Athens, historian Dusan Batakovic,
expressed his admiration for Velimirovic
According
to the philosophy outlined in its program, Obraz
is not a party but rather a political organization which sustains the ideal of
“a rich host-ruled Serbia”. The members of Obraz
perceive democracy as an evil. They don’t “believe in the pluralism of
interests of the Serbian people, but in it’s spirit of convention, uniform
system of values and one collective destiny for all Serbs”. This is a summary
of the understanding of society advocated by Velimirovic, Justin and Ljotic.
The magazine “explored
the terrain for its political infrastructure”. One of the magazine’s
contributors was Vojislav Kostunica, who published in this same magazine his
stance regarding the Dayton Agreement with a plea for the revision and
unification of RS with Serbia.
One of Obraz’s promotive meetings was
held in Arandjelovac, in the party offices of DSS. Obraz is close to individuals, organizations and magazines of
similar orientation, like Momir Lazic’s magazine Reality (Zbilja), the
Internet magazine “Comment” (“Komentar”), and several monks and priests. Its
attitude towards political parties is best seen in the comment that “its
members have more sympathies for the Party of Serbian Unity (Arkan) or The
Serbian Radical Party (Seselj) then for the coalition Sandzak”.
The
activities of Obraz take place at two
levels: through panels and street actions. One of the well-known actions of
this organization was the prevention of the Gay parade, when around a thousand
people gathered showing readiness to confront even the police. Another
well-known action is the poster with the image of Radovan Karadzic with “Every
Serb is Radovan” written on it, which was posted throughout Serbia..
The action was condemned only by a few nongovernmental organization, but not by
the authorities.
The
growing nationalism had its reflection on the attitude towards others. The wave
of hate speech and intolerance marked the whole year, not only towards minority
groups within Serbia, but also towards its neighbors. In the begging of 2002
the minister of Foreign Affairs, Goran Svilanovic found it appropriate to
address the domestic public through the media and warn that “reconciliation
with the Croats Bosnians and Albanians is necessary”, and that the minorities
have to be respected and the hate speech finally stopped. Likewise, he directed
his appeal to his colleagues in DOS, expressing his surprise that “one of the
TV stations financed by the Federal Government allows an entire tirade of hate
towards Jews”. He specifically addressed the president of the FRY and the Prime
Minister of Serbia, characterizing their silence as louder than all the
incidents with outbursts of hate speech, and warning them that “this silence
has to be stopped”.
In the beginning of
the year Obraz went public with
“Basic Directives” where the “enemies of the Serbs” were marked. In an
exclusive proclamation they state: “We hear different individuals and groups –
all these howlers offer their own ‘way out’ and aggressively propagandize their
version of ‘love’. We hear the voices of Zionists, communists, partisans,
masons, Croat nationalists (Ustashis), Turkish converts (poturice), Moslem
nationalists (Balists), cult members, perverts, criminals, junkies, anarchists,
false nationalists, Satanists. All of them we hear loud and clear, but we do
not hear the voice of Serbian sacred (zavetne) and state-preserving
(drzavovtorne) community- the voice of the Serbian nation”.
Excesses of this sort
were not made only by organizations like Obraz,
but the hate speech has become the practice of certain politicians in DOS,
Velimir Ilic being one of the leading ones among them. He often used hate
speech for political confrontations, especially with Djindjic. The most
striking was his statement that Djindjic “brought some thugs, one Vlahovic, or
one Djelic, who disperse illusions. Imagine, the minister of enegetics Goran
Novakovic – a Croat in the Serbian Government. Imagine, Milos Minic’s daughter
being deputy of the Federal minister of Foreign Affairs. The mayor of Belgrade,
Mrs. Hrustanovic – her husband a Muslim”.
The media themselves
were not immune to hate speech, and some of them such as Serbian word (Srpska rec) and Views
(Pogledi) joined the campaign primarily along the lines of anticommunism.
Thus Srska rec responded to the
election of Radmila Hrustanovic for the Mayor of Belgrade with a commentary
that she is “a born Belgrader from Plasko in Lika. Her father is Tito’s general
Stevan Dokmanovic and she graduated at Belgrade law faculty in Sarajevo.
Married to Serif Hrustanovic from Herzegovina, more precisely Kula Fazlagica,
municipality of Gacko. During World War Two Kula Fazlagića was the
epicenter of Ustashi genocide of Serbs in East Herzegovina. Criminals from Kula
Fazlagica slaughtered more than 200 Serbs and threw them into pits«. And Pogledi
from Kragujevac sharply attacked children of communists: »Indeed, could someone
as Nenad Čanak become the master of the most civilized part of our country
had the unit of his father, the notorious Sixth Lika division, not crippled
Serbia in 1944-45? Isn’t Čanak’s rival a descendant of the best-known
communist family in Vojvodina – Veselinov? Isn’t Žarko Korać a descendant
of the leading Marxist theorist in the country? Don’t Koštunica and
Đindjić, and Svilanović also come from communist families? In
DOS even the proverbial exception that confirms the rule does not exist; they
all are children of communists.
The extremism in hate
speech was characterized by sociologist Ratko Bozovic as the failure of the
political elite. He states that with us “mainly the terms confirmed by war are
used, the old story continues and the language only reveals the context… There
is a lot of cloudy, affective sediment, misunderstanding, all stories, and it
is all visible in the language.
Ron
Haviv’s exhibition of photographs “Blood and Honey: The Balkan War Journal”
took place in Belgrade (with a stormy round table held in Rex) but it has been
banned in three Serbian cities: Čačak, Kragujevac and Kraljevo. In
Noi Sad the exhibition provoked stormy reactions from various nationalistic
circles who prevented its display through aggressive actions. The president of
the Vojvodina assembly Nenad Čanak organized security measures, but the
visitors nevertheless managed to express their wrath. Special posters were
prepared fort this occasion. The exhibition is a photo essay on the dissolution
of Yugoslavia by one of the most esteemed documentary and war photographers
from New York.
The
number of people who participated in happenings of nationalistic Right amounts
to several thousand. Ravna Gora assembled at least ten thousand people whose
consciousness is nourished by “Draža, the knife and ‘gibanica’”. Organizations
swearing to Orthodoxy and Monarchy cannot be numbered, especially since many of
them are informal. One of the Internet based right wing media (www.komentar.net) gives links to 200 different sites that
sympathizers of the Right should take into account. On those sites, among other
things, it can be read that “nothing genial cannot be created, nor can it be
lived properly, if it is not in the bosom of Serbdom, Orthodoxy and homeland”;
that the family emerges out of a “social need for the regulation of sexual
intercourse between opposite sexes and for the legitimacy of the offspring”,
but that the family in Serbia is in the first place the “guardian of
nationality, homeland, faith and culture” and in the last place a union which
satisfies the “developmental needs” of an individual.
Voices
raised by individuals and groups against the ever more frequent outbursts of
racism are generally rebuffed by Serbian nationalists with the argument that
“fascism can not be associated with the Serbian spirit and Orthodoxy” and thus
it is hard to find “someone belonging to the Serbian people who does, or would
follow an ideology such as fascism”.
Nonetheless, the skinheads don’t hide the fact that one of their goals is “the
fight for the survival of the white race and the restitution of the racial
pride, the unity of Serbian countries and the recovery of territories that were
taken away as well as the establishment of order, labor and discipline”.
Some
international organizations responded to the frequent outbursts of racism, as
for example, the Human Rights Watch who made an appeal in one of its statement
to Serbian Government to take measures against extreme nationalists. HRW also
criticized the Government for the “passivity” in confronting extreme
nationalists.
The
return of the monarchy presents an important point in the program pf Serbian
nationalistic Right. In the aftermath of October changes this issue has also
been brought up. On February 16, 2001 the Federal parliament revoked the Decree
on deprivation of citizenship and property of the Karadjordjevic family. FRY
government’s explanation points out that the Decree was illegal even from the
viewpoint of the legal system and the law on citizenship that was in power at
that time. Soon afterwards, prince Aleksandar moved into the palace complex of
the Karadjordjevic family, the White Palace in the Dedinje area.
The Serbian Renewal
Movement is the most important political party in Serbia which has always
supported monarchy. It envisages a referendum on the question of monarchy or
republic in its program. Velimir Ilic’s New Serbia is also a monarchist party.
However, according to the polls, only a quarter of the Serbian population supports
the idea of a monarchy, whereas the political parties, in general, perceive it
as a symbol of State continuity and the proof of another, noncommunist Serbia
as well as a possible mediator within the opposition ranks. In spite of the
opposition’s recurring proposal for a referendum on monarchy/republic during
the last few years the referendum never took place.
Prince Aleksandar, who
openly shows monarchist pretensions, is constantly present on the political
scene, not only in Serbia but Republika Srpska as well. He also organized three
gatherings of opposition parties: first in Budapest by the end of 1999, second
in Athens in 2000, and the third in the same year in Banjaluka. Besides direct
contacts with parties, prince Aleksandar acts through the Crown Council, whose
members are well-known individuals from the so called nationalistic block such
as Dusan Batakovic, Predrag Palavestra, Matija Beckovic, Svetlana Velmar
Jankovic, Pavle Nikolic and many others. The royal family has taken an
important place in the public social life of Serbia, and gained support among
others from the diplomatic community in Belgrade for it. Supporters of monarchy
believe that the monarchy is a symbol of stability and continuity, the
viewpoint of its opponents being that it leads straight to a genuine political
chaos. In any case the actual role of the monarchial campaign in Serbia is to
strengthen the nationalism and keep the project of a greater state alive.
A
part of the Serbian elite still does not accept the failure of realization of
the project of a greater state which is explained by a specific conspiracy of
the West against the Serbian people. The NGO “Svetozar Miletic” (formed at the
end of 2001) stands out among those who are saving the “endangered Serbian
state”. Members of this group especially preach against decentralization of
Serbia, since they see there a mere attempt to further fragmentize Serbia. The
special role of this movement is to oppose the moves by proponents of autonomy
in Vojvodina who allegedly intend “to separate Vojvodina from Serbia by passing
a special constitution for Vojvodina and internationalizing the question of
Vojvodina”.
Srdja
Trifkovic, a historian from the US, elaborates that Serbs should wait for a
better international moment to “reclaim their” territories. He says that “the
outcome of that war is not final and irreversible” that the conditions will be
met for “a new reshuffling of cards when the US looses its interest in
maintaining the new order in the Balkans, which has no real connections with US
strategic interests, when Russia starts the process of rejoining the circle of
significant powers, and when Western Europe looses it’s current missionary
appetite for constructing hybrid nations… when all of that happens, Serbs
should be ready for a revision of their defeat. All injustices they have
suffered, will be subject to that revision, from the recognition of Broz’s
territorial borders, cleansing of Krajina and the imposition of Hague’s
“collective guilt” to the absurd Dayton Bosnia, NATO bombing and the occupation
of Kosovo… The fundamental and indivisible Serbian national interest is the
territorial, political, spiritual and cultural unification of the Serbian
people, on all the territories that Serbs inhabit for centuries, within the boundaries
of their own national state.
Nikola
Popovic, another historian and director of the Institute for contemporary
history, in an interview given to “Politika”, publicly advocates a
recomposition of the Balkans along ethnical borders, with the application of
land property rights as the criterion for setting the borders, as well as an
exchange of population, following the example set by Greece and Turkey after
World War One. He openly says that Serbia has led “a war for a Serbian state”,
but that the Serbs had the misfortune “that, up to now, the West was against
the establishment of a Serbian state” and thus “the realization of the Serbian
national project is a matter of the future”.
These
views are not supported only by informal circles of intellectuals and
professional historians, but also by the highest federal and Serbian
authorities. In his presidential campaign, Vojislav Kostunica declared that
“the RS is a part of our family, dear and close to us, only temporarily
separated, but forever ours and in our hearts”, which was, in order to remove
any shadow of doubt, immediately confirmed Dragan Marsicanin: “That is a wish
of the Serbian people, a historical interest and a goal to be reached”.
Recently, in Der Speigel, Zoran Djindjic suggested a solution for
Albanians and Serbs similar to the one shared by Muslims and Croats in BIH
Federation (each community would have its own institutions). However, if
Albanians would persist in their demands for independence, Djindjic suggested a
new Dayton conference that would include “a complete redefining of the
territorial borders in the region”.
The Diaspora has taken a special place in the
promotion of the right with its conservative views. Generally, they show a
total lack of understanding for the essential problems of Serbia today. It is
more the case of a perception based on the myth about Serbia. A well known
organization is the “Serbian national defense” (“Srpska narodna odbrana”)
that has been active in the US for almost a century. The president of this
organization, Slavko Panovic, says that he remained “a Serb because he has been
attached to SPC through orthodoxy and the tradition of Saint Sava
(svetosavlje), as well as to SNO and other organizations that dealt or are
dealing with Serbian matters”. The
federal government formed a Diaspora Council and appointed 22 members of the
Council on a parity basis. For the first time a government body was established
to deal with all the important questions pertaining to this segment of the
population. It is a completely new model for arranging the relations with the
Diaspora, founded mostly on the experience of Greece. In a discussion about the
role and importance of Diaspora, Goran Svilanovic, the minister of foreign
affairs, said that “the Diaspora did nothing for its homeland (matica)”, which
caused a sharp reaction of Michael Djordjevic, president of the Congress of
Serbian Unity (Kongres srpskog ujedinjenja), who believes that the
Diaspora’s “orientation is anticommunist, mostly anti-Yugoslav and that it backs
up private property whereas a large number of individuals in the Government do
not qualify for these categories”.
The
radical nationalism reflects itself also on the question of language that has
again been actualized. It goes as far as negating the equality of the Latin
alphabet, although it has always been one of the two alphabets with equal
rights of use in the Serbian language. Debates on the Cyrillic alphabet are
especially revived in Vojvodina. On the February 12, 2002, the association for
the protection of the Cyrillic alphabet (“Ćirilica”) held its first annual
assembly in Novi Sad, and amongst other things, it has been stated that “the
Cyrillic alphabet is our only alphabet, which has, for 175 years, given shelter
to our oldest cultural institution – the Matica in its spiritual efforts and
creativeness”, and that it has always been “the basic instrument for the
intellectual and civilization development of our society”. During the same
assembly it could be heard that “everything worthy in the long history of
Serbian people (has been written) in our first and basic alphabet”, the
Cyrillic. Concern has been expressed that in spite of all “the suppressing of
the Cyrillic is a constant process”, which the Serbs themselves are guilty for,
since “the state institutions, state services and state officials, who are the
only ones who have an adequate possibility to reverse the course of reality in
this case, still do not do what they are obliged to”. Dragoljub Zbiljic, the
president of the executive board of “Ćirilica” goes as far as declaring
that in “our circumstances the Cyrillic is, before all, a question of the
state”. Protectors of the Cyrillic perceive the Latin alphabet as exclusively
Croatian, and Cyrillic as the Serbian alphabet. Tiodor Ristic says that the
Serbian people were “left without the name for their language. What has
happened to the Serbs has not happened to any other nation in the world in
recent history. Through religion and language, the Serbian people have been
assimilated by other nations, those who were conceived on its national ruins,
which is a unique case. From Vuk’s Serbs of three religions – Orthodox,
Catholic and Islamic and one language, three nations were formed, as well as
three languages, with the intention of create a fourth, phantom Montenegrian
language, besides the so called Bosniak or Bosnian,”.
The
Hague tribunal is the biggest thorn in the flesh of the Serb right, as they
understand it as “the prolongation of the war against Serbs, only by other
means”, thus “those in Hague prisons are nothing but prisoners of war”. Radovan
Karadzic is perceived as the symbol of new Serbian nationalism and it is said
that: “as long as he is in the mountains and caves, Karadzic stays a thin
glimmer of hope that one day that country will be a better place for the Serbs”.
The committee for the truth about Karadzic claims that Dr. Karadzic “will not
surrender alive” and that “his persecutors are looking for him with such
perseverance” because he had “become a part of a myth and a legend, and every
new failure of the Atlantic pact to get hold of him, makes this legend stronger
and sturdier”; that was also on the mind “of the folk poet (guslar) when he
introduced him as the only Serb into the national poem.” A
great part of the Serbian right, despite proclaimed anticommunist beliefs,
perceives the Milosevic trial in much the same way, placing it in the context
of a denial of the Hague tribunal on the whole, as a manifestation of the
conspiracy of the International community against the Serbian people.
The
absence of a critical approach by the broader public to the new rise of the
nationalist right urged a group of intellectuals to address the wider Serbian
cultural public with a letter of warning.
This letter warns of “a rebirth of the radical nationalism and new populism,
which can be recognized by a matrix of a noticeably political-ideological sort,
as well as the notorious cliché, communist as much as nationalist, about the
‘bright future’ and ‘brilliant past’. It seems that Serbia is dragging its feet
towards the future, determinedly looking back and sunk into the past.
Differences between the communist left and nazi right on the political scene
are lost”. The letter also points at “intermingling of the power structures
within SANU, the Army headquarters and the Church, with the participation of
powerful party representatives” which creates an atmosphere in which “the
public, after continuously loosing four wars under the rule of Milosevic, is
being pushed, in the name of resentment, towards a new single-mindedness that differs
from the communist one by altered symbols but can be more vicious than the
former. This new single-mindedness is marked by the totalitarian and
undemocratic ideology of Milan Nedic, Dimitrije Ljotic as well as by a triumph
of “the provincial philosophy” of Nikolaj Velimirovic. The group of
intellectuals warns that there must not be “any hesitation in the choice of the
road between modernization and retardation, between Nazism and democracy, the
province and Europe”. Further on, the letter says that it does not suffice to
remove Milosevic from power, but rather a “change the whole system” is needed.
This letter provoked intense reactions and
other intellectuals joined the appeal soon after, as for example Sima Cirkovic,
a historian, who pointed out that “the events the letter draws attention to are
rooted and nourished by some common traits of the present mentality, which only
a few struggle against: arrogance, intolerance, lack of objectivity and
realism. In an effort to restore the lost national self-respect, faltered by
the defeat and disgrace caused by a fatally erroneous politics, messages of
encouragement are aired that support and strengthen this mentality”.
The
Serbian Orthodox Church refuted allegations of this group of intellectuals, and
in issued a declaration accusing them for a brutal attack and putting forth
“absurd statements” about a conspiracy of the Church, Academy of Sciences, the
Army and political leaders against their own people. They are accused of
“asking for a change of the cultural model, failing to set names like Saint
Sava, Mihailo Pupin, Mokranjac, Hajduk Veljko, Stefan Milenkovic and Dejan
Bodiroga” as examples, but rather “offer themselves and those who they consider
to be the intellectual elite of Serbia”.
SPC
puts emphasis on the fact that, besides a transformation of the economical and
judicial system, Serbia needs a change of the cultural model, one that would
stem from the Orthodox religion and the all-encompassing experience of the
people. When the Serbian people return to such a cultural model “the
establishment of a modern economic and judicial system will also bear the right
fruits. Only then will our country be ready to join the European Union as an
equal partner and spiritually enrich it with our authentic values”.
The
SANU also expressed its view of the appeal and qualified it as a “mere
pamphlet”, which has been promoted by all o media, even those owned by the
state. Its statement declares that “the logic of the state media requires that
space be provided for an institution such as SANU to express its own views”.
Conclusions and
Recommendations:
·
In the aftermath of
the October changes a reinforcement of new radical nationalism and new populism
expressed itself through anti-Semitism, anticommunism xenophobia, xenomisia and
increased intolerance. The appropriate ideological matrix is more and more
based on the conservative Serbian thought put forward by: Nikolaj
Velimirović, Justin Popović, Dimitrije Ljotić. The essence of
their ideas can be summed up as anti-individualism, an understanding of the
nation as an organic community and anti-western feelings. Due to its simplified
perception of the society and the world this type of nationalism is very
attractive for young generations which, in their pursuit of identity, accept
the readily available system of values without criticism.
·
By refusing to
accept the defeat and by nourishing the illusion of the “return of lost
territories” Serbian nationalism deepens the frustrations of the society and
creates preconditions for revanchism towards neighbors. The recent statement of
prime minister Djindjic about the “new Dayton” with reference to the same
principle in the cases of both BiH and Kosovo discloses the fact that the new
authorities have not abandoned the idea of redefining the borders on the
Balkans.
·
Serbia has neither
the strength nor the potential to prevail over the new wave of populism and
nationalism on her own, and as a consequence may be lastingly isolated and
impeded in its transition as well as the restitution of links with its
neighborhood and Europe in a wider sense. Hence the international community
needs to assert the character of Serbian nationalism and position itself
accordingly from both the ethical and the political point of view, since by
perceiving it as “liberal nationalism” it only makes it legitimate and thus
adds to confusion.
·
Right now
anti-western feelings and a denial of the Hague tribunal are the main features
of Serbian nationalism, resulting in an obstruction of transition and the
fulfillment of accepted international obligations. Due to the lack of a liberal
vision of the Serbian society and its future the international community needs
to make a strategic decision aimed at the creation of a new elite which is
going to correspond with the European system of values through supporting the
radical changes in education, especially in elementary and secondary schools.
The
Army of Yugoslavia
At
a meeting in Belgrade on 27 December 2002, the Supreme Defence Council,
presided over by Vojislav Koštunica, adopted a Defence Inspectorate report on
‘the inspection and appraisal of units and institutions of the Army of
Yugoslavia carried out in 2002’.
The report, submitted
to the Council by General Ninoslav Krstić, was not available for public
scrutiny. The public was also kept in the dark about many other problems
concerning military affairs in spite of frequent references made throughout the
year by both military and civil authorities to transparency and democratic
civil control.
The
Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) was said officially to have functioned in 2002 in the
best possible manner in spite of ‘very complex conditions’ including chronic
shortage of finance. Early in 2003 the weekly Vojska wrote, among other things, that ‘...it was generally
concluded that the set objectives were fully achieved in spite of the fact that
combat training during 2002 was organized and realized in exceptionally complex
conditions, above all in view of the restrictive financing and the resulting
difficulties...’
Such general statements about the VJ are nothing new. However, references to
combat training alone are no indicator of the true military strength of the VJ
because all the ‘more severe tests’ of its combat readiness boiled down to
several minor exercises involving special forces.
The
VJ kept searching for an identity throughout 2002, being as much confused and
disinclined to concede defeat as the society as a whole. The Orthodox and Serb
military traditions it invoked and cherished were hardly the right setting in
which to solve the dilemma about participation in the new security architecture
for the region and Europe. The VJ tried to move towards Euro-Atlantic
integration but its efforts were hindered by socio-political, psychological and
professional factors which could be analyzed at three levels: VJ
reorganization, Serb Orthodoxy and military traditions as a determinant of
morale, and barriers along the road to Europe.
I REORGANIZATION
In
domestic official military-political parlance the terms ‘reorganization’,
‘transformation’ and ‘reform’ with reference to the VJ always have the same
meaning, i.e. the transfiguration of the VJ into a new quality!
1.
Tactical-Level Reductions
Reform
of the VJ started with the creation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
in 1992, when the former Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) was renamed the Army of
Yugoslavia. Discussion of the matter was expedited during 2001 and especially
2002 as the time for establishing the new state-union of Serbia and Montenegro
drew near. VJ reforms were first announced by General Nebojša Pavković as
chief operative in the ‘heroic resistance to the NATO aggressor’ in 1999. The
new ‘supreme commander’ Koštunica took no back seat to his ‘glorious’
predecessor Milošević in inordinately praising this leading general.
Pavković was thus to become the chief designer and executive of the
‘transformation’, i.e. of reducing the VJ first at a tactical and then at a
strategic level.
The
first stage of ‘transformation’ or ‘tactical-level reorganization’ was carried
out between October 2001 and the end of February 2002. In this period some ten
regiment- and brigade-level units and institutions and some twenty
battalion-level units were disbanded while about fifty units ranging from
company to regiment were either re-formed or relocated.
The number of VJ members affected by the cuts is not known. While the General
Staff and the political circles around President Vojislav Koštunica hailed the
operation, which was carried out according to Pavković’s ‘Project for the
VJ’s tactical-level rationalization and partial reorganization’, as an
extraordinary achievement, prominent analysts were of the opinion that it ought
to have been effected soon after the signing of the 1995 Dayton Accords.
No
one asked publicly why it had taken the VJ so much time to reduce its regular
troops given the high cost of their maintenance and the grave economic
situation in the country. However, since the VJ and the Serbian Orthodox Church
(SPC) are the two most trusted institutions in Serbia, the absence of public
pressure for the VJ’s rationalization and transformation was hardly surprising.
2.
Reorganization and
Strategic-Level
‘Reorganization’
Most
‘rationalization’ having been effected by the end of 2001, the Supreme Defence
Council met on 26 December and decided that the VJ should move on to a ‘higher
stage’ of self-organization entailing the abolition of the army commands.
The public was informed of the decision by the office of President Koštunica.
Contrary to expectations, Pavković did not go into his ‘well-earned
retirement’. On 27 December 2001 Koštunica spoke up for ‘his general’,
stressing that ‘General Nebojša Pavković suggested that he should go, but
I asked him to stay for the sake of the reforms being carried out in the Army
of Yugoslavia’. Koštunica also said that ‘in the course of last year the Army
embarked upon substantial structural changes, the most sweeping to have been
undertaken by any of our institutions’.
27
February 2002 was the last day of the existence of the strategic-level commands
(the First Command in Belgrade, the Second Command in Podgorica, the Third
Command in Niš, the Air Force and Air Defence Command, and the Navy Command).
However, at the same time no fewer than nine corps were formed – six Army
corps, an Air Force Corps, an Air Defence Corps, and a Navy Corps. This was
twice the number of corps in possession of any of the former Yugoslav republics.
The
reaction of the circle around Koštunica to the abolition of the army commands
was of two kinds: while some grieved for Serbia’s ‘long, rich and glorious army
tradition’, others addressed congratulations to the VJ leaders. On the eve of
VJ Day, 16 June 2002, Koštunica gave an interview to Vojska in which he said, among other things, ‘That complex and
extensive task was carried out in an extremely short time and the VJ changed
over to a corps-brigade form of organization without experiencing a disruption
of or any major difficulties in command. The second stage, involving a large
number of organizational-mobilizational changes, is about to be completed. It
seems to me that the third stage, due to be completed at the year’s end, will
be the hardest and most painful because of the projected reduction of the VJ’s
numerical strength to between 60,000 and 65,000’.
Overdue
for nearly a decade and involving the mere elimination of a step in the
strategic-level chain of command of the VJ, the operation was objectively not a
simple affair because it was resented by the military establishment. By that
time armies had already been phased out elsewhere in Europe as too cumbersome,
unwieldy, inefficient and expensive strategic formations. Their survival in the
FRY was an anachronism reflecting a conservative tradition and the isolationism
of Slobodan Milošević.
The
changes carried out in the VJ so far – not only those made in 2002 but those
effected before
– have not brought about substantial transformation because such a goal cannot
be achieved without political will and enormous financial resources. One also
wonders whether genuine transformation is possible at all without taking stock
of the armed forces’ role in the recent wars and making the findings public, and
without making a clear break with the Milošević legacy in the spheres of
defence and security. So far the Supreme Defence Council and the Federal
Government, including the Ministry of Defence, have not exhibited a readiness
to move in the right direction. There is much obstruction on the part of the VJ
itself: its members, who are no doubt aware that their professional interests
are at stake, keep warning that the organization is perilously close to penury.
The
numerical strength of the FRY peacetime armed forces is still unknown. General
Branko Krga said that as a result of the ‘first and second phases of change’
the VJ had been reduced to ’80,000 formation posts’;
Vojislav Koštunica predicted that the VJ’s numerical strength would be reduced
to 60,000 to 65,000 during the ‘third stage of reform’ at the end of 2002; and
General Krga said again, in his capacity as the new Chief of the General Staff,
that the ‘numerical strength of the VJ stands at 77,000, with plans to reduce
it to 60,000-65,000’.
The conclusion to be drawn from the above is that the ‘third stage of reorganization’
provided for by the ‘dynamic plan’ of Nebojša Pavković and referred to by
Vojislav Koštunica has not even begun. The FRY or rather the state-union of
Serbia and Montenegro still has a massive peacetime army whose numerical
strength is out of proportion with the country’s objective needs as well as its
material and demographic potentials.
II SERB ORTHODOXY AND
MILITARY
TRADITIONS AS INSPIRATION
FOR MORALE
For
all its talk that the VJ is ready for change and that its numerical strength
must reflect the ‘needs and potentials of the state’, the officer corps is
largely of the opinion that Serbia and Montenegro ought to possess the most
respectable and most numerous armed force in the region. This aspiration
permeates not only the ‘officer caste’ but nearly every level of social and
political life of the state-union
because it is firmly entrenched in a set of beliefs deeply implanted in the
Serb nation. The Serb political elite continues to believe that the FRY (i.e.
Serbia and Montenegro) and its army are the ‘key factor of peace and stability
in the Balkans’. Domestic military analysts are convinced that more or less all
the countries in the immediate neighbourhood should attach themselves
voluntarily or otherwise to this ‘geostrategic’ and ‘geopolitical’ ‘backbone’
of the Balkans on their road to regional and wider collective security. This
implies that any collective security arrangement not including Serbia, and
consequently Montenegro, will be flawed because it would not enjoy Serbia’s political
backing.
The
newspaper publishing enterprise Vojska has published jointly with the
publishing house Idea a book of ‘capital value’ for the Serb nation: Jovan
Janićijević’s Srbija
između istoka i zapada (Serbia Between East and West). The chief
message of the book is that ‘actually, strategically, geopolitically or
otherwise, Serbia is the manor on the highway, the centre of the Balkans, a
boundary between cultures and religions – a space between East and West...’
The book voices the predominant attitude and enjoys the endorsement of the
General Staff (the Directorate for Morale).
1.
The Refusal to Assume Responsibility
The
overemphasis on morale in general and on its ‘crucial segments’ in particular,
especially within the professional component of the VJ, is proportional to the
demoralization and overall confusion of society and the military. The VJ’s
persistent refusal to assume any responsibility for the warlike policy and war
crimes is encouraged by its leadership and clearly condoned by certain segments
of society because the VJ is still the most popular institution. A leading
article in Vojska says among other
things: ‘The military personnel quite naturally resent and are hurt by the
numerous insinuations of all kinds because, if for no other reason, they still
feel the smell of gunpowder from the recent war operations in which, true to
their tradition and their glorious predecessors, they performed the duty of
their profession honestly yet again, even placing sacrifices at the altar of
their people’s freedom-loving. They thus defended their honour, reputation,
showing once again that the Army is the chief guarantor of the survival of this
state, which is the will and the wish of the people whose confidence – if
public opinion polls are to be trusted – it enjoys more than anybody else...’
The
conviction that Serbia has a special role to play in the Balkans is widely held
although numerous statements leave no doubt that the VJ still has no clear
picture about which territory belongs to whom. This is borne out by, among
other things, the same leading article in Vojska:
‘...the current socio-political and economic situation in the country has a
bearing on morale, which is all the more reason to defend the dignity and
reputation of the members of the Army of Yugoslavia at every step and at all
costs. All who wear or wore its uniform must place this before their personal
needs and interests, as much in the name of their tradition and their glorious
forbears as in the name of their meritorious contemporaries, who during war on
our soil over the past decade exhibited considerable professionalism and
patriotism...’
As
the organ of the VJ, Vojska exerts
considerable influence on the officer corps and plays an important part in
shaping and boosting their morale. The ‘majestic resistance to the aggressor in
1999’, a subject to which the General Staff devoted a comprehensive
multi-disciplinary study the same year, figured prominently in the weekly’s
morale-building activities.
‘The study of the FRY’s defence during the NATO aggression, occupying over
2,000 pages, has thus become a part of the spiritual inheritance of the Serb
and Montenegrin people who, as on countless occasions before throughout the
century, shouldered the burden of its freedom-loving traditions at the century’s
very end...’
2.
The VJ and the Church
On
28 November 2000, the VJ Directorate for Morale organized a round-table
discussion on ‘Regulation of religious issues in the Army of Yugoslavia’.
The title was craftily worded so as to help the Church, above all the SPC, to
establish itself and divine service in the barracks. The introductory speech
was delivered by General Milen Saimić, then head of the Directorate. Since
both generals and SPC leaders had ‘anticipated with certainty’ that in the
aftermath of the 5 October changes there would be ‘even fiercer onslaughts on
the spiritual being of the Serb people...it is imperative to erect a strong
bulwark against any spiritual colonization by means of all kinds of sects,
cults and occult practices, which would be the only safe way to preserve our
spiritual and national identity...’
It might be said that it was after that that Orthodox shrines began to be
visited on a massive scale.
On
Ascension Day in Belgrade last year, Military Academy cadets from all three services
marched meekly in the procession right behind the cross, the flags and the
icons, ‘carrying the slava icon of
the City Assembly and the icon Virgin with Three Hands, a gift by Chilandar
Monastery’.
This first joint appearance of military and religious personnel (‘ideologues’
and ‘politicians’) was incompatible with the secular character of the state;
what is more, not all of Serbia’s citizens are Orthodox Christians or even
religious.
On
6 February 2002, the newspaper publishing enterprise Vojska promoted Colonel
Borislav Grozdić’s book Pravoslavlje
i rat (Orthodoxy and War) in the VJ’s Central Club in Belgrade.
The work was published by the VJ General Staff organ in feuilleton form in some
ten instalments. Dr Miodrag Petrović, a scientific adviser of the
Institute of History of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) who was
among the reviewers of the book, wrote: ‘As the Orthodox faith is deeply woven
into the ethnic consciousness of the Serbs, their identity is inconceivable
without it. The book should be perused as a work deeply devoted to Serb
patriotism and imbued with love of God and man. It stresses that one should
love even one’s enemies as long as they do not harm one’s nearest and
dearest...’
When
the remains of Prince Lazar were moved from Ravanica Monastery to Lazarica
Church on St Vitus’ Day last year, the procession of pilgrims included a large
group of officers who had turned out to pay homage to the martyred prince.
For the second year running, on 27 January, St Sava’s Day, the Directorate for
Morale organized a concert in the VJ Central Club.
On this day, which happens to be the patron-saint’s day or slava of the 72nd Brigade, an elite unit of the VJ, the brigade and
other units were treated to a reading of Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović’s
‘philosophical thoughts’ on war and the army.
At the same time, a group of commissioned and non-commissioned officers went on
a pilgrimage to Chilandar Monastery on Mount Athos. A
group of cadets and officers attended a memorial service for the defenders of
Belgrade held in Ružica Church in Belgrade’s Kalemegdan fortress, after which
they posed for a group photograph with Patriarch Pavle.
And the governor of the Military Academy Hospital (VMA), General Zoran
Stanković, played host to the Patriarch at a function commemorating the
Hospital’s 158th anniversary.
Summing
up the performance of the VJ’s engineer corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Marko
Lonić from the Engineer Corps Directorate said, ‘True to the tradition of
their forbears, the members of the engineer corps rendered their assistance to
the Serbian Orthodox Church by repairing and reconstructing roads leading to
the monasteries of Ostrog, Šišatovac, Mužići, Sukovo, Soko-grad, Prohor
Pčinjski, Slanci, Dubrava, thus helping to establish spiritual and
physical contact between the people and Orthodox shrines, as well as making it
possible for both the people and the Army of Yugoslavia to expand their
knowledge of their roots’.
The
joint editing and printing by the newspaper publishing enterprise Vojska and
the publishing house Pravoslavna reč (Orthodox word) of Novi Sad of a
‘capital work’ from the standpoint of the Serb nation – the Grand Encyclopaedia
Monasteries of Serbia – was probably
the ultimate proof of the VJ’s reverence for Serb Orthodox shrines. Although
the prestigious ‘publishing achievement of the year’ award eluded this lavishly
designed book by Slobodan Mileusnić at last year’s Book Fair in Belgrade,
the head of the VJ newspaper publishing enterprise, Colonel Stanoje Jovanović,
received ‘plaudits’ from the FRY President.
In
spite of its financial problems, the VJ managed to publish another book with
the rather provocative title of Crnogorsko
srpstvo zbiljskih Srba (The Montenegrin Serbness of True Serbs). The book
was serialized by Vojska at a time
when Serbian and Montenegrin officials haggled over the fine points of a
constitutional charter drawn up to define the new state-union of Serbia and
Montenegro.
Yet another book to be published, running to nearly 1,000 pages, was Vojskovođa sa oreolom mučenika
(Army Leader With a Martyr’s Halo). Its author Ivan Matović, who earned a
notoriety as editor-in-chief of the army organs Vojska and Narodna Armija
(People’s Army) during the early 1990s, not only tries to rehabilitate the
highly controversial World War Two ‘army leader’, Arso Jovanović, but to
put him on a pedestal as a popular ‘hero-martyr’ and victim of Josip Broz
Tito’s disreputable character and ineptitude as commander!
In
May the VJ financed a festival of much-publicized martial songs and marches
with the mawkish title ‘My Soldier!’
The new ambitious head of the Directorate for Morale, Colonel Slobodan
Stojanović, said (and others concurred) that the event would help boost
morale in the VJ! Also, the generals headed by the new Chief of the General
Staff, Branko Krga, felt it was their honour and patriotic duty to help
transfer the remains of the controversial Chetnik General Svetomir
Đurić from Germany to the fatherland
with full military honours.
In
the profuse publishing output of the VJ there was hardly a title dealing with
the anti-fascist struggle of the Serb and Montenegrin peoples during the Second
World War. There was certainly not a title devoted to any aspect of human
rights and liberties and democracy, nothing to show that the VJ’s attitude
towards the values of civilization and humanistic processes goes beyond the
obsessive cocoon of its (Serb) nation.
III BARRIERS TO THE
PARTNERSHIP
FOR PEACE
The
question of Yugoslavia’s participation in the programme Partnership for Peace
figured prominently on the military-political scene in Serbia and Yugoslavia
last year, and several important discussions were held on the subject with the
participation of foreign experts. On the other hand, however, the prospect of
the VJ’s affiliation to regional and wider European security associations ran
up against all kinds of obstacles of which mental and psychological barriers
proved more formidable than people thought.
Oppressed
by the recent war past which they would be happiest to forget, the VJ colonels
and generals would like to see the VJ affiliated with a regional security
system on condition that it call the shots. Their arguments range from their
conviction that the VJ is the chief power in the region and that the
international community tacitly regards it as such, to the merits of the
country’s geo-strategic position. Viewed in this context, last summer’s
shooting on the Danube island near Šarengrad was not a mere incident whatever
the official interpretation.
Likewise, the agreement in principle reached by Croatia and the FRY regarding
the status of the Prevlaka peninsula is not viewed in Serbia and Montenegro
merely as a step towards establishing good-neighbourly relations between
Croatia and Montenegro.
1.
Scandals Involving Generals
The
numerous scandals involving generals which shook the VJ could be viewed as an
obstacle to integration into European processes. The chief protagonists were
three generals all of whom are now retired: Momčilo Perišić,
allegedly caught in an act of espionage; Nebojša Pavković, the only chief
of the General Staff to have been sacked so far, though the circumstances of
his dismissal remain controversial; and Jovan Čeković, a key figure
in illicit arms deals with Iraq.
The
first two affairs have several points in common: all signs are that they were
engineered and provoked by the people close to President Koštunica; the people
who manufactured them obviously regard such drastic strikes against the
sensitive military structure as an appropriate tool in the power struggle waged
primarily on Serbia’s military-political stage between the political camps led
by Koštunica and Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić; the
scandals indicate that the VJ is still as much manipulated and abused for
political ends as it was by Slobodan Milošević; the affairs also show that
although the VJ was under civil control that control was by no means
democratic, which is especially true of its secret services – the Intelligence
Service and the Security Service better known as KOS. The third scandal is only
formally linked to the first two.
a) Perišić
On
the evening of 14 March 2002, VJ police arrested Momčilo Perišić and
US diplomat John David Neighbor in the Knin Restaurant of the Šarić Motel
on the Ibar Highway. In short, Perišić, President of the Movement for
Democratic Serbia and then Serbian Deputy Prime Minister, and the member of the
US embassy in Belgrade were accused of espionage; the first of taking
confidential and highly classified documents out of the General Staff with the
assistance of Colonel Miodrag Sekulović, who was then in active service,
the second of receiving those documents from Perišić. The military
prosecuting authorities took immediate action but Perišić was protected by
his parliamentary immunity and remains at large to this day.
The
VJ Security Service had been preparing the trap for Perišić for a long
time, most probably on someone’s instructions. As time went by the initial
suspicions that the ‘operation’ was planned by Koštunica’s office turned out to
be well-founded. This was yet another disastrous move by Koštunica, who had
hoped to seriously undermine the position of his chief rival, Serbian Prime
Minister Zoran Đinđić, as well as to shore up his own declining
popularity by dropping a bombshell in the form of an espionage scandal with
Đinđić’s deputy as the chief culprit.
The
outcome was probably not what the VJ Security Service and its chief, General
Tomić, wanted and anticipated. Whatever the true objective of this fumble,
the signals picked up by various quarters were quite clear: first, Koštunica’s
rivals no longer doubted whom the VJ backed in the political power struggle in
Serbia and Yugoslavia; second, the Chief Prosecutor at the Hague Tribunal,
Carla del Ponte, must have realized that she could not count on any serious
cooperation on the part of the VJ; third, those who had been demanding that the
VJ secret services be placed under democratic control by state and civil
institutions knew that the move would be seriously resisted.
b) Pavković
On
the surface, the ‘Pavković affair’ was linked to the ‘Perišić affair’
in at least two ways: first, the VJ Security Service was involved in both;
second, the reason formally given for Pavković’s dismissal was his refusal
to confirm Perišić’s ‘treachery’. Before that, Koštunica (and the circle
of his seen and unseen advisers) had long (and quite unreasonably) been
resisting the demands of the ruling DOS coalition to dismiss Pavković from
his post as Chief of the General Staff. Even after this demand was explicitly
repeated at the fifth session of the Supreme Defence Council – the first
sitting starting on 24 March and the second ending a week later – Pavković
came out unscathed. Then, quite unexpectedly, at the sixth session of the
Council on 24 June, the ‘supreme commander’ surprised everybody by exercising
his ‘constitutional power’ and dismissing Pavković. The shock was all the
greater in view of the fact that Koštunica acted against the opposition of the
two other members of the Council, Milan Milutinović and Milo
Đukanović, and did not permit their objections to be discussed at any
length. After the session, Koštunica’s Military Office drafted a statement
saying that the ‘supreme commander’ had decided to take the step because
Pavković had failed to help General Tomić to ‘clarify the
Perišić espionage affair’. It was also stated, with quite a bit of
cynicism, that Pavković also had to go ‘in the name of democracy and civil
control of the Army’.
The
subsequent spate of grave recriminations between Koštunica and Pavković
brought to the surface many other things and laid bare the VJ’s part in the
political games. When Koštunica installed General Branko Krga in
Pavković’s place everything seemed to be in order again, at least to the
uninitiated.
c) Čeković
When
in October 2002 a scandal broke out involving the foreign trade firm Jugoimport
– SDPR over alleged exports of weapons and military equipment to Iraq and the
servicing of Saddam Hussein’s war machine,
the first questions were raised about corruption in the very top echelons of
the VJ. Nevertheless, the domestic media refrained from treating it as a major
scandal, nor did they present its true proportions and possible consequences
for the country’s international position. The ‘patriotic front’ reacted
immediately and angrily, accusing the ‘West of engineering yet another ploy
against the Serb people’. On 12 October 2002 SFOR raided the Orao aircraft
works in Bijeljina
and found irrefutable evidence that took the wind out of Belgrade’s sails. The
evidence left no doubt that for a very long time weapons and military equipment
had been exported from the FRY (and Republika Srpska) to Iraq (an some other
prohibited destinations). The Federal Government convened in an extraordinary
session after Richard Boucher, the State Department spokesman, sharply warned
the Belgrade (and Banjaluka) ruling elites that it was time they stopped
servicing Saddam Hussein’s armed forces. The session brought about the
dismissal of Jovan Čeković, Slobodan Milošević’s hand-picked
general who acted as the company’s director-general, and of General Ivan
Đokić as the ‘person in the Federal Ministry of Defence objectively
responsible for trade and military equipment’. The Government also closed down
Jugoimport’s representative office in Baghdad headed by Colonel Krsto
Grujić.
The
sacking of these three generals was the de
facto extent of the ‘purge of responsible persons’.
There were no further resignations or dismissals in the Ministry of Defence,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Federal Government, and the General Staff
in spite of warnings that the practice amounted to a breach of a UN Security
Council resolution and could lead to severe consequences for the FRY. The
affair petered out after two months with the United States, determined to
dismantle Saddam Hussein’s war machine at all costs, apparently deciding to
treat the FRY leniently at least in public. One wonders whether all arms trade
between Belgrade and Baghdad has stopped because some of the numerous
roundabout channels built over the years may still be in operation.
The
state organs reacted to the disclosure of the Baghdad link irresponsibly, not indicating
that they were aware of the seriousness of the problem. By playing down the
problem, washing their hands of it, and dismissing the services rendered as
mere ‘repair of obsolete aircraft’, some DOS leaders proved not only that they
were ignorant and amateurs but that they were also involved in and tolerated
every malpractice of the former regime.
Although
the servicing of Saddam Hussein’s military hardware could not have been
possible without the involvement of military experts of all kinds, the VJ
General Staff and the Ministry of Defence insisted to the very end that the VJ
had nothing to do with ‘this business’.
The
general military arrangements between Belgrade and Baghdad are of long
standing. The military industry of the former SFRY exported everything
including manufactured and intermediary goods, technology, scientific projects,
experts, and projects for educating Iraqi officers. Though a good many of these
arrangements were severed following Operation Desert Storm and war in the
former Yugoslavia, ‘military cooperation’ between Belgrade and Baghdad was
never discontinued. On the contrary, continuing exports of arms and military
equipment to Iraq, complemented with transfer of appropriate military
technology and highly-skilled labour, testify that the policy and practice of
Slobodan Milošević are still alive.
By
reacting as and when it did, the US Administration made clear that although it
had been aware of the Belgrade-Baghdad connection all the time, it decided to
intervene only after US interests had been crossed. However, the affair was
soon shunted to the sidelines after the State Department addressed a number of
objections to the International Crisis Group over its report on the Yugoslav
connection in the arming of Saddam Hussein.
2.
Civil Control of the VJ
Establishing
civil control over the armed forces was a prime topic regarding the VJ
throughout last year.
The publicly promoted view was that Yugoslavia must put the civil-military
relations on a new footing so that all parts of the armed forces could be
subjected to democratic control by civilian authorities. A special impetus was
given by some international associations and institutions which insisted that
civil control of the VJ was a necessary condition for FRY and VJ participation
in Euro-Atlantic integrations.
The
professionals in the VJ themselves graduated from outright rejection or mockery
– ‘We won’t let ourselves be controlled by some civilians’ and ‘An innocent
view of...’
– to almost buttonholing parliamentarians and other politicians to come and
control the army. Needless to say, their idea of such control envisaged formal,
almost perfunctory inspection of ancillary structures, services, etc. Thus, at
the end of August 2002, the President of the Security and Defence Committee of
the federal parliament, Boris Tadić, led a parliamentary delegation on
‘quick check’ of the Priština Corps.
Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs Dušan Mihajlović visited the Niš and
Priština corps on a similar errand in mid-September, and the Speaker of the
Chamber of Citizens of the federal parliament, Dragoljub Mićunović,
lead a team of assistants to VJ forward positions on the administrative border
with Kosovo in October.
Of
course, such visits too can give one an insight into the state of affairs in
the VJ. However, in such cases the professionals quite naturally choose to show
the ‘controllers’ only that which can help improve their public image while
keeping everything else out of their sight. Deliberately and effectively, the
VJ projects a public image of itself as someone willing to submit to civil
control while carefully keeping its dark secrets from public scrutiny. An
example of this practice was the persistent refusal of Nebojša Pavković to
permit the KOS and the Intelligence Service to be moved from the General Staff
to the Ministry of Defence. Likewise, General Krga refused to permit General
Aleksandar Tomić or anyone from the Security Service to testify before a
committee of inquiry of the Serbian Government in connection with the
Pavković affair!
The
first steps towards establishing civil control of the VJ according to
democratic principles and procedure were nevertheless taken during the course
of last year, and the Federal Assembly on 20 June 2002 adopted a Law on the
Security Services.
All that, however, was insufficient because civil-military relations must first
be regulated by law laying down the rights and obligations of the civil and
military structures in dealing with each other. These initial steps appear
unconvincing because while the political establishment wants to control the
military it does not know what and how to control. For example, it is still
unknown who draws up the military budget, let alone how the funds are spent.
Parliament also does not know the full extent of the VJ’s publishing activities
although these are paid for from the budget, or how come the SPC has become so
firmly entrenched in the VJ without anyone bothering to ask parliament what its
position on the matter was. Only in-depth democratic control would disclose the
true nature of the VJ ‘in whom our people have almost unlimited confidence’, as
the officer corps likes to point out frequently.
3.
The Partnership for Peace
On
25 March 2002, at its fifth session chaired by Koštunica, the Supreme Defence
Council ‘launched an initiative for the FR Yugoslavia to accede to the
Partnership for Peace programme’.
In this connection, ‘it was recommended that the Federal Government obtain the
opinion of the Federal Assembly on the initiative at the earliest opportunity
so that negotiations could be commenced in a timely fashion’. This was the
start of the formal procedure for the accession of Yugoslavia and its armed
forces to the Partnership for Peace.
Had
Belgrade offered the international community more credible evidence that the
Republika Srpska Army no longer received any financial (and other logistic)
support from this side of the Drina river; had civil control been established
over the VJ on the model of Western democracies; had the remaining two from the
‘Vukovar three’, i.e. Šljivančanin and Radić, been extradited to the
Hague Tribunal along with Ratko Mladić, who had been strutting through
Belgrade under the protection of military special forces (a fact which came to
public notice especially during the Pavković affair) – had all this
happened, Yugoslavia would probably have been admitted to the Partnership for
Peace before the Constitutional Charter of the state-union was even adopted!
Last
year was marked by the eager efforts of the European Union, NATO, and even the
US Administration – all of whom placed their trust in those politicians and
economists in Belgrade who, in the wake of Milošević’s political downfall,
had come to international notice in the spheres of diplomacy, economy, and
finance – to see Yugoslavia in the Council of Europe and the Partnership for
Peace.
This encouragement was based on various motives. International Balkans experts
made clear in their numerous statements that they saw a disorganized and
unstable Serbia and Yugoslavia as a potential source of instability for the
whole region. Some of them clearly thought that the sickest man of the Balkans
and Europe stood greater chance of a democratic recovery if he joined in
Euro-Atlantic integration processes, including the Partnership for Peace, even
if he did not meet the admission criteria.
But Serbia and Montenegro did next to nothing on their part to justify such
confidence.
On
the other hand, quite a few domestic analysts, politicians, and generals on
whom the benevolent attitude of the international community was not lost
predicted that Yugoslavia would join the Partnership for Peace if not in the
first then in the second half of the year. However, the NATO summit in Prague
on 21-22 November 2002 came and went without any such invitation being
extended.
The FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina remain the only two European states left in
NATO’s waiting-room.
In
spite of the fact that membership of the Council of Europe and the Partnership
for Peace has been delayed, domestic commentators, politicians, and generals
remain optimistic. Thus Minister of Defence Velimir Radojević told the
Royal Institute of Defence in Brussels at the end of the year that ‘The
professionalism and courage of the VJ is the reason why it is eagerly expected
in security integration processes...’
More incredibly still, General Radovan Radinović, the VJ’s chief
strategist (his influence still strong in spite of his retirement), alleged on
RTS Channel One that Yugoslavia would agree to join the Partnership for Peace
on condition that NATO let the VJ take the place of KFOR in Kosovo, as well as
that the VJ be given considerably more freedom of action within the Partnership
than other members.
During
the last two months of the year, General Branko Krga often said publicly that
the VJ was willing to volunteer troops for UN peace missions.
Though this offer is quite in line with the requirement that the VJ should
conform to NATO standards in every way if it desires membership of collective
security associations in the region and especially elsewhere in Europe, the VJ
still faces enormous obstacles ranging from financial and
technical-technological to mental and psychological.
The
present state of affairs in the VJ as regards weapons and equipment, training
and education, organization, system and manner of command, cannot be expected to
change shortly. Since the VJ has only taken the first steps not towards
transformation but towards simple reduction of personnel and materiel, one
wonders whether the same cadres are capable of carrying out true
transformation.
The Police and Secret Services in
Serbia
Introduction
The
process of reforms and stabilization of the Serbian Ministry of Internal
Affairs (MUP) launched in February 2001 slowed down during 2002 primarily owing
to lack of political will (which could also be interpreted as political
caution) to transform the inherited internal affairs apparatus, the police
forces, and the security services into infrastructural agencies to be
controlled by parliament and other democratic mechanisms of civil society. By
the end of the third year since the overthrow of 5 October 2000, the new
government still had not succeeded in purging the internal affairs apparatus
and imposing professional standards on it. The system of values had hardly
changed: ‘the interfusion of police and organized crime’ (something even the
Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs, Dušan Mihajlović, admitted) was
being suppressed only very slowly; the attempts to solve the most sensitive
criminal offences and crimes of the former regime were actively resisted from
within as well as by the ruling political structures, as a result of which
‘political opportunism in the top echelons of power induced and nurtured
opportunism in lower police structures’. A
great many compromised people in the police force and especially in the secret
services remained untouchable in spite of the existence of clear indications
and well-founded suspicions as to their culpability (many of them will probably
be indicted by the Hague Tribunal for organizing or participating in the
pseudo-patriotic paramilitary formations suspected of involvement of the graves
crimes committed by the Milošević regime).
The
links between organized crime in Serbia and Republika Srpska and the
involvement therein of persons indicted of war crimes by the Hague Tribunal were
publicly ‘unveiled’ by Mihajlović.
This explicit disclosure of connections between hardened criminals and Serb
‘patriots’, which came as a hard slap in the face of a part of the Serb public,
was occasioned by the assassination of Nenad Batočanin, a high-ranking
member of the federal MUP, and Željko Škrba, former bodyguard and racketeer
of the controversial Belgrade businessman Momčilo Mandić who was
identified by the media as the principal source of funds for both Radovan
Karadžić and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) of Vojislav Koštunica.
As on many previous occasions over the last ten years or so, the police failed
to discover the assassins and the public speculated that Škrba had spoken about
the financial ties between organized crime and persons indicted for war crimes
(Karadžić and Ratko Mladić).
‘We
have information that the organized crime is part of the general criminal
legacy including war crimes. The money provided by the organized crime (from
trafficking in narcotics, oil, and cigarettes) went to finance terrorist
groups, including protection of war crimes indictees,’ Mihajlović said.
A
crucial question often posed by journalists was why the present government had
not yet cracked down on organized crime; the answer of Marko Nicović, the
former head of the Secretariat for Internal Affairs (SUP) in Belgrade, is that
the mafia was in possession of secret files on the ruling Democratic Opposition
of Serbia (DOS) coalition leaders, that is, on their deals with Milošević
and his secret police. (Nicović himself was close to the Yugoslav Left –
JUL, an affiliation which brought him considerable wealth over the past ten
years.)
Another
hypothesis why the authorities did not wish to pounce on the mafia was that
there was too much money at stake, as well as that organized crime was highly
influential where it mattered.
Opportunists, who subscribe to this view, say that Serbia’s leading mafiosi
have so much money that laundering it is their chief and often only concern and
that any talk of a fight against organized crime amuses rather than worries
them.
This
impotence or lack of political will on the part of the state to crack down on
organized crime and to purge the institutions (above all the Serbian MUP) was
why Mihajlović’s adviser Božo Prelević tendered his resignation.
The
government faced a very grave legacy in this domain: Slobodan Milošević
left behind a total chaos manifested above all as a collapse of all values, his
prime goal of completely ruining society having been accomplished with
thoroughness. This legacy, the extent of which had gradually come to light
since October 5, shows that whatever he touched was devastated so completely as
to be irreparable and that it would be cheaper and safer to start from scratch.
Public
Security
Some
progress was visible in this domain in 2002: the territorial structure was
consolidated, the system of communications improved, and the material-technical
base somewhat modernized (through the acquisition of new vehicles, etc).
However, deficiencies in equipment and personnel remained the main problem. As
it turned out, crime-investigation techniques had been neglected for years as
something of secondary importance for the regime. According to statements by senior
public security officers (contained in the minutes of the federal parliament’s
committee of inquiry into the assassination of Pavle Bulatović and
published in 2002), the police were denied any technical assistance by State
Security, which had a monopoly of all listening systems and other most
up-to-date technical, informational, and communicational resources. The
Security Institute, the former federal institution of prime importance for
scientific-technical and educational work whose expertise was sought in
connection with the most complex cases, was selectively evacuated at the end of
1998 as part of preparations for war in 1999. The result was the destruction of
many expensive modern pieces of equipment which did not interest State Security
but were of great importance for criminological work. The Institute languished
in a political and administrative limbo throughout 2002. For the first time in
twelve years, State Security – now the government’s special
Security-Information Agency (BIA) – co-operated actively with the police in
investigating the assassination of the assistant chief of the Department of
Public Security, Boško Buha. Nonetheless the Department’s technical problems
remained acute: it lacked information technology and networking systems for its
administrative sector; its telecommunications and radio equipment was
hopelessly obsolete; and there was a shortage of crime-investigation equipment
for everyday use.
Public
Security’s personnel structure was quite inadequate: there was a shortage of qualified
staff to ensure the normal life of society such as patrolmen,
crime-investigating inspectors and technicians, skilled operatives, and
administrative officers. The former regime obviously did not attach too much
importance to such professions because it envisaged the police above all in a
paramilitary role. For instance, the Belgrade Police Department, which ought to
be able to cope with the best organized and wealthiest gangs in the country,
was not only understaffed by 40 per cent but also lacked educated personnel.
The Criminal Police Directorate, which spearheads the fight against the most
serious crimes, had only 31 per cent of the personnel it needed.
The
problems of personnel quality were discussed by Belgrade SUP chief Milan
Obradović, who stressed that the police had more need of young, educated
and civil police officers who speak foreign languages and are skilled in
computer use than of special forces.
Such personnel was precisely what the police force needed to improve its public
image and prestige lost during the 1990s.
According
to Belgrade SUP data,
members of the department earned on average 13,431 dinars (between 220-230
euros) a month at the end of the year and could expect only a 5 per cent
increase at most in 2003.
Political
rather than professional criteria appear to have been more important as far as
promotion was concerned: policemen with vocational qualifications such as
secondary MUP diplomas, higher and university education degrees, etc., were not
promoted as quickly as might have been expected. Policemen said that their
resentment was fuelled by a policy of favouring ‘civilians’ (people from civil
institutions employed by the Serbian MUP) at the expense of ordinary members of
the force.
They also cited instances of nepotism in the force: for example, the present
chief of the Valjevo SUP, Colonel Milan Janković, was formerly local
secondary school principal and teacher of physical culture who closely
collaborated with Minister Mihajlović while he was mayor of Valjevo; after
the change of government Janković was appointed to the post and given his
present rank although he had never worked for the Serbian MUP before.
According to internal MUP rules, the rank of colonel is only conferred on MUP
personnel with more than twenty years service, among other things. With regard
to the Serbian MUP’s personnel policy, it remained unclear just what kind of
personnel the Police Academy had been producing, considering that it had been
conceived more as a counterpart of the Army Military Academy than as a police
educational establishment. The Police Academy programme was somewhat modified
as part of the MUP’s ‘demilitarization’ drive.
In
addition to lack of personnel, the police were severely hampered in their work
by shortage of equipment. For instance, the Belgrade SUP had neither a DNK
laboratory – now a standard tool of modern crime-investigation procedure – nor
even modern microscopes, and was short of at least 4,000 computers. It was only
at the end of 2002 that it received a narcotics incinerator thanks to a foreign
donation. ‘While we have one of the best organized and richest mafia
organizations in this part of Europe, our police lack even the most elementary
equipment,’ said Nadežda Švalja, assistant chief of the Belgrade SUP.
Some
apparent progress was made in the fight against corruption within the police
force. Although most complaints were filed against lower-ranking officers, the
scope of the operation was considerable, with increasing use of more active
methods such as provocations, ‘sting’ operations, etc. One hoped that the
anti-corruption drive would not stop short of the big deals inevitably linked
to politics and protected from above.
The
general statistics published by the MUP in its annual reports looked good only
quantitatively. According to data for 2002 presented by General Sreten
Lukić, head of the MUP Public Security department,
general crime declined by 25 per cent and the economic crimes detection rate
increased by 7 per cent; homicide was down by 16 per cent, rape by 21 per cent,
infliction of grievous bodily harm by 7 per cent; robbery by 9 per cent; 17,191
weapons of various kinds were confiscated and 1.5 tonnes of narcotics and over
1,000,000 cigarette boxes impounded.
However,
the problem was one of quality: until the gravest crimes with psychological,
symbolic and political implications are solved, such as the assassination of
Buha and the crimes committed by Spasojević and Luković, the public
will not feel safe. There will be no mutual trust between the police
(government) and the citizens as long as the murders of Slavko Ćuruvija
and Ivan Stambolić, the mass graves of Albanian civilians, the
assassination of the SPO leaders on the Ibar highway, remain unsolved or
partially unsolved in spite of the existence of firm evidence and clear
indications. The recriminations of the police, prosecuting authorities and
courts of law were of no help here, let alone the admissions of some people in
top executive positions that there existed a ‘monopoly of power’ shared with an
uncontrolled faction of State Security and its allies and business partners
from organized crime and pseudo-patriotic paramilitary formations.
As
far as the efficiency of Public Security was concerned, March 2002 was full of
promise, it having been leaked to the public that the Serbian MUP was writing a
‘white book’ on organized crime in the republic. Journalist circles soon
obtained copies of the 123-page book entitled Criminal Groups and Individuals Engaged in Organized Crime. In the
book, which persuaded even the better informed public that the end of organized
crime in Serbia was at an end, the Criminal Police Directorate disclosed that
fifty groups with 230 members and fifty-nine ‘individual perpetrators of all
kinds of criminal offences’ operated in Serbia. Thirteen of the most dangerous
groups operated in Belgrade, ten in Šabac, nine in Požarevac, and on average
three in other towns.
The
public believed that all that was left for the police to do was the
comparatively easy routine job of arresting the ‘godfathers’, ‘soldiers’, and
‘free agents’. When nothing happened, an irate Prime Minister Zoran
Đinđić wondered publicly why the police had arrested none of the
fifty mafia ‘godfathers’ in Serbia if they knew their identity. Interior
Minister Mihajlović, to whom the question had apparently been directed,
replied that the police had operative information about the criminals but
unfortunately no evidence yet that would stand in a court of law. This was
another ‘success’ of the Serbian MUP without a sequel.
Disciplining
members of Public Security and improving the public image of the police
entailed tackling another phenomenon from the recent past: ‘moonlighters’ or
‘self-employed men’ in the force. When Nenad Batočanin, a high-ranking
policeman, and Nenad Škrba, reputed as a ‘dangerous man’ from the Bosnian Serb
underworld, were assassinated together in Belgrade at the end of 2002,
speculation about links between policemen and criminals assumed a new
topicality. Crime columnists repeatedly wondered why former or active policemen
were frequently ‘collateral damage’ in assassinations of ‘respectable
businessmen’.
Many politicians, businessmen, pop stars, and even criminals hired former or
active policemen as their bodyguards.
Not a few policemen ranking from patrolman to senior inspector worked for the
MUP during the day and moonlighted in discotheques and restaurants owned by
‘retired’ or active criminals for the rest of the day. It was no secret in
police circles that some police officers had turned their part-time work into
lucrative businesses such as private firms providing ‘physical and technical
protection of people and facilities’ and employing their retired and active
colleagues. A number of analysts of military-police affairs had termed this
(private) segment of the security sector the country’s ‘third armed force’.
Although
speculation about private armies (armed with, among other things, long-barrelled
weapons) which provided security to various political parties (e.g. Komet to
the Yugoslav Left), businessmen and companies (e.g. the Brothers Karić)
lost in topicality after 5 October 2000, the phenomenon carried considerable
weight in terms of Serbian MUP work and the efforts of the authorities to
restore the rule of law. Fenomen, a firm providing ‘physical and technical
protection of people and facilities’, was notorious for its good connections
with the police, public prosecutors, judges, political and business circles,
and criminals of all ranks.
A
draft new law on internal affairs was still in preparation amid speculation
that a separate law on the police was also possible. The many problems in this
domain, including the controversy over members’ rights to organize into trade
unions, left no doubt that resistance to inevitable change was considerable.
Despite
some progress made in the sphere of public security (a number of suspects were
arrested in connection with the shooting of the police General Boško Buha;
however, they were not brought to trial owing to problems with evidence) and
generally favourable statistics, the Serbian MUP was yet to furnish evidence
that the set of values in this sphere had radically been changed and that the
time had come for policemen to perform their duties in a professional manner.
State
Security – Only a Name Change
Whether
detaching State Security from the MUP and attaching it to the government under
the name of Security-Information Agency (BIA) was a good or a bad move for the
state and its citizens remained a big question. Paradoxically, it was easier to
control and supervise State Security while it was still part of the MUP because
its head was a member of the Collegium and assistant to the Minister of Internal
Affairs; in other words, supervision was closer and the chain of command more
direct before. A department minister always finds it easier to control his
assistant in daily contact. In addition, the new government had opted for
probably the worst of the three draft laws on the new agency. The choice merely
confirmed the government’s priorities and intentions to dispense with far
better and more democratic ways to exercise parliamentary control, judicial
supervision, and public control over the service. This indicated that the
executive wished to keep sole possession of the secret police.
In
the spring of 2000, the DOS – or its greater part – took over State Security in
the state it was in: thus Vojislav Koštunica spared Rade Marković and
Zoran Đinđić kept Milorad ‘Legija’ Ulemek-Luković. Very
soon afterwards it became evident that the judiciary was unable to process some
cases because of State Security involvement. There was a limit beyond which no
one was to touch the service. The trial of suspects in the assassination of SPO
members on the Ibar highway showed that Mihalj Kertes, head of the Federal
Customs Administration under Slobodan Milošević, Milorad Luković,
former commander of the Red Berets, and others remained inviolable.
Investigation
into the murder of the proprietor of the daily Dnevni Telegraf, Slavko Ćuruvija, and into the kidnapping and
disappearance of the former president of the Serbian Central Committee, Ivan
Stambolić, was halted whenever it came upon clear indication of where the
persons who commissioned and executed these crimes were, namely in the State
Security operations centre. The complete team of wholesale drug dealers
remained at large. There remained gave doubts about the liaison between Kertes
and the State Security bosses in narcotics deals, and why those who had
deposited 600 kg of heroin in the vaults of the Komercijalna banka were free
three years after the discovery. Milorad Luković not only remained immune
from criminal prosecution but continued to lecture about ‘patriotism’; at the
same time, his cronies in the Special Operations Unit (JSO) known as the Red
Berets at the beginning of 2002 launched a heavily funded self-advertising
campaign with the help of billboards, TV spots, newspaper advertisements, etc.
As Prime Minister Đinđić observed, the funds were not provided
by the Serbian MUP; they were contributed by anonymous sponsors such as Dušan Spasojević. During the mutiny of
November 2001, members of the JSO themselves boasted that they needed no pay
because they had sponsors to support them. It did not require much of an effort
to put two and two together and arrive at the shocking conclusion that state
power was shared with a paramilitary-criminal formation notorious for contract
killings and some other crimes.
Rumour
that the former head of State Security, Jovica Stanišić, remained in
charge of the service (now renamed BIA) behind the scenes raised speculation as
to why the authorities kept their hands off State Security since it was common
knowledge that its members had performed the dirty work for Slobodan
Milošević. The media put forward the following explanation of the current
power of Jovica Stanišić: ‘It is no secret that after the dismissal of
Rade Marković (in February 2001) it was precisely his men who occupied the
key posts in the service’.
Analysts
of Serbia’s 1990s political scene say that, during the large civil protests in
1997, a leader of the Zajedno opposition coalition, Zoran Đinđić
was in touch with Jovica Stanišić, then head of State Security and, according
to many, the second most powerful man in Serbia. In these contacts Milorad
Vučelić acted as a go-between.
Stanišić is said to have put Đinđić is his debt ‘for life’
when he warned him on the eve of the NATO intervention in 1999 that he was
scheduled for liquidation. (The message was delivered by Zoran Mijatović,
who in 2001 became deputy to Serbian State Security chief Goran Petrović.)
The
Stanišić story was given fresh currency at the end of 2002 by Serbian
Radical Party leader Vojislav Šešelj, who told the media that potentates close
to the government were preparing to assassinate him and named Stanišić as
the organizer of the plot. While some dismissed the allegation on the grounds
that Šešelj was given to making sensational statements, the Serbian Deputy
Prime Minister, Nebojša Čović, nevertheless said that, ‘As Šešelj has
always had a boss in government, and has always been somebody’s broom, one
ought to ponder who his present boss is’.
The
public took the exchange of accusations between Šešelj and Čović to
mean that the DOS was gradually dissociating itself from Stanišić and
others and was using Šešelj to drive the message home. Furthermore, Šešelj’s
‘voluntary’ departure for The Hague was attributed to a last warning from
Stanišić, indicating that Šešelj had put his life above ‘Serb national
interests’ after all.
It
was also at that time that the image of the Serbian government and of Interior
Minister Mihajlović in particular suffered an especially heavy blow: the
grounds of the company Defence Road in Zemun Polje near Belgrade, owned by
Ljiljana and Ljubiša Buha, were raided and the complete works blown up;
fourteen most up-to-date asphalt-laying machines and several vehicles were
destroyed; and the damage was estimated at over 10 million euros. The raiders
evacuated the staff and people living nearby, planted the explosives with
professional thoroughness, and left the premises at leisure. The police
conducted an on-site investigation and went on with their inquiries apparently
without effect. While the MUP remained tight-lipped, the story began to
circulate in public that the raid was the work of Dušan ‘Duća’
Spasojević, better known as the godfather of the Zemun clan, and Milorad
‘Legija’ Ulemek-Luković, former commander of the JSO.
The
matter obviously involved much more than a mere showdown between the
Surčin and Zemun gangsters and a threat to public security: police records
on the protagonists – Ljubiša ‘Čume’ Buha and Dušan Spasojević – had
existed for years; the MUP brochure cataloguing organized criminal groups
states that scores of criminal complaints against the two had simply been
thrown out. The implications of the last detail became clearer after Buha began
to speak at length about his and Spasojević’s connections with State Security
since the early 1990s. Buha alleged that Stambolić was done in by none
other than his (Buha’s) former buddies Spasojević and Luković as JSO
operatives under the command of the Serbian MUP State Security Department.
At
first there was an embarrassing silence; next the authorities made a few
half-hearted promises to investigate the matter; then they sacked Andreja
Savić, explaining meekly that what they actually wanted to do was get rid
of his deputy Bracanović but did not dare touch him because of
Luković. In retrospect, a little more is now known about the dismissal of
Goran Petrović and Zoran Mijatović from the top of State Security
following the JSO mutiny in November 2001.
The
end of 2002 saw yet another internal crisis culminating in the dismissal in
January 2003 of Andreja Savić as BIA director and his deputy
Bracanović. While the government insisted that Savić’s ‘six-month
mandate’ to transform State Security into the BIA had expired, no one could
recall that Savić’s mandate had been limited. The sacking coincided with a
scandal involving the ‘Surčin group’, another organization which had
meanwhile broken up; its boss Buha fled abroad and began to disclose highly
embarrassing details about his best men, friends, and business partners from
State Security.
A
certain Miša Milisavljević, a former State Security employee, was
appointed the new BIA director, and a certain Goran Živaljević, also a
former State Security worker, his deputy. The latter is on record for
committing at least one criminal offence involving a false arrest, abuse of
office, etc., as part of the efforts of the Milošević regime to remove or
intimidate possible embarrassing witnesses. Petrović and Mijatović
had investigated the matter thoroughly and reported the findings to Minister
Mihajlović towards the end of 2000; however, no further action was taken
perhaps in order not to provoke Luković and his Red Berets who were
implicated. By promoting Živaljević, the Serbian government manifested its
disinclination to investigate the biographies of some of former and current
State Security members.
In
view of the foregoing, there should no longer be any doubt whether or not it
pays to overhaul what Milošević destroyed in his wake. In 1989, for
example, the Czech Republic came to the conclusion that it would be simpler to
disband its State Security service, lustrate it, and put it back together with
help from uncompromised (or bearably compromised) professionals. Had the DOS
government taken a similar or identical step – it had several very practical choices
at its disposal – Serbia would now have a ‘service’ or whatever its name free
from uncontrollable and powerful factions under parliamentary rather than
executive control.
Conclusion
The
draft law on internal affairs, sponsored by the Serbian MUP itself, appeared to
be getting nowhere, and it remained unclear whether anyone bothered to work on
it any more. The authorities clearly attached very low priority to this piece
of legislation and the multitude of sub-legal acts connected with it. The law on
the special prosecutor was adopted post-haste for clear demagogic reasons; by
opting for the worst possible version, the government pocketed this
institution, thus disregarding the experience of other countries which
recognize the importance of parliamentary, democratic, and civil control of
such special, sensitive, and potentially dangerous institutions. The
nonchalance with which members of the ruling coalition had disregarded, were
disregarding, and appeared determined to go on disregarding, some key systemic
laws was appalling.
The
MUP itself could hardly be accused of having neglected its principal duties; on
the contrary, it did rather well. But Minister Mihajlović alone had no
power to decide on such matters of strategic political importance. If the trend
continues and the government goes on treating the MUP with even less concern,
public security, administration, and crime suppression will suffer even more
undue damage. The MUP comprises not only the police; one of its reform ideas
was to give local self-government an increasing administrative role so as to
free the MUP from a number of administrative jobs and stopgap duties, the idea
being that local self-government can easily handle many such tasks; the draft
legislation on this too was waiting for the government to submit it to
parliament. After all, the public administration sector, public law and order,
and crime suppression are of much greater importance for the population at
large that intrigue involving the criminal-intelligence-paramilitary
underworld. However, the very existence, power, and insolence of this
underworld poisoned the public environment and undermined the credibility of
the state and the very foundations of the constitutional order. This eminently
political issue is of vital importance for the future of the state, that is, if
Serbia wants adapt to the rest of the normal world; the government’s indulgence
towards and concern for people such as Luković and his friends and best
men may lead to undreamed-of political adventurism, further interfusion of crime
and politics, and – this possibility cannot be ruled out – insane attempts by
political terrorism to effect a coup.
The
pseudo-patriotic criminal lobby still closely connected with factions within
State Security did not feel defeated at all because it continued to enjoy
privileges under the new government. After all, this lobby never believed in
the political goals of the Milošević regime: Milošević used them and
they used Milošević; not having any political goals and preferences, they
do not care whether they serve Milošević, Arkan, Šešelj, Koštunica or
Đinđić as long as they are left alone to concentrate on their
business, of which the Serbian MUP’s criminal police are well aware.
Complicated
though the problems and ways of organized crime in Serbia may appear, some of
the elements and connections are apparent even to people who have no access to
‘sensitive’ information (in possession of military or state security). After
all, the secrets have been in circulation for too long: for instance, the
‘operation Audi’ (the make of car from which many Belgrade ‘businessmen’ were
shot with 100 per cent success) was rehearsed in a police assault course.
While, at the end of 2002, media circulated stories about a ‘phantom Audi’ to
boost sales, ordinary policemen diligently stopped and thoroughly searched
nearly every car of that make. Nearly everybody, including the police, barked
up the wrong tree, something they had been doing for years past.
The
job of discovering the core of organized crime in Serbia, its members and its
protectors, ought not to be entrusted to the police but to experts on finance,
money flows, and, especially, money laundering. The fabulous wealth plundered
on battlefields throughout the former Yugoslavia or in Serbia itself (some of
Serbia’s leading reputable private firms are the fruit of pillage of
‘socialized property’, e.g. from Generaleksport, ex-Yugoslavia’s largest
foreign-trade firm) is the best protection its owners and their accomplices can
have. Expose this network and you will find out at whose behest the murderers
are prowling the streets of Belgrade and who has grown immensely rich on the
misery of millions nor only in Serbia and Montenegro, but in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Croatia.
The
Political Aspirations of the
Serbian
Orthodox Church
With
the coming of Milošević into power the public scene has been reopened for
the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) after five decades of the communist era. The
aim was to obtain the support of the Church in the realization of the national
program, and, indeed, the Church played the role it had been assigned. One the
on hand, it strongly encouraged the rise ethno-nationalistic spirit combined
with aspirations for the “Greater Serbia” project on all levels of the society:
religious and national feelings of citizens have been manipulated for overtly
political purposes. On the other hand, the Church openly backed the regime of
Slobodan Milošević. However, its comeback failed to reach an institutional
form, due to an ambiguous attitude of the Milošević regime towards the
communist ideological heritage, which, among other things, took the secular
character of the state as granted.
With
the overthrow of Milošević and the establishment of the new regime, which
explicitly and manifestly based its legitimacy on anti-communism, the
ideological obstacles for the legalization of the ongoing process of the Serbian
Orthodox Church’s public reappearance were removed, and the activities leading
to an institutional shift from the secular principle on all levels of social
and public life accelerated.
1. Rebuff of the Principle
of Separation
of Church and State and the
Violation
of the Freedom and Equality
of Religious Beliefs
The
redefinition of the relations between the Church and the State started when
religious instruction in a dogmatic form became a part of public school
curricula. Practically overnight, at the very beginning of the 2001/2002 school
year a decree issued by the Serbian government in July 2001 instituted
religious instruction in elementary and secondary schools. The decision was
taken in spite of strong public opposition, without any preparatory trainings
of instructors, serious considerations of such programs, and was made formal
through a decree, which seriously breached constitutions of both Serbia and FRY
in several ways. Starting with the principle of separation of church and state
itself, and then by a flagrant violation of the provision guaranteeing the
privacy of religious feelings and the freedom of consciousness, up to a factual
abolishment of equality of confessions, by granting the right of religious
instruction only to confessions explicitly listed in
the decree. Immediately after stepping into the schools, the Church entered the
Army. Then a request for the integration of the Faculty of Theology into the
State University followed, as well as a request
for the restitution of the Church’s property. These two requests are still
waiting for a legal solution.
Both
the Church and republic and federal ministries of religion made it clear that
they regarded all these measures only as the first step towards the rejection
of the principle of separation of church and state, proclaimed by the
Constitution, and towards establishment of some form of unity between the two.
Greece and its model of the state church are often being set as an ideal. “The
State should proclaim the Serbian Eastern Orthodoxy as official religion, that
is, our state should be verified as a Serbian Orthodox one, though other
religions should have the right to exist, but not in the same rank as the
Serbian Orthodoxy and only the ones the Serbian Orthodox Church does not regard
as satanic” (Office of Religious Instruction within the Patriarchate).
The former dean of the Faculty of Theology believes that “religion is not a
private emotional feeling, as it is being explained here”,
while in an official address to the public, the Serbian Orthodox Church sharply
attacks the point of view according to which religious feelings are in the
domain of an individual’s privacy, while calling proponents of the secular state “followers of the Satan.”
The
former FRY Minister of Religion, Bogoljub Šijaković, also rejects the
model of separation of church and state as being in conflict with Serbian
tradition and proposes a solution, which incorporates elements of different
models of unity – from state church, through “symphony” between the state and
the church, up to the model of acknowledged churches as was the case in the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The Patriarch himself prefers the “symphony” by saying,
“We believe that the best relation between state and church is the one that
used to be, that of the symphony – harmony between the state, that is, the
society and the church.”
This model of the state-church relations shaped in Byzantium and evolved during
many years into a system giving holy sanction to the national state, in modern
times became the foundation for the development of the “church nationalism”.
There
are individuals within the SOC itself who oppose the idea of the unity of state
and church as an anachronism harmful to the interest of the church. “Attempts
still exist here to build a divine state according to the Byzantine model. The
Byzantine symphony today is a total absurd and an obstacle that prevents the
Church to take its proper place,” believes father Nenad Ilić, adding that
the Church has to be separated from the State and politics in order to “resume
its genuine meaning”.
It is hard to find out whether such opinions are supported in the ranks of
higher clergy. In public addresses, these voices are extremely rare.
Although
the final model for the state-church relation, namely the fundamental
reorganization of this model, cannot be established without a revision of the
Constitution, the rebuff of the principle of separation of church and state has
in fact already taken place in an indirect way through the model of
acknowledged churches.
The
Serbian government’s decree on the introduction of religious instruction has
already established the category of “traditional churches and religious
communities” by listing the churches and religions (seven in total).
Unprecedented in the existing legal system in Serbia, this category
discriminates other confessions. In the meantime, the concept of acknowledged
churches – named as “traditional,” “big churches
recognized worldwide,” etc. – has gained legitimacy in different ways and on
all levels, and is practically not being questioned any more, except when the
number of churches the State should acknowledge is concerned. Advocating the
restitution of the Church properties the Serbian Minister of Religions
acknowledges the right of restitution only to “traditional churches and
religious communities, which are seven.”
And the request of the Serbian Orthodox Church for the access
to the radio broadcast system signed by the Patriarch, mentions other
“historical, that is traditional religious communities” without naming them.
Pravoslavlje,
a periodical published by the SOC, goes a step further, and proposes passing of
a “law on the Church” instead of a law on the freedom of religion. The magazine
advocates the view that it is wrong to neglect “the fact that the Church is one
and unique” and treat it the same way as “everything that was ever called a
religious community, all that was created literally yesterday at a meeting of a
secret organization, a cult, or by people who have wavered from the true religious
course…or are, moreover, susceptible to religious terrorism…”
This
understanding of the freedom of religion is widespread in the circles within
the SOC. Numerous churches and religious communities, mostly Protestant, are
considered religious sects or cults. Intense intolerance, even unveiled
aggression towards these “cults” persists. “Serbian people are subject to
systematic and planned evil, as has been justly observed by Bishop Nikolaj:
this is a spiritual genocide committed by numerous cults - Protestant, satanic
and those coming from the Far East,” says Pravoslavlje.
A fear that a Western conspiracy might commit a spiritual genocide of the
Serbian people is being spread via this periodical, fear of genocide to be
carried out by religious cults. “There is a plan to systematically cover the
whole area of Serbia and Montenegro with a net of cults.”
Furthermore, “It is not a question here about something as an Adventist church…
It is about the Adventists known to our people as the cult of Sabbatarians.”
“The fact that they emerged and… are more and more frequently appearing in the
media” is, in fact “a God’s sign and an alarm bell for the Serbian Orthodox
Church, its followers and its clergy”. This is similar to the “spontaneous
response” to the occurrence of “cults” and their “avant-garde propaganda” after
the World War I, when the “famous Prayer Movement” emerged. This “greatest and
most magnificent wonder in the modern history of our church”, the “Prayer
Movement, was organized and led by St. Bishop Nikolaj.” “Maybe these new
activities of the cults … will give birth to a new Nikolaj whom we need today
more then ever before,” says the priest and editor-in-chief of The Voice of the
Church radio outlet and magazine, Ljubomir Ranković.
The
reference to Bishop Nikolaj as the highest authority in the Serbian Orthodoxy
is characteristic for the communication between the SOC and its followers.
Bishop Nikolaj is a cult personality for the most conservative and nowadays
predominant circles of the SOC.
Their major characteristics are an anti-Western stance on all issues and
nationalism, with elements of fascism. The remains of Bishop Nikolaj were
transferred to Serbia in May 1991, in the days when Serbia started a war in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia. This was in accordance with the attempts of
Milosevic’s regime to mobilize the nationalistic euphoria and the pro-war
feelings more effectively. After October 5, 2000, the SOC promotes Bishop
Nikolaj even more than it used to. He is being qualified “as the greatest Serb
after Saint Sava,” and turned into a myth as “a symbol of Serbdom and
Orthodoxy.” For example, on March 24, the anniversary of the beginning of NATO
intervention in Serbia, the Church, in the presence of the top military
official, General Nebojsa Pavkovic, unveils a monument to this controversial
bishop in the Soko monastery;
to a bishop who had publicly shown his respect of Hitler and overt
anti-Semitism.
Recently, the Federation of Jewish Communities in Serbia and Montenegro,
drawing attention to the rise of anti-Semitism after October 5, pinpointed
Bishop Nikolaj’s book “Words to the
Serbian People behind Dungeon Windows” as the “the most disgusting anti-
Semitism” where Jews “are the synonym for the Devil.”
The
current glorification of Bishop Nikolaj has, to a great extent, its rationale
in the attempts of the Church to obtain a special place within the state.
Namely, reference to Nikolaj is the usual “argumentation” the SOC uses to
disqualify other churches as cults and, in fact, to advocate the idea about a
state church.
In
view of such an understanding of freedom of religion by the SOC, an
understanding that ultimately leads to a denial of this very freedom, frequent
outbursts of intolerance towards other confessions did not come as a surprise,
including such violent acts as the one of last December in front of the
Patriarchate, when followers of the Church of England were prevented from
attending the Christmas service.
2.
Pretensions to a Moral and Ideological
Monopoly
on the Society
After
the October 5, with strong and manifest support from top FRY officials,
especially President Vojislav Kostunica, the SOC is growingly imposed as the
supreme moral and ideological arbiter – starting with the education of children
up to the overall cultural and civilizational
orientation of the society. The moral values the Church promotes are, almost
without exception, characterized by collectivism, xenophobia and anti-Western
feelings. Furthermore, the way these values are promoted is marked by a high
degree of intolerance and even aggression.
The SOC is particularly vigilant in its
attempts to be the arbiter in education. Its standpoint is that “to separate
the Church from school is the same as to separate a mother from her child.”
Moreover, all those opposing the idea of religious dogma as the moral
foundation of education are “followers of the Satan.”
In
its confrontation with the atheists, the SOC uses the hate speech in its
“purest” form. Unrestrained and straightforward methods the Church uses are to
be attributed to the fact that it relates atheism to communism and pro-Western
feelings, the phenomena that the Church believes have lost their legitimacy
within the Serbian society during the last fifteen years.
The journal Pravoslavlje
says that “the Serbo-phobia and the fight against
God led by communist hordes… have created an enormous spiritual wasteland among
Serbs. In the tomb of the Serbian people, the SFRY, education was founded on
atheism… For centuries the love of God has marked the Serbian nation… and
today, we are a mindless crowd that can be manipulated and seduced by any
charlatan. With further Americanization we will become mercenaries of the new
age,” writes Pravoslavlje.
In
his Christmas epistle for the year 2002, the Serbian Patriarch condemned
atheist parents for “pushing their own children on the road of false happiness
and false freedom…” and “destroying their children’s lives.”
Both ministers of religions, the Serbian and the federal, joined the claims
that atheism was illegitimate. The acting Serbian minister, Vojislav
Milovanović, believes that atheism caused war, poverty and a “moral plunge
into the abyss,”
while the ex-federal minister, Bogoljub Šijaković, relates atheism to “the
state of mind and psychological heritage of a spiritually and morally disturbed
society, we have lived in for fifty years.”
The
Church places human rights activists in the same company with atheists: like
atheists, they are related to communism, that is, “Titoism”. For the Federal
Minister of Religions, human rights activists are “political chameleons,” “who
used to persecute people for their faith in the name of communism and Titoism,
and now do the same in the name of human rights and European integration.”
The Patriarch considers human rights activists to be “sinful minds”
– which is similar to the way Bishop Nikolaj labeled individual rights and
freedoms as “some petty declarations of human rights..
In
the attempt to gain control over the education, the Church shows great
ambition, albeit nervousness, intolerance and lack of control. The introduction
of religious instruction in public school curricula was not enough to satisfy
its pretensions to be the arbiter in moral issues of the society. The
government of Serbia became their main target, the Ministry of Education above
all, since the Church identified there a political option loyal to the
principle of a secular state. Namely, the Ministry had made it clear that the
decision to introduce religious instruction was unwelcome and contrary to the
Church’s status, and a political favor resulting from the pressure by the
Church and political structures the Church leans on. The Serbian Orthodox
Church responded with insults and insinuations, the hate speech and anathema.
In
this context, typical is the statement by which the SOC Synod targeting the
Serbian government because of some controversial activities in the summer camps
organized by the Ministry of Education. Ill-willed interpretation of something
unverified – and misguiding, as it turned out later on – information about
inappropriate conduct of instructors had a conspicuously political role,
whereby the Church was the harshest critic of the government and the
responsible Minister. “As long as there is religious instruction, the gerrymandering
shamelessness and satanic immorality cannot impose their rule over human
self-consciousness and become the measure of humanity and human dignity.” In
its statement, the Synod says, “Ministers and educators who undermine the
spiritual and moral values of their own people and thus the universal moral
values…are not only undeserving to carry this honored name, but also have no
the right to carry it”. The Synod draws attention to the fact that “modern
education and the development of a new consciousness of high school students,
things they are being taught in educational workshops, are nothing but
perfidious child brainwashing.” “In our time, unfortunately, a marriage is made
between the post-communist atheism and the Western capitalist hedonism. From
such a hideous marriage monsters and freaks the world has never seen before are
already being born. And all this under false pretensions of ‘new
consciousness’, ‘a new man’, ‘new order’ and ‘new community’. We are asking our
new teachers and educators whether they are aware of this danger that faces the
modern man and humanity? Or is it that some of them really do want to direct
the younger generation on this road to nowhere? Is it possible that this was
the essential reason for opposing the introduction of religious instruction in
the schools? And for imposing as a substitute, or alternate, the so called
civic education?” reads the statement of the Synod.
The
Montenegrin Metropolitan Amfilohije Radovic adds his personal opinion to the
statement of the Synod, by sending a direct political message. Namely, in his
opinion, the Civic Alliance of Serbia (the political party the acting Minister
of Education belongs to) “like all other political parties, emerged from Tito’s
mold.”
Extreme
intolerance to everything that comes from the Western cultural and
civilizational circles is one of the most important messages that the SOC sends
to its followers. It is also the most noticeable trait of its rhetoric. In
this, the SOC is entirely consistent with its newly reborn idol, Bishop
Nikolaj, who saw in the modern history of Serbia a Western conspiracy to
“transform the recently liberated Serbian populace into the populace of the
rotten West.”
“Serbs
in Europe, yes; Europe among Serbs, God forbid!” makes a phrase that can be
taken as the SOC’s motto when it comes to its attitude towards the West.
“The forces of Satan - conspiring, political, cultural, liberal, leftist – are
leading the NWO (New World Order), which is, beyond doubt… inspired by the
Satan.” The main source of all evil is America, where “a collapse of moral… and
mental health” took place. The whole West is under the influence of “hellish
forces…conspiracy against Christianity, a Godless culture.” The West is
dominated by “atheist psychology as the modern heresy, similar to the Gnostic
one,” claims Pravoslavlje just to
hopefully conclude that “amongst Serbs there won’t be any disturbed individuals
who would readily infect us with the deadly malaise of Western culture. Let
them and their progress remain at arm’s length.”
This
hope is accompanied by fear - a fear from “a strategy of soft approach,” which
was “established right after the end of the World War II…, and which implies
total and incontestable acceptance of foreign values, foreign religion, foreign
customs, foreign economy, way of life and way of thinking, spiritual and other
values as our own values.”
All these “foreign values” are often classified under the concept of “the new”
in the rhetoric of the SOC. One of the symbols of victory of the “soft
approach”, or “the new” is New Belgrade, which thus becomes an object of
hatred.
“New
Belgrade is the biggest Satanic experiment, the culmination of communist
exhibitionism… as such, it is a
tragedy, a spiritual gulag, a spiritual ‘Goli Otok’ (The Barren Island – a prison camp).” “The city of ‘the new’, new
schools, new kindergartens, new shops, a new Student City, a new Sports Hall,
new highway - for the new children, new students, new people. A city in the
desert, the city without churches, without a family, without a history, the
city of the Godless, unbaptized, de-Serbed, the city of dead souls… the city of
the future ‘Aryans’… the city where evil culminates.”
An undoubtedly patriarchal vision of the society
promoted by the SOC is also vividly expressed in a book by patriarch Pavle “Some Questions of our Faith” illustrative
of the rejection of “the new.”
3.
Perception of the Society and the State
Anti-Western feelings are followed by an adequate
concept of the state and the society. Here the SOC remains within the concept
known as the “new Serbian right,” which is, in fact, closest to organicism.
Among Serbian theologians, this concept is most consequently developed in the
works of Bishop Nikolaj and Justin Popović. In
brief, this approach rejects individualism and embraces the principles of
collectivism and mutual solidarity or, in the Serbian variant of the tradition,
the “spirit of gathering” and the ethics pertinent to “a head of an orthodox
family.” According to organicist theory, the society represents an organism –
the “national organism,” individuals being nothing but “cells” that function to
the benefit of this organism. An optimal solution is the “organicist-orthodox
monarchy” based on the “God, the King, Family” triad.
This
concept of society and state is explicitly professed as ideal by the head of
the SOC, Patriarch Pavle. Besides the unity of the State and the Church
(following the “symphony” model) he professes the unity between the society and
the state (“society, that is state”), and thus negates any individualism. He
also questions the value of the multiparty system by posing a rhetorical
question, “Are political parties mature enough to secure an organic relation
within the society, as in a body where each organ performs its own function, to
the benefit of the whole organism? And, conversely, the organism has no other
interest but the good of each of its organs… The Church always strives for such
an organic relation within the society.”
The
Montenegrin Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović voices the same stand. “Since
the beginning of time Serbs have been solving all their problems at gatherings…
and thus it would be good that the spirit of people’s getting together is
renewed today. Parties are of a newer date and imported to Serbs from the West,
which may be dangerous to us, who approach everything from a metaphysical
standpoint. Decisions have to be made in the head of the entire nation – only
those decisions are farsighted and far-reaching.”
Identification
of the Serbian nation with the Serbian Orthodox Church serves to support the
same vision of the society and the state, thus adding another link in the
organic unity: state and church, society and state, nation and church.
“Since
the beginning of time the Serbian Church is the pillar of the national being.
This has been denied by communists,” that is by “international ideology”, which
has “died away” – says an editorial run in Pravoslavlje.
Patriarch Pavle is even more explicit in his view that belonging to the SOC is
a necessary condition for belonging to the Serbian nation. “They say ‘I am a
Serb’, though if unbaptized, one cannot be a Serb,” says the Patriarch. This is
yet another reason why atheism is unacceptable. Simply, because, according to
Patriarch Pavle’s strict interpretation, a Serb cannot be an atheist.
There
are different opinions in the SOC when it comes to the above issue, though such
individuals are in the minority. For example, professor at the Theological
Faculty, father Vladan Perišić, Ph.D., believes that the fact that “we
came to the point when nationalism became an affirmation of the Orthodox faith”
is upsetting. “The Church has already paid a high price for having identified
itself with the nation, and it will continue to pay the same price if it fails
to eradicate the equality sign that is being put between the two.” The Church
should free itself from this “embrace” and return to its “mission of witnessing
the science of Christ, which does not know of nations” and where, as written in
the Gospel, “no Greeks or Jews exist.”
4. The Church and Politics
In
view of the activity of the SOC in daily politics, its close connections with
the institutions of power, both civil and military, as well as its promotion by
the media – one could say that the conditions for the realization of strategic
goals of the SOC have never been more favorable. After it managed to return,
under the Milošević regime, to the political scene for the first time
after forty years, the Church came into the position after October 5, 2000 to
finalize its comeback by legalizing its new/old role. Significant multifold
ties between the Church and politics, already a characteristic of the
Milošević regime, are constantly growing stronger after the overthrow of
October 5, 2000. The presence of the Church in politics was stripped naked in
its most brutal and primitive form in the speech of Metropolitan Amfilohije
Radović at the memorial service for the murdered Serbian Premier Zoran
Djindjić. The Metropolitan abused his participation at the service to
deliver a political speech dominated by the rhetoric of conflict and hatred,
xenophobia and isolationism - the very opposite of the vision of modern,
European Serbia the late Premier strove for.
An
active role in politics is a constant of the history of the Serbian Orthodox
Church. This fact is not denied even by the Church itself. “The Church is not
going to determine who is going to rule this country, but it is going to
support those new men who understand the moment, the situation the nation is
in, and show a way out of the dead end” – this was how editors of Pravoslavlje rationalized the Synod’s
decision of the summer 1999 to no longer support Slobodan Milošević, but
back those supposed to succeed him after the loss of Kosovo and the signing of
the Kumanovo Agreement that put an end to NATO intervention in Serbia.
In
an attempt to explain Serbs’ poor awareness about “the faith of their own,”
Patriarch Pavle says that throughout the history the SOC has been less occupied
by faith, and more by state and politics. Having no problems with this fact,
the Patriarch states that the Church, during its whole history, including the
20th century, was forced to “leave behind its primary duties” in
order to participate actively in the struggle for the unification of “Serbdom,”
which was why “a priest had to be a teacher and a judge, and to pull a gun to
defend himself and his family”. Legitimizing the neglect of spiritual matters
by the urge to create a state, which needed fighting for, Patriarch Pavle
implicitly legitimized the same behavior of the Church during the latest wars
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, namely the support the Church was
giving to Milošević’s warring policy. Finally, such a perception of the
role of the SOC implies that the Church will continue to consider “leaving
behind its primary duties” legitimate and to engage in politics, and, if
necessary, in a war.
How
powerful is the position the SOC holds after October 5 was demonstrated by the
way religious instruction was introduced in public school curricula. The
Serbian government, except for the Minister of Religions, was against the
latter, in principle. Moreover, the Deputy Minister of Education threatened to
resign, while the Minister himself, on several occasions, has expressed his
negative stance on the idea. However, religious instruction was introduced by a
governmental decree. This is only the most important in a series of concessions
the Government made under the pressure constantly exerted by the Serbian
Orthodox Church, that is, by political circles the interests of which
intertwined with those of the Church. This primarily refers to closest
associates of the president of the former FRY, Vojislav Koštunica. Thus, for
example, the Minister of Religions, Vojislav Milovanović, by the end of
last year announced incorporation of the Faculty of Theology in the Belgrade
University, the restitution of property to “traditional churches and religious
communities.” He also said that, at that point, over fifty major religious
facilities were under construction throughout Serbia, and that the government
had procured more than a hundred million dinars to that end.
As for the dispute on the youth summer camps whereby the SOC accused the
government of “gerrymandering shamelessness and satanic immorality,” an end was
put to it after a meeting between the Minister of Education Gašo Knežević
and the Patriarch at the initiative of Bishop Atanasije Rakita, president of
the SOC Committee on Religious Instruction. The meeting resulted by an
agreement that the Church will join in the future operation of the camps. On
that occasion the Minister of Education offered the program of educational
reform in Serbia to the perusal of the Patriarch.
The most important role of the Church as a today’s institution is the one
of symbolizing the idea of pan-Serbian unity, whereby the Church attempts,
after the military and political defeat, to round up spiritually, culturally
and politically the territory, which, due to the military defeat, failed to be
united in a single state or – as in the case of Montenegro – has not been
united in the desired way. Thanks to its great influence on the people, the
Church’s endeavor obtains heavy logistic support from the state and the Army.
The
SOC has never recognized the borders of Serbia within Yugoslavia after the
World War II. At the beginning of 1992, at the time when the war for reshaping
these borders was already underway, the Congregation of the SOC issued a
declaration saying it acknowledged not the borders set up by the AVNOJ, while
Bishop Atanasije Jevtić qualified their revision as a question vital for Serbian people, which in
itself justified the Church’s interference into politics. In the summer of
1995, the Patriarch signed that Milošević
was entitled to negotiate the borders in the name of Bosnian Serbs in Dayton.
However, after the Dayton Accords were signed, the Congregation of the SOC,
dissatisfied with the solution reached, declared the Patriarch’s signature
invalid.
The territory of Serbia as decided by the AVNOJ is twice
smaller than “the historical Serbian region,” writes Pravoslavlje in 2002, naming Josip Broz as the prime culprit. Then
who’s a quisling, asks Pravoslavlje,
and concludes, “In any case, neither Milan Nedić nor
Draža Mihailović are to be found in the ranks of the World War II
quislings”.
A
national-political engagement was the most prominent activity the SOC pursued
in 2002. The main problems were the so-called schisms – a term the SOC uses to
qualify the Montenegrin and Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC). Actually, the
core of the problem in the case of Montenegro is the SOC’s attitude to
Montenegrin authorities, which are being denied since the SOC considers
Montenegro a Serbian ethnical territory without any hesitation. Consequently,
it negates the very existence of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church (MOC). In the
case of Macedonia, however, the SOC reopened a years-long and partially solved
question of the autocephaly of the MOC, with the intent to deny its
autocephalous status, but not the very existence of the Macedonian Church. In
both cases the SOC acts with unquestionably political or, to put it more
precisely, territorial and political pretensions – although openly and with
greater ambitions when it comes to the former, and more modestly and in a
concealed way in the case of the latter. Finally, in both cases, the Church is
fully supported by the Russian Orthodox Church, which calls upon “respect for
canonical norms.” This, and every other support to the Serbian Orthodox Church,
was expressed by the Russian Patriarch while bestowing the highest award of the
Russian Orthodox Church on the Serbian Patriarch, “for his personal
contribution to the strengthening of Christianity and the unity of Eastern
Orthodox nations.” While expressing his thanks, the Serbian Patriarch said he
was primarily grateful to the Russian leadership, then to the Russian Army, and
finally to the Russian Orthodox Church for the help they gave to the SOC and
the Serbian people with regards to Kosovo and Metohija.
Serbia
and Montenegro can part – says Amfilohije Radović – only against peoples’
will, by violence, theft, blackmail and threat. The SOC will, therefore, ignore
Montenegro’s possible decision on independence. As to the Montenegrin Orthodox
Church, it is the “child of Titoists,” who are “today continuing the violence
against the SOC.”
This is the sum and substance of the SOC’s attitude regarding Montenegro’s
state status.
The main characteristic of the political
engagement of Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović is radical nationalism and
extreme hate speech, which often slips into elementary impoliteness, even
vulgarity.
Another
illustrious instance of overt political engagement of Metropolitan Amfilohije
Radović united with hate speech is his appearance at the New Year
celebration in Podgorica, in the night between January 13 and 14. 2002. On that
occasion, in support of the continued existence of the common state, he
exclaimed, “Let every Montenegrin nail with a hammer the damned emperor
Dukljanin to the Vezir bridge.”
At that point the issue of Montenegro’s referendum on the state status was in
full swing. Later “explanations” in which Amfilohije claimed that he had in
mind Emperor Dukljanin as the legendary symbol of paganism were not only
unconvincing, but also hypocritical, in view of the fact that Duklja (the
medieval Montenegrin state) has become the symbol of Montenegrin state
independence during the recent processes aimed at the realization of this goal.
The
Serbian Orthodox Church pursues its strategy of ignoring Montenegrin
authorities through attempts to impede the exertion of state authority on the
land owned by the Church and thus build a state within a state. Refusing to act
upon a decision of the Republic’s Bureau for the Protection of Cultural
Monuments to cease the works on four monastery complexes on the Lake of Skadar,
Amfilohije Radović warns the director of the Bureau that from now his
office will not be allowed, without a written consent of the Diocese, to perform
any works on the lands “owned’ by the Church, and that the SOC “does not accept
to be a hanger to any necrophilic institution…with pagan spirit and
petty-profit orientation.” (Qualifications pertain to Montenegrin authorities.)
Reminding the director of the Bureau that the time when cultural monuments were
protected “by commissaries” was over, he refers to the cultural project of the
Cetinje biennial by saying, “The recent biennial turns the royal Cetinje into
an ‘artistic’ doghouse, the entrance to the royal palace into an artistic
'ox-promenade' and other postmodern vulgarities, all of which humiliates the
ancient city.”
In
its strategy of creating “a state within a state” the SOC is openly supported
by the Army. On the eve of the cease of existence of the FRY, having in mind
the fact that the Constitutional Charter of the new state envisages that all
real estate of the Army that is not in a direct function of defense becomes the
property of the two republics, the SOC and the Army hastily sign contracts by
which the Army property was transferred to the SOC – huge complexes of land,
army barracks, etc. Thus, for example, Metropolitan Amfilohije and the outgoing
Minister of Defense Velimir Radojević signed a contract on December 12,
2002, by which the Army transferred to the Church the property of 10.000 square
meters of land, with accompanying buildings, on the Flower Island, a first-rate
tourist location.
By this openly political arrangement, this small public estate, as it already
is, is to be divided between Montenegro state and the Serbian Orthodox Church,
with the latter establishing its own authority on “its” part.
The
opening of the “Macedonian question” in the spring of 2002 intensified to the
extreme the bitter relations between the two churches. The conflict arouse upon
the initiative of the SOC that the two churches come to an agreement on the
canonical status of the MOC. The MOC separated from the SOC and proclaimed
autocephaly back in 1967, but without canonical acknowledgment, which needed
the consent of the SOC. The solution proposed in the spring of 2002 by the SOC
(Metropolitan Amfilohije, Bishop Irinej of Niš and Bishop Pahomije
of Vranje) was that the MOC should renounce autocephaly, while the SOC would
grant it autonomy in return . The MOC Synod, however, did not accept
the offer by the SOC, and after that Patriarch Pavle, in the name of the SOC
Synod, issued a public appeal for overcoming the “schism” and reestablishing
the canonical unity of the Serbian Orthodox Church. By this appeal, he
implicitly acknowledged that the SOC was ready to accept individual eparchies
also.
Metropolitan of the Veleško-Povardarska Eparchy Jovan accepted the offer, which
resulted in division within the MOC, that is, in the unification of one of its
parts with the Serbian Orthodox Church. The ensuing dispute between the Serbian
and Macedonian Orthodox Churches showed the same political matrix and political
technology that was in the core of the conflicts in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia. The head of the MOC accused the Patriarch of “unhidden appetites”
for “usurpation” of the MOC and wondered when the SOC would put an end to its
aspirations to “rule over what is not Serbian.” “You have to understand that
this is ours and belongs to us only.” “It is more than clear that you intend to
destroy the unity of the Macedonian Orthodox Church,” said the head of the MOC,
adding that by these acts the Serbian Patriarch lost the respect of the
Macedonian people.
During
2002. the question of the autonomy of Vojvodina also became very acute. The
position of the Serbian Orthodox Church on the issue was defined by Bishop
Irinej of Bačka,
one of major nationalistic hard-liners within the SOC, also known as the “red
bishop” due to his close relations with the Milošević regime. Irinej is a
member of the extreme nationalistic movement “Svetozar Miletić,” whose
members are, among others, Kosta Čavoški, Vasilije Krestić and Smilja
Avramov. The same as Amfilohije, Bishop Irinej of Bačka openly joined the
political dispute. Though incomparably more moderate, his speech was not freed
from explicit nationalistic intolerance.
In
January 2002, Bishop Irinej of Bačka declared that the SOC was going to
organize the annual commemoration for the victims of fascism in Novi Sad (the
Novi Sad raid) separately from provincial authorities should Vojvodina
parliamentary speaker, Nenad Čanak – an outspoken advocate of the autonomy
for Vojvodina - take part in it. Čanak reacted by reminding Irinej of the
tolerance the latter showed for former top people such as “Arkan,
Perošević, Jugoslav Kostić and others” and warned him that after
October 5 “the importance and participation of the SOC in public affairs has
grown considerably, and the uninstitutional influence of the SOC dignitaries
even more.” In its political rise the SOC came to the point when it starts to
“rank state officials by their ‘suitability’,” said Čanak. The result of
this conflict were two ceremonies held separately.
By
the end of the year Irinej engaged in yet another political battle, with his
statement that the Assembly of Vojvodina “is not Serbian because Serbs are a
minority in it.” Sharp political reactions of the Vojvodina’s DOS (the ruling
alliance) ensued, calling this act a “distasteful accounting of the national
composition of the Province Assembly” by the SOC.
A few days later, Irinej participated in the assembly of the “Svetozar Miletić” Movement in Novi Sad, where a demand
for early provincial elections was made under the pretext that “the Assembly of
Vojvodina does not have democratic legitimacy and mocks the citizens, and that
even a minimal consensus between the Assembly and the majority of Serbian
people in Vojvodina does not exist. The Assembly is acting openly against the
Serbian state” or, as Irinej put it, against “Serbian unity and congregational
spirit.”
Active national-political, or, to put
it more precisely, nationalistic engagement of the Serbian Orthodox Church was
the foundation on which the unity of interests and conspicuously successful
cooperation between the Church and the Army were developed after October 5.
Apart from the aforementioned examples of direct cooperation (as in the case of
Montenegro), the latter is also evident on the level of symbolism. Namely, a
newly established rule provides that the highest representatives of the Army
take part in all important ceremonies organized by the Church – from unveiling
of monuments, through opening of temples, to enthronements of church
dignitaries.
Some
of these ceremonies are interesting as they indicate to this new union of
interests. Thus, for example, Chief the General Staff General Pavković and
his escort landed from a military helicopter to attend the ceremony of
unveiling of the monument to Nikolaj Velimirović in the Soko monastery on
March 24, 2002, the anniversary of the beginning of the NATO intervention in Serbia.
Also, general Pavković laid the first stone of facilities to be erected on
the grounds of the Mileševa monastery, and according to the monastery journal Mileševac, two hundred soldiers were
engaged in the works. A fish pond, stables, a poultry farm and a monument to
“the victims of communist terror” were built on the terrain belonging to the
monastery, the prior of which and the main entrepreneur of the works, father
Filaret, is known for his unrestrained and bellicose mood at the beginning of
the 1990s. The works on the monastery lands were undertaken without a
permission of local authorities, which resulted in criminal charges against
father Filaret “for drastic endangering of the Mileševa monastery area as an
authentic spiritual and architectural whole in harmony with the natural
environment.”
Conclusion:
Immediately
after the change of the regime in Serbia on October 5, 2000 the Serbian
Orthodox Church managed to impose the question of its institutional
redefinition, which implied abandonment of the constitutional principle of the
separation of church and state, as a priority, issue of strategic importance
for the society and the state; and all that was done at the point when the
citizens and the society as a whole found themselves at the brink of moral and material
disaster, an outcome of the policy that has been abundantly supported by the
Serbian Orthodox Church.
The
past year is strongly marked by a vivid activity of the SOC, aimed at achieving
the above goal. To that end, the Church fully cooperated with both federal and
republic ministries of religions, enjoyed the support of the Yugoslav (Serbia
and Montenegro) Army and a more or less benevolent attitude on the part of the
majority of Serbian media.
The Church sought its main pillar among political and social structures, as
well as among most fierce individual opponents of Serbia’s facing its recent
past, i.e. the responsibility for wars and war crimes. These forces had based
their legitimacy and social authority on ethno-nationalism and adherence to the
project of pan-Serbian unification even before October 5, 2000. After the
military defeat, the Church has been growingly unveiling itself as the main
pillar for all those attempting to keep this project alive. By ignoring the
issue of its own responsibility for wars and war crimes ever since October 5,
the Serbian Orthodox Church, which had revitalized its political influence once
Milošević came to power, today strives to secure for itself an
institutional form that would boost its influence, and is obviously on a good
road to success.
PART TWO
Political
Crisis Blocks Changes
After
acceleration of economic reforms in early 2002, aggravation of political crisis
first slowed down the pace of reforms and then-paralysed them. Aside from the
process of privatisation and partial modernisation of the tax system and tax
services-everything else has been partially blocked by political deadlock in
Serb parliament, obstruction of presidential elections, procrastination of
agreement on radical re-arrangement of relations between Serbia and Montenegro
(the EU-assisted formation of union between Serbia and Montenegro).
Dr.
Vojislav Kostunica, now ex-president of the FRY, leader of the block
dissatisfied by direction and pace of economic reforms, and opposed to new
distribution of economic powers in Serbia, was entirely responsible for the
blockade of reforms. But the fact is that it was Kostunica, who in the
immediate post-5 October period, tried to strengthen his internal position by
posturing as the "defender of traditional values " and insisting on
the continuity of legal order ("legalism"). By opting for that tack
and direction- obstruction of socially painful reforms in order to cheaply gain
the upper hand and with assistance of old guard to call snap elections in order
to take full control over Serbia and the FRY, induced the pro-Kostunica block
to make a series of wrong, nervous and paralysing moves in Serb parliament.
Those moves were equally nervously counteracted by the pro-Đinđic
block moves, notably, attempts to "oust" Kostunica's MPs from
parliament by way of the Prime Minister's majority in parliamentary
Administrative Committee. That feud nearly paralysed the work of Serb
Parliament and "infected" all other political processes. One of the
consequences of the foregoing was a double failure of presidential elections in
Serbia (very low turn-out of voters).
But
the said conflict mostly affected Đinđic's moves. Namely under the
status quo pressure Prime Minister was compelled to practically stop the
process of economic reforms and he began emulating Kostunica-style Kosovo
rhetoric and Kostunic's allergy to the Hague Tribunal. So now we face a
paradoxical situation: Đinđic is now saying what Kostunica has been
long thinking, and economic reforms are totally sidelined.
That
"schizophrenic" situation was fuelled by praises of Serb reforms by
the top financial institutions (IMF; WB, EBRD). On the other hand population at
large are aware that politics still prevail over economy, that their living
standards have not improved, that recession is lingering, that some top
politicians have close links with heads of gangland, that reform moves are
incomplete and "selective" (beneficial for some political circles and
harmful for other,) that order of government's moves is not logical (first
privatisation and then de-nationalisation), that government is avoiding legal
regulation and stabilisation of the state-run mass media/information system (in
order to continue its control over the leading print and electronic media) and
that the authorities are visibly unwilling to efficiently combat corruption.
The
aforementioned reform-centred confusion was exacerbated by Washington's mixed
messages to Belgrade, which were closely monitored by public opinion in
Belgrade. For example in May 2002 Washington's strongly manifested reservations
towards Belgrade because of the latter's near non-co-operation with the Hague
Tribunal, were surprisingly succeeded by Washington's moves tantamount to staunch
support to Belgrade reform-minded circles. Firstly the US Secretary of State
Colin Powel signed certification of aid to Yugoslavia for the year 2002. Then
the management board of the World Bank approved a long-term $ 825,000 million
worth of loan to Belgrade (in support of financial sectors reforms and
acceleration of privatisation process.) However it bears stressing the US
member of the board did not vote for that decision, but influential US
representatives in the IMF did not either urge its deferment.
Then
the IMF in its report assessed that the pro-reform forces in Yugoslavia
realised "impressive achievements" and that "the Yugoslav
economic program is wise and monetary and fiscal policies are in sync with the
inflation-curbing measures." And finally at the May conference of the
US-Yugoslav Business Council, the US Ambassador to Belgrade, William Montgomery
extolled "Yugoslav economic authorities for having done a fantastic
job." On that occasion Montgomery underscored that "the US
Administration shall render extensive assistance to US companies interested in
investing in Yugoslavia." All the foregoing signalled Washington's resolve
to "encourage" pro-reform forces in Serbia. But all those signals did
not manage to resolve the most glaring problem of the transition in Serbia-lack
of direct foreign investments. Namely in 2001 direct foreign investments
amounted to only $ 155 million, and in 2002 they totalled only $ 500 million
(the bulk of which are related to purchase of three Serb cement plants.)
In
fact the aforementioned WB loan and other international assistance aimed at
strengthening institutions, which could guarantee investments of private
foreign and domestic businessmen and loans granted to citizens and small
entrepreneurs. The fact is that large foreign investors are wary in view of
slowed down overhaul of legal order and non-enforcement of judicial rulings.
Team of the EU Commission in its late December report also assessed that
"reform process is too slow and the legal insecurity is rife."
(according to the Belgrade media the Serb government decided to treat that
report as 'confidential' on internal political grounds.)
But
it is a notorious fact that government of Serbia failed to put under its
control all police services (or informal centres of power within them) and to
transform the Milosevic era judicial mechanism, in terms of making it more
independent from political and interest-related pressures. All the foregoing
not only discourages foreign investors but also calls into question the credibility
of all reform forces in Serbia.
Foreign
Assistance and Lack
of
Direct Foreign Investments
West
supported very much the Serb reforms in 2001, but that foreign support started
losing momentum in 2002. The foregoing was confirmed by deferment of the
international donors conference and by the extent of external debt of the FRY
(mostly Serbia).
Since
during the election race the issue of the FRY's external indebtedness was one
of the points of discord between presidential contenders, in fall 2002 Deputy
Finance Minister Dr. Veroljub Dugalic disclosed many relevant data on the FRY's
balance. In reliance on the IMF data, he stated that in the post-5 October
period the external debt fell from $ 12.2 billion to $ 8.6 billion (several
debts have been written off). That debt may be further reduced to $ 7 billion,
when the London Club and the Paris Club within 3 years write off some debts.
Thus
in a very short time the external debt of Yugoslavia thanks to understanding of
the West was reduced by $ 5.8 billion. During the Milosevic era (period of
disintegration of the SFRY and sanctions), the external debt of Yugoslavia
increased from the aforementioned $ 6.5 billion (1991) to 12.2 billion, or was
nearly doubled. Now if all optimistic predictions are realised all the interest
rates accrued at the expense of the blocked Yugoslavia shall be written off.
Writing
off the Milosevic era interest rates is in fact not a major achievement of the
new authorities. But as the capital without interest rates is not a genuine
capital, than one must note that democratic authorities have achieved a major
success in regulation of external debts, and that foreign creditors enabled new
authorities in Serbia and Montenegro to move forwards without the Milosevic-era
economic burden.
As
regards a direct external assistance, the Serb government was compelled to
earmark the bulk of it for appeasement of dramatic social problems. Thus in
2002 150 billion dinars from public spending totalling 320 billion dinars were
earmarked for social benefits, allowances and protection. In other words
350,000 families received outstanding children allowances, outstanding health
benefits were paid out to the elderly and infirm, 78,000 disabled received
their benefits, and 200,000 most vulnerable retirees twice received assistance
totalling 600, 000 million dinars.
In
2002 pensions were also regularly paid out, thanks to additional 47 billion
dinars from the republican budget (only 40% of necessary money).
The
fact that only 60% of regular pension funds were provided is indicative of the
depth of economic crisis. That transition crisis coupled by state obligations
from the past period, thanks to considerable foreign donations, is being
"cured" through the -public spending. However the Serb government is
not deft and swift enough to jump-start the recovery of production and exports,
in order to alleviate the social allowance burden of successful companies.
Added
to that foreign investors are not willing to up their investments in Serbia.
Though the Đinđic Administration tried to lure them by increasing
social benefits and allowances (and consequently reducing risks of such
investments).
Serb
public opinion tends to interpret the foregoing as insufficient foreign
economic support to democratic transition in Serbia and to disregard
"internal" reform-stopping brakes.
Instead
of more energetically tackling the overhaul of the police and judicial
apparatus, in order to boost confidence of foreign investors, the Serb
government used the foreign investors reservations to halt the enforcement of
the law on extra-profit aimed at effecting a total break with the Milosevic era
profiteers. Namely from the very outset that law was criticised for creating
"a new legal insecurity" and "turning off foreign
investors." After its disappointing results and in view of the
aforementioned it was repealed in August 2002.
Public
Revenues Board of Serbia recently disclosed that of Euro 727 million profit
generated during the Milosevic era it managed to collect only over Euro 50
million. It was also communicated that decisions on forcible tax collections to
the tune of Euro 72 were sent to 158 companies. In fact the collection of
extra-profit realised through privileged export-import deals was blocked,
because many DOS leaders were one-time users of privileges granted by
Milosevic, through their private companies of those of their sponsors.
A
Promising Start
One
can say that the first, major reform-minded move, after a series of pro-reform
slogans and statements, and adoption of several reform laws, was made on 3
January 2002 when the National Bank of Yugoslavia kicked off liquidation of the
four largest state-owned banks (as their recovery exacted nearly $ 5 billion or
32% of the then gross national product it was easier to declare them
insolvent.).
Swift
liquidation of those four banks (Beogradska banka, Invest banka, Beobanka,
Jugobanka) meant also 'liquidation' of their foreign creditors. Had they been
able to transform their investments into shares they could have demanded
ownership of one third of the Serb companies, debtors of those banks. Then the
Serb government would not have had anything to sell in the process of
privatisation.
During
that operation the National Bank of Yugoslavia Mlađan Dinkic bore the
brunt of wrath of redundant 10,000 employees. In sign of protest against that
move and alleged abandonment of the concept of the "national banking"
Dr. Jovan Rankovic a leading economist of Kostunica's DPS and the Federal
Finance Minister handed in his resignation. But when Democratic Party of Serbia
realised that its opposition to liquidation of large banks would not be
politically profitable it engaged itself in other battles against
"influence of foreign capital" and in defence of "the national
interests."
Governor
Dinkic encouraged by the first success then proceeded with his purge of the
entire banking system, that is declared insolvent other twenty banks. On the
basis of the Agreement with the Paris Club envisaging writing off 66% of the
Club's debts, he decided to introduce the majority state ownership over 10
relatively perspective Vojvodina banks and thus directly positioned himself to
dictate the direction of their privatisation. In fall 2002 the NBY pushed
through the Federal Parliament the Act on the State Take Over of Debts and
Guarantees of Commercial Banks Towards the Paris and the London Club. Thus for
only $ 2.5 billion (undertaken obligations with a 20- year repayment period)
the NBY got shares worth about $ 7.5 billion.
Governor
Dinkic also pledged that the state would pay off old foreign currency savings
by the year 2016 (instead of the year 2011) including the savings 'eaten away'
by the failed pyramidal banks "Dafinament" and
"Jugoskandik". By and large he thus regulated the public debt
totalling Euro 4.25 billion.
In
parallel the National Bank of Yugoslavia smoothly carried out the operation of
conversion of DM and other European currencies, into Euro ( a total of $ 4
billion were converted into Euro).
Thanks
to the aforementioned actions Governor Dinkic and his NBY team put more order
into the banking system, restored confidence in banks (foreign currency savings
reached nearly Euro 800 million, while foreign reserves of the FRY reached $ 3
billion). They thus put in place most prerequisites for formation of a real
financial market and for normal and cheap system of financing production and
spending in the country.
Despite
divided opinions on the two-year long stability of Yu dinar, one must mention
15 May, the day on which the IMF officially declared that the FRY took on
commitments from Article VIII of its Statute, and subsequently proclaimed Dinar
convertibility in monetary transactions with foreign countries. That move was
preceded by signing of a three-year FRY-IMF financial arrangement.
In
fact the aforementioned arrangement was reached in early March after two-week
negotiations with the IMF mission in Belgrade. The arrangement regulated
conditions of financial support totalling $ 829 million until May 2005
(including the drawing rights on the last instalment of the previous
arrangement to the tune of $ 280 million), and the IMF recognised further FRY
special drawing rights to the tune of $ 650 million (on which basis Belgrade if
it sticks to the IMF-prescribed economic policy may be granted $ 62 million
loan in each of the next 13 quarters). The foregoing was by and large a
recognition of "successful FRY economic policy in the FRY").
The
above was also certification of the previously reached deal with the Paris Club
(2001) and most surely facilitated successful conclusion of other major loan
arrangements (loan for construction and repair of corridor no. 10 through
Serbia, etc.)
In
order to ensure Washington's support for YU dinar and credibility of its
monetary policy the NBY was compelled to push through parliament a key Act on
Foreign Currency Liberalisation, stipulating a relatively "free foreign
currency market at which domicile commercial banks without limitations may buy
currency for the sake of their own liquidity, grant them as loans to companies
and also engage in conversion operations "in their own name" (and not
in the name of the NBY)." Financing of exports with foreign currencies by
commercial banks was simplified, but the notorious provision on the
"return of currencies" in case of failed operations was retained (the
state in fact never got that money back, for it was one of the channels for the
"capital flight" to other countries.) Obligation of registering
export deals and the right of central bank to criminally prosecute those
persons who fail to do that were also retained. Companies were finally allowed
to have foreign currency accounts in domicile banks.
The
new Foreign Currency Act has some contradictory provisions, which are a
throwback to the old system in which in principle everything was allowed, but
in fact many things were banned. The Act for example lays down that:
"inflow and outflow of capital in terms of direct investments is free….foreign
citizens, but not Yugoslav citizens resident abroad are allowed to buy domestic
bonds/securities…Yugoslav citizens living abroad are not allowed to purchase
long-term foreign securities or to invest their money in foreign investments
funds. Both residents and non-residents are not allowed to buy property at home
and abroad. Crediting of economic activities of companies abroad and
investments on the basis of those activities are restricted, and may be even
banned in case of "upset of balance of payments" (and the said
phenomenon persists in this country for 12 years now!).
Under
the Act citizens when travelling abroad are allowed to take out of country Euro
2,000 in cash but those who have credit cards may use them without restrictions
abroad.
One
would not like to underrate the aforementioned foreign currency liberalisation,
but one must note some of its shortcomings. YU dinar in the foreseeable future
shall not reach "the real convertibility" in view of the continuing
economic crisis in Serbia and its devastated economy. In fact "convertible
dinar" (coming from the country which monthly exports amounting to $ 150
million, are offset by over $ 250 million monthly trade deficit) at this moment
of time at the world market may only help citizens of Serbia carry out
small-scale monetary operations. The foregoing may also help the domestic
experts gauge the YU dinar purchasing power with respect to other foreign
currencies.
Acceleration
of Privatisation and Low Prices
of
Socially-Owned Companies
Privatisation
did not start in 2002, after the adoption of the new Act drafted by government
of Serbia, but on 28 December 2001 when the sale of the three Serb
cement-plants was effected (that deal was worth $ 140 million).
Then
privatisation grew slack in spring, but gained momentum after the launching of
the government-sponsored action "Privatisation of 1,000 companies in
2002" in early July.
In
fact the Serb government on 4 July thanks to amendments to the Act on
Companies, first enabled itself to sell other shares of social capital. Then on
22 July Privatisation Minister Aleksandar Vlahovic and the leading domestic
banks signed the Protocol on Privatisation Financing, which facilitated
"hire-purchase" of socially-owned companies. And finally on 1 August
government of Serbia amended the Decree on Evaluation of Value and Auction
Privatisation of Companies. That move brought about halving of inflated
book-keeping value of socially-owned companies, and lowered the initial auction
price of those companies to one-tenth of their registered value.
Government
also renounced its theory that privatisation (through state-run sales) should
lure fresh foreign capital, or prominent, foreign strategic partners. It
instead hastened to impose to socially-owned companies new, individual
(according to opposition "assorted") owners. Thus two objectives were
reached: citizens were stimulated to put their savings into the domestic banks,
and production in paralysed companies with dubious or non-owners was
jump-started.
Government's
measures aimed at simulating domestic entrepreneurs, both those with clean and
dirty money, to buy ailing socially-owned companies. Minister Vlahovic was
explicit: "Origins of capital invested in privatisation shall not be
examined." Thus an interested investor may buy cheaply a socially-owned
company either with cash (non-laundered money!?) or through a favourable loan,
and as soon as 45% of the set price is paid, that individual may sell that very
company.
All
the aforementioned moves gave impetus to privatisation process. In 2002, 200
companies were sold (12 via tenders and 184 via auction) while minority share
packages from the republican Share Fund were sold too. According to Minister
Vlahovic those sales generated Euro 350 million, while new owners pledged to
subsequently invest Euro 300 million in those companies. Minister Vlahovic
announced sale of 1,500 companies (including overhauled 40 large "public
companies") in the course of 2003.
Some
of privatisation deals were accompanied by scandals. Trading in shares of
Apatin Brewery at the Belgrade Sock Market generated much buzz because of
alleged rip-off of workers of that company. Namely their shares (acquired under
the old Act on Transformation of Socially-Owned Company) were sold by brokers
for $ 20 each, while the state-owned shares were sold several days later for $
175 each. Criticised was the sale of the three sugar-refining plants (each
worth Euro 3) at the international tender. The buyer was Miodrag Kostic (former
sponsor of Democratic Party) from Novi Sad.
Major
Infrastructure Works
Are
Much-Delayed
In
2002 it was widely hoped that the crisis of infrastructure would be alleviated
by construction of so-called European no. 10 corridor, southbound and running
along the river Morava valley. Many thought that the said corridor would become
the principal route for the Athens Summer Olympics in 2004. During the early
May visit of Kostas Simitis to Belgrade it was stated that Greece would help
development of the Balkans region by Euro 100 million approved by the EBRD for
regulation of the bottleneck in area between Leskovac and Macedonian border. As
that part of highway is 120 km long, it was assessed that for the said sum a 24
long detour road in the vicinity of Leskovac and 43 km long section from Bujanovac
to Macedonian border may be built, while the longest section, the one running
through Sicevac gorge (35 km) could be re-constructed as a semi-freeway. As
Euro 600 million are needed for the full construction of that section of
corridor 10, the republican Minister for Construction of Serbia, Dragoslav
Sumarac announced the tender for pertinent highway and nearby attractive
locations thereof. However by the early 2003 no such tender was announced by
the Serb media while the Serb parliament received the new Bill on Concessions
proposed by the Serb government.
The
aforementioned delay in amending the basic regulations of concession-giving
systems was caused most certainly by political, and strategic reasons. As the
Serb government as early as in the fall 2001 renounced its concession plans
relating to northern parts of corridor 10 through Serbia and Vojvodina, one
gained the impression that the Serb authorities were trying to retain control
over that lucrative transversal, and that they counted upon the IMF loans for
building thereof. But when it turned out that the aforementioned would be a
major financial effort for Serbia, the only possible solution resurfaced:
granting of infrastructure concessions (though Prime Minister Đinđic
has his reservations about that model of the foreign capital lure, which, by
the way since the 10th century has been viewed as the betrayal of
the "national economic interests" (whatever that meant and means).
That
direction of investment acceleration in Serbia is widely backed by domestic
economists, but its attraction for international investors remains to be seen.
By the way any major foreign investments may reduce the political risks and
help broaden the circle of those interested in concessions. But the
Đinđic Administration avoids liberal deregulation of the old economic
system, for the sake of internationalisation of economy of Serbia. To
illustrate the aforementioned assertion it is necessary to recount the tale of
privatisation of the oil sector of Serbia which is linked to various obstacles
to foreign investments in infrastructure.
The
main stumbling block regarding activation of the aforementioned "Greek
Loan" (in fact the EU loan) is the early 2001 decree of the government of
Serbia on the state monopoly on imports of oil and oil derivatives aimed at
enabling the state-run Oil Company of Serbia to achieve accumulation necessary
for overhaul of refineries and warehouses destroyed during the NATO 1999
bombing. That decree objectively de-motivates foreign investments in oil
derivatives distribution network, in which companies from Greece, Russia,
Austria, Hungary, and other countries have shown interest.
In
his bid to create prerequisites for activation of the Greek loan, the
Republican Privatisation Minister Aleksandar Vlahovic, urged the suspension of
the state monopoly on imports of oil derivatives. In line with that advocacy he
announced the tender for privatisation of "Beopetrol," a company
which in the early 90's broke away from the Croat Company "INA."
(Vlahovic also said that the damage compensation lawsuit recently filed by INA
was not legally founded and that government of Serbia might win that lawsuit by
way of international arbitration.) He added that in order to make the tender
successful, the aforementioned decree on imports of oil should be amended to
allow for imports of crude oil to Serbia, to be effected by the future buyer of
"Beopetrol," probably a foreign company.
But
in the face of all the aforementioned Vlahovic's communiques and privatisation
demands of his ministry the Oil Industry of Serbia took the stance that it
should take part in the competition for the purchase of "Beopetrol".
In fact NIS fears that its it would not stand much chance in future
privatisation deals, were "Beopetrol" to be sold to a foreign buyer.
It also bears stressing that the purchase of "Beopetrol" would be a
lucrative deal for NIS, as the former generates yearly revenues of $ 15-20
million. But Minister Vlahovic's inclination to sell "Beopetrol" to a
foreign buyer with foreign currency cash goes against any such NIS wish.
Summing
up Performances
of
the "Reform-Minded" Government
In
summing up performances of the reform-minded government of Serbia in the past
two-year period, we note only partial successes and total failures. Pays were
tripled, costs of living doubled, living standards rose only by 20%. Production
was partially revived and increased only by 4%, taxes tripled, and some order
was put in state/public services. Privatisation is now gaining momentum, but
many people are aware that it cannot be carried out in a just way and that new
owners of Serbia shall not be angels with a clean financial past. Much was done
in the sphere of recovery of economic ties with foreign countries and top
international institutions, but inflow of foreign investments is still low.
One
can say that the Serb government instead of fundamental de-etatization of
economy, tried to concentrate funds in the state budget and exert full control
in resolution of all economic problems (this was partly due to the pressure of
anti-reform forces and partly to traditional command role of state in the
economic sphere). The foregoing was repudiated by the IMF which now demands
re-balance or rather down-scaling of the republican budget by 10-20%.
However
Prime Minister Đinđic maintains that the increase in budget from $
3.5 billion in 2002 to $ 4.5 billion in 2003 should double privatisation
revenues, which, according to some optimistic predictions, are likely to reach
$ 2 billion in 2003. Imminent are sales of tobacco industry and of large part
of state-owned cell phone industry shares.
By
and large both citizens and the new authorities in Serbia have underrated the
burden of the legacy of the previous regime, and were too optimistic about the
celerity of changes. In order to prevail over the aforementioned onerous legacy
systematic, economic planning and new and radical measures are needed.
Economic
and Social Rights
Second
year of transition in Serbia began with signs of palpable fear of all population
strata in the face of imminent, massive job cuts and other radical, economic
changes. After the first serious legislation-related moves of the Serb
government in 2001 (adoption of tax laws package, Act on Privatisation, Act on
Labour, overhaul of the largest Serb company Kragujevac-based "Crvena
Zastava", sale of the three large cement plants), it was clear that the
process would be accelerated in the next few years, that is revved up to
encompass a large number of companies. Although the top political and economic
experts were openly reform-minded, other key players did not reach the
consensus on the timetable and pace of next economic and social moves. Lack of
political and social consensus throughout 2002 affected the reforms, either by
slowing them down, or by devaluating their earlier results. Ideological and
program differences caused a major rift between parties, members of the ruling
coalition, and subsequently affected further implementation of economic
reforms.
1.
Standards of Living
Catastrophic
predictions by opposition leaders relating to a plummeting standard of living,
and an army of jobless caused by arbitrary sale and closure of factories
country-wide, have additionally frustrated and intimidated broad population
strata, already traditionally disinclined towards the idea of market economy.
At the same time liquidation of some large Serb banks in the early 2002,
entailing redundancy of 8,500 employees, only strengthened those fears. On the
other hand, Prime Minister and members of government have more or less
successfully responded to numerous pressures and frequently unrealistic social
demands. They were guided by "strategy, without strategy", that is
reacted to each case "in a different manner, as possible under the given
circumstances." In the face of numerous objections and sharp attacks, and
an ever-dwindling popular support to reforms, Prime Minister Zoran Đinđic
was fully aware that "the government implementing reforms cannot be
popular….but Serbia has the most socially-minded government of all countries
undergoing transition." ("Vreme", 24 October 2002). He
illustrated the foregoing by the following data "200 billion dinars of 250
billion of the planned budget were allocated well in advance on the basis of
citizens' rights."
In
the late 2002, on 18 December, at the "Poverty in Serbia" Conference
findings of a very comprehensive survey on standard of living were presented.
Survey was carried out by "Strategic Marketing" in co-operation with
the World Bank experts. It shall represent the basis for future moves in the
domain of social protection and the one for working out the poverty-reduction
strategy. According to the newly-established poverty line 800,000 people, that
is, 10.6% of population are considered poor, while a large number of people are
just above that poverty line. Experts have stressed that the decline in the
number of poor resulted from a good social policy, by also from newly-applied
criteria. They explained that the number of poor would double if the current
poverty line were upped by 20%. The most surprising was the following data:
most poor are inhabitants of rural areas (14%), and five- or more member
households (13%). To date it was widely believed that in Serbia the most poor
are inhabitants of large industrial centres, that is inhabitants of urban
areas. As regards the age structure the most poor are inhabitants over 65 (15%
of the poor) and then children between 7 and 14 of age (12.7%). Highly-educated
individuals make up only 2% of poor, but every fifth unqualified worker is
poor. Unemployed are also among the most vulnerable population strata. The
black market employs mostly retirees and farmers or small holdings owners, but
also the jobless. Nearly 12% of fully-employed are also moon-lighting. Regional
analysis of poverty confirmed an obvious inequality in the degree of
development in some parts of the country: poverty rate in Belgrade is 7.1%, in
Vojvodina 8.8%, well below the republican average. The largest number of poor
people live in South East Serbia (16.6%) and in West Serbia (13.5%). In Central
Serbia every tenth citizen is poor. Average spending is $ 1,600 per capita, 50%
less than in Croatia. Interestingly enough 10% of the richest people in Serbia
spend seven times more than the same percentage of the poorest people. The poor
need an additional 21.2% of money to meet the bare necessities.
Citizens
cannot be even comforted by the data on betterment of macro-economic situation
or by the fact that Serbia's poverty rate is equal to the one registered in the
neighbouring developing countries. According to Milan Đuric, President of
"Nezavisnost" trade union of "Retirees", says that 750,000
retirees in 2002 received monthly pensions of about 6,500 dinars, and Milenko
Smiljanic, President of Council of Alliance of Independent Trade Unions of
Serbia says that the survey carried out among workers indicated that 47% of
them lived worse than two years ago, and 45% had the same standards of living.
("Danas", 20 December 2002). Although due to different methodology
the last and previous data are incomparable, hardly any citizen of Serbia is
ready to lend credence to the presented data that in 2000 every third citizen
was poor, in mid-2002 every fifth, and in late-2002, only every tenth.. Obvious
efforts made by the Serb government to resolve social problems (the latter are
frequently minimised on political grounds) and funds allocated to that end,
don't suffice to create a stable social situation in the country. Radical
economic moves at the outset of transition, axing of a large number of jobs
because of privatisation or insolvency, slow creation of new jobs, and lack of
investments are objective and expected problems. Added to that a large number
of citizens is still not coping well with the newly-emerged circumstances,
namely they are reluctant to change their jobs and expect the state to solve
their work problems. The biggest problem are however retirees. Due to low
pensions, bereft of possibility to moon-light and faced with rising living
costs, they barely subsist. Refugees, notably the elderly and families with children
are also in a dire predicament. As regards labour-fit population, several
hundred thousand of them working in failed companies, receiving irregular pay
checks and being non-eligible for any kind of social benefits are really having
a hard time. According to Independent Trade Union 200,000 of their members have
not received pay checks for months or years.
2.
Poverty-Reduction Strategy
Program
"Poverty-Reduction Strategy" was launched in September 1999 by the
World Bank and IMF, at an initiative of leaders of G 7 (loan-granting
countries). The latter deemed it as a new kind of support to heavily indebted
countries. That program articulates the plan of national development and
defines attainable objectives contributing to reduction of poverty, integration
of social, macroeconomic and structural elements and identification of
parameters for gauging the progress made in that direction. So-called Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), mostly African and Latin American countries,
and low-income countries so-called IDA countries (International Development
Agency), notably Yugoslavia, are duty-bound to implement the aforementioned
strategy. After elaboration and adoption of the Poverty-Reduction Strategy IMF
and WB shall write off the external debt of the first-group countries, while
the second-group countries shall become eligible for favourable, long-term
international loans.
According
to the IMF and WB decision Serbia and Montenegro are duty-bound to work out two
independent strategies and to separately elaborate the Initial Framework of
Poverty-Reduction Strategy, before kick-starting the work on the final version.
That document was submitted to the WB and IMF by the Serb government on 22 June
2002, and the two international institutions gave it high marks. Deadline for
elaboration of the final strategy is July 2003. 9 ministries are directly
working on it, while other ministries shall be consulted when the particular
needs for their suggestions arise. Ministry for Social issue is in charge of
the project co-ordination and elaboration.
Government
of Serbia has prioritised three objectives: anti-poverty combat, revival of
economy and constitution of the state based on the rule of law. In stressing
that poverty was the no. 1 state problem, much before the disclosure of
findings of the poll on Standards of Living of Population, the Serb government
publicly admitted its awareness of the gravity of the social problem, but also
announced its readiness to resolve that problem without threatening or
renouncing the key goal-reform or rather an overhaul of the whole social
system. In view of the foregoing it opted for the national poverty-reduction
strategy based on economic development of the country and joint efforts of the
whole society in anti-poverty combat, rather then the strategy based on
favourable international loans. Hence a heavy reliance on internal resources in
the program financing, through improvement of budgetary revenues and structure
of budgetary spending, along with a minor reliance on additional help-
non-repayable foreign loans.
In
combat against poverty the focus is on re-structuring of economy, development
of new products and services and expansion of a network of small and
medium-scale companies, all of which should lead up to creation of new jobs.
Transformation of economy along modern, market principles and on sound basis
would ensure better social assistance, better education and health services to
the poor and vulnerable population groups.
If
the Anti-Poverty Combat is accepted by the WB and IMF, it shall be a program of
momentous importance for population but also for the future of the state.
Government of Serbia shall then have to fine-tune all reform processes and gear
them towards reduction of poverty, while social policy and assessments of the
needs of the poor shall constitute a basis for elaboration of a national
development strategy. Although the ongoing reforms and democratic processes in
Serbia have been to date closely monitored by numerous international
organisations and international institutions green-lighting of the
aforementioned strategy would entail both additional control and various kinds
of assistance and guidance on the path of transformation of the whole society.
3.
Legal Framework
The
very first year of reforms indicated lack of strong and uniform will for
changes (there were evident differences over co-operation with the Hague
Tribunal, and a clean break with the legacy and policy of the previous regime).
There was no massive popular support for changes, and many failed to grasp the
key issues of transformation of society and system. Euphoric mood and
unrealistic hopes which marked the year 2001 were dispelled last year. At the
same time the true nature of the existing processes and motives of their prime
movers were laid bare. Historical chance given to Serbia (despite tragic
consequences of its previous policy and its delay in latching on to modern
European processes) was called into question due to lack of responsibility,
egoistic interests and lack of readiness of the ruling political establishment
to grasp the transition process in its entirety. Major differences in programs
and ideas of parties-members of the ruling coalition escalated last year and
even evolved into open conflicts resulting in the definite rift between the two
largest political parties, and re-alignment of DOS into the so-called
"reform-minded" and "anti-reform minded" blocks .
Continuing political instability in the country slowed down the reform
processes and de-motivated the minority of citizens ready to shoulder the
burden of changes.
Due
to foregoing there was much obstruction and filibustering in Serb Parliament.
Throughout 2002 it was a scene of futile discussions and political insults and
vilification, its work was repeatedly blocked, and legislative functions
stalled. Plans relating to adoption of new laws and fine-tuning of the entire
legal system with modern legislation of Western democracies are much-delayed,
which affects the international image of the country, and the internal situation.
Numerous unregulated areas and initiated changes exact immediate work on
creation of the new institutional and legal framework.
In
the face of the above-mentioned situation government of Prime Minister Đinđic
managed to ensure support for adoption of some most important laws. But some
important bills are still pending, due to continuing squabbles between the
leading parties.
Ministry
of Finances and Economy continued the reform of the fiscal system in the course
of last year. It also introduced measures leading to a major financial
discipline and put in place new models of business operations. As laying the
groundwork for market economy is a difficult and comprehensive task, the
above-mentioned measures were frequently taken to task by companies, budget
users, financial clerks, business management, municipalities and even state
bodies. Many in fact feared new market principles and the loss of sinecures, as
well as the loss of opportunities for further financial machinations. But the
fact is that many changes in the fiscal policy and measures of financial policy
contributed to stabilisation of budget, and did not cause the business
paralysis as predicted by many detractors of those changes. The fact is that
many laws and measures prior to their enforcement were fine-tuned with the
projected budget and financial policy. All the foregoing contributed to
stabilisation of economic conditions in the country, although not to
satisfaction of the majority of population.
Under
criticism were the Serb government and competent ministries, but the
opposition's favourite object of vilification was the Finance Minister Božidar
Đelic. Namely in 2002 he acted a tough negotiator, who rarely gave in to
numerous demands of pauperised workers from failed companies, dissatisfied
budgetary users, retirees or farmers. In the face of criticism and objections,
Đelic consistently altered the fiscal policy, pensions-related
legislation, budget, and took an active part in the overhaul of the banking
system, health policy, and education. Although the work of other ministries was
under the public spotlight and scrutiny throughout 2002, moves made by
Đelic generated most media buzz. They were either extolled or totally
challenged and denied.
In
the face of a large number of redundant employees, the Serb government on 7
March 2002 adopted "The Social Program for Employees to Be Made Redundant
in the Process of Re-Structuring of Companies and during Preparations for
Liquidation, and Closure Thereof." This document was adopted because of
harsh criticism of trade-unions "that government embarked upon
privatisation without putting in place an adequate social protection
policy", but without participation and approval of those very trade
unions. That led to further differences and collisions. The program envisages
three key modes for resolution of economic-social status of redundant workers:
notably, termination of contract and registration with the Labour Market
Institute, the right to severance pay plus mandatory, additional training, and
the right to payment of the lump monetary compensation.
In
the first case the fired worker/employee after registration with the Labour
Market Institute is entitled to monetary compensation and the right to pension,
disability and health insurance during payment of monetary compensation.
Moreover his or her families are entitled to health benefits, if they are not
otherwise insured. The Right to Monetary Compensation lasts until the day of
expiry of insurance, and the pay thus envisaged may not be lower than 40% of
the average pay of employees, or higher than 80% of that pay. Duration of that
right depends on the years of service. Those with 10-15 years of service are
entitled to "welfare" money or monetary compensation for 9 months,
and those with 25 years of service may exercise that right in the next 2 years.
Payment of monetary compensation is effected during pregnancy, maternity leave,
provisional disability, and vocational training. The lump monetary compensation
may be requested if the money paid out is to be used for future employment.
Added to that such persons may join gratis vocational training organised by the
Labour Market Institute.
The
redundant worker/employee may opt for the second variant envisaged by the
Social Program. Namely he or she may exercise the right to monetary
compensation increased by 10 index points during vocational training or a
special monetary assistance. That person is also entitled to exercise other
rights, notably those to pension, disability and health insurance on the basis
of his/her unemployed status.
The
person who opts for the third variant gets the lump monetary compensation equal
to 10 average pays in the republic according to the last released data by the
competent statistical body, or 100 Euros, for each year of service. That person
may register with the Labour Market Institute, but is not entitled to the
monetary compensation envisaged for the unemployed. Funds for the payment of
the lump monetary assistance should be provided by companies, but as they are
often unable to do that, the newly-adopted social program envisages for those
purposes the territorial autonomy and local self-management funds. To meet the
aforementioned needs the Serb government earmarked 4.5 billion dinar assistance
from the Transition Fund, and 2.5 billion dinar for the Labour Market
Institute. To date the largest number of redundant workers, notably those
approaching the retirement age or intending to start up their own business,
opted for the last variant. Bank or special-purpose loans for development of
small and medium scale companies are an additional opportunity for those
intending to start up their own business. But, on the other hand many are nor
able to meet the strict criteria for granting of those loans. Social Program
envisages stipends worth 30,000 dinars for all those interested in
self-employment opportunities, while assistance to the tune of 300,000 dinars
is foreseen for 10 or more workers intending to launch a partnership company.
Act
on Financial Support to Families with Children was adopted as a measure of
social policy on 2 April. That Act envisages payment of allowances for children
to low-income families (900 dinars for the first, second, the third and the
fourth child respectively). Allowances are not envisaged for "the next
children" for, according to Minister for Social Issues Gordana Matkovic,
"we don't want to encourage non-functional families." Castodians also
have that right under the said Act. Allowances granted to single parents,
children in care of institutions, children with arrested development, shall be
increased by 30%. A novel right, the one to parent allowance, was introduced as
a measure of population policy. The allowance for the second child is 50,000
dinars, for the third child 90,000 and for the fourth 120,000. Well-off
parents, whose yearly tax basis exceeds 12 million dinars and parents who
neglected their children (gave them to foster care institutions) are stripped
of that right. The Act envisages additional measures of protection for children
in foster care and children with arrested development. According to the most
recent data in Serbia children allowance covers over 655,000 children.
Due
to very bad, almost non-extant employment and education policy in the past
decades Serbia has a large number of redundant workers and first-time job
seekers (new graduates) First the Labour Market Institute set up the Centre for
Encouragement of Employment of the Young Unemployed Cadres and then the
name-sake Fund was set up by the Serb government, the Labour Market Institute
and 34 leading Serb companies. Employment stimulation program aims at
straddling the gap between the industry's needs for highly educated cadres and
young experts without the experience necessary for such jobs. Young experts
were offered 12 different variants, notably jobs as assistants, or of
associates with stipends and mentors, or first-time jobs backed by the
Institute's financial assistance. According to Director of the Republican
Labour Institute of 24,000 young people invited to enrol in the program, 13,750
responded positively, while 8,000 decided to accept the jobs offered by the
best Serb companies. (Danas, 16 May 2002).
In
2002 there were no major clashes between trade unions' leaderships and
competent ministries and government over labour-related legislation (unlike in
2001, when the Labour Act and Privatisation Act were very much disputed). But
there were differences over adoption of many laws regulating some areas of
social life (Acts on Primary and Secondary School, University Act, Health Care
Act, set of legislative measures). Due to aforementioned differences and
problems in the work of parliament, announced laws on trade unions and strike
are yet to be debated. They are likely to generate much media buzz and become
the sticking point between trade union leaders and government of Serbia.
In
early 2003 we should see the adoption of the Act on Employment and Insurance in
Case of Unemployment. The Act shall be backed both by the Serb government and
the three largest trade-unions at a forthcoming Social-Economic Council. It
would be a precedent, in view of traditional misunderstanding which in the past
frequently blocked the work of the Council and the long-running resistance of
trade unions to a bill aimed at introducing momentous changes in the area of
employment (and unlikely to receive a nod by many employees and workers).
Namely that Act envisages a number of new measures and sanctions with a view to
stimulating so-called active employment including self-employment, professional
and geographic mobility, reduction in the number of black-marketeers and
unemployed. Hence any person unemployed for a period of over 2 years who
refuses to accept an adequate job, additional training or education, or caught
in black-marketeering or moon-lighting shall be struck off the evidence of
unemployed in the next 12 months, and consequently lose the right to financial
compensation and health insurance. "Adequate" job means. employment
offered to that person in the first three months and corresponding to his or
her qualifications, or nearly adequate employment offered between 3-9 months.
If both jobs are rejected, then the unemployed shall have to accept any job,
after 9 months. Under the Act all those who fail to report regularly to
employment services, who are not found at home by staff of employment services
three times in a row, those who fail to bring evidence of their active job
search, all those caught moon-lighting or those who refuse all offered jobs, shall
be struck of evidence. The current Republican Labour Market Institute shall be
transformed into the National Services for Unemployed and Employers. Unemployed
shall have to conclude an agreement on mutual rights and obligations with the
aforementioned Services within 12 months. Employers' subsidies for employment
of surplus professions and over-50 job-seekers are defined, as are heavy fines
for non-registration of employees. In the offing is also for the first time the
founding of private employment agencies, job-seeking clubs, business centres
for those who want to engage in business, and public works through the National
Services for the Young, Handicapped, Technological Surplus, etc. It is however
clear that adoption and subsequent enforcement of this law would lead to
different, free-of-charge health rights between genuine job-seekers and the
ones registered as such. Its positive effects shall be the change in mind-set
and incentives to active job search. But reactions of a veritable army of unemployed,
unused to making efforts, and dependant on state, remain to be seen.
In
order to simplify and accelerate tender privatisation, and higher employment
amendments to the Privatisation Act are in the offing, and are to be debated in
early January 2003. Trade unions have already announced their objections to
some novel solutions, notably "limitation of trade-union demands in
drafting of social programs by privatisation-targeted companies".
According to the Serb government that provision was necessary because "of
unrealistic demands of trade unions which make companies unattractive for
potential buyers."
4.
Trade-Unions in Transition
4.1 Trade Union Combat
In
2002 trade-union combat for protection of the rights of employed and
improvement of their status took the shape of hundred small and big strikes
which were quite legitimately and legally the ultimate device in the defence of
workers' interests. But in 2002 there was no major break-through in social
dialogue between trade-unions, employers and government, that is competent
ministries. At play were still inherited weaknesses from the previous period,
notably politically-motivated trade-union actions, mutually intolerant and
radical statements, arrogance and manipulation, bias, inability for risk-taking
and lack of responsibility transcending concrete conflicts.
On
the other hand the motives for strikes by and large crystallised: there were
strikes for pay rises and those against privatisation. In the second case
demands were as different as the underlying fears and dilemmas of the employed
relating to the privatisation process. Some resist privatisation out of belief
that social property is their inheritance or legacy, some think that property
is being sold for nothing, while the third are sceptical toward market economy
and business. But by and large workers and employees are mostly afraid of
losing their -jobs. Resistance to the very process of privatisation has visibly
dwindled (with respect with the motives of some protests in 2001). This can be
explained by gradual acceptance of reality by employees, enhanced by the trade
union's insistence on inevitability of that process. Hence objections and
negative responses of some trade unions should be viewed more as criticism of
the government's failure to include them in the important process of
decision-making and as reflection of their fears and combat for sinecures and
positions, than as their resistance to privatisation.
Added
to that it is unrealistic to expect that trade unions would back axing of tens
of thousands of their members and at the same time extol the virtues of such
moves. If government took into consideration at least some trade-union demands
perhaps the number of strikes for pay rises would decrease and negotiations
would be more successful. And such a development would be beneficial for both
sides. Unfortunately both sides keep losing their energy in marathon
discussions and in unrealistic demands. One should not even mention the
advantages stemming from a more peaceful climate, in which tolerance and mutual
respect would be the main features of conduct of both sides.
Despite
the mood of heightened tension and nervousness in 2002, the causes thereof were
more of political than of economic nature. Across-the-board pauperisation and
difficult financial situation were primary causes of that tension. But the
negative mood was also increased by many political and financial scandals, and
disunity among the ranks of DOS member parties. This affected the level of the
stability in the country too. All the aforementioned negative phenomena were
further exacerbated by some undermining actions of the political forces
defeated two years ago. Analysis of political situation in 2002 and numerous
polls indicate that population at large negatively responded to the ongoing
political crisis and constant conflicts among the top leadership. One also
gains the impression that the economic crisis would be easier to swallow by
many citizens if there were more unity among the top political tiers. Added to
that the number of strikes in 2002 was negligible and of low intensity, despite
the voiced threats and sharp words.
Strike
of employees of the four, largest Serb banks, Jugobanka, Beobanka, Beogradska
banka and Investbanka, generated much media buzz. It took place in the early
January after decision on liquidation of the four banks and simultaneous axing
of 8,500 jobs. Organised by the Trade Union of Financial Organisations of
Serbia (asplinter group of trade-union Nezavisnost) workers for days tried to
break through solidarity of population, other trade unions, political parties
and state officials and negotiate suspension of liquidation decision and
"overhaul of the banking system." Representatives of the trade-union
accused the National Bank of Yugoslavia and other backers of the liquidation
decision, notably the NBY Governor Mlađan Dinkic of "destroying the
Serb banking system and consequently the Serb economy on foreign orders."
("Nacional" 11 January 2002). After a meeting with President
Kostunica (at the trade-union request), they were even more frustrated for
failing to reach their objectives. Namely Kostunica (who does not have powers
to interfere into the NBY work or the decisions of the Finance Ministry) met
with them, had talks with financial exports and only made an irrelevant
statement, for the sake of his own political marketing and with the intention
to further undermine the work of the Serb government and of Prime Minister
Đinđic. Nonetheless the trade-union representatives were surprised by
"a vague stand of Vojislav Kostunica" and considered that his
"non-reaction was the proof that the pertinent liquidation decision was
taken single-handedly by Mr. Dinkic." (Blic, 6-7 January 2001).
Workers
repeatedly tried to radicalise their strike (blockade of Belgrade's
thoroughfares, occupation of the bank outlets in several Serb towns, hunger
strike). A general strike on January 10th failed, for only several
hundred banks' employees turned up (instead of expected several thousand). Due
to lack of more massive support and encouraging public reactions that event
marked the end of the employees' protests. Most employees realised that the
liquidation process was over, and that public opinion was not too inclined
towards employees who at the time of the staggering inflation received
regularly their pays without ever calling into question financing of wars and
ailing companies, disappearance of gold and other monetary reserves. Strike of
banking workers best reflected the then picture of Serbia: continuing political
manipulations, disunity of trade-unions, deeply divided society, selective
re-examination of morals from wrong positions and out of unprincipled reasons.
In
2002 educational workers did not strike (during the Milosevic era they often
defied the then regime and in 2001 staged a strike to warn the newly-installed
government of Serbia that they would not tolerate educational problems and low
standards of living). Similar threats and warnings were voiced in the customary
periods (on the eve of the new school-year, and after the winter holidays), but
once their demands for pay rises were met their protests died out. Since its
installation the Serb government greenlighted several pay rises to educational
workers, for their pays were indeed very low, and their massive strikes were
pernicious and irritating (problem of too much leisure time of children,
affected timetable of parents, re-scheduled end of the school-year, inadequate
knowledge and marks, etc.) Because of a negative experience gained during the
last, politically manipulated and non-backed strike, educational workers
decided not to make maximal and unrealistic demands.
Health
workers, organised by several trade-unions (Nezavisnost, New Trade Union of
Health Care Employees, New Trade Union of Health Workers, and Trade Union of
Health Care and Social Protection Employees) were less successful in their
demands. In Mach 2002 the Serb government approved pay rises to doctors, and
pharmacists, and reached a deal with their trade-union. In June the new Trade
Union of Health Workers demanded a pay rise for other health workers, and in
September a short strike of the Trade Union of Health and Social Care Workers
was staged. Though many acknowledged efforts being made to improve the
situation in that area, in December demands for new pay rises were voiced anew
and subsequently a strike was organised by trade-union Nezavisnost. While
members of Nezavisnost from Nis first walked to Belgrade, and then staged
protests in front of the Health Ministry, other trade-unions were negotiating
the pace of pay increases in 2003!
Contrary
to the above strike which the Serb government handled deftly aware of the
disunity of trade unions, the one of railway workers, members of the three
trade-unions, staged in March caused much more concern. 30,000 members of
trade-unions took part in the strike, which was the longest one in the
post-October 5 period. An 11-point deal was reached with the government, while
pay rises remained on the agenda for the next 10 days. According to many the
strike was triggered by fear of job losses, and the fear of announced overhaul
of railway system and adoption of the new Railway System Act. From its
inception that big system depended on political decisions, in view of its
strategic importance for the development of the Balkans states, and the
neighbouring powerful empires. Hence its development and future always depended
on numerous, and often divergent interests, and was conditioned by
international loans. Like the state the railway system failed to latch on European
processes, and under the former regime it totally collapsed. That systems faces
a radical overhaul in view of an enormous number of employees and practically
unusable technology and infrastructure.
Although
the Serb government has not made public its railway-related plans, it may be
assumed that concessions shall be given to foreign railway companies, and that
many jobs shall be axed. Therefore the fear of losing jobs is superior to the
discontent with low pays. Persistence of the striking railway workers compelled
the competent ministry to engage in long and laborious negotiations with them,
despite small number of passengers and low cargo transport handled by those
services. The scant-worded, post-negotiations communique indicated government's
willingness to have railway employees, members of railway trade-unions on
board, as partners in re-structuring of the system and in drafting of a good
social program. The strike ended when pay rises where pledged. Until the
overhaul of the system, one may expects sporadic warning strikes.
In
late October workers of "Telecom Serbia" company went on strike. They
demanded repeal of the Serb government decree on limitation of salaries of
public companies employees. Strikers this time round enjoyed the backing of their
management and after a controversial blockade of thoroughfares in Belgrade,
reached a deal on the pay rise with the competent ministry (but the disputed
decree remained in force). Identical demand was made by strikers from the
Power-Generating Industry of Serbia, PTT, and Oil Industry, but despite threats
the general strike of public companies employees never materialised, and pay
rises were negotiated by separate deals with competent ministries and the
Finance Ministry.
In
2002 Trade Union of Judiciary Employees repeatedly demanded pay rises for all
employees in this sector (and not only for judges), and disclosure of the
end-users of the judiciary-earmarked international donations. Tension among the
judiciary was heightened by the conflict between the Justice Minister and some
judges, which in turn affected relations between the Serb government and
several holders of the top judicial posts. The foregoing was not only due to
discontent with low salaries of judicial staff, as was often depicted by the print
and electronic media (in the meantime judges started receiving the promised
monthly pay of Euro 500).
Throughout
2002 there were other smaller strikes and work stoppages in many companies
Serbia-wide. Ailing and collapsing companies were unable to jump-start
production without massive infusions, but at the same time were unready to
accept privatisation. They were also teetering on the brink of ruin, because of
the burden of the excessive workforce. That workforce was on the other hand
often compelled to stage strikes in a bid to ensure even minimal pays. When the
local self-community bodies were unable to help, then money was provided by the
state funds. But the foregoing only prolonged the agony of state-owned
companies.
The
Bor Mining Basin and Smelting Plant is facing an imminent overhaul. Its workers
on several occasions had overhaul-themed talks with the government
representatives in 2002. Despite several management re-shuffles, judging by the
December strike, the resolution of the crisis was not imminent. In view of the
strategic importance of the Majdanpek pits (gold and copper), government
representatives on several occasions visited that basin. In February they were
kept as hostages by miners and citizens of Majdanpek, dissatisfied by the official
declaration "that the lease on basin's life may be extended for another
10-12 years, if foreign investors are found and the entire industry is
re-structured." At the end-year a communique indicating the possibility of
signing a strategic partnership with a foreign company raised hopes of Bor and
Majdanpek workers.
In
2002 there were no skirmishes or incidents with police during strikes.
Representatives of trade-unions moreover repeatedly praised "the correct
police conduct." On the other hand citizens were often irritated by long
blockades of thoroughfares and even of a freeway by strikers. The foregoing
indicates that the right to strike should be urgently regulated.
4.2 Relations Between
Different Trade-Unions
No-one
is denying the gravity of Serbia's economic situation and necessity for a
radical shift in economy. But there are differences between trade unions and
government as to the resolution of problems. On the other hand trade unions
don't have a uniform stand on that issue either. Unfortunately these
differences are thwarting a constructive dialogue which could help crystallise
the optimum solution in the given moment. On the contrary they tend to deepen
the existing rifts and misunderstanding. Continuing rows and conflicts between
trade union don't lead to attainment of the common goal and trade union
interests are moreover frequently overshadowed by strained and sour relations
between various trade unions.
Long-standing
rift between Independent Trade Union of Serbia (SSS) and Associated Branch
Trade Union (UGS) "Nezavisnost" was not bridged in 2002, despite
favourable circumstances. Moreover trade unions retained their centralised and
authoritarian system of organisation and hard-line stances. Strong showing of
the third large trade-union Association of Free and Independent Trade Unions
(ASNS), whose former President is the incumbent Labour and Employment Minister,
caused new rifts and jockeying for power. Due to the foregoing the 2002 strikes
were weak, while mutual accusations and smear-campaigns of trade unions have
lessened the faith of workers in their professional "protectors."
During
the strike of employees of the five largest banks slated for liquidation,
Milenko Smiljanic, President of Independent Association, sent the following
message to strikers: "You cannot count on my support, or on large-scale
solidarity of workers, for 8 years ago you broke away, had a lot of money, were
independent, and had a good time. And now?" (Glas, 9 January 2002) In his later comments he tried to soften that
rigid stance by stressing that "lay offs of 8,000 people is a tragic
social development, which should raise concerns of any serious trade-union
leader." (Danas, 10 January
2002). But strikers did not get the backing of any large trade union, for the
latter were aware of the necessity of that move, but lacked courage to declare
it publicly.
Strike
of railway workers also caused a rift between trade unions. Although it was a
massive strike, members of Independent Trade Union of Engine Drivers from Uzice
and Kraljevo stayed away, for "the strike was stage-managed by corrupt
leaderships of weakened trade union leaderships." (Danas, 13 March 2002) This generated much media buzz. Major dailies
kept running conflicting statements of strikers and trade unions. Though the
Serb government representatives sat on the fence, it was obvious that the rift
was playing into their hands, for it weakened the basic strikers' demands.
Government moreover used the media to further compromise the strikers, deepen
the existing rift and prevent a possible support by and other trade-union.
Trade-unions
disunity became even more evident on the occasion of 1 May -International
Labour Day-celebrations. Independent Trade Union and Associated Branch Trade
Union organised a protest against non-extant social dialogue with authorities,
while Association of Free and Independent Trade Union declared that it would
stay away from protest, deeming it "a waste of money." President of
ABTU qualified that statement as a criminal one, for "the 1st May
parade is priceless." (Danas, 30
April -2 May 2002). In early June ITU and ABTU started a media-carried polemic
relating to division of trade union property (wholly in hands of ITU). Mutual
accusations and discrediting continued and peaked when the ITU became a member
of the World Confederation of Trade Unions. (Danas, 2 November-18 November 2002). After eruption of numerous
local strikes, trade unions started accusing each other of "forging
unprincipled coalitions and political compromises to the detriment of
workers."
As
root-causes of those rifts are very deep, more unification in that area or
division of huge property which the ITU inherited in 1990 from the Alliance of
the Socialist People is unlikely in 2003. Negotiations shall be very laborious
and likely to open other issues relating to the work of trade unions during the
Milosevic era.
4.3 Trade Unions and Social
Dialogue
The
confusion in the media, NGO and trade unions scene continued in 2002. 5 October
losers quickly turned coats or sided with the new authorities, while the former
anti-Milosevic opponents among the media, NGO and trade union ranks failed to
take an adequate stand on the new authorities or to position themselves
properly.
Relations
between authorities and trade unions were often strained. Both had to accept a
dialogue in order to take some difficult decisions in economic sphere. But
dialogue did not suit either. Since the founding of the Social-Economic Council
in August 2001 representatives of trade unions- ABTU and ITU often walked out
of meetings, only to rejoin them after a while. They repeatedly complained
about government's disrespect for their positions and maintained that the
Council was only a smoke-screen for other not-so-lawful government's moves. In
March 2002 both trade unions stormily responded to the newly-adopted Social
Program of the Serb government, allegedly "drafted without their
consent." Miljenko Smiljanic, President of ITU, called that Program
"a rump act of the government of Serbia, out of sync with positions of the
two largest trade-unions." In his opinion "the program failed to
cover all redundant employees, the level of offered protection is not
sufficient and sources of financing of that social program are dubious. If the
authorities refuse new talks with us, or those talks fail, then the Serb
government shall face veritable street wars, or a host of massive
protests."(Politika, 14 March
2003). The Social Program was not amended, but on 15 April 2002 the Agreement
on Promotion of the Work of the Social-Economic Council was signed. But the
rift between the authorities and trade-unions continued. President of ITU
Branislav Čanak repeatedly criticised government because of lack of social
dialogue, inefficiency of the Council, poorly conducted privatisation process.
He moreover maintained that "no Minister fights for the workers' rights.
All of them act as typical technocratic neo-Liberals by placing the burden of
transition and its costs on the shoulders of socially threatened population
strata, notably, of workers." (Nacional,
12 September 2002) On the other hand Prime Minister Đinđic argued
that the government was in no position to pursue a liberal economic policy due
to precarious standards of living of citizens after 10 years of total plunder.
"We are pursuing a socio-economic policy which lessens our potential for
public investments …because such investments would prove to be costly for
citizens although effective in the process of jump-starting the
production." Prime Minister admitted that the social pact would be ideal
from the standpoint of government, but "it is not currently feasible due
to differing interests of health, judicial, educational workers and their
trade-unions. All of them are trying to reach separate deals with government.
That indicates lack of the trade-union solidarity. Authorities act as one, that
is as one negotiator, but we don't face trade union or employers as one
negotiator."
But
in the face of the foregoing, the social dialogue continued, mostly because of
the situation on the ground. During 2002 several compromise solutions and
agreements were reached, because of both sides readiness to assume
responsibility. In view of a large army of redundant workers, such compromise
solutions are a must, and also mutually beneficial. Trade-unions have shown
that that are not strong enough to articulate workers' discontent, or to stage
a large-scale protests, their propensity for political manipulations and
posturing, and lack of readiness for risk-taking. Government appeared to be
very resolute in implementing its decisions, insofar as they did pose risk to
its political survival. And that political reality should be accepted by both
sides.
5.
Future of Reforms
According
to the Labour Market Institute data in the late 2002 there were 903,310
unemployed people in Serbia, which is 15.7% (122,00 people) more than in the
late 2001. Among them there were 526,000 first-time job seekers, while the
others were made redundant. Unemployment grew because of accelerated
re-structuring of economy. (Danas, 2
January 2001). At the same time the 2002 Economic Diagram showed that the
number of insolvent companies employing about 840,000 workers was 55,993.
Number of employed workers was decreasing (with respect to November 2001 was
down by 3.8%), but prices remained relatively stable ( total rise of retail
prices in January-December 2002 period was 15%), while living costs were up
11.8%. Salaries were up 12% (Danas, 28
January 2003). In view of expected redundancies and an accelerated
privatisation in 2003, the future of the reforms hinges on investments leading
to a substantive job creation. But domestic companies cannot make such
investments, while the foreign capital is still reluctant to enter this
country.
In
summing up results of privatisation in Serbia, Minister Aleksandar Vlahovic
maintained : "Model chosen by government of Serbia is most efficient for
attracting investments, most efficient in anti-money laundering campaign, and
the best for ensuring full implementation of our plans." At the conference
"Privatisation in Serbia-experiences and possible improvements."
Vlahovic explained that "in the first year we prepared institutional and
legal framework for privatisation, but results from the late 2002 indicate that
the process is gaining momentum. In December we had 147 auctions, of which 130
were successfully completed. In 2003 our Agency for Privatisation plans 120
auctions every month. According to still incomplete data for 2002, at auctions
we sold 184 of 210 offered companies, and 44 minority shares packages of
offered 83. By way of tenders we sold 12 companies and are negotiating the sale
of another 9 companies. Total value of those tender sales was Euro 195.6
million, value of their social programs was Euro 82 million and obligatory
investments were worth Euro 282 million. Privatisation revenues in 2002
totalled Euro 350 million ( double the planned one). In 2003 we plan to effect
privatisation of another 1,300 socially-owned companies, 1,200 via public
auctions, and 50 via tenders. Most important privatisation deals shall
encompass 20 overhauled companies including Tobacco Industry, Beopetrol and
Mobtel. The state expects that those sales would bring into its coffers Euro
1.5 billion. Once the amendments to the Act on Privatisation are greenlighted by
parliament (in early 2003) privatisation process shall be simplified, and a
more creative ambience for privatisation shall be created. In the face of
announced protests by some trade unions, Minister Vlahovic in early January
started talks with representatives of trade unions in order to find compromise
solutions for some controversial issues.
Re-establishment
of political consensus, reduction of political risks, sustainability of
macro-economic stability, betterment of the judiciary status, and reduction of
corruption and criminality are the next, no- so-easy objectives. Once they are
attained all obstacles to inflow of major foreign investments shall be removed.
The
end-year "Strategic Marketing" survey indicates also the importance
of political stabilisation. Among the politicians the highest rated were the
Finance Minister Bozidar Đelic and the NBY Governor Mlađan Dinkic.
Interestingly enough the rating of the newly-formed party G-17 Plus is growing.
Citizens view it as an expert-economic team and lend it more credence than to
the key parties of the ruling coalition-DP and DPS.
And
finally one should say that at this moment of time politicians should assume
full responsibility if they want reforms to continue full-throttle, despite
possible social discontent and evident existential fear of some strata of
population.
PART THREE
Judicial System and Independent
Judiciary
Problems
faced by Serb judiciary in the immediate post-October 5 period essentially
remained the same two years on. Difficult tasks faced by the judiciary, notably
the purge of compromised and unprofessional cadres, tackling of
"major" criminal cases relating to war crimes and misuses committed
by the former authorities representatives, war crimes trials and restoring the
faith of population at large in the work of the judicial bodies, have not been
carried out to a satisfactory extent. Although it is clear that the
enthronement of professional and independent judiciary in Serbia is a long-term
and difficult process, one must note that much more in that regard should have
been achieved. Reasons for so little progress in that province are complex.
One
of the key reasons for a partial overhaul of the judiciary is the fact that a
clean break with the former regime's practice in almost all segments of the
country's legal system has not been effected. Ungrounded and slow overhaul of
the entire constitutional and legal system resulted from only formally
proclaimed principle of division of power and the rule of law, that is lack of
strong political will to make a clean break with the long-standing undemocratic
practice. Key prerequisite for establishing the reform-geared framework should
have been promulgation of the new constitution as a supreme legal and political
act of the country. That move would have been tantamount to laying the
foundations for a consistent division of power and establishment of a legal
state. Added to that the much-delayed adoption of the Constitutional Charter,
failed presidential elections, usurpation of parliamentary functions by the
executive and turning of parliament into a mere stage for intra-party jockeying
for power, 15-months old stalled work of the Constitutional Court are further
indicators of non-functioning of the key institutions of this society, or of their
malfunctioning. On the other hand political jockeying for power and run-ins or
deals of many parties, frequent scandals and excessive focus on retaining or
winning over new positions or posts, clearly indicated that the authorities
lacked a genuine vision of the country's future, and the potential to carry out
the key reforms in the crucial segments of society.
Besides
the new authorities in 2002 showed their lack of skill and readiness to
genuinely take measures leading up to establishment of a strong and independent
judiciary. On the contrary, some positive measure taken during 2001 (adoption
of a set of new, better acts in the province of the judiciary, proceedings for
dismissal of compromised judges, dismissal of presidents of courts of law,
etc.) were to a large extent invalidated by the unconstitutional moves of the
executive aiming at taking full control over the judiciary. The peak of
arrogant meddling of the executive in the judicial affairs were amendments to
the set of recently adopted laws. Through the parliament, like in the Milosevic
era, the new government tried to put in place a legal possibility for directly
impacting the selection/appointment of presidents of courts, judges and
prosecutors. Although those moves caused an uproar among the judiciary and
legal expert circles, still weak and "non-purged" judicial bodies
failed to adequately respond to that challenge. The authorities moves clearly
indicated that restoration of independence, influence and dignity to judicial
profession should not depend only on the "goodwill" of the executive
or legislative authorities, but rather on good organisation of the judiciary
and resolve of the judicial cadres to effect a true changeover in their field
of work.
Reactions
of ordinary citizens to conflicts between the executive and the judiciary were
best indicated by surveys on citizens' stands on the judiciary. From a series
of polls and surveys examining the position of public at large on the judiciary
we have singled out the one carried out in mid-year.
Belgrade's
Centre for Marketing Research "Marten Board International" and daily
"Blic" in 18-21 June 2002 period carried out the pertinent poll
covering randomly stratified sample of 595 respondents, adult citizens of
Serbia. The more interesting findings of that poll: over two-thirds of citizens
of Serbia (75.6%) thought that courts of law in Serbia were not independent,
11.6% of respondents thought they were independent (11.3% did not have any
opinion on that matter.)
When
asked "Who is bringing most pressure to bear on courts of law?",
32.6% of respondents answered "interest groups with gangland links,"
one fourth of respondents (23.4%) answered "government of Serbia,"
and 10.3% answered "politicians and some political parties." Only
4.2% of respondents thought that no-one piled pressure on courts of law. Work
of courts in 2002 was assessed by 1-5 mark. 27.1% of respondents gave 1 mark,
28.8% gave 2 mark, and 2.3% of respondents gave 5 mark to courts of laws.Work
of the Justice Ministry of the Republic of Serbia received the following marks:
1 (29% of respondents), 2 (28.4%) and 5 (only 2.5% of respondents).
Reform
of the Judiciary
From
the judiciary angle there are two key reasons for failed or partial reform of
judiciary. The first has to do with not sufficiently sincere will to and lack
of political consensus among the ruling structures to make the judiciary
independent, and. The second, closely linked with the first, is the lack of a
clear and comprehensive reform strategy resulting from agreements, co-operation
and harmonised/synchronised moves of the judiciary, legislative and executive
authorities.
Half-hearted
reform of much humiliated and undermined judiciary was stalled if not
regressed. Initial impetus for changes and tacit compromise between the
executive and the judiciary to kick-start the reform without radical changes
and a clear break with the former regime (on-dismissal of compromised judges)
were soon dispelled under the burden of squabbles and fundamental discord
between representatives of the judiciary and executive.
Inching
Forward
In
2001 there were some breakthroughs in the overhaul of judiciary system. New
President of the Supreme Court of Serbia, and new presidents of 145 district,
municipal and commercial courts were elected. Judges were allowed to form and
join their professional associations, direct and public political influence on
courts of law subsided, division into compatible and incompatible judges was
discontinued, unconstitutional decision on dismissal of judges deemed
incompatible in the Milosevic era was repealed, new judges were appointed,
judges who on different ground broke the laws and rules of their profession
were relieved of their duties, public debates on the necessity of lustration
were initiated.
Although
adoption of a set of laws (Act on Courts, Act on Judges, Act on High Judicial
Council, Act on Public Prosecution Office, and Act on Seats and Areas of Courts
and Public Prosecution Offices) resulted from party deals and not from
consultations with experts, the normative groundwork for improvement and
advancement of the judicial system was laid. In line with legal provisions, the
executive and legislative powers and influence relating to appointment and
dismissal of judges and presidents of courts were restricted, and the said
powers were vested in the High Judicial Council and High Personal Body. The
High Judicial Council, an extra-parliamentary, expert and independent body, was
set up. That body was tasked with proposing judicial and president of courts candidates.
High Personal Council, was set up as a body of the Supreme Court of Serbia. Its
key task is to determine and deliberate grounds for dismissal of judges and
presidents of courts of law, and their disciplinary responsibility. Much
improvement was achieved by the decision to downscale powers of the Justice
Ministry only to monitoring a just and proper implementation of the Judicial
Rules of Procedure and by introduction of clear provisions relating to the
right of natural judge.
In
order to facilitate a consistent implementation of the aforementioned laws, in
the late 2001 and throughout 2002 a set of important sub-legal acts was passed.
Rules of Procedure and on the Set-up of the Supreme Court of Serbia, Rules of
Procedure of the High Personal Council, Rules of Procedure of the High Judicial
Council, Rules for Appraisal of Extra-Judicial Activities of Judges, the
Framework Rules on Kinds and Modes of Professional Training, Guidelines for
Training of Judicial Trainees, were adopted in the said period. After 15 months
of total paralysis in July 2002 the Constitutional Court of Serbia was finally
constituted.
At
the initiative of the Supreme Court of Serbia in early September 2002 mediation
as a new manner of litigation-tackling in our judicial practice was introduced.
Initially this form of litigation- tackling shall embrace all pending cases
(older than three years) relating to compensatory damage, division of separated
couples' property, debts and other cases which exact long proceedings.
Advantage of mediation as a way of "peaceful" resolution of
litigation, lawsuits, disputes, is that it shortens lengthy proceedings and
cuts back the costs thereof. In that process parties involved in litigation
take a proactive stance by endeavouring to find right solution and by giving
mutual concessions help resolve the dispute to their mutual benefit and
interests.
After
a long struggle, in July 2002 the pay rises to judges and prosecutors were
greenlighted. Their average monthly pay is now Euro 500. In order to provide
for a regular and better work of clerical staff of courts of law (trainees,
minutes-takers, expert associates) government also approved the pay rises to
the judicial administrative staff.
Thanks
to the expertise and financial assistance of international NGOs- and some
foreign states the Judicial Centre for Vocational Training of Judges and
Prosecutors was inaugurated in Belgrade. Putting in place that centre was
tantamount to meeting in an institutional way the need for consistent and
serious education of judicial personnel. The Centre shall organise general and
special courses for judges, prosecutors, judicial associates, trainees and
other clerical staff. Added to that different computer and English language
courses and seminars for judicial staff were organised. The process of
computerisation of courts of law was also stepped up.
Retrograde
Trends
There
were positive trends and some turnaround in the process of building a
professional and high-quality judiciary, but negative trends, notably the
pressures of the executive on the judiciary, abounded too.
Muted
and not-so-transparent conflict between the executive and the judiciary
suddenly caught public attention when arrogant representatives of the Justice
Ministry in the morning hours of 10 June 2002 under watchful camera eyes of
private "BK" TV turned up in the building of the District Court in
Belgrade to check the presence or absence of judges in their workplaces.
Controllers of the Justice Ministry noted that in 9:00 to 9:30 a.m. period out of
109 judges employed there, in their offices were only 23. That surprise visit
was intended to show to the public that courts of law were inefficient because
of unprofessional attitude of judges. On the same day the meeting between
representatives of the executive, judiciary and legislative power issued a
communique harshly critical of slack work of courts of law. Prime Minister thus
explained the sharp wording of the communique: "during the tour of Serbian
towns, most complaints were related to poor work of courts of law. In the
meantime only three judges were dismissed on grounds of misuse of their
profession, while about 7 of them handed in their resignations. Many cases
relating to a major plunder of our country, misuses of positions, big political
scandals, are still pending. Only one judgement was passed, but it was
invalidated by the Supreme Court."
Minister Batic was even more critical: "our penal policy is catastrophic,
it in fact favours offenders and criminals. Minimal sentences are meted out in
most cases. Of 467 persons accused of illegal possession of arms, 79 received
conditional sentences, and only 17 were sentenced to prison terms. Of 97
persons accused of illegal possession of drugs, only 7 were sentenced to prison
terms,. and four received conditional sentences."
The Justice Ministry drafted a document "Reform of the Judiciary"
(later declared an internal, and not an official act) listing the measures and
deadlines to be met "in order to restore faith in the national
judiciary". Here's the integral version of those measures:
1.
Dismissal of 50-100
judges since October 2001 on the initiative of the Justice Minister.
Deadline-15 days.
2.
Winding up
proceedings against 50-100 front men of former regime and local power-holders.
Deadline-2 months.
3.
Institute criminal
proceedings against the same category of persons, on the basis of charges
already filed. Deadline-2 months.
4.
Stepping up standard
proceedings and passing judgements on cases older than 6 years. Deadline-one
year.
5.
Completion of all
future lawsuits within the next two years and of criminal proceedings within
one year.
6.
Scheduling hearings
within the maximum 15-30 days timeframe.
7.
Introduce immediate
changes in penal policy by delivering much more severe sentences (to date
mostly minimal sentences have been handed down).
8.
Step up or
radicalise detention measures- Immediately.
9.
Introduce immediate
changes in currently too familiar relations between judges, prosecutors and
defence counsels/lawyers, i.e. their professionalisation.
10. Deliberate
whether presidents of courts, judges and members of their immediate families
may exercise their profession of lawyers or prosecutors in the area within
competence of a pertinent court.
11. Maximum
limitation of all seminar, co-operation-related travelling until consolidation
of the judiciary. Immediately.
12. More rigorous discipline in order to achieve
full adherence to working hours and timely start of hearings. Immediately.
The
aforementioned "demands" of government and competent Ministry caused
a veritable uproar among judges. They qualified "the monitoring
mission" of the Justice Ministry as "breach of law, constitution and
District Court's Rule of Procedure, for the presence of cameraman ought to have
been approved in advance by the Supreme Court President (and that was not the
case.) President of District Court in Belgrade Vida Petrovic Skero rebutted all
accusations by saying that the court by 100 increased its efficiency with
respect to 2001. She added: "Some cases are still pending due to
non-existence of procedural laws providing for more efficient proceedings,
underfunding, and slow work of police and prosecution." Conflict between
the two powers peppered by mutual accusations and insults, peaked when judges
of the Belgrade District Court in the late June sent an open letter to Prime
Minister Đinđic. The letter inter alia reads:
"Your
penal expedition's raid on the Court in presence of BK TV cameramen for the
sake of a purported "monitoring of the work of judges" was
inadmissible and contrary to law. The same applies to your statement on the
early morning presence of only 20% of judges. Moreover you arrogantly
maintained that judges demanding Euro 500 pays had first to earn that money by
showing up on time in their workplaces and adhering to the work hours and work
discipline and that 'judges discontent with this country, are free to seek
adequate jobs elsewhere.' Judges don't discharge bureaucratic duties, they are
not clerks, for judicial duties exact a longer intellectual engagement than the
one prescribed by the law, in the shape of working hours. We were informed that
your Justice Minister demands radicalisation of detention measures, by his
ungrounded and untrue words 'the most corruption-prone judicial practice is the
one related to determining detention.' WE ARE NOT CORRUPT, and yet we pass a
lot of decisions on suspension of detention. Detention is an interim measure
encroaching upon the rights and freedoms of citizens. Hence its rare
enforcement, or rather, only in cases when institution of regular criminal
proceedings or security of citizens cannot be otherwise ensured. Every student
of law knows that, but not your Justice Minister. We were informed that your
minister deems necessary dismissal of 50-100 judges, but we were not informed
about the criteria for such numerous dismissals and of the legal grounds
thereof. No-one is disputing the fact that those judges who misused their
powers or breached the judicial ethic code should be relieved of their duties,
but we are of opinion that the said issue should be regulated by the act
spelling out conditions of and criteria for lustration, and not by a hastily
written lustration-related amendment to the Act on Judges which obviously
serves the day-to-day political purposes. You have not consulted judges when
drafting the set of acts on the judiciary and that was contrary to your
apparently only declarative advocacy of a civilised and democratic state. You
have not consulted us when drafting the currently debated amendments to those
acts…We are not against well-intentioned criticism which in an argumented way
shows respect for our profession. But we would like to REMIND you that both you
and your Justice Minister are duty- bound to respect the constitutional
principle on the division of powers, the Act on Independence of the Judiciary
(with respect to the legislative and executive power, article 3 of the Act on
Arrangement of Courts of Law), and that you, as the executive power, are not
allowed to interfere in the course of proceedings, penal policy and discipline
of judges. Your Justice Minister may, in compliance with the Act on Arrangement
of Courts of Law (Article 71) monitor implementation of judicial Rules of
Procedure, which by the way have not yet been adopted, and service the
judiciary work in line with Article 5 of the Act on Ministries…We DEMAND your
apologies for recent insults and fabrications, and ask you to recommend to your
Justice Minister to start doing his job, to establish what reforms are, to
enable judges to take part in public discussions on the Justice Ministry-proposed
laws, to create conditions for a proper functioning of courts, to respect law,
ensure training of judges and conditions propitious for smooth enforcement of
adopted laws and-to stop meddling in our affairs."
Instead
of requested apologies, the executive resorted to another perfidious show of
strength. Namely the executive re-launched its campaign of "removal of
opponents." The brunt of that show of strength was most felt by (former)
President of the District Court in Belgrade, Vida Petrovic -Škero, one of the
most vocal detractors of conduct of the executive. Resentful of direct
pressures on the court, and on herself as its president, and fearful of a
possibility to be compelled to act only as the court's manager and not its
judge, Vida Petrovic Škero applied for a position of a Supreme Court judge. She
was appointed to that position by Serb parliament, for it suited the
authorities to be rid in such an elegant way of such a sharp
detractor/opponent. Supreme Court judge Zoran Ivosevic said that “politicians
tend to bring pressure to bear on courts of law. Don't you remember how the
Prime Minister and the Justice Minister ordered courts to carry out reforms
within certain deadlines? Courts, notably the District Court and its president
energetically resisted those orders. But she is no longer president of that
court. She unwillingly applied for a position in the Supreme Court. She would
have remained president of the largest court in the country if she had not been
subjected to various pressures, notably by the Justice Minister”.
But the harassment continued. On grounds of her independent position and lack
of understanding for "higher social interest" Vida Petrovic Škero,
the incumbent judge of the Supreme Court of Serbia, was summoned by a
magistrate. She stated that she was "summoned for committing a
misdemeanour, namely failing to act on an order given in 1999 to the then
president of the District Court by the anti-fire commission. I have never seen
that order. They are threatening me with an exorbitant fine. President of a
court may not be held accountable for what is legally considered a competence
of the Justice Ministry."
That persecution peaked in October when Petrovic-Škero on vocal order of the
Justice Minister (she has not received a pertinent decision in writing) was
dismissed as a member of Commission in charge of judicial exams. In sign of
protest other members of that commission, Leposava Karamarkovic, Zoran Ivosevic
and Dragor Hiber handed in their resignations.
Reform
of "Reformed Laws"
Decisions
of Serb parliament taken at the 18th July 2002 session indicated the
lethal nature of the conflict between the executive and the judiciary. Namely
the executive thanks to its parliamentary majority forced through the
parliament amendments to the Act on the Judiciary, only 200 days after its
adoption in 2001. While in the previous period the executive had limited itself
only to piling pressure on and insulting the judiciary, this time round,
through the said amendments it undermined the entire principle of division of
power and laid the groundwork for a direct and anti-constitutional influence on
the judiciary. Without consultations with judges and legal experts, amendments
directly limiting independence of the judiciary in some crucial segments of
decision-taking were approved. That was a very retrograde move, by which the
status of the judiciary was regressed to the one characteristic of the
Milosevic era.
At
the aforementioned session amendments to the Act on Judges, Act on the High
Judicial Council, Act on Public Prosecution Offices, Act on Arrangement of
Courts of Law and Act on Seats and Areas of Courts of Law and Public
Prosecutors Offices were adopted.
According
to the novel amendments to the Act on Judges, the High Judicial Council, an independent
and expert body, ceased to be the only body designated to put forward the names
of judicial appointees. If parliament fails to elect a candidate proposed by
the High Council, the second candidate shall be proposed by a competent
committee (Parliamentary Committee for Judiciary and Management). As the said
Committee is governed by the parliamentary majority, it may be assumed that
only politically suitable candidates would be elected, but also the ones whose
expertise and professionalism has not be certified by the High Judicial
Council. In line with the opinion of a competent minister, it is up to the
competent parliamentary committee and not the High Judicial Council to propose
candidates for presidents of courts. This is sheer emulation of the previous
practice which ensured that only politically suitable candidates be eligible
for those posts. Thus the High Judicial Council was turned into a smoke-screen
body, or the one without any real powers. Moreover presidents of courts were
stripped of possibility to act as judges, and their duties were reduced to
sheer technical management of courts. That solution was without precedent in
judicial systems of democratic countries and its implications were quite
serious. It meant that about 200 presidents of courts could be dismissed by
spur- of-the- moment decision. By extension such a decision could slow down the
work of small courts with 4-5 judges, one of whom was the president-elect. One
can only assume that such a provision was introduced in order to facilitate
manipulation of presidents of courts, reduced to mere technical managers and
divested of their judicial functions.
High
Personal Council is no longer the body of the Supreme Court of Serbia. Under
the new amendments it is named by parliament (and not by the General Session of
that court) at proposal of the High Judicial Council. High Personal Council as
a judicial body should take decisions on the status issues of judges. After
introducing changes in its composition, the decision-making process was once
again put in the hands of the legislative power. The executive also increased
its powers, for, under the new amendments a competent minister may institute
proceedings for dismissal of judges, and suggest new candidates for the posts
of presidents of courts of law, presidents of higher courts and president of
the Supreme Court of Serbia.
Act
on Public Prosecution Offices was amended in a similar fashion. Namely the
Justice Minister is now empowered to take decisions on dismissal of the
republican public prosecutor on grounds of "his or her unprofessional and
non-conscientious discharging of duties." Those new powers of the Justice
Minister are contrary to the constitutional principle of independence of the
public prosecutor, for they put in a subordinate position the former with
respect to the executive power. Another amendment rules that the executive
power shall have precedence in proposing candidates for public prosecutors.
Thus criteria for election of candidates to the top judicial positions are once
again unrelated to expertise, integrity and professionalism.
Amendments
to the Act on Arrangement of Courts of Law, and the Act on Seats and Areas of
Courts of Law and Public Prosecution Offices have been also hastily drawn.
Initially
the aforementioned laws envisaged introduction of new kinds of courts of law
(the Appeal, Management and Commercial ones) by 30 September 2002. But that
deadline has been extended to 28 February, that is 3 March 2003, due to lack of
funds, expert personnel, and technical amenities.
Judges
and presidents of courts were outraged by new amendments. Association of Judges
of Serbia publicly protested against those reforms, while most concrete anti
-amendments measures were taken by the Supreme Court of Serbia, republican
Public Prosecutor Office, District Public Prosecutor Office in Belgrade and all
five Belgrade-based municipal prosecutors offices. The Supreme Court of Serbia
appealed to the republican Constitutional Court to appraise constitutionality
of controversial provisions of the Act on Judges and demanded that the
provisions be temporarily put out of force pending the final decision on their
constitutionality. Similar appeals were launched (without the request for ban)
by the aforementioned prosecution offices.
At
its 19 September 2002 session the Constitutional Court of Serbia adopted the
proposed measure and passed a decision on "suspension of some acts and
actions envisaged by the disputed legal provisions, in view of their harmful
effect on functions of courts of law." Final decision shall be taken after
the parliament convenes (within 45 days) to discuss the disputed amendments.
Act on Public Prosecution Offices was challenged on the same grounds, and
parliamentary decision on its new amendments is also pending. Therefore all
judicial bodies are currently paralysed. Former provisions cannot be enforced,
while novel amendments due to a temporary measure of the Constitutional Court
have not taken effect. By extension in this legal interregnum dismissals and
appointments of judges and presidents of courts cannot be effected. Added to
that many judges who have reached the retirement age cannot retire because of
non-functioning of the competent body, the High Personal Council.
Lustration
Lustration
must have been one of the most frequently used terms in the past period. But
inversely to its frequent mention, only few steps towards its concrete
implementation have been made. Two years after the 5 October changeover the Act
on Lustration has not yet been passed. Instead some lustration-related
provisions have been incorporated into some laws. However they only add to the
general confusion and relativisation of the past events, instead of laying the
legal groundwork for purges of some former and current holders of public functions.
There
are many diverse reasons for non-implementation of lustration. Firstly, there
is no genuine political consensus or political will to carry out a
comprehensive lustration. Prior to taking office DOS has never prioritised
lustration. Consequently even now lustration is not one of DOS's uppermost
objectives. All the talk about lustration of former power-holders is only a
political marketing trick which serves to garner more votes. Secondly, in the
post-5 October period a clean and essential break with the previous regime has
not been effected, notably in personnel terms. Months after the coup the key
state positions were still occupied by front men of former authorities, while
some DOS members, close associates of the former regime, still occupy top
political positions.
Such
a continuity cannot encourage tackling of the facing process and the issue of
wartime responsibility. Thirdly, contrary to the Eastern European countries
practice of making a clear distinction between criminals and victims, in Serbia
that line has not been drawn, or rather that distinction was relativisied.
"In Serbia there is a relatively
narrow circle of victims of former regime, and a broad circle of double role
people- both victims and accomplices of the regime. Such a composition of a
social milieu does not augur well for lustration. Lustration as a measure of
facing up to the past aims to raise
awareness about human rights, legal state and the nature of regime by
meeting the need to learn, mark and
remember the offences and wrongdoing of the past authoritarian regime and identity of perpetrators thereof. As
regards the victims lustration would be welcome as another proof that their
sacrifices made sense. For sacrifices become nonsensical if perpetrators of
crimes and the past which they created remain beyond our reach? If everything
remained covered by the oblivion, then victims would remain only victims and
the guilt would remain depersonalised, and ascribed to the regime proper
("the system was bad"), or even fate (" it was a hard
era,"). But here dominate
victims-accomplices, and not genuine
victims. The former after the changeover tend to depict themselves as
victims, and not accomplices. Moreover they tend to turn a deaf ear and a blind
eye to the recent past and show a total disinterest in the perpetrators, for any concern about them could bring them their
back to their roles of accomplices."
In
such a political and social reality any expectations as to a thorough
lustration in the judiciary is unrealistic. The executive and the judiciary
were deeply split over that issue too. Government, that is its Justice Minister
kept accusing the judiciary of shying away from purges of compromised and
corrupt judges. And the fact is that two years on only 3 judges were dismissed instead
of the officially "inculpated" 150. Moreover presidents of courts
simply disregarded well-grounded initiatives for dismissals of many judges.
According to the Justice Ministry data in 1 January-1 November 2002 period 33
judges handed in their resignations, while 11 retired. In the same period 11
public prosecutors handed in their resignations. Amendments to the Act on
Judges (July 2002) contain the lustration-related provision, which according to
the Justice Minister "constituted a good enough basis and obligation for
further dismissals." Under the provision of article 79 a "taking part
in rigging of electoral results, in framed trials and trumped-up charges, and
gross violations of human rights guaranteed by Constitution, law and international
covenants and pacts, shall be deemed misuses of judicial duties."
President
of court in which the incriminated judge discharges his duties is duty-bound to
submit a proposal on dismissal of such a judge along with evidence, at the
latest by 1 July 2003. If grounds for such a dismissal are valid, and president
of court fails to act on them (in line with paragraph 2 of the aforementioned
article) it is up to a president of a higher court to institute proceedings for
dismissal of the former, within the next 6 months.Judges thus responded to the
issue of lustration: Why is the judiciary the only area in which lustration is
required? Why is not lustration initiated in the police, health services, media
and university?
Added
to that judges were convinced that a kind of purge was carried out in the last
two years, for 200 judges either retired or handed in their resignations. In
their mind further dismissals would slow down the work of courts of law, for
according to some estimates there are already 100 vacancies, and the young
trainee judges cannot work efficiently. Presidents of courts negatively
responded to the official stance that they should trigger the lustration
process, notably dismissal proceedings. They explained that they don't want a
repeat of the Milosevic era practice, that is, to once again forcibly draw up
lists of "unwanted" or "unsuitable" judges. In their mind
the new lustration-related provision was flawed, for its enforcement was not
feasible within the next two years, even if the High Personal Council dealt
only with dismissal proceedings within that timeframe. Judges and presidents of
courts were of opinion that the lustration act on the state level should be
adopted, and that such an act should cover all public services, and clearly
spell out the criteria, guidelines and procedure providing for an adequate
defence of persons facing the dismissal proceedings.
Constitutional
Judiciary
After
a 17 month-long break (3 February-4 July 2002) caused by absence of quorum, the
Constitutional Court of Serbia resumed its activities. Dr. Slobodan Vucetic was
appointed the court's president and 6 new judges were elected to that court at
the 18th June parliamentary session. At the first court's session
president of court said that a total of 473 cases was pending, of which 130
dated back to pre-3 February 2001 period. According to him 36 laws and the two
government decrees are disputed, while 33 new cases (from the past 18 months)
included 62 challenged laws and 18 republican government decrees.
Constitutional Court judge Svetozar Čiplic thinks that "450 cases
cannot be solved in the next two years, for new cases shall keep arriving and
we face a grave personnel crisis due to many vacancies in lower judicial
ranks."
Three
commissions were set up within the Constitutional Court: the Revision
Commission, Commission for Personnel, Organisational and Financial Issues and
Commission for Monitoring Provisions and Phenomena Impacting Implementation of
Legality and Constitutionality. The last one is very important, for its task is
to "perceive shortcomings and flaws of the constitutional system in place,
for the sake of better constitution of the future legal system."
Work
of Constitutional Court of Serbia shall largely depend on the mode of
definition of the union between Serbia and Montenegro (the Constitutional
Charter), for some powers shall be relegated from the federal bodies to the
republican ones. This broadest legal framework shall lay the groundwork for
adoption of the new Constitution of Serbia and adoption of the new Act on
Constitutional Court of Serbia. Although the two aforementioned acts were not
adopted in the late 2003, NGO "Lex" in late April elaborated a model
of the Act on the Constitutional Court of Serbia resting on democratic
principles which should be contained by the new constitution of Serbia.
Objective of that model is to make the system of constitutional-judicial
protection independent and efficient, to expand the area of appraisal of
constitutionality of legal acts and to fine-tune the entire system with
principles and experiences of democratic countries of Western Europe. That
model inter alia envisages limitation of judges' mandates to 10 years (instead
of the current lifelong mandate), introduction of three-member trial chambers,
in addition to plenary sessions. All the foregoing should provide for more
efficient handling of less complex cases, and their resolution within 6 months
(in absence of deadlines for resolution of such cases, there was often much
delay in appraisal of constitutionality of some acts. That delay was frequently
due to political wishes and influences too.)
That
model offers two new, important solutions: introduction of institute of
Constitutional Appeal and responsibilities of President of the Republic.
Constitution of Serbia contrary to the federal and Montenegrin constitutions,
does not envisage as the competence of the Constitutional Court, constitutional
appeals by citizens and state bodies against violations or breaches of
constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms. Institute of constitutional
appeal is a time- honoured instrument for protection of human and civil rights
in democratic countries. As such it should be introduced by any country
aspiring to become a truly democratic one.
The
second important novelty is the inclusion of the Constitutional Court in
assessments of possible violations of Constitution by President of Serbia. One
of co-authors of the model, Slobodan Vucetic, says: "the model does not
envisage the possibility of discharging the president, unlike the government,
on political grounds, for the president shall not have such, misuse-susceptible
powers. In order to prevent the dismissal triggered by a prevailing political
influence, two instruments of protection of authority and functions of president
need to be put into place. Firstly, a high, qualified parliamentary majority,
most probably the two-third one, shall have to vote hands-down the proposal for
dismissal of president. Prior to that at least half of MPs would have to submit
a proposal for dismissal of president for his breach of constitution, along
with justification in writing, to the Constitutional Court. Only if the said
Court confirms the breach of constitution, that judicial decision would become
the basis for parliamentary dismissal of president. Without such an assessment
of the Constitutional Court parliament would not be able to make that move.”
Whether
and to which extent the said Model would be adopted, hinges on many factors,
mostly on assessments of political forces. They may decide that only some
solutions proffered by the model are acceptable, or greenlight all of them.
The
pressure brought to bear on the Federal Constitutional Court indicates the
supremacy of political powers and their interests over decisions of the top judicial
institutions in the country. Public opinion was not very much interested in the
work of the Federal Constitutional Court from its re-establishment in September
2001 to October 2002. It came under the public spotlight only recently due to a
much-publicised rift between DP and DPS, and a subsequent move made by the
Administrative Committee of the Serb Parliament at its 29th June
2002 session. Namely that Committee temporarily suspended mandates of 45 MPs,
members of Democratic Party of Serbia. The suspended MPs appealed against that
decision, deeming it contrary to the Act on Election of MPs, Agreement on Joint
Lists of MP Candidates, and "Coalition Agreement" and a breach of
their constitutionally guaranteed active and passive suffrage.
At
its 16th October 2002 session the Federal Constitutional Court and
its president Momčilo Grubac repealed the Administrative Commission
decision with the following justification: "enforcement of that decision
could entail great damage, notably annul the free electoral will of citizens by
preventing MPs elected by them on 23 December 2002 to discharge their
duties." The foregoing ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in fact
paved the way for the return of DPS MPs to the republican parliament. A day
later vicious assaults on FCC's President Momčilo Grubac were launched. An
unknown Student Association of the Novi Sad University communicated that
"Grubac, contrary to the provision of the FRY Constitution banning
constitutional judges to exercise other public or professional duties, lectures
delivered at the Novi Sad Law Faculty received fees totalling 600,000
dinars….thus committing several criminal offences." (Novosti, 19
October 2002) Political circles, notably Democratic Party, resentful of the
Court's final decision, embraced that information as the ultimate truth, and
started clamouring for Grubac's resignation.
At
his press conference held on 18 October 2002 Grubac said: "Accusations
targeting the judiciary in Serbia are inadmissible. What's the meaning of the
statement that 'judicial decisions shall not be recognised and enforced" ?
Or of the slander that "the Federal Constitutional Court is a private
court of law of the FRY President?" or of the statement of the Justice
Minister that "the FCC is a non-extant court of a non-extant state?"
or of the insult "so-called FCC and its last ruling. All the foregoing is
tantamount to the most vicious attacks on the judiciary, an incitement to
revolt against that power and a call to anarchy and the end of the legal state.
I wonder about the fate of presidents and judges of local, provincial courts,
if things like this can happen to the highest court in the state.” Grubac also
said that he was “on several occasions indirectly warned that everything hinged
on my conduct and that I should not rock the boat too much, for otherwise, I
would have to bear the consequences of any move of mine…" In that text the
following claims were laid out: "even a scant probe into masterminds of
the communique, indicated that the Students Association was closely linked with
Democratic Party, the most powerful DOS member-party….namely the SA members
are: Aleksandra Visnjic (President of SA), former front woman of
"Otpor", president of the Association of Students of Machine-Building
Faculty in Belgrade, and member of the Executive Committee of the Democratic
Youth… Maja Kovacevic, (spokesman of SA,) a member of the Executive Board of
the City Committee of Democratic Party in Novi Sad, and Vladimir Vukovic,
president of the Executive Committee of the Club of Democratic Youth in Novi
Sad." (Danas, 4. November 2002) It the meantime it was discovered
that the 'document' forwarded by the SA was a "forgery". But the
later did not have any impact on further course of developments, as the FCC,
its president and the aforementioned ruling have been already demonised.
Conclusion
From
the standpoint of enthronement of the legal state and protection of human
rights, situation in the judiciary exacts a serious, comprehensive analysis and
urgent measures aiming at normalisation and improvement of the judiciary
status. This means that all three power branches shall have to draft a joint
program and simultaneously implement it, for engagement of only one branch of
power could not lead to necessary changes.
Without
trying to act as arbiters in the current conflict between the judiciary and the
Justice Minister, Helsinki Committee holds that the first step should be
normative and factual adherence of the executive to the constitutional
provisions. Objections raised by the executive regarding the judiciary work and
some demands encapsulated in the document "Reform of the Judiciary"
are essentially grounded and justified. The fact is that only 3 compromised
judges were dismissed to date, and that many other dismissal proceedings were
stalled in 2002. Added to that proceedings against members of the former regime
are being procrastinated, the judiciary in general acts slowly and
inefficiently, hearings are much-delayed, and "friendly deals"
between judges, lawyers and prosecutors are rarely prevented or sanctioned. But
the manner of criticism and imposed deadlines were inadmissible and indicative
rather of demagogy and scoring of cheap political points, than of a genuine
wish for improvement in the judiciary sphere.
The
executive did not have the moral right to criticise the judiciary in such a
way, notably in view of its non-provision of conditions for adequate
functioning of the judiciary. In fact it was the Justice Ministry which made
many wrong moves: adoption of unconstitutional amendments to judiciary-related
laws, non-insistence on adoption of the new procedural laws facilitating a more
efficient work of courts of law, non-adoption of relevant sub-legal act,
non-provision of funds enabling regular work of the judiciary.
On
the other hand the judiciary could have done more to preserve its independence
and improve its image. Despite non-adoption of the Act on Lustration, the
existing normative framework offers possibilities for launching proceedings for
dismissal of judges on grounds of their unprofessional and inexpert work and
misuses of power under Article 243 of the Criminal Act of the Republic of
Serbia. But many such dismissal proceedings have been stalled and no criminal
proceedings against corrupt and compromised judges have been instituted.
Hesitancy
of presidents of courts, who have the authority to institute dismissal
proceedings, and of prosecutors, who have the authority to institute criminal
proceedings, are the root-cause of the bad situation in the judiciary. Passivity
or leniency of holders of the top judicial posts in the face of 10-15% judges
deemed "incompatible" gave rise to discontent and anger of the
executive and many ordinary citizens.
Society
of Judges of Serbia, the only professional associations of judges, has not
responded adequately to the pressure campaign. The Society, which boasts a
1,700-strong membership (there are 2,500 judges in Serbia) at its management
board and other sessions failed to seriously discuss the burning issues of its
profession, and did not have an adequate answer to challenges posed to the
judiciary. Its public activities were mostly reduced to issuing of communiques
when the damage had been already incurred. We think that the Society of Judges
of Serbia and Association of Public Prosecutors must play a more pro-active
role, not only in the defence of the judiciary interests, but also in drafting
guidelines for the future work of those branch associations. They should also
insist on a more devoted and engaged work of their currently only formal
members.
Retrograde
trends in the judiciary which marked the past year, must be checked, for they
affect our internal affairs and also taint the international image of our
country.
Without
going into all reasons of the FRY's delayed accession to Council of Europe, we
would nonetheless like to point out that one of the key reasons thereof was
non-harmonisation of our judiciary-related legislation with European standards,
notably Recommendations of Council of Europe. The most recent amendments to the
judiciary-related laws, which enabled direct influence of the executive on the
judiciary, and reduced the judiciary independence, are contrary to the
aforementioned recommendations and standards.
Most
surely the first step towards restoration of independence of the judiciary is
the repeal of controversial amendments.
It
is expected that implementation of the document "Strategy of the judiciary
reform in Serbia" would bring about key changes. This is the first
post-October 5 document which in a systematic and comprehensive way lays out
key reforms in the forthcoming period. The project was hammered out by the
Council for Reform of the Judiciary, composed of representatives of government
of Serbia, Serb parliament, presidents of the Supreme and Constitutional Court
of Serbia, republican public prosecutor, president of Bar Association of
Serbia, professors of Law Faculties in Novi Sad and Belgrade, representatives
of NGOs and international organisations, notably OSCE and Council of Europe.
This indicates that all relevant prime movers shall take part in the said
reforms. By extension their joint efforts and single contributions should the
public at large.
The
future of that still undeveloped document, and of its later implementation,
shall depend on the will of relevant political factors to truly make judiciary
independent and highly professional. But in view of recent political
stranglehold on the judiciary, one justifiably fears that even this document
shall not yield better results.
The Right to Fair Trial
and Rights of Detainees
New
Act on the Criminal Proceedings (adopted on 28 December 2001) took force on 1
March 2002. The law drafted after the 5 October changeover by domestic and
foreign legal experts content-wise meets high standards relating to a fair
trial. Unlike the old Act (adopted in 1977 and later amended) the new one
envisages new solutions relating to the citizens' rights in so-called pre-trial
proceedings, limited powers of police, expanded rights of defence
counsels/lawyers, and shorter detention terms.
Novel
is the provision of Article 5 spelling out that "the arrestee must be
immediately informed, in his or other language that he/she understands, of
reasons of his /her arrest and of his/her right not to say anything, of his/her
right to hire a defence counsel of his/her own choosing, and of his/her right
to have his or her family informed of his/her arrest. The arrestee, without a
court decision, ought to be immediately taken to the competent investigating
judge" Article 16, para. 1 of the Act lays down that "the accused has
the right to be taken within the shortest possible time to court and be tried
without delay."
Novelty
are also reduced powers of police in pre-trial proceedings. The police right to
summon citizens to so-called informative interview, oft misused in the
Milosevic era, has been considerably restricted. In summoning citizens for
information-gathering purposes, police must quote reasons thereof.
Information-gathering must not be effected forcibly and ought not last more
than 4 hours. If a citizen is summoned as a suspect, he/she must be notified of
his/her right to hire a lawyer. If during the collection-gathering interview a
citizen is appraised as a suspect, police body should immediately notify
him/her of the right to hire a lawyer, of the charges he/she faces of his/her
right to answer to questions only in presence of his/her lawyer, and in case of
detention all his/her rights should be read to him/her." (Article 226)
Interviewee
or detainee may be remanded in custody for maximum 48 hours since the hour of
detention or response to summons. He or she should be handed at the latest
within two hours the writ on detention, and police should immediately notify of
that detention order the investigating judge. A suspect must hire a lawyer upon
receiving the detention writ, of his own choosing or the one chosen by police
from the list submitted by the Bar Association. An appeal against detention is
allowed. It may be filed immediately to the investigating judge and the later
is duty-bound to take a pertinent decision within 4 hours after its receipt.
Interrogation of a suspect may be delayed for maximum 8 hours, until arrival of
a lawyer. If lawyer's assistance is not ensured within the said deadline, a
suspect shall be released or taken immediately to investigating judge (Article
229).
The
aforementioned provisions provide for the highest-level protection of human
rights of citizens in pre-trial proceedings. However their enforcement is still
problematic, and their adoption caused a veritable uproar among the police
ranks. According to police "in adopting those provisions the focus was on
rights of suspects/detainees…and the intention was to tie our hands."
Police representatives say: "we don't have sufficient funds and technical
means for successful and efficient information and evidence collection and the
presence of lawyers during interrogation shall be a major obstacle in the
aforementioned activities." The foregoing indicates a deeply embedded
conviction that torture and coercion are the best ways for evidence collection.
A recent statement of a Belgrade police inspector attested to a heavy reliance
on that practice: "I think that this law offers maximum protection for
criminals. Earlier, after a three-day detention and some beating-up, they would
confess even the misdeeds which they have not committed. Now we have almost
have to bring them coffee and ensure lawyers and then see them mock us to their
hearts' content" (Glas, 17 June 2002).
The
fact that police in this state with a ever-rising criminality rate is
ill-equipped and cash-strapped does justify their inefficient work in
clarifying criminal offences. Added to that police is under influence of some
political circles, has links with gangland, and is very much corrupt. But
police has at its disposal various criminal-technical means and tactical
methods for uncovering perpetrators of various crimes. However they are rarely
used. The solution of this problem lies in the advancement of police expertise,
and employment of new expert personnel staff, and not repeal of the
aforementioned provisions. Added to that the state should earmark more funds
for betterment of technical capability of police forces and try to uproot a
deeply entrenched mind-set that coercion and torture are the best instruments
for collecting evidence in police stations.
The
new Act marks a turnaround in the position of defence counsels and the right to
mandatory defence. Provision of Article 71 spells out: "if the accused is
deaf, mute or unable to defend himself/herself successfully in the proceedings
concerning a criminal offence punishable by a 10-year prison term or an even
harsher sentence, the accused must have a lawyer during the first
interrogation" (para. 1) or "as soon as the court issues a detention
order." (para.2) "The first lawyer from the list submitted by the
corresponding Bar Association to the president of the first-instance court
shall be appointed for detainee's defence counsel." (para.5)
"If
there are no conditions for mandatory defence, and the proceedings concern a
criminal offence punishable by a three-year prison term, orthe interests of
justice so demand, a detainee unable to bear the defence costs shall be ensured
a lawyer from the Bar Association list." (article 72, para 1)
Unlike
the previous act, the new one envisages mandatory defence-presence of defence
lawyer of the accused from the first interrogation, and not after submission of
indictment. Added to that presidents of courts must appoint lawyers from the
Bar Association list, and not those of their choosing (the past practice.)
Moreover the foregoing may be requested at the start of pre-trial proceedings
and not after the indictment-filing (the old act).
However
the proposed normative solution may cause some misuses. Namely on the Bar
Association list there were frequently names of inexperienced lawyers or those
who did not practice the criminal law. It is thought that some of their
colleagues wanted to provide the 'freshmen' with the lucrative money-earning
opportunities. The foregoing practice calls into question the quality of
defence. The Bar Association could help solve the problem by placing on those
lists only the names of experienced criminal lawyers. This would clearly
improve the quality of the mandatory defence of detainees/accused.
From
now on the defence counsel has the right to conduct a private, confidential
interview with the arrestee/ detainee before the latter's interrogation. Unlike
in the past, such an interview my be monitored only visually and not by audio
means. (Article 75, para. 2)
Most
important detention-related novelties concern the length of detention, from the
hour of indictment-filing or handing down of the first-instance sentence. The
new act contains the old solution/provision that the detention prior to
indictment filing may last maximum 6 months. (Article 144). But contrary to the
old act, the new one envisages that detention, after indictment-filing, may
last maximum 2 years and "if within that timeframe the first-instance sentence
is not passed, detention shall be suspended and the accused released."
After pronunciation of the first-instance sentence, detention may last at the
longest another year, and if the second-instance judgement confirming or
revising the first one is not delivered, then detention shall be suspended and
the accused released. If the second-instance judgements repealing the
first-instance one is delivered, detention may last maximum one years since
pronunciation of the second-instance court ruling. (Article 146. Para. 3 and 4)
The
said amendments constitute a justifiable pressure on the first- and
second-instance courts of law to deal more swiftly with detention-related
cases, for the institute of detention is not a criminal sanction. It is thought
that the introduction of the aforementioned amendments would mark the end of
practice of 5-6 years long detentions of the accused. Moreover under the new
provisions, human rights of detainees shall be better protected for they shall
be able to immediately serve sentences under more liberal and humane regime
than the one envisaged for detention.
But
enforcement of the provision contained in Article 146, para. 3 and 4 was
differently interpreted by courts of law. On the eve of enforcement of the new
act, the District Court in Belgrade, in a restrictive interpretation of the
said provision, decided to release 8 persons charged with the commission of
grave criminal offences (for which a mandatory detention is determined under
the new act). The District Prosecution Office in Belgrade then appealed to the
Supreme Court of Serbia for "the provision in question is not applicable
to individuals already tried under the old act… the intention of the law-maker
was not surely to effect release of hardened criminals." The Supreme Court
of Serbia allowed the appeal and consequently the District Court determined a
new detention measure of all the eight individuals. The decision of the
District Court was hasty, because the law-maker did not provide for clear
interpretations of the aforementioned provision.
Added
to a fair trial within a reasonable timeframe, viewed within the context of key
principles ensuring the right to a fair trial (presumption of innocence, public
nature of trial, the right of unjustly convicted or detained to compensatory
damage), the new Act on Criminal Proceedings is entirely in line with European
standards, commitments undertaken by the FRY after its ratification of
international documents and the FRY preparations for accession to Council of
Europe.
One
of the problems in implementation of this Act may be the stance of the
political protagonists and media on violation of principle of presumption of
innocence. Very often influential politicians use the print and electronic
media to publicise "their verdicts" in instituted or non-instituted
proceedings against certain individuals and call on judges to "take into
account the higher political interests" in deliberating sentences. The
sensation-hungry and circulation-bent media, often ignorant of the judicial practice
on the other hand tend to leak uncertified or semi-reliable information terming
them as "irrefutable evidence". This causes the judges or presidents
of courts of laws to explicate via the media the reasons behind their rulings.
It is true that judicial authorities should be controlled by public opinion and
trials followed by the media, but neither should take on the role of a court of
law.
This
problem could be solved by setting up information services in courts of law and
appointment of a judicial spokesman in charge of disclosing information of
public interest. This could help pre-empt arbitrary or tendentious coverage of
trials. Process of education of journalists could be also kick-started with a
view to their familiarising with elementary rules of judicial proceedings,
notably with the fact that the principle of presumption of innocence does not
duty bind only competent courts but also the media as a key factor in
opinion-forming.
Torture
and Harassment by the Police
Enforcement
of the new Act on Criminal Proceedings, notably its part relating to limited
powers of police in pre-trial proceedings, was counter-productive. Instead of
decreasing the police torture and harassment, it directly impacted the increase
of both. But it bears saying that the extent of torture cannot be statistically
gauged, firstly because of reluctance of tortured citizens to report such
malpractice, and secondly because of the general social climate in which more
faith is placed in the police, than citizens' words. Many citizens fear
reprisals, and don't trust the state's proclaimed intention to protect them.
But on the other hand thanks to liberalisation of the general social climate in
the post-5 October period, many citizens are now readier to report such police
misuses. Added to that the media are also readier to report on the cases of
police torture and harassment.
However
it is still difficult to assess the real extent of police torture and
harassment. For example according to the data presented in the Report of the Ministry of the Interior of
the Republic of Serbia in 1 January-30 November 2002 period 1,420
disciplinary proceedings were instituted against perpetrators of 848 grave and
572 light breaches of official duties. Criminal charges were filed against 226
policemen who have committed 459 criminal offences. 42 policemen were arrested,
and 195 suspended on various grounds. But the said report does not contain the
share or percentage of torture and harassment cases. The data of lawyers of the
Fund for Humanitarian Law speak of 200 torture cases in the post-5 October
period.
Despite
our difficulties in gathering relevant information, we may say that torture of
citizens by police, which sometimes results in death, is still rife and
insufficiently sanctioned. There are many examples of the foregoing, but we
shall now quote only the most conspicuous ones.
Vranje
policemen, Srdjan Kostic and Sasa Stevanovic, have detained Nenad Tasic on
grounds "of a being an accomplice to a recent burglary" on 18 August
2002. During his 8-hour long interrogation in the police station, they beat up
Tasic with batons and hands. The other detainee recounted the course of that
interrogation: "Kostic started hitting Tasic's hands, and whenever he
cringed with pain, Kostic started hitting them harder! Nenad's hands looked
like burst melons. Later Kostic started slapping hard Nenad's face. Nenad's
mouth was bleeding, and his jaw was distorted. "
When Tasic fainted policemen first took him to the Vranje health Centre, and
later, due to complications, to the Nis Neuro-Surgical Clinic. Tasic fell into
the coma and came round only a month later. Doctors reported that one lung was
broken and that he had severe brain concussions. Because of this brutal
beating, the two policemen were suspended and charges were filed against them.
Non-clarified
death of Milan Jezdovic during his interrogation in a Belgrade police station
generated much media buzz. Jezdovic was taken to a police station with several
other persons suspected of possessing large quantities of narcotics on the
night of 4 December 2002. The police communique reads: "Jezdovic, a
well-known substance abuser and dealer, felt sick during interrogation. The
first aid team which promptly arrived tried in vain to help him. Its report
stated a massive heart attack provoked by myocarditis as the cause of
death."
But Jezdovic's friends who had been detained with him told the media a
different story. Aleksandar Draskovic told Svedok
of 17 December 2002: "They tried to force me to confess that I had 15
kg of heroin, that I was dealing in cocaine. They brutally beat me up. They
kept kicking me, jumping all over my body, one policeman was strangling me,
while the other kept kicking my testis. With an electronic device they kept
scorching my head, stomach, hands and penis. I felt terrible pains, I fainted,
I was covered in blood, but they did not want to bring a doctor despite my
pleas. Then the doctor came. After a disinterested glance he said that they
should call him again if I needed a shot of pain-killer. When I pleaded again
for doctor's help, one of the inspectors told me: 'Since you are fooling around
with us, we shall kill you.' But the worst thing was torture of Milan. He
begged them to stop, told them they would kill him if they continue their
torture, but they did not stop, and kept saying 'Die, die'. They kept kicking
him, strangling him with nylon bags, and when he fainted they threw a jug of
water over his face." In a response to such testimonies of witnesses and
posthumous photographs of Jezdovic clearly showing bruises on his head, the
Belgrade police issued the following communique: "When Jezdovic resisted
the arrest and tried to reach a knife on the shelf, one Inspector of the Fourth
Department was compelled to calm him by a judo move. During his fall the young
man hit with his head a small table. Then we handcuffed him in the face of his
resistance."
Jezdic's
friends were charged with possession of illicit substances. District Court in
Belgrade has launched a probe into circumstances leading to Jezdic's death.
Institution of proceedings against policeman who have detained and during
interrogation brutalised Jezdic and his friends hinges on the findings of that
probe.
Unfortunately
the police torture targets also underage children.
On
9 July 2002 in village Americ four policemen have unlawfully searched the house
in which there were only three underage children. They were allegedly looking
for buried weapons. Policemen entered the house and asked one mentally retarded
child, D.Dj (15 years old) where the weapons were. When the child could not
provide the relevant answer, the policemen threatened to break his hands and
legs and torture him with an electrical baton unless he told them the truth.
Then the younger brother S.Dj. (11 years old) told the policemen: "Can't
you see that he cannot talk! How can you beat such a child!?" But they
nonetheless took out the mentally retarded child, gave him a spade and ordered
him to start digging. He kept digging for 2 hours, and dug out about 10 holes,
but weapons were not found. The police booed: "Kept digging or we shall
bury you in one of these hotels". One policeman went back to the house and
lied on the couch in order to make a phone call. That policeman spent 45
minutes in the house, and S.Dj. saw him opening and ransacking the fridge.
Finally they left the house and while exiting the courtyard burst into
laughter."
Prosecutors offices did not respond adequately to the increased cases of
reported torture and harassment of citizens. None of them upon receiving relevant
information launched proceedings against perpetrators and many frequently
accepted the police report denying any misuse of power. In some cases the
police were the ones who filed charges against their victims for
"obstructing duties of officials" or threatened to do if victims
manifested readiness to seek justice.
Added
to unregulated situation in the judiciary and police, one of the main reasons
for ineffective protection of civil and human rights of citizens is lack of
responsibility of courts of law. Namely, when a victim finally overcomes the
hurdles in the shape of police threat and prosecution passivity, it then faces
non-diligence of courts of law.
Proceedings
against policemen accused of breaches of their duties last a long time, for
judges frequently don't want to tackle various misuses of official powers. For
example, as the main hearing cannot be held without the accused, and orders for
their arrests are rarely issued and as rarely carried out, hearings are so
often deferred that the objective of proceedings, dispensation of justice for
the damaged party, loses any sense.
Criminal
proceedings (instituted in 1998) against three Belgrade policemen are still
underway in the Belgrade District Court. Goran Markovic, Jonuz Jonuzi and Goran
Jaksic are charged with beating up Dusan Lukic in Savski Venac police station
and cellar in 15-18 March 1995 period in a bid to extort his confession
relating to a car theft. According to the indictment the three policeman
handcuffed Lukic, and beat him up with baseball batons with another five
colleagues, whose names have never been disclosed. He fainted on several
occasions by was brought round by water jets. Lukic was finally taken to the
Emergency Centre, where the doctors diagnosed fatal injuries to his vital organs.
Because of broken spleen and liver, kidney insufficiency, internal
haemorraging, and so called brain explosion caused by a blood clot, Lukic died
twenty days later (Nacional, 13 September 2002).
But
the August ruling of the Supreme Court of Serbia raised some hopes as to a
major shift in the judicial bodies position on police torture. Acting on the
appeal against the ruling of the Vranje District Court (which sentenced a
Surdulica police inspector to 10 months prison term for extortion of confession)
the Supreme Court revised that ruling to -18 months prison term. Inspector
Jovanovic on 7 April 1997 for five hours beat up the damaged party Radivoje
Jovanovic, in order to extort confession from him.
Some
turnaround was also noted in lawsuit proceedings relating to compensatory
damage to victims who had suffered psychological pain or whose health had been
impaired. Most damage compensatory lawsuits were filed by members of
"Otpor" maltreated and brutalised by police during 2000. In cases without
political correlation claimants face protracted proceedings, though their
prospects for getting adequate compensation are better.
Special
Prosecutor
On
model of some European countries, Serb Parliament on 18 July 2002 adopted the
Act on Organisation and Powers of Bodies Combating Organised Crime (popularly
called anti-mafia law) which introduced the institution of a Special
Prosecutor. But the Act could not take effect immediately, due to restrictive
provisions of the then valid Act on Criminal Proceedings. On 17 December 2002
both houses of federal parliament adopted the Act on Amendments to the Act on
Criminal Proceedings, thus paving the way for enforcement of the republican Act
on Combat against Organised Crime.
Organisation, Powers, Competence and Other
Provisions
Act
on Organisation and Competence of Bodies for Combating Organised Crime
regulates education, training, powers and competence of special units of state
bodies tasked with uncovering of criminal offences and criminal prosecution of
perpetrators thereof. The Act is enforced for the sake of uncovering of
criminal offences with elements of organised crime and prosecution of
perpetrators thereof:
·
offences against the
FRY constitutional order and security;
·
against humanity and
international law;
·
money-laundering and
forgery, unauthorised production and distribution of narcotics illicit trade,
illicit trading in arms, ammunition and explosives, trafficking in human
beings, burglary, extortion of graft, abductions and extortion of money in
blackmail cases;
·
other criminal
offences entailing the minimum five year prison term.
But
it seems that ambitions of law-makers are huge. Namely the act covers not only
natural criminal offences from the area of criminal association, but also those
against constitutional order and security of the FRY, and those against
humanity and international law. Such ambitions burden the special prosecution
office. State security services should deal with protection of constitutional
order and regular prosecution offices should tackle war crimes. In view of his
new powers, a special prosecutor shall have to incorporate the republican state
security offices into its special department and divide it into three sectors.
Further negative consequences of the foregoing are: the unnecessary internal
discord in the Ministry of the Interior and judiciary, increased expenditure,
and watering down of the original idea-combat against the organised crime (See
Miloš Vasić text, Vreme, 11 July 2002). Under the Act the competent
prosecution office is the District Prosecution Office in Belgrade. Within its
fold a Special Department for Combating Organised Crime (so-called Special
Prosecution) shall be set up. 18 At its helm shall be a special prosecutor
appointed by the republican public prosecutor from the ranks of public
prosecutors and their deputies and eligible for the two year term of office.
Special prosecutor may be relieved of his duties before the end of his first
mandate.
A
two-year mandate seems a short one given the complexity of cases entrusted to
special prosecutor (a large number of suspects, engagement of a large number of
forensic and other experts, etc.) In practice special prosecutors shall be
probably re-elected for another two-year term, which can result in their more
devoted and pro-active work.
That
kind of appointment should be in hands of parliament, and candidates should be
put forward by government. We think that a special prosecutor should not be
appointed and dismissed by the republican public prosecutor. A more adequate
solution would be to vest in a special prosecutor full autonomy with respect to
the arrangement of his outfit/agency. Furthermore, in order to prevent external
and internal pressures his most immediate superior should be -the Serb
Parliament.
In
order to ensure unfolding of activities of the Interior Ministry bodies
relating to the aforementioned criminal offences, the Department for Curbing
Organised Crime shall be founded within the Interior Ministry of Serbia. Head
of that department shall be appointed and dismissed by the Interior Secretary. District Court in Belgrade shall deal wit
the first-instance proceedings relating to organised crimes cases, the Appeal
Court in Belgrade shall act as the second-instance judicial body, while the
Supreme Court of Serbia shall deal with the conflict of competences between
regular courts. 21 A special Department for dealing with cases covered by the
aforementioned Act shall be founded within the District Court. At its helm
shall be a president appointed by president of District Court in Belgrade. The
Appeal Court in Belgrade shall have a special department for dealing with
organised crimes cases, and president of that department shall be appointed by
president of the Appeals Court.
A
special detention units shall be set up in the District Court in Belgrade for
persons remanded in custody for committing offences covered by the
aforementioned Act.
Before taking up his
post a special prosecutor is duty bound to disclose data on his
financial/property status, on financial-property status of his spouse, and of
next of kin. Those data shall be deemed confidential, and security check of a
candidate for that post without his knowledge is also envisaged.
There
is much emphasis on the obligation of keeping official secrets (confidentiality
of data in pre-trial and investigating proceedings). Due to seriousness of
duties, major responsibility and potential exposure to different threats and
pressures, employees of these services shall get high salaries and shortened
years of service. Bodies and services founded under the aforementioned Act
should have about 250 employees, including 15 judges and 15 prosecutors.
New Procedural Institutes
(a Protected Witness, Undercover Investigator
and Other Measures)
The
Act on Amendments to the Act on Criminal Proceedings puts in place the new
evidence-proving institute- a protected witness. The Act spells out 27:"
the state prosecutor may propose to court that a protected witness (a member of
or a criminal organisation) against whom proceedings have been instituted be
interrogated/heard if there are extenuating circumstances on the basis of which
he/she could be released or have his/her sentence commuted (under the Penal
Code of the FRY) if the importance of his/her testimony for uncovering, proving
or preventing other criminal offences of criminal organisation outweighs the
gravity and consequences of the criminal offence he/she has committed.
That
role is envisaged only for members of mafia organisations and not for those
ready to indicate cases of corruption among the police and prosecution ranks
(as is the case for example in the federal state of New York, USA).
If
a criminal offence cannot be otherwise proved, the investigating judge, at the
proposal of a special prosecutor may approve a temporary measure: rendering of
simulated business services, contracting of simulated legal deals, and
engagement of covert investigators insinuating themselves into the criminal
groups and subsequently acting as "moles". Under order of investigating
judge, an undercover investigator may use surveillance and telephone
interception/bugging devices and install them in business premises and flats of
suspects.
Hence
an undercover investigator may search any flat without warrant, install bugging
devices and record all conversations, whereby he should submit daily reports on
the foregoing to his superior, a judge. Law does not recognise that procedural
action, and it was to date used only in secret services operations. But at
issue is the weight of thus collected evidence. Many operational-technical
measures applied by secret services are now officially introduced as legally
approved evidence-gathering measures (see interview of Goran Petrovic, Blic,
27 June 2002). And finally it is unclear what kind of person may offer
simulated business? An undercover investigator? Article 503 paragraph 3 of the
Act on Criminal Proceedings lays down: "undercover investigator's
instigation to commission of criminal offences is prohibited and
punishable." But there is a favourable circumstance: "if a special
prosecutor does not institute criminal proceedings within 6 months, all
collected data must be destroyed and the person covered by those data notified
of that measure. The said data mustn't be used for any other criminal offence
unless the offence in question was committed by organised crime groups."
Court
may determine the measure of temporary seizure of personal belongings and
property. Novelty is also seizure and blocking of property when there is
reasonable doubt that property was acquired in an illegal way.
According
to the provisions in place, the aforementioned amendments are not in keeping
with the legal provisions on executive procedure and obligatory relations.
One
of the shortcomings is an unregulated protection of a special prosecutor,
judges and policemen. Special prosecutor has not yet been appointed nor have
been judges. It is thought that investigating judges of District Court are most
likely appointees. But if all 13 of them are appointed to new duties, then the question
of their replacement with new judges in a short period of time emerges.
Conclusion
The
state's resolve, albeit a formal one, to energetically deal with organised
crime is a good sign. However the aforementioned shortcomings of the Act on
Organisation and Competence of Bodies for Combating Organised Crime, and of the
Act on Amendments to the Act on Criminal Proceedings, and some provisions
encroaching upon the area of human rights may cause misuses, collide with other
provisions, incur overhead expenses in formation and functioning of such an
organisation, and consequently lead to its under-performance.
Death
Penalty
In
the late 2001 the Act on Amendments to the Penal Code of the FRY has been
adopted. Under the former the death penalty sentence may be delivered if it is
envisaged by the republican law. In the late February 2002 Parliament of Serbia
voted in the Act on Amendments to the Penal Code of the Republic of Serbia
under which the death penalty was abolished. The foregoing was tantamount to
harmonisation between the republican and federal legislation. Death penalty was
replaced by a 40-year prison term as the maximum sentence (previously the
maximum prison term was 20 years). Since 1992 due to conflicting provisions of
the republican and federal law no death penalty was carried out and some
convicts waited as long as 18 years for execution thereof.
In
Serb prisons there were 25 convicts whose sentences had become final before the
adoption of the aforementioned act. Consequently their capital punishments were
commuted to a 40 year imprisonment. Some cases are pending because all legal
remedies are yet to be exhausted. The aforementioned amendment makes part of a
comprehensive fine-tuning of domestic legislation with legislation of Council of
Europe.
Conditions in Prisons
and Detention Institutions
Human
rights of convicts and conditions under which they serve their sentences, are
one of the rare segments of reform of the state administration in which much
progress has been made. The reform of penitentiaries began in the immediate
post-5 October period and the ensuing prison revolts. And that reform continued
during 2002. Conditions in prisons were greatly improved, and a major step
towards reaching EU standards (the accession pre-condition) has been made. Many
prisons have been re-vamped and reconstructed, torture and harassment of
prisoners decreased, but the new act on enforcement of criminal sanctions,
setting up a new normative framework for full respect of prisoners' rights, has
not been adopted. The model of that law put forward by NGO "Lex",
highly observant of the rights of prisoners, has not been seriously considered.
It bears saying that any new Act on Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions should be
fine-tuned with international documents from that sphere, notably the European
Convention on Human Rights and accompanying Protocols (which must be ratified
immediately after the FRY accession to Council of Europe), and European
Convention on Prevention of Torture and Inhumane and Degrading Treatment of
Prisoners (which must be ratified a year after accession) and European Prison
Rules. To prevent that the process of the future normative adoption of the
aforementioned standards remains the dead-letter, in the second half of 2002,
OSCE and the Serb Justice Ministry started courses of education of prison
personnel, notably of security services/guards in order to enable them to apply
the said European standards in practice.
With
a view to learning more about status of human rights and freedoms in prisons in
Serbia, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, has been engaged in a
pro-active prison monitoring for a year now. To date we visited 11 prisons, and
4 of them on two occasions.
Our
basic goal is to gain an objective, systematic, expert and comprehensive
insight into enforcement of some criminal sanctions. Our five-member monitoring
team is composed of two jurists, two special pedagogues (one is an expert
consultant) and one forensic expert. During our visits we were allowed access
to all premises, and interviews with management, personnel, and prisoners
(either those who of their own will wanted to talk to us, or those chosen by
our team) in absence of prison guards and other prison personnel.
During
2002 the Helsinki Committee team visited the Juvenile Remand Centre in Valjevo,
Niš Penitentiary and Padinska Skela open-type prison (near Belgrade), Zabela
women prison near Pozarevac, District Prison in Belgrade, District Prison in
Novi Sad and Ćuprija open-type prison.
In
order to effect a comprehensive evaluation we opted for 6 aspects relevant for
enforcement of criminal sanctions: quality and conditions of life, security,
return to the community, contacts with the outside world, legality of treatment
and prison personnel.
In
this text we shall give only a brief general analysis of the said 6 aspects.
a) Physical Environment and
Accommodation,
Ventilation and Lighting,
Sanitary
Conditions and Hygiene
During
November 2000 prison riots many buildings within Penitentiary Pozarevac-Zabela
compound, and in Nis Penitentiary were totally or partly destroyed. In most
prisons, barring Novi Sad District Prison, some parts of Padinska Skela Prison,
and Cuprija Prison, buildings are very derelict, being over 50 years old. In
the course of 2002 the Justice Ministry thanks to foreign donations effected
adaptation and re-vamping of some buildings, notably of pavilion VII in Pozarevac-Zabela
closed-type prison, women department of prison hospital in Belgrade, women
department of Pozarevac prison. During our tour adaptation of pavilion VII in
Pozarevac has been completed and interior decorating was in progress. New
sanitary installations have been put in place, as were new beds and bedding,
and new personal chests of drawers. Following the most thorough re-vamping of
pavilion VII prisoners shall be able to serve their sentences under more
favourable conditions.
Adaptation
of women department of the Prison Hospital in Belgrade has been also carried
out. That department now meets European lighting, space, ventilation and
heating standards. Generally speaking the District Prison in Novi Sad, Padinska
Skela Penitentiary and open-type department of Ćuprija prison meet
Central-Eastern European prison standards. However in other prisons living
conditions have not been much improved. Some are overcrowded due to a general
increase in number of convicts and detainees. According to communique of the
Justice Ministry of the Republic of Serbia on 11 October 2002 there were 4,668
convicts and 1,440 detainees in prisons Serbia-wide. That is an 8 % increased
with respect to 4,318 convicts and 1,105 detainees registered in October 2000.
There
isn't much furniture in dormitories. Moreover pieces of furniture are very old,
as are sanitary installations in bathrooms and toilets. Hot water is rare.
Pozarevac penitentiary, the third largest prison in Serbia, faces serious
problems of water supply and heating. Most prisoners complained of inadequate
heating during wintertime.
Building
housing a district prison hospital in Belgrade has ventilation and heating
problems. The entire building should be adapted in order to provide for a more
humane and adequate treatment of about 450 convicts in the Belgrade District
Prison and about 400 patients in the prison hospital.
Despite
long-standing neglect and non-investments into adaptation and repairs, hygiene
level in most prisons we have visited is at a satisfactory level. There were no
large-scale infections due to regular de-ratisation, disinsection and
disinfection campaigns.
In
all prisons the management was able to supply basic hygiene items (hair
shampoos, shaving foams, razor blades and toilette paper) only to the poorest
convicts. The other convicts have to buy them in the prison canteen or get them
via parcels.
Majority
of canteens are well supplied and convicts may buy in them at market prices
cigarettes, coffee, milk, fruit, detergents, sweets, etc.
b) Food and Meals
Most
prisons have kitchen for preparing convicts' meals. Only in Požarevac Women
Prison meals are prepared in the kitchen of the men department, contrary to
rules. All meals are served at normal meal times in the communal dining room or
taken to solitary cells. Level of hygiene in kitchen and other facilities in
nearly all prisons is satisfactory. An exception is the Nis prison, for the
food there is prepared in a temporary impromptu kitchen (the original one was
burnt down during November 2000 riots) and kept in inadequate premises. But the
construction of the new kitchen expected to meet the required standards is
under way.
Food
is prepared by professional cooks in accordance with a weekly or two-day menu
signed by the prison director. According to 80% of convicts food is of poor
quality, and of quality and quantity which don't satisfy the standards of
dietetics, health and hygiene. Small quantities of meat are every day on the
many, but the choice of vegetables and fruit is poor, and dairy products are
rarely served.
Prisoners
get supplementary food via parcels, of they can buy some foodstuffs at market
prices in the prison canteens.
c) Medical Care
Size
and arrangement of medical care facilities depends on the size/capacity of
prisons. In large prisons there are special medical services which include
in-house hospitals with adequate number of beds, large number of full-time
medical staffers of various profiles and necessary medical equipment. In the
Novi Sad District Prison that in-house hospital is in the educational service
premises and has only few beds. Doctors from the local Health Centre effect
visits upon calls. All urgent cases are sent to civilian hospitals.
There
are dental wards in every prison, but due to short supply of material, they
deal only with tooth extraction. Convicts who have money are allowed to buy the
necessary material or even pay for services of private dentists.
Medical
staff is by and large disgruntled with its status and pays. Due to
understaffing many have to work overtime during week-ends and holidays for
small fees. Added to that they feel that their jobs are sidelined with respect
to other services in prisons.
Generally
speaking the level of health protection in Serb prisons is not satisfactory due
to shortage of qualified cadres, chronic underfunding, poor supplies of medical
material and lack of equipment.
2.
Security
We
viewed that segment from aspects of both external and internal security.
External security concerns real or hypothetical danger which convicts pose for
a broader social community. Internal security concerns security of convicts and
personnel.
On
the basis of analysis of collected data we may say that external security is
not satisfactory. Security measures are by and large rudimentary. Concrete
walls with fencing and guards' towers on the top encircle prison compounds.
Guards armed with machine-guns are authorised to use them in case of attempted
escapes of prisoners. Other security measures (video cameras, sensors, other
electronic devices) are non-extant, which makes more difficult the security
staff work. Prison management is thus compelled to have many guards in towers,
and employ an insufficient number of them on the ground.
Various
sources gave us various information on internal security level. According to
documentation the number of convicts equals the number of guards. There were no
reported assaults on or injuries of prison personnel. But the level of
perceived danger is the highest among guards, and lowest among educators. Different
convicts-interviewees had different opinions on different categories of prison
personnel/services. Some prison staffers treated convicts well and some
mistreated them. Almost all prisoners have positive stance on managers, and
most frequently mention-prison guards. They told us that their most frequent
contacts were with guards, managers, and then-educators.
But
from those informal interviews we have also learnt about their feelings of fear
and insecurity in that closed community. Research to date indicated that
convicts feel depressed, deprived and frustrated and in response develop some
specific ties oft manifested in clashes and fights between themselves.
Statistic data speak of frequent conflicts resolved through physical assaults
and brawls. Weapons are often made or otherwise procured. During a resent
large-scale search of the entire Pozarevac-Zabela compound large quantities of
dangerous weapons -metal and wood batons, knifes, daggers, several guns and
same explosives-have been found in different hiding places in pavilions,
workshops or even underground. It is widely assumed that many weapons were
hand-made of procured by 'friends' from the outside world.
Thefts,
racketeering, different blackmails and other forms of abuses are frequent among
convicts. In some prisons even murders have been reported. A major problem are
so called informal groups of convicts which tend to establish a parallel system
of rule and code of conduct in prisons, and hold more sway on prisoners than
the prison management proper. During last year efforts were made to break up
those groups by transferring gang-leaders to other prisons. But the problem
still persists in many penitentiaries.
3.
Legality of Treatment
That
aspect concerns compliance of prisons with legally prescribed rules (laws,
sub-legal acts, house rules). Observance of those rules is the key task of
prison personnel. In other words prison personnel must successfully pre-empt
incidents, minimise negative conduct of prisoners and otherwise keep order in their
institutions. Rules of conduct must be clear, sanctions specified and
consistently implemented.
On
the basis of the available data we were able to conclude that house rules are
very clear and accessible to every convict, immediately after his or her admission.
In most prisons several copies of house rules are appended on walls.
Majority
of convicts say that prison staffers are unbiased, disciplinary measures justly
meted out, and appeals proceedings justly conducted. But in informal
interviewees they voiced their discontent with the way they were treated.
Majority of convicts-interviewees were visibly discontent with unlawful and
unjust management and other personnel decisions. Convicts thought that
favouring of some inmates (so- called snitches), rife corruption, and other
negative phenomena exacerbate the relations within the prison and general mood
in that kind of institution. According to them the most corrupt were educators
and to a lesser extent security staff (who can procure cell phones, drugs, etc.).
Some examples of misuse of official powers by security staff were reported but
both the prison management and republican authorities failed to take
corresponding disciplinary measures against incriminated guards. Due to such
lax stance of officialdom, many convicts are reluctant to report such misuses
at all. But it bears saying that some disciplinary measures were taken on
several guards and other security workers were either fined or suspended for
breaches of their duties.
But
none of our interviewees mentioned a torture or harassment case (unlike during
the Milosevic era). Some complained about rare, but nonetheless excessive use
of coercion by the security staff, but were ignorant of sexual harassment
incidents.
A
serious incident threatening to evolve into a revolt happened on 13 August 2002
in Nis Prison. Several convicts protested against poor living conditions, very
severe regime and nearly military discipline. To put it briefly according to
them the director too often and unjustifiably resorted to the measure of
confinement of some convicts to the high level surveillance departments. If
these claims are true, and in view of inadequate living conditions in those
special premises and duration of the said measure (up to 6 months under the Act
on Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions) then their discontent is justifiable. But
situation in that regard has been partially improved thanks to insistence of
convicts.
4.
Return to the Community
Unlike
the Serb Act on Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions, pertinent international
provisions clearly spell out that "one of goals of institutionalised
sanctions is the return to the community of convicts after their release."
To achieve that goal the emphasis must be laid on "treatment, work,
education, vocational training, leisure activities, recreation, exercise of
religion and post-penal social integration.
Our
primary sources for familiarising with that dimension were educators and
employment services personnel, vocational training staff and -convicts.
Employment
services and vocational training staff told us that they organised training of
convicts in various existing production lines. But the problem is outdated work
technology and disinterest of investors in contributing to updating technology
and marketing of possible products. Exceptions in that regard are the Novi Sad
prison and Padinska Skela Penitentiary which have solid revenues from their own
production.
From
social re-integration aspect services for training and employment unfold the
following activities: monitoring and evaluation of conduct and work of each
convicts. Over half of a total number of convicts are included in the work
process, though even many more convicts are eligible for pertinent courses and
employment. Convicts face choices of jobs/workplaces in line with their
previous occupations. Workday lasts 8 hours, 40 weekly work hours are envisaged
and week-ends are rest days.
Work
conditions and protection at work vary, but generally merit 3 (medium) mark.
Convicts pays/remuneration are low and non-stimulating. Part of pay is put in
savings accounts and part is given to convicts.
Here
are some relevant data disclosed by re-education personnel: admission of
convicts begins in the admission department. A team composed of a social
worker, special pedagogue and psychologist after 15 to 30-day observation of
each convict proposes his classification/placement and plan of treatment. The
latter is then approved by the prison director. Criteria which weigh mostly on
classification are: length of sentence and health status. Plan and program for
each convict is drawn up by educator, and its covers the educational group,
primary and vocational education, workplace, recreation and intensity of
individual and group work. Educators also propose re-classification, and the
latter depends on conduct of convicts as evaluated by educators, vocational
training staff and security staff.
Level
of engagement of convicts in work in all prisons, barring the Women Prison in
Pozarevac is not satisfactory. There is only individual work due to shortage of
staff trained for other kinds of treatments.
Educational
groups are too big to provide for a good treatment. According to educators,
each convict has on average 2 meetings per month, and if the need arises even
more frequently. Each meeting lasts about 1 hour. Interviews may be spontaneous
and initiated either by educators or convicts.
On
the other hand majority of convicts told us they rarely saw their educators,
and that some interviews, scheduled every 3-4 months last only 15 minutes.
Education
in all prisons, barring the Juvenile Detention Centre in Valjevo, is not-extant
due to lack of funds and premises (many special purpose buildings have been
destroyed during the November 2000 prison revolt). But we have realised that
the problem of education is a long-standing one. Namely in the past little
attention was paid to education. Only few convicts were covered by educational
programs, partly because of disinterest of convicts proper and partly because
of lack of motivation of personnel. Therefore more emphasis should be laid on
education because of its important role in future social integration of former
convicts.
It
bears stressing that prison libraries are poorly equipped, notably with new
editions. Added to that the library in Pozarevac penitentiary has been totally
destroyed during the November 2000 revolt. That problem should be gradually
resolved for many prisoners are interested in reading.
We
have learnt that daily press (but insufficient number of copies) is received
regularly and that convicts may subscribe to any daily they want to. In all
prisons there's a sufficient number of functional radio and TV sets.
Recreation
encompasses sports, cultural and artistic activities, but their exercise varies
from prison to prison. In majority of prisons there are outdoor handball and
basketball grounds, table-tennis facilities, etc. Pozarevac prison has a
recently renovated Olympic-size pool and the lawn football ground.
But
many convicts are not interested in cultural and artistic activities. An
exception to that rule is the Pozarevac Women Prison which boasts a developed
drama and musical section.
As
regards religion, most convicts are of Orthodox faith. Some prisons have
special premises for services aimed at satisfying religious needs of convicts.
Due to large interests of convicts pastoral visits are paid and regular
services held during major religious holidays.
There
are no special pre-release plans or preparations. The customary procedure is to
notify police or competent social work centre of pending release. The final
interview is conducted and the convict is timely placed in semi-open
department. As regards co-operation with extra-institution factors, our
impression is that it is reduced to the level of obligation which the prison
has towards such bodies and nothing more. Most convicts told us that their
educators have never met their families. On the other hand educators think that
asking for meeting family members would be tantamount to infringement of the
convict's right to privacy.
Our
conclusion is that co-operation and co-ordination with families and
castodians/social institutions are at a very low level, and that post-penal
re-integration is ill-prepared.
5.
Contact with the Outside World
This
aspect concerns convicts' contacts with their families, lawyers, competent
bodies in the country, international organisations, and diplomatic-consular
representatives of their countries. These contacts are realised through phone
calls, correspondence, visits, stay in special premises during special visits,
receipt of money and parcels, outings/nights-out and stay outside the
institution.
In
all prisons there is at least one telephone booth, available to convicts at
least once a month, in line with the previously established rules.
Correspondence
and complaints in writing are censored. Letters are received by general
services, handed to educators and then to convicts. Letters are seized very
rarely. As regards parcels they are first checked by guards, and their contents
are registered. Parcels or contents thereof, are rarely seized.
Visits
lasts between 1-2 hours, and their frequency depends on treatment/category
accorded to convicts. Contacts with lawyers are possible whenever the need
arises or convicts ask for their assistance.
Stay
in "special premises", wherever they exist, is carried out under the
lawfully prescribed procedure, three hours every three months. Convicts were by
and large content with the exercise of that right, but thought that it should
be legally extended due to its beneficial impact on conduct of prisoners.
6.
Prison Personnel
That
aspect has a major influence on enforcement of all sanctions. Basic services in
prison are security, re-educational, and vocational training and employment
services.
Generally
speaking employees of security services are young or younger males with
secondary school education. Candidates eligible for the guard posts must have
some experience, at least two years of service, finished military service,
secondary school diploma and be physically and psychologically fit for
exercising those duties. If those conditions are met, candidates have to attend
a six-month course and pass a relevant exam. All the concerned employees
thought that those conditions were minimal and hence insufficient for the
exercise of regular and humane work of members of those services. They also
demand introduction of additional training program including courses of martial
arts, psychology, sociology, penal sanctions, non-violent resolution of conflicts
and human rights.
Staff
of those services outnumbers employees of other services, but there are
frequent vacancies due to the gravity of job and small number of candidates.
Security staff are aware of importance of their jobs. They have shortened years
of service, and although pays are regular, they are considered too low in view
of professional perils and stressfulness of their duties.
Vocational
training and employment services have enough, mostly male, employees. Such
personnel composition is in line with the nature of training (machine-building,
wood- and metal-working courses etc.) Most of them are satisfied both with
their jobs and the work of prison management and other services. Their
complaints were mostly related to outdated work technology and poor work
conditions. They told us that environment at work was not so stressful, nor
were professional hazards (possibility to be assaulted by convicts.).
They
think that the standing of their services is equal to the one of other
services. Heads and managers of those services give suggestions for and
evaluation of every convict. But our impression was that they were of secondary
importance, or, in other words, that diligence at work was not a key criterion
for re-classification of convicts or their 'awarding'. We would however like to
stress the importance of work in the process of re-education of convicts, and
consequently demand that more attention be paid to that aspect.
Re-educational
services employ both highly educated men and women, but some employees have
other faculties diplomas (geography, defence, protection) although their jobs
require knowledge of psychology, sociology, and pedagogy. Furthermore it was
argued that the future employment criteria should also include assessment of
personality of educators.
All
educators said that their jobs were highly stressful, but disclaimed any
injuries or incidents at work. They have shortened years of service, and are
disgruntled with low, though regular, pays.
Barring
several exceptions (notably Pozarevac Prison for Women), educators are
under-motivated for the high-quality work, further education, and new work
methods. They are also aware of the fact that their work on post-penal
re-integration of convicts is not rewarding, in view of bleak prospects for
such a successful development in the majority of cases. We would also like to
stress that notwithstanding the foregoing many interviewees-educators expressed
their interest in additional professional training.
Recommendations for Improvement of Prison
Conditions:
–
Provision of
mandatory minimal funds for renovation of toilets, bathrooms and replacement of
sanitary equipment;
–
Provision of funds
for regular supplies of hygiene items, and sufficient number of summer and
winter prison uniforms;
–
Nutritional values
of meals should be brought into line with the level envisaged by the law;
–
Improvement of
medical and medical material supplies;
–
Improvement of
security by introduction of contemporary surveillance devices (video, movement
sensors, etc.);
–
Ministry of Justice
should step up its inquiry into convicts' allegations about security and
re-educational staff misuses of power. If those misuses are proved then
criminal and disciplinary proceedings against those staffers should be
immediately instituted;
–
Coercion measures
and punishments should be minimised and less stress laid on rules and norms for
the sake of improving relations in prisons and creating a general positive
mood;
–
Intensify
anti-aggression training of security employees to prepare them to most
efficiently deal with aggressive convicts;
–
Prioritise
communication and management style which best stimulate good relations between
personnel and convicts. Within the program of re-education focus should be
placed on links between convicts and society in general, and not on exclusion
of convicts from the latter;
–
Prioritise
educational methods stimulating interest of convicts in work and vocational
training by introducing modern work technology, new production lines, and
awards for diligent work;
–
Introduce methods
which increase convicts' interests in education by provision of contemporary
and more creative teaching aids and awards for diligent work and organise
computer and language courses;
–
Take into
consideration all alternatives for a gradual re-integration of convicts into
social life; introduce program and activities priming the convicts for their
life after release from prison; enhance co-operation to that end with
corresponding social centres and other social control bodies;
–
Introduce mail boxes
in prisons, in order to provide for direct sending of letters of convicts to
the Management for Enforcement of Sanctions, the Red Cross and NGOs and
preclude prior reading thereof. By extension that measure would provide for
confidentiality of correspondence and prevent or minimise possible misuses or
re-distribution by the prison personnel.
–
Take into
consideration all possibilities and alternatives for a gradual return of
convicts to the community and consequently introduce special programs and
activities priming them for the post release life, in co-operation with
corresponding social centres and other social control bodies.
–
In selection of
candidates for various prison posts take into account their social and
emotional suitability;
–
Improve status of
personnel and stimulate their work by pay increases and other incentives;
–
Encourage personnel
to broaden their expertise by attending various courses, counselling and
additional training with a view to teaching them to more humanely treat
prisoners and unfold their activities in a more engaged and efficient way.
Co-operation
with The Hague Tribunal and War Crimes Trials
Animosity
to The Hague Tribunal and insufficient co-operation with this international
judicial body have marked the year 2002 too. Anti-Tribunal mood of both Serb
elite and Serb population was partly due to misunderstanding of the role of the
ICTY and strings attached to co-operation with it, namely financial assistance
and accession to international organisations, notably Council of Europe.
Constant pressures and threat of sanctions by international community (like in
the case of the arrest and hand-over of Milosevic in 2001) remained the only
successful mechanism for compelling the FRY and Serb state bodies to step up
co-operation with the ICTY.
In
the face of the US administration threat relating to suspension of financial
aid to Yugoslavia by 31 March 2002, the Federal Parliament on 11 April 2002
finally adopted the Act on Co-operation with the ICTY. Delay in adoption of
that act was a time-buying device and the excuse for allegedly unregulated
domestic legislation in the area of co-operation with foreign judicial bodies
(the latter was superfluous for the FRY was duty-bound to comply with the
ICTY's demands under the Tribunal's Statute). The aforementioned Act laid the
normative groundwork for hand-over of war crimes indictees and access to the
FRY archives and other pertinent legislation of major bearing on evidence
collection. But it became once again clear that the main hurdle to co-operation
was lack of political will and not allegedly non-extant laws.
Before
the adoption of the aforementioned Act the ICTY forwarded to the FRY and Serb
state bodies a list of 23 war crimes indictees still at large.
On
that list were: Dragoljub Ojdanic, former Head of the General Staff Deputy of
the Yugoslav Army, Nikola Sainovic, former Vice Prime Minister of the FRY,
Vlajko Stojiljkovic, former Serb Interior Secretary, (committed suicide on 11
April 2002), Milan Milutinovic, former President of Serbia (all jointly
indicted with Milosevic), Veselin Šljivancanin, Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic
(accused of crimes in Vukovar), Ratko Mladic, former Head of the General Staff
of the Republika Srpska Army, Radovan Karadžic, former President of Republika
Srpska, Milan Martic, former president of Republika Srpska Krajina,
Momčilo Gruban, Head of Guards of Omarska detention camp, etc. After
adoption of the Act many indictees, notably Sainovic, Ojdanic, Martic, Mrksic
and Gruban, aware of the state obligation to hand them over (albeit
unwillingly), in the late April and in the first half of May voluntarily
surrendered to The Hague Tribunal.
At
their joint session the federal and Serb government on 17 May 2002 decided to
give guarantees for defence in absentia of the five aforementioned indictees.
But to date only Momčilo Gruban has been released. Several days before the
guarantees-related decision, District Court in Belgrade, as a competent court,
issued the warrant for the arrest of 17 other indictees from the list. From
then on police did not arrest any indictee. They justify their passivity by
their ignorance of the whereabouts of indictees. However, we have learnt from
some sources that the top state leadership in fear of the fall of its political
rating has never ordered police to search and arrest the indictees. Milan
Milutinovic, after termination of his presidential term of office, in early
January 2003 surrendered to The Hague.
Uncooperative
attitude of the FRY and Serbia is also evident in another segment of compliance
with the ICTY-related obligations and commitments: access to archives and other
documents which may serve as an invaluable source of information-gathering or
shed more light on proceedings in progress in The Hague. Commitments or
obligations of states towards the ICTY are clearly specified in Article 29 of
Statute of the International Tribunal: "States shall co-operate with
the International Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of persons
accused of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law. 2
States shall comply with undue delay with any request for assistance or an
order issued by a Trial Chamber, including, but not limited to: a) the
identification and location of persons; b) the taking of testimony and the
production of evidence, c) the service of documents; d) the arrest or detention
of persons; e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the
International Tribunal." But in line with provisions of the Act on
Co-operation with the ICTY (17 April 2002) the decision to set up the National
Council for Co-operation with the ICTY was taken. That council "should
co-operate with the ICTY especially in the areas of status of indicted Yugoslav
citizens and their right to defence, status of witnesses- Yugoslav citizens,
access of the ICTY to archives and in other pertinent matters."
Furthermore, "the National Council shall take all the necessary measures
to assist families of indicted Yugoslav citizens, facilitate access of defence
counsels to archives and other documents having bearing on defence arguments,
and assist them in other matters stemming from the FRY obligation to protect
their citizens.
National
Council is empowered to set up its permanent commissions… co-operating in the
areas relating to military issues, archives and security." (paragraph 3
and 4 Decisions). But in practice it turned out that the said provisions in
fact relativised co-operation with the Hague Tribunal. Old guard of the
Yugoslav Army deeply entangled in the war conflicts has in final say in
selection of documents required by the ICTY, as does the Supreme Defence
Council, which appraises the priority state and security national interests and
determines which documents are be considered confidential. But during the
Milosevic trial it transpired on several occasions that for the sake of
"exercise of Milosevic's right to defence" he and his lawyers, amicus
curia, were regularly allowed access to documents beneficial for his or their
arguments. Until the aforementioned access to potentially incriminating
documents is granted, FRY's and Serbia's co-operation with the ICTY shall be
considered inadequate.
Trials
for War Crimes Committed
in
Serbia and Montenegro
All
the relevant international factors have taken a clear stand on trials for war
crimes committed during wars in the territory of former Yugoslavia: namely the
ICTY should wrap up proceedings in progress (in cases in which indictments have
been raised, proceedings have commenced, and in a number of other, limited
cases), while all other trials should be organised by national courts. As the
ICTY has a limited mandate, such a position is fully justified from the
standpoint of international community. But the next question is: are there good
enough conditions for organising just war crimes trials in Serbia?
If
we analyse the current and future war crimes trials in Serbia from any
aspect-political will of the incumbent authorities, position of the general
public on Serbia on so-called national interest and international community,
media coverage, financial and procedural status of criminal legislation,
insufficient expertise of judicial personnel for that kind of trials, and other
sticking points, namely unresolved organisational, technical and financial
problems affecting such trials, one can say that prerequisites for fair and
high-quality war crime trials in Serbia have not been met.
Political
atmosphere in Serbia, position of citizens on so-called national interests on
the one hand and international community, on the other hand, political will of
power-holders, in fact preclude any possibility for fair war crime trials.
Minimum
coverage of war crime trials and the related commentaries, and the maximum
coverage of communiques and statements issued by various Committees for Defence
of Radovan Karadžic and Veselin Šljivancanin, create an inauspicious mood for
staging of such trials, notably in provincial milieus. The aforementioned was
best illustrated by the first war crime trial in the post-Milosevic Serbia, the
one held in Prokuplje.
Procedural
and other legislation and provisions thereof don't provide for organisation of
fair, ICTY-style war crime trials in Serbia. For example, the FRY Penal Code
does not envisage the criminal offence on the basis of command responsibility.
Added to that the Act on Criminal Proceedings does not foresee
cross-examination of indictees and witnesses, use of audio and video recordings
as evidence, and the institute of the protected witness. Non-implementation of a genuine lustration,
strong pressure of the executive, and chronic understaffing (due to lack of
professional and trained judicial cadres), makes the Serb judiciary unprepared
for expert, professional and impartial conducting of proceedings against war
crimes indictees. Limited lustration was carried out among the police ranks,
and only partial purges of compromised prosecution personnel were effected.
This means that many hold-overs of the former regime among staff of both fear
even small-scale lustration, for it could lead up to raising the issue of their
own responsibility.
Most
indicative of the foregoing is a decreased interest in further uncovering of
mass graves Serbia-wide.
During
2001 and 2002 in Petrovo Selo, Batajnica and lake Perucac several mass graves
were uncovered. To date 716 corpses of Albanians killed in Kosovo were found in
those mass graves. It is believed that in other locations in Serbia there are
also mass graves. 18 months since the discovery of the first mass graves no
pertinent investigation has been launched or suspects named.
All
authorised bodies, notably the police, prosecution, and courts of law are
keeping mum about mass graves, and are shifting responsibility for passivity to
each other. In the early February 2002 Milan Sarajlic, Deputy District Public
Prosecutor communicated that "the District Public Prosecution Office to
date has not received any official information from the Serb Interior Ministry
on mass grave uncovered last year in the police boot camp in Batajnica." Rade
Terzic, District Public Prosecutor, said, "The Serb Interior Ministry
never responded to our official requests relating to identity of authorities in
charge of places where mass graves have been found, identity of police
commanders, and army and police units operating in certain localities,
operations of paramilitary units, circumstantial evidence pointing to crimes
against civilians."
On the other hand the Serb Interior Ministry shifted responsibility to judicial
bodies who "are yet to officially inform us of forensic results, namely
the cause of death, identity of victims, so that the police may determine the
place of death, manner of execution and successfully track down perpetrators f
those crimes."
One
may realistically presume that the bodily remains found in mass graves, are in
fact remains of corpses of Albanians killed during the Kosovo conflicts in the
first half of 1999, and then transferred to Serbia for the sake of hiding the
crime traces. That assumption was recently confirmed by the forensic findings.
On the other hand the Serb Interior Ministry shifts the blame on the judicial
bodies which are yet to "officially inform them on the forensic experts
work, in order to enable us to launch a most comprehensive investigation."
Some
of the bodies have been identified as bodies of Albanians killed in Kosovo in
the first half of 1999 and then transferred to Serbia for the sake of
evidence-hiding. But police often resorts to the excuse that the said victims
have not been killed in Serbia in order to defer any probe into those killings.
However that excuse does not hold water for the removal of those bodies and
their subsequent burial in Serbia in itself constitute a criminal offence.
Therefore we face two different kinds of criminal offences, and non-launching
of investigation into any of them is ungrounded. Data on identity of those who
took part in Milosevic-hosted meeting in mid-March 1999, when he issued orders
on removal of traces of Kosovo crimes, have been disclosed. The names of those
who ordered mass killings and cover-up of crimes and of perpetrators thereof
are known, but no-one has been officially accused.
Nebojsa
Ranisavljevic has been tried for war crimes against civilian population under
article 142, paragraph 1 of the Penal Code of the FRY by a High Court in Bijelo
Polje (Montenegro) since 4 May 1998. Indictment against Ranisavljevic reads:
"on 27 February 1993 in Višegrad (B&H) as a member of 25-strong
military formation under command of Milan Lukic from Višegrad, he took part in
the attack on a passenger train of the Yugoslav Railways, in abduction a group
of passengers, their looting and killing at the Štrpci railway station. This
was the sequence of developments: several soldiers ordered head of railway
station Štrpci to stop the passenger train no. 671, operating on the
Belgrade-Bar railway line, entered the train, asked for IDs of passengers, took
off the train 19 civilian passengers, Mulsims, citizens of the FRY, told them
to board a bus, and then ferried them to an abandoned building in the vicinity
of Visegrad where they looted and tortured them. After that they took them out
in groups and cruelly killed them."
After
a lengthy, but well prepared and professionally conducted proceedings
Ranisavljevic was convicted and sentenced to a 15 year prison term on 9
September 2002 (the sentence is not final). But those who ordered the abduction
and those who committed the massacre are still at large and unaccused, though
the evidence collected to date amply indicates the involvement of the top state
bodies of Serbia and the FRY in the abduction plan. To corroborate the
foregoing we would like to quote some assertions made by lawyers of the Fund
for Humanitarian Law, who have been monitoring Ranisavljevic's trial, in their Analysis of Trial of Nebojsa Ranisavljevic:
"Mitar
Mandic, at the time of abduction the Head of Defence Unit of Yugoslav Railways,
testified before the court. In his then capacity he submitted a confidential
report no.4/1-93 of 1 February to General Director of Railway Company in Belgrade.
During his testimony he confirmed that he was informed by head of Užice railway
station of "a possible stopping of train in the Štrpce station and
forcible abduction of several passengers." He said that he then met with
General Kuzmanovic, Deputy Defence Secretary, in Ministry of Serbia, and that
Kuzmanovic told them that he would inform of the plan the Defence Minister,
Head of Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Yugoslav Army. Mandic added that at the
said meeting he demanded the YA to pile pressure on the Army of Republika
Srpska to renounce its abduction plan. The witness added that he then took part
in the meeting of the top railway officials who discussed all aspects of the
announced abduction. Mandic also took part in the same-themed meetings in Uzice
police, Uzice State Security Services, in Uzice Military Headquarters and in a
meeting with all heads of railway stations on the Uzice-Gostun line.
Confidential
report No. 4/1-93 signed by Mitar Mandic, reads:
"I
have been informed on 28 January 1993 by head of Uzice-Zivanica station that
members of Republika Srpska Army from Rudo municipality shall stop the train
and abduct passengers. The entire action would take place on the part of
Belgrade-Bar railway line running through Bosnia. Probably at Štrpci or Goles
railway station."
"Head
of Uzice railway station informed me on 28 January 2001 at 10.30 of the
announced abduction of passengers."
"I
had talks with Deputy Defence Minister, General Kuzmanovic. I indicated that
our security workers protecting the part of the Belgrade-Bar railway line
running through Bosnia were taken captives, and warned him of the abduction
plan which could exacerbate the security status of our railways and trains. On
behalf of my company I asked the Defence Ministry and the Yugoslav Army to pile
pressure on the Serb army in Bosnia to renounce that plan, for it could
backfire…."
"Information
on abduction was confirmed …we were told that the plan was a strategic
operation of Serb army aimed at creating conditions for exchange of captives
and dead. That army action was assessed as unacceptable on several
grounds….Such solutions should be effected elsewhere in central Bosnia."
"Railway
Company Belgrade rejects any assessment of effects of such actions of Army of
Republika Srpska, for their true nature and goals are ignored."
As
a sign of Serbia's readiness to co-operate with the Hague Tribunal and to stage
war crime trials in Serbia proper on orders of "higher instances"
proceedings commenced
in
May 1999 against Sasa Cvjetan and Dejan Demirovic (accused of a murder under
article 47 paragraph 6 of the Penal Code of the Republic of Serbia) were
resumed. But this time round both persons were indicted of commission of a war
crime. Although prosecutor Bukumirovic asked the Supreme Court of Serbia to
empower other "more equipped, expert and better protected court to conduct
the proceedings", the SCS ruled that the trial be resumed in Prokuplje.
Indictment (filed on 5 April 2002) charged Sasa Cvjetan (in detention) and
Dejan Demirovic (at large), members of the reserve police unit
"Skorpija", with the killing and wounding of several Albanian
civilians on 28 March 1999 in centre of Podujevo, or committing the criminal
offence of war crime against civilian population under Article 142 of the Penal
Code of the FRY. Cvjetan was also charged with burglary and unauthorised
possession of fire arms and ammunition.
That
trial showcased all weakness of domestic war crimes trials. Milorad Lapcevic, a
recently appointed district court judge, and a man without relevant experience
was in charge of Prijepolje trial. District Public Prosecutor Bukumirovic
(nearing the retirement age), often exposed to verbal assaults and even threats
by the accused, and assisted by only two deputies, could not adequately represent
the plaintiff side in that complex trial. During pre-trial proceedings
investigating judge Mijat Bajovic made some grave oversights, namely he failed
to notify the accused Cvjetan of his rights and did not allow his lawyer to be
present during interrogation.
None
of the witnesses, mostly co-fighters from "Skorpion" unit, has shed
more light on circumstances surrounding the war crime, and they moreover denied
the involvement of their unit in that offence. Not a single Albanian
eye-witness or member of families of the killed was summoned to testify, or
allowed to directly follow the trial.
Because
of the foregoing and on the initiative of the Fund for Humanitarian Law, the
republican public prosecutor appealed to the Supreme Court of Serbia to entrust
Belgrade or Novi Sad District Court with the proceedings for the sake of
"a more efficient and just trial". And the Supreme Court allowed the
appeal and delegated the case to the Belgrade District Court.
The
main hearing is still pending.
Three
years after commencement of trial of Ivan Nikolic (charged with the criminal
offence of a murder), the District Public Prosecution Office in Prokuplje, on
instructions of the republican public prosecution office, changed the
indictment (16 April 2002) and charged Nikolic with commission of a crime
against civilian population under Article 142, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code
of the FR. According to the indictment, "Nikolic as a member of the
reserve unit of the Yugoslav Army, in breach of international customs of war, on
24 May 1999, gunned down Albanian civilians Bahrija and Vlaznim Emini."
Several
days later public prosecutor Viseslav Bukumirovic stated, "I was called by
some unidentified persons who threatened me on grounds of my role in the
trial."
Threats continued throughout the trial. At the May press conference, visibly
frightened prosecutor Bukumirovic stated that he received new threats, namely
"some people threatened to kill me and my family." Police
communicated that the search for callers was underway, but were reluctant to
disclose more details.
The callers have never been found.
In
a poll carried out by a local Prokuplje media, the majority of respondents took
a negative stance on the war crimes trials. Here are some of the comments:
"Why the Albanians who killed our people are not tried? What about
responsibility of Muslims and Croats? It is a too hasty trial. Our patriots
defended the honour of Serb people."
Only few respondents said that all perpetrators should assume responsibility
for their crimes.
Just
a few days before pronunciation of the sentence, the Association of the 1999
War Veterans, very vocal opponents of the trial, staged a protest rally in
front of the court. In its communique it was stated that "all the patriots
and fighters are invited to take part in the protest", but it was stressed
that "the Association of Fighters does not intend to bring pressure to
bear on the work of judicial bodies, but demands that a just sentence be passed
for we firmly believe that Ivan Nikolic is innocent."
During
the inadequately prepared proceedings in this obviously politically motivated
trial most witnesses did not have any information about the case or they just
'overheard some details', namely that "Nikolic bragged about killing two
Balias (a pejorative term for Muslims), no forensic report was presented nor
was Nikolic's machine gun examined. In his concluding argument prosecutor
Bukumirovic in an unprecedented move for the prosecution presented extenuating
circumstances, namely said, "Nikolic is a young, single man, caught in the
maelstrom of war… Nikolic was a brave soldier who once captured 9 terrorists
and handed them over to his superiors."
On 8 July 2003 Ivan Nikolic was convicted of a war crime against civilian
population and sentenced to 8 years in prison. President of trial chamber judge
Tasic justified the sentence by the following words: "if Nikolic had
killed Albanian civilians during armed conflicts he would have been considered
a patriot, but, in view of the murder circumstances, he is considered a man who
has breached international conventions on protection of civilians during armed
conflicts." He added, "we wanted to release Nikolic from detention,
but such a legal possibility is non-extant."
Defence
Counsels appealed against the sentence, and decision of the Supreme Court of
Serbia is pending.
Nis
Military Court was the first military court in the territory of Serbia to pass
a verdict on war crimes committed during armed conflicts in Kosovo and sentence
perpetrators thereof, a group of the Yugoslav Army officers. Under indictment
filed on 19 July and revised on 16 September 2002, Security Colonel Zlatan
Mancic, Captain Rade radojevic and soldiers Danil Tesic and Misel Seregi were
charged of war crimes against civilian population and instigation to murder,
while Mancic was also charged with the criminal offence of misuse of official
powers under article 174 of the Penal Code of the Republic of Serbia. The
indictment reads: "Colonel Mancic in early April 1999, in village Kušnin
near Prizren ordered soldier Tesic to gun down two Albanians. He also ordered
Captain Radojevic to choose another soldier to do the same thing. The choice
fell on soldier Seregi. The two soldiers killed the Albanians and torched their
bodies in order to cover up the crime. Colonel Mancic was also charged with
looting and torturing an Albanian in the late March 1999. Mancic continued with
looting of Albanians until May 1999 when the military police caught him and
seized DM 470 and other things found during the search of his flat.
On
October 11 2002 all the accused were convicted (but the sentence is yet to
become final.) Colonel Mancic was sentenced to 7 years in prison, Captain
Radojevic to 5 year prison term, and soldiers Tesic and Seregi to respectively
3 and 4 years prison terms. Conviction was based on the confession of the two
former soldiers, namely both Tesic and Seregi admitted that they have killed
two unidentified Albanians and then torched their bodies, and on the admission
of Captain Radojevic during pre-trial proceedings that the murder was committed
on orders of Security Colonel Zlatan Mancic. Until the sentence becomes final,
Colonel Mancic and Captain Radojevic were released from detention.
This
trial was a major breakthrough in the judicial practice of military courts.
Those sentences were tantamount to the official acknowledgement that crimes
committed in Kosovo have not been random acts of violence by some renegades, as
previously maintained, but rather part of the official plan to effect ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo.
But
pronounced sentences were light in view of the fact that under the provisions
in place such criminal offences entail prison sentences ranging from 5 to 20
years in prison. Moreover the sentences meted out to officers who have brutally
murdered 2 civilians, devaluate the principle of justice and deeply humiliate
both the victims and their families. Added to that the said trial was organised
under pressure, which indicates that the Yugoslav Army is not ready of its own
will to face up to its responsibility for the crimes committed.
In
January 2003 a trial of perpetrators of a crime in locality Mioče
(B&H) shall commence in Belgrade's District Court. Under indictment Milan
Lukic (at large), Oliver Krsmanovic-Orlic (at large), Dragutin Dragicevic-Bosanac
and Djordje Sevic, members of a paramilitary unit "Osvetnici" (under
command of Lukic) are charged with stopping a bus in Mioce, unlawfully checking
ID's of passengers, forcing 17 Bosniak passengers to alight, ordering them to
board a truck driven by Krsmanovic, ferrying them to Višegrad motel
"Viline Vode", and then torturing, looting and killing them in
presence of a large group of citizens. Mevlida Koldžic was brutally tortured,
raped on banks of river Drina, and gunned down. Lukic and Dragicevic
slaughtered many passengers and then threw their bodies into the river. All
indictees are charged with committing war crimes against civilians under
Article 142, Paragraph 1, of the Penal Code of the FRY.
It
is hoped that the trial shall be fair, professional and devoid of pressures,
since the proceedings are conducted by the District Court in Belgrade.
Critical
analysis of war crimes trials indicates that all shortcoming and obstacles
mentioned in the first part of this text have fully surfaced.
Added
to necessary shifts in mind-set of citizens, media coverage and mind-set of the
ruling elite, the first step towards better war crimes trial would be
establishment of a special national court for such trials. A specialised court
with enough funds and expert judicial staff would be best equipped to meet such
a challenging legal matter.
We
deem that the just and high-quality war crime trials constitute a key
prerequisite for starting the process of reconciliation and re-building of
confidence between nations living the in territory of former Yugoslavia.
Dispensation of justice by legal means is also a necessary ingredient of all
the post-conflict situations and processes.
Within
the framework of a general dispensation of justice the proceedings under way before
the International Court of Justice in the Hague are of paramount importance.
Namely in 1993 B&H has filed charges against the FRY for "commission
of genocide and aggression". On 3 February 2003 the court started its
pertinent proceedings. Tibor Varadi, legal representative of Yugoslavia said,
"the Yugoslav legal team took very seriously that legal challenge…we have
been preparing our arguments for 2 years, but discussion on the gist of the
dispute shall affect the regional mood, therefore it had better be
avoided…" Vojin Dimitrijevic ad hoc judge of that court and president of
the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights thinks that "Yugoslav and B&H
politicians would better strike a deal and renounce the lawsuit, in view of its
possible length and costs. Bosnia faces a long, laborious and costly process of
proving genocide. If the court determines that Yugoslavia has to pay
compensatory damage to Bosnia, all citizens of Yugoslavia, including the
anti-war ones shall have to pay it, while all citizens of Bosnia, including
even the pro-war ones shall receive it." Head of B&H legal team, Sahib
Softic thinks that "the most important thing is to establish that the FRY,
for the sake of implementation of its Greater Serbia state project, initiated
the war in which 200,000 citizens of B&H, mostly Muslims/Bosniaks, lost
their lives…By way of deportations and brutal mass killings non-Serbs were
eliminated from certain B&H areas. For the sake of the past and the future,
we need a ruling confirming that genocide has taken place. Then we shall be
able to pre-empt new, megalomaniac state projects executed via mass atrocities.
The issue of money is of lesser importance."
We
fully respect all the aforementioned arguments, but nonetheless think that the
process of dispensation of justice by legal means is a key component of the
post-conflict situations. Namely we think that only by establishment of
responsibility of states for war campaigns, determination of individual
responsibility and punishment of all perpetrators of war crimes, a sound basis
for the future, normal cohabitation between nations may be laid down.
Social Reactions to the Rise in Juvenile Delinquency
in Serbia
System
of social reactions to juvenile delinquency includes activities aimed at
prevention and curbing of that negative social phenomenon. The system has at
least two components: prevention and intervention. Although they are under
authority of different bodies, they should be co-ordinated and mutually
complementing and stimulating. Unfortunately those two components to date have
been treated as separate and unrelated.
Prevention
represents the first step in this tiered system. Programs of prevention should
be complex and comprehensive in order to include a large number of the young
from the general "normative" population or the delinquency-prone
young. Prevention programs as by rule are within competence of health, social,
judiciary and social organisations and institutions tasked with taking care of
children and the young. Dysfunctional state institutions and a host of system
contrarieties directly affect preventive potential of the aforementioned
factors. Crisis in schools, social protection institutions, medical care
institutions were engulfed was minimally alleviated by active engagement of
NGOs and humanitarian organisations in our country.
In
the sphere of juvenile delinquency-prevention the absence of common strategy
and ideas and of joint activities of competent institutions and bodies is
evident. There are few preventive programs (almost exclusively implemented by
NGOs and humanitarian organisations) in several municipalities, schools and
other institutions, but their target groups are small in size, and effects, due
to absence of systematic support, are minimal.
The
second-tier of the system encompasses the young who have manifested delinquent
behaviour.
There
is a number of options applicable in specific cases. Some cases shall be
dismissed, and some shall be subjected to criminal sanctions. Non-pursuance of
criminal proceedings in some cases does not necessarily entail disinterest in
the future conduct of a convict. In Serbia there are many medical, social and
other services which take a pro-active stance in such cases. However, it bears
stressing that the absence of a comprehensive strategy makes those services
uncoordinated, fragmented and even ineffective in resolution of juvenile
delinquents problems.
There
is another form of social responses to juvenile delinquency: criminal sanctions
for juveniles (8 disciplinary measures, punishment in the shape of juvenile
prison and security measures). Interventions depend on the assessed needs for
treatment and level of peril posed by conduct of juveniles.
In
order to show the basic trends of juvenile delinquency phenomenon and social
reactions to them, we shall present unfortunately only the data on juvenile
delinquency in the 1990-1991 period, and data on the most important indicators
for the 1990-91 period for Central Serbia without Kosovo.
One
of the key indicators of the social and judicial responses to the juvenile
delinquency and social responses to it is a ratio between registered, accused
and convicted juvenile delinquents.
Table 1. Number of registered, accused and
convicted juvenile delinquents
|
year
|
registered
|
accused
|
convicted
|
|
No.
|
index
|
No.
|
index
|
No.
|
index
|
|
1990
|
3630
|
100
|
2497
|
100
|
1828
|
100
|
|
1991
|
3163
|
87
|
1818
|
73
|
1347
|
74
|
|
1992
|
3632
|
100
|
2525
|
101
|
1801
|
98
|
|
1993
|
4743
|
131
|
2871
|
115
|
2118
|
116
|
|
1994
|
3740
|
103
|
3341
|
134
|
2228
|
122
|
|
1995
|
3173
|
87
|
3416
|
137
|
1961
|
107
|
|
1996
|
3210
|
88
|
2789
|
112
|
1353
|
74
|
|
1997
|
3137
|
86
|
2432
|
97
|
1264
|
69
|
|
1998
|
2677
|
74
|
2589
|
104
|
1725
|
94
|
|
1999
|
1942
|
53
|
2211
|
88
|
1518
|
83
|
We
shall first try to describe general trends. In the post-1991 there was a
decrease in the number of registered, accused and convicted juvenile
delinquents. In 1993 the number of registered delinquents increased as did the
number of accused and convicted in 1994 and 1995. From 1994 the number of
registered delinquents steadily fell, and in 1999 it was by 50% index points
lower than in 1990. Number of accused and convicted delinquents kept decreasing
since 1996 (12 or even 17% index points lower than in 1990). By and large,
judging by the official statistical data, juvenile delinquency has steadily
decreased since l990.
Interesting
data are related to the ratio between the number of registered, accused and
convicted juveniles. In the analysed period of the total number of registered
delinquents 80% were on average accused and 52% convicted. This means that half
of registered juveniles were in one way or another criminally sanctioned, while
the other half were considered candidates for some interventions outside the
criminal law system.
It
is also worth noting that every year criminal sanctions were meted out to over
1,700 juvenile delinquents.
Our
criminal legislation foresees a total of 8 disciplinary measures divided in
three groups: disciplinary measures (reprimand and admission to a disciplinary
centre for juveniles), strengthened surveillance measures (by parents or
custodians, foster families and social institutions) and institutional measures
(admission to juvenile remand centres or correctional facilities). Juveniles
who have committed criminal offences may be also sentenced to juvenile prison
or punished by security measures.
Table 2. Structure of criminal sanctions meted out
to juveniles in the territory of Central Serbia in
1990-1999 period
|
year
|
total
|
disciplinary
measures
|
reinforced
surveillance measures
|
institutional
measures
|
juvenile
prison measures
|
security
measures
|
|
No.
|
%
|
No.
|
%
|
No.
|
%
|
No.
|
%
|
No.
|
%
|
|
'90
|
1828
|
751
|
41,22
|
983
|
53,95
|
88
|
4,83
|
6
|
0,33
|
1
|
0,05
|
|
'91
|
1347
|
490
|
36,43
|
809
|
60,15
|
46
|
3,42
|
2
|
0,15
|
3
|
0,22
|
|
'92
|
1801
|
606
|
33,97
|
1066
|
59,75
|
112
|
6,28
|
17
|
0,94
|
28
|
1,55
|
|
'93
|
2118
|
706
|
33,54
|
1306
|
62,04
|
93
|
4,42
|
13
|
0,61
|
9
|
0,42
|
|
'94
|
2228
|
718
|
32,41
|
1413
|
63,79
|
84
|
3,79
|
13
|
0,58
|
26
|
1,17
|
|
'95
|
1961
|
581
|
29,86
|
1283
|
65,93
|
82
|
4,21
|
15
|
0,76
|
18
|
0,92
|
|
'96
|
1353
|
530
|
39,82
|
742
|
55,75
|
59
|
4,43
|
22
|
1,63
|
22
|
1,63
|
|
'97
|
1264
|
506
|
40,45
|
694
|
55,48
|
51
|
4,08
|
13
|
1,03
|
15
|
1,19
|
|
'98
|
1725
|
622
|
36,57
|
1034
|
60,79
|
45
|
2,64
|
24
|
1,39
|
13
|
0,75
|
|
'99
|
1518
|
586
|
39,54
|
835
|
56,34
|
61
|
4,12
|
36
|
2,37
|
15
|
0,99
|
Share of meted out disciplinary measures is
very large (36%). When compared to the results of earlier research in recent
years there was a considerable increase in determination of disciplinary
measures with respect to the 60's and 70's. Stakic says that in Serbia, in the
1960-1976 period pronouncement of disciplinary measures increased by 19.3%.
It bears saying that the quoted data reflect mostly reprimand measures, due to
non-existence of disciplinary centres.
In
the 1960-196 period measures of strengthened surveillance were meted out in
61.6% cases (in the 90's in 59.40% cases). Measure of strengthened surveillance
by parents or custodians was meted out in 60% of cases, while surveillance by
social centres was meted out in 40% of cases.
In
the 90's the share of institutional measures was 4%. In the 1960-1976 period
that share was 19.1%. That measure covers admission to a correctional facility,
for special institutions for juvenile delinquents don't exist.
Share
of juvenile prison sentence was about 1% in the 90's. But in 1999 that measure
was seven times more often delivered than in 1990. According to Stakic in the
60's that share was 5%, while in 1989 it fell to 1-2%.
The
following security measures may be also delivered: mandatory psychiatric
treatment, and hospitalisation, mandatory out-patient treatment, mandatory
treatment of substance abusers and alcoholics, ban on driving, seizure of
personal belongings and expulsion of foreigners. Share of security measures in
the total number of sanctions was on average 1%.
In
summing up the structure of criminal sanctions meted out to juveniles, we may
say that of 8 legally prescribed educational measures only 5 are enforced:
reprimand, strengthened surveillance by castodians ad parents, strengthened
surveillance by social institutions, admission to correctional facility, and
admission to juvenile educational centres. Other measures are not put in place
due lack of conditions for their enforcement. A
lesser number of sentences envisaging stay in juvenile prisons and security
measures are also meted out.
Ministry
for Social Protection supervises the work of centres for social labour and
educational/correctional facilities, while the Justice Ministry is in charge of
operations of juvenile remand centres and juvenile prisons.
In
the territory of Central Serbia in each large municipality there is a centre
for social work which employs teams tasked with strengthened surveillance of
delinquents and enforcement of juvenile delinquents-related criminal sanctions.
But the general crisis of social protection system has affected the work of
those teams. Most marked problems are: under-staffing, poor work conditions,
under-funding, shortage of equipment and material, long and frequent strikes.
Reception
centre in Belgrade operates as a special unit within the Institute for
Education of Children and the Young "Beograd", but their activities
often collide. The building which housed that centre has been renovated, but
other services have been moved there. Reception centre deals with temporary
reception, observation and classification of juvenile delinquents, and they are
supposed to stay there temporarily during the diagnostics regime. But due to
non-existence of special purpose institutions, juvenile delinquents often stay
in the centre several years.
In
Serbia there are 3 educational/correctional centres, in Belgrade, Nis and
Knjazevac.
Institute
for Education of Children and the Young "Beograd" has been founded in
1954 as a social protection institute for 10-16 years old educationally
retarded children. A four-grade primary school started operating immediately
within the Institute, and in the late 1955 the school for industrial activities
was launched (its work was suspended in 1955). Initially 120 children divided
into 11 educational groups were accommodated in that institute. Several years
ago the Institute moved to a new building in the Belgrade suburb of Vozdovac.
Currently it takes care of 50-60 youngsters. A special primary and secondary
school "Vasa Stajic" operates within the Institute.
Institute
for Education of Youngsters in Knjazevac was founded in 1948. In 1945-47 period
it operated as a reception centre for war orphans. In 1979 the Institute moved
to the special-purpose compound (5,000 m2, in the vicinity of Knjazevac) with
11 housing units/buildings accommodating schools and educational groups. That
institute also has a primary school. It currently takes care of 60 very young
children.
Institution
for Educationally Retarded Youngsters and Over 15 Delinquents was founded in
Nis in 1961. That special-purpose compound consisting of three buildings
(delinquents accommodation building, educators accommodation centre and
management-administrative building,) is located in downtown Nis. Youngsters attend
Nis schools, notably Popular University (extraordinary night classes). About 50
youngsters are accommodated in the Institution, but another special purpose
building as of late has been converted into the refugee accommodation centre.
In
the 70's there were 7 such institutions, in Belgrade, Nis, Knjazevac, Novi Sad,
Negotin, Zrenjanin and Sremska Mitrovica. But in the past 30 years half of them
have been closed. That trend continues, as closure of Knjazevac centre is under
consideration.
The
only correctional facility in Serbia is the one in Krusevac. It was founded in
1947. It is located in an area of over 30 ha, and has 15 buildings. Part of
buildings are used by the Pristina University. That facility has currently 200
juvenile delinquents (of whom 10 are of female sex). Their age ranges from 14
to 23. The facility has a reception centre, woman department, open department,
semi-open department and closed department, and 2 schools.
The
only juvenile prison in Serbia is in Valjevo. It was founded in 1965. Since
1968 it has been only taking care of juvenile delinquents from Serbia and
Montenegro. In that prison there are 250 juvenile convicts of whom over 90% are
over 18.
Institutions
for Social Re-integration
of
Juvenile Delinquents
Basic characteristics
of convicts: Most of them come from lower
social-cultural classes, dysfunctional and broken homes. 40% are Romany. Most
of them have committed thefts and burglaries, but in recent years the number of
perpetrators of grave criminal offences, notably murders, is on the rise
(especially in correctional facility in Krusevac).
Most
wards are those with arrested development and various conduct disturbances
(22.49%, or every 4.5 juvenile) In Knjazevac their share is 37.93%, in Belgrade
and Nis, 25% and 27.66% respectively, and in Krusevac-22.49%. (See
Zunic-Pavlovic, Ilic, 2002).
By and large all those wards are eligible for being placed in special
institutions.
Living conditions: Most
institutions for re-integration are short of space, for some of their buildings
or premises are used for other purposes. Most of them are inadequately
designed. Despite partial adaptations and renovations, they are in a poor state
and provide for an inadequate accommodation (heating is bad, as is sanitation).
Manner of operation:
Newly-arrived wards are placed in the
reception centre for a 30-day period. That centres engages in observation of
wards, programming of their treatment, and adjustment of wards to the new
living conditions.
Diagnostic
work is also carried out in the reception centres, as the earlier data from
centres for social work are usually unusable and incomplete (they don't contain
information on physical and mental state of wards which have a bearing on
future treatment).
Observation
work is carried out by an expert team made up of a psychologist, pedagogue, and
social worker. They also take into account earlier conduct, gravity of offences
committed, current behaviour. That expert team submits a summarised report with
the plan and program of future treatment, assessment of necessary stay in the
institution, plan and program of education and vocational training. That report
is analysed and approved with rare modifications by the council of educators.
Wards are usually released after a successful implementation of individual
plans and programs.
After evaluation wards are classified in
educational groups (10-15 members each) according to the criteria of conduct
manifestations and consequences, and educational level, and not according to
the criteria of different treatments, or individual psychological
characteristics. Thus one educational group may wrongly include wards of
different age and different levels of conduct disturbances.
Education: The
focus of the treatment strategy is on education and vocational training.
Youngsters staying in re-integration institutions attend schools in broader
local community, schools within institutions' compounds, or special classes in
local communities or in institutions for re-integration. However such a
fragmented educational system makes more difficult transfer of knowledge,
exchange of experience and co-operation between institutions.
In
view of the contemporary trend of inclusive education of all persons with
special needs, existence of special primary and secondary schools in
institutions, and attendance of courses for elderly at the Popular Universities
is quite debatable.
Personnel
problem is salient in all schools. Teachers often lack expertise and skills for
dealing with wards.
Schools
are under-equipped (shortage of contemporary teaching aids is sorely felt) and
under-funded.
Counselling/psychotherapy:
Despite good ratio between wards and educators, the latter being mostly special
pedagogues, no group or individual, systematic or regular counselling is
carried out. In fact individual counselling is imparted only in case of
incidents or problems with wards, and the group one is not practised on grounds
of "danger of criminal infection"! There are no special programs for
certain categories of offenders (sexual, property, etc.)
Substance-abusers
make up 20% of total population of those institutions, while nearly 90% of
wards had some experiences of that kind. Not a single institution employs
special teams for work with that kind of wards.
Recreation:
Free time is not structured and no high-quality contents thereof are envisaged.
All institutions have sports grounds, but no indoor pools or gyms, though most
wards are in an age which requires much exercise. Sports are good for
channelling aggression, and familiarisation with co-operation and positive
competition.
All
institutions have libraries, but most of them have small number of books and
only old editions.
In
communal premises there are TVs and videos.
Institutions
don't have screening rooms and halls for artistic and other manifestations.
Artistic
workshops and sections are rare.
Institutions
rarely provide daily and week-end press.
Visits
to theatres or sports competitions with local schools are rarely organised.
Institutions
don't have computers let alone computer centres available to wards.
Religion: There
are no pastoral visits or religious services.
Contacts with
outside world: In general wards have the right to
unlimited receipt of letters and parcels, and to 1 weekly visit. They are
entitled to 15 day leaves, and week-end and holidays visits to families. But as
most of them come from broken homes or other social protection institutions,
they rarely exercise the aforementioned rights.
Educators
very rarely manage to realise a successful co-operation with families of wards.
Co-operation
with the competent centre for social work is also weak. Institution is
duty-bound to submit to courts every 6 months reports on enforcement of
punitive measures and judges of competent courts and representatives of social
work centres must make a mandatory visit to the institution every 6 months.
Co-operation
with the local community is weak and insufficient, in all areas (education,
work, recreation, sports, religious activities, arts and culture).
Personnel: All
educators have university degrees, but have not been trained for work with this
category of juveniles. Competitions for new educators are frequent, due to
frequent resignations on grounds of poor work conditions.
Post-institutional
reception: The weakest link in the entire
process of re-socialisation is the post-institutional reception of juveniles.
Even when co-operation is good with centres for social work, they can rarely
help former wards resolve their existential problems. This practically means,
that after release, wards with limited funds provided by the institution-must
fend for themselves. Their prospects are very bleak for they are jobless,
unable to rely on broader social and family ties/net, and without permanent
accommodation.
Conclusion:
The
above summary indicates that the system of social responses to juvenile
delinquency is in a profound crisis. All the concerned parties agree that
something should be urgently done in that respect, but measures taken so far
have not yielded good results. But concerns about the current state of
re-socialisation of delinquents, without a genuine insight into the causes of
recent failures, lessen the likelihood of finding genuine solutions. We hope
that imminent reforms are well-founded and based on good analysis of past mistakes.
Elections in 2002
Two
presidential elections were held in 2002. The first took place in
September-October period. First round of presidential elections was held on 29
September and the runoff on 13 October. As the turn-out in the runoff was under
50%, President of Serbia was not elected and under the Election Law in place
new elections should have been scheduled. The 50% census was scrapped under the
new amendment passed in November. However the second, 8 December presidential
elections failed too due to under 50% turnout in the first round. In the last
year local elections were held in some municipalities too.
Serbia
faces new presidential and probably parliamentary elections in 2003.
Presidential elections
September
elections have clearly delineated political scene in Serbia, and the new
balance of powers is likely to become fully manifest at parliamentary
elections. DOS coalition, whose common goal was ouster of Milosevic regime, in
the post-5 October period slowly fragmented because of
Đinđic-Kostunica conflict. In fact it split into three large
right-wing blocks including also several opposition parties (Socialist Party of
Serbia, Serb Radical Party, and Socialist Alliance of Yugoslavia): Miroljub
Labus heads the centre right block, Vojislav Kostunica the block of
conservative nationalists and Vojislav Kostunica the block of the far-right
parties.
Due
to DOS's failure to effect lustration and a clean break with the Milosevic era
political legacy, the routed forces managed to stage their political comeback
and regian confidence of their voters. Thus Vojislav Šešelj, President of
Radical Party won 22% of votes (one fifth of electorate). He has scored similar
results at nearly all elections, barring the ones held in 2000. Šešelj's victory
was boosted by Milosevic's open support. Candidates of Socialist Party of
Serbia (which in the meantime split into three fractions) got a small number of
votes. During the presidential race no-one pointed out that one of the
contenders, that is Šešelj, faced the Hague Tribunal indictment. The
aforementioned indicated that war crimes still were not tackled properly, or
that the old policy was still pursued. Not a single contender ran on the ticket
of regionalisation and decentralisation (which are key points of demands for
new republican Constitution). Kostunica's and Labus campaigns received most
media coverage. Polls also favoured the two aforementioned contenders. Thus
Šešelj's strong showing was the biggest surprise of both elections.
Vojislav
Kostunica's Ticket
During
his campaign Kostunica clearly manifested his adherence to the old policy, that
is, "keeping Montenegro within the joint state, unification with Republika
Srpska and maintenance of status quo in Kosovo." In those terms most
indicative was his statement (at a rally) that "Republika Srpska is part
of the family…temporarily separated from Serbia." As regards Kosovo
Kostunica tried to get across the following message: "We should not
accelerate the settlement of Kosovo's final status…our struggle for Kosovo must
continue and it shall be long…"
During the presidential race Kostunica insisted on multi-ethnicity, but his
words that "Labus won support of Hungarians and Bosniaks" implied a
different position on minorities. High official of Democratic Party of Serbia
Zoran Sami
confirmed that "DPS candidate did not fare well in places inhabited by
ethnicities" and stated "Labus made it to the run-off primarily
thanks to votes of Vojvodina Hungarians and Sandžak Bosniaks". Kostunica
extolled his success of "preserving the common state of Serbia and
Montenegro." According to Kostunica "Belgrade and Podgorica hampered
preservation of the common state." He garnered support even of his
parliamentary opponents, when Đinđic stripped DPS MPs of their
mandates. His campaign way by and large "anti-Government" on grounds
of "ties between Serb governments and mafia." In his vocal attacks he
mostly targeted Prime Minister Đinđic and Finance Minister Bozidar
Đelic, for "they failed in their collection of extra-profit tax…or
rather took some kickbacks from those supposed to pay that legally prescribed
tax." He even vilified some members of government on grounds of their dual
citizenship: "Experts from backwater places like Bolivia."
Miroljub
Labus Campaign
In
his campaign Labus focused on reforms and economic issues, and criticised
Kostunica's anti-reform position. He pointed at Kostunica's hypocrisy:
"Before the international community Kostunica assessed reforms as
positive, while at home he said that Serbia turned into the Balkans
Columbia." Labus also ran on pro-European ticket: "By 2007 our
country may become an EU candidate." According to Labus: "the gist of
reforms is continuation of privatisation and profitable sales, the money from
which could lead to creation of new jobs. All this could ensure Serbia's
leading position in the Balkans."
His stance on Montenegro was flexible: "I have failed to convince
Montenegrins that we have a strong federation, and having a strong federation
is better than the state disintegration." Labus thus commented Kostunica's
remark on Republika Srpska: "Such statements are made by individuals who
take their people to woods and not to modernity. I am a man who would like to
take my people to Europe. for I am an anti-border man." He added, "In
2004 Serbia and B&H shall trade without any customs barriers."
Other
Candidates
Vojislav Šešelj
gave the impression of the most articulate and precise candidate. His priority
was anti-crime campaign and "rooting out mafia in Serbia". He stated,
"Mafia rules Serbia and all gangland leaders are friends of Prime Minister
of Serbia Zoran Đinđic."
He assessed Milosevic's backing as "invaluable" and stated "I
shall never renounce the idea of a common Serb state….that objective may be
attained peacefully, at negotiating table."
Other
candidates only took away votes which would have otherwise gone to the two key
contenders. Velimir Ilic, at the
very outset of campaign took a pro-Kostunica position. Hence his campaign was
stridently anti-Labus for "he is the favourite contender of national minorities
in South Serbia and Sandžak. The candidate preferred by Riza Halimi or Sulejman
Ugljanin is not a good candidate for Serbia. Only the majority people have to
right to chose their president." Ilic was against the concept of civil
state, hence his assertion that "Svilanovic cannot pursue the civil kind
foreign policy…such a policy does not hold water in Serbia."
Nebojsa Pavkovic's
candidacy was a last-ditch attempt at taking away pro-Kostunica ballots. In his
speeches Pavkovic promised suspension of military service and
professionalisation of army. He counted upon support of co-fighters "who
together with me put up resistance to NATO aggression against Yugoslavia."
Vuk Draskovic is
the longest running presidential contender. But it became evident that his
discourse and image symbolised the past era (but he is yet to accept that
fact.).After a decade-long vacillation between the far-right nationalism and
civil options, this time round he opted anew for extreme nationalism. He
continued his demonisation of Serb Prime Minister Zoran Đinđic.
Borislav Pelevic and
Vuk Obradovic ran on the ticket of glaring social and
economic problems affecting population at large, but their discourse was not as
convincing as Kostunica's. Branislav
Ivkovic and Velimir Bata
Zivojinovic, the two candidates of the fragmented Socialist Party of
Serbia, did not fare very well (it is indicative that Slobodan Milosevic did
not render his support to any of them).
Reformers of
Vojvodina backed Kostunica for "he was the
most likely candidate to press ahead with adoption of the new
Constitution…defining the constitutional position and contents of autonomy of
Vojvodina." Dragoljub Micunovic of
Democratic Centre and Nebojsa Covic of
Democratic Alternative in explaining
their support to Kostunica, stressed that "his victory would be a boost to
the necessary balance of political power and corruption-curbing campaign, as
well as to the efforts to preserve a common state and to establish the rule of
law." Other DOS members backed Miroljub Labus as did, in a discreet way, Sandžak-based
Party of Democratic Action.
During the run-off neither Kostunica nor Labus
offered anything new to voters. Šešelj called on his voters to abstain from
voting for "the electoral boycott is a legitimate means of political
struggle." Vuk Obradovic encouraged his voters to back Kostunica, while
other contenders refrained from any such support-related recommendation. Prime
Minister Đinđic on several occasions called on voters to go to the
polls and vote for Labus, but his covert message was in fact-stay home!
Results
of Presidential Elections
Held
on 29 September and 13 October
According
to results of the Republican Electoral Commission (REC) of 6.553,042 registered
voters, the turn-out was 55.50% or 3.637,062 voters. In first round Vojislav Kostunica
got 1.123, 420 votes, Miroljub Labus 995,200, Vojislav Šešelj 845,308, Vuk
Draskovic 139,047, while 74.534 ballots were declared invalid. As no candidate
got the necessary majority (50% plus 1 vote), the run-off was held on 13
October. In the run-off Kostunica got 1.991,947 votes, and Labus-921,094.
Turnout in the run-off was 45.46% or 2. 979,524 voters.
Regularity
of Elections (Voting Lists and
the
Real Number of Voters)
After
elections Democratic Party of Serbia accused the authorities of electoral
rigging, and maintained that Kostunica was in fact elected the new President of
Serbia. DPS ranted that "there was no central electoral list, and that the
figure of 6.553,042 voters was doctored". According to DPS that figure
should have stood at 5.950,000, which in turn implied that in the run-off the
turnout was above 50% of electorate. DPS appealed to the REC, accused the
republican authorities and competent ministries of that oversight, and
announced street protests in case of REC's dismissal of DPS appeal.
CESID
stated that "the voters' list was incomplete, but DPS must have been aware
of that fact when the elections were called. However they decided to take part
in the elections under conditions clearly indicating the absence of the central
voters' list".
Prime Minister Đinđic stated that "voters' lists
are within competence of municipalities which are run by DOS."
Hence the attempts to accuse government or REC of irregularities is not
grounded in facts."
REC
dismissed DPS appeal and the Supreme Court of Serbia confirmed the official
results of election, that is, called for their repeat. Supreme Court of
Serbia's justification reads: "DPS has unfoundedly accused REC of poor
management of electoral lists. We confirm that management and updating of
electoral lists is exclusively within competence of municipal administrative
bodies. Copies of said lists were forwarded to REC 15 days prior to
commencement of elections, and the originals were available to all presidential
contenders at all municipal polling stations."
According
to OSCE "elections were by and large regular, in keeping with
international standards." But it also remarked in its communique
"election legislation is still rife with shortcomings inherited from the
Milosevic era." It was also noted that "much progress was made with
respect to previous elections" and "democratisation is under
way." That remark is partly accurate, but Helsinki Committee thinks that
those elections were also an expression of principled resistance to reforms and
transition and of pursuance of the much-defeated idea of the national
project." All contenders advocated ideas of modern state, but their
campaigns were bereft of principles thereof.
December presidential elections
Election
Campaign
Interest
in the presidential function was obviously on the wane, for only Kostunica,
Šešelj and Pelevic put up their candidacies anew. In view of such a
constellation of powers it was pretty obvious that Kostunica was headed for an
outright victory. Therefore in his campaign he tried to encourage voters to go
to the polls. On the other hand the success of elections was uncertain, for 50%
census plus one voter rule was still in place.
In
the meantime Labus abandoned Democratic Party for turning its back on him. By
this move he tried to convince voters that he was not sufficiently backed by
DOS and Democratic Party in the first round and that they in fact coveted the
failure of elections. His opinion by and large corresponded to reality, for
that non-support was in fact DP's tactical move prompted by awareness of slim
chances of Labus to score a victory. On the other DP accused Labus that the
underlying goal of his campaign was promotion of G17 Plus, that is, of its
morphing into a political party.
Đinđic's
conditioned his backing to Kostunica by demanding a reciprocal move, but
Kostunica refused that "assistance" by saying "I don't need
support of DP loyalists." Thus Kostunica was backed once again by
Democratic Centre (Micunovic), Democratic Alternative (Covic), Reformers (Isakov),
New Serbia (Velja Ilic), Social Democracy (Vuk Obradovic) and other
non-parliamentary and new parties
notably: Civil Alliance of Serbia (Svilanovic), Social Democratic Party.
Orlic was pro-Kostunica, while Korac had his
reservations), Serb Resistance Movement (Trajkovic), Sandžak Democratic Party
(Ljajic), G17 Plus. New Democracy shilly-shallied in this regard. Kostunica was
openly backed by the two leading trade unions: Alliance of Independent Trade
Unions of Serbia and "Nezavisnost". A group of prominent, non-party,
public figures (artists, athletes, rock musicians) also launched a pro-voting
appeal, as did some academicians and Prince Aleksandar Karađorđevic.
The Church and Patriarch Pavle repeatedly warned of "the gravity of situation"
and significance of election of a new President. OSCE conducted voter-animation
campaign while EU, Council of Europe and other international dignitaries
reiterated the importance of elections.
In
his campaign Kostunica failed to project the image of an energetic contender
and did not offer new ideas. As he was fully aware of his good chances for
scoring an outright victory he launched a virulent anti-Đinđic
campaign.
Šešelj
did not encourage his voters to go to the polls. Aware of his slim chances, he
engaged in smear-campaign against Đinđic, Kostunica and Covic
(alleging their connections with mafia). Targets of his criticism
were often victims of the recent wars. His pre-election spots also included
coverage of meetings between Radovan Karadžic and Radical Party paramilitary
forces.
Campaign
of Borislav Pelevic did not receive much media coverage.
Results
of 8 December Presidential Elections
According
to the REC 45.17% of registered voters cast their ballots, and due to such a
low turnout, elections were declared invalid in the first round. Kostunica won
57.77% or 1.699,098 votes, Vojislav Šešelj won 1.063,296 votes or 36.08%, and
Branislav Pelevic 3.53% or 103,926 votes. 2.73% of ballots were declared
invalid.
Regularity
of Elections
DPS
refused to recognise final election results, for in its opinion "In Serbia
there are less than 6 million voters. 415,715 were wrongly registered, and
112,000 were twice registered. ID numbers of a large number of voters have not
been entered (in one municipality of over 3,000 voters). DPS representatives
also stated that they were banned from accessing a compact disc with voters
lists, and "the Republican Electoral Commission, contrary to law, burned
down many ballots from September elections." DPS twice appealed against the
REC decision, but both times the Supreme Court of Serbia dismissed those
appeals. Finally DPS submitted 12,000 pages of evidence to the Supreme Court of
Serbia and in its appeal maintained that " the accurate number of
registered voters is 5.690,207, that is, 835,553 voters were not properly
registered. In line with the foregoing, turnout was -51.8%. " When that
appeal was dismissed too, DPS stated that it would respect the Supreme Court's
decision.
Kostunica
accused the government, agencies for public opinion polls, CESID and
independent analysts of those irregularities. According to him "their
predictions of most likely failure of elections directly discouraged voters to
go to the polls."
According
to OSCE "Serbia proved that it was capable of organising elections in
keeping with international principles" and "DPS' complaints about
irregularities were tardy."
Helsinki
Committee takes the stand that both rounds of presidential elections had been
organised in line with democratic principles. Hence they may be fully
considered fair and regular. All contenders were accorded the same media
treatment (obviously in line with their financial status and political power).
During the voting process there were perhaps minor oversights, but they did not
have a major impact on the final results. By the way minor oversights also
happen in countries with long election tradition. As regards DPS complaints, we
share the opinion of the Supreme Court of Serbia
(see previous paragraph Regularity of elections-Electoral Lists and Genuine
Number of Voters). We would like to remind the public that most municipalities
are run by DPS and other DOS members. Therefore the perceived irregularities
resulted from disinterest and sloth of the ruling parties local officials. As
the DPS contender ran for president twice, its members had enough time to check
the lists and if necessary to update them.
Parliamentary
Election of President
Most
vocal advocates of this idea are the Christian-Democratic Party of Serbia and
Democratic Party, as well as several parties from the current DOS. According to
Vladan Batic "We should first institutionalise the state, pass the new
Constitution, and introduce the system in which parliament elects
president."
Arguments which favour that option indicate that it is time-saving,
money-saving, provides for protection of voters from indecent conduct and
smear-campaigns by many contenders during electoral race, reduces influence of
charismatic, untouchable leaders with sweeping presidential powers. DPS, is against
that idea, although its candidate won presidential elections twice. Media polls
indicate that the majority of citizens want to elect president directly, at
regular elections, but are not ready to turn out in sufficient numbers.
Acting
President of Serbia
Nataša
Mičic, president of Serb Parliament and member of the Civil Alliance of
Serbia took on the post of the Acting President of Serbia on 30 December 2002.
She is the first woman in Serbia to occupy this highest state office. She
announced that on 6 March 2003 she would decide on the date of the new
presidential elections.
Reasons
behind the failed elections are many: the split in DOS resulting in double
smear- campaign (top contenders accused each other of connections with
gangland, shady deals, misuses of power, etc); vague programs of contenders,
(some of them tackled the issues outside the competence of President of
Serbia), non-existence of the left, or centre left; absence of Democratic Party
candidate at December elections; popular discontent with results achieved so
far and citizens' lack of credence that elections could improve situation in
the judiciary, police, education, social sphere; preoccupation of citizens with
their own, existential, day-to-day problems (the last reason is perhaps the most
important, and voters large abstinence should be also seen as a message to all
politicians in the Serb political arena that they should try harder to improve
life of population at large.)
Local elections
Emergency
local elections were held on 22 December 2002 in five Serb municipalities. They
were held under the new Act on Local Self-Rule stipulating direct elections of
municipal presidents/mayors. Elections were held in Leskovac, Despotovac,
Razanj, Ub and Barajevo. SNP candidate won in Despotovac, while the DPS
candidate became a major of Barajevo (one of Belgrade's suburban
municipalities). The run-off winner in Ub was a candidate of a group of
citizens "Zavicaj". Leskovac, the fifth largest municipality in
Serbia, did not get a new mayor even after the second round. The winner of
runoff elections in Razanj was a DOS candidate.
DOS
and DPS were not successful at local elections, for voters, disgruntled with
the work of their officials, turned again to former SPS cadres.
Act
on Popular Lawyer
(Ombudsman)
The
25 November 2002 session of the Serb Parliament Committee for Motions backed
the Bill on Ombudsman. The Bill stipulating power, elections and procedure of
Ombudsman should be shortly debated by Parliament. Thus in early 2003 Serbia
shall get it first Popular Lawyer and citizens disgruntled by administration
and public services work shall be able to appeal to him to help them right the
wrongs incurred in previous proceedings, or to investigate their complaints
against governments departments. That institute is known in legislation of West
European countries as Ombudsman, and it boasts a specially long
tradition in Scandinavian countries.
Reasons Behind the Adoption
of the Said Act
The
need for introduction of the institute of Popular Lawyer arose from the Pact
for Stability of South East Europe obligations of our country. Added to that
our country is also duty-bound to fine-tune our legislation with international
standards in the province of human rights and freedoms.
In
many democratic countries Ombudsman became one of the most efficient institutes
for extra-judicial control of administration and protection of human rights. It
reflects the need of individuals to efficiently protect themselves from misuses
of officialdom, and contributes to striking a fine balance between the
executive and legislative power. Ombudsman also represents a possibility for an
equitable treatment of citizens before the law. Its role is to help individuals
protect their rights and to protect them from injustice incurred by the
exercise of discretionary rights of administration whenever an administrative
act is resembling a law, and hence is not disputable before the court of law.
To put it briefly, Ombudsman is an instrument for protection of civil rights
from the poor work of administration. Ombudsman should help strengthen the rule
of law and democratic processes.
Explanation of Some
Provisions
Introductory Provisions
Key
role of Popular Lawyer is to control law-enforcement by state bodies, notable
management and administrative bodies and public services in the name of
parliament and thus protect human rights. Pursuant to the above, Article 1 of
the Act, establishes the institute of Popular Lawyer as a an independent body
for protection of human rights and freedoms and determines the circle of
subjects whose work shall be controlled by Ombudsman. Popular Lawyer cannot
control the work of legislative bodies, as it is established to exert control
over work of other non-parliamentary bodies by parliament proper. Exempted from
Ombudsman control are also courts of law, notably in view of the constitutional
principle of judiciary independence.
Article
2 spells out: "anyone who deems that his or her right has been violated by
an administrative body procedure may appeal to Ombudsman." Hence the
existence of personal interest is a necessary condition for turning to Popular
Lawyer.
In
keeping with Article 1, "Popular Lawyer is an independent body",
Article 3 lays down that "in his work he must adhere to the letter of constitution,
laws and certified international pacts and treaties…no-one has the right to
influence his procedure and decisions."
Competence and Powers
Popular
lawyer controls enforcement of laws and other provisions by
management/administrative bodies. But his control duties go beyond legal
control and investigation of legality of management/administrative work, for
they encompass full control of efficiency and purposefulness (article 5).
Therefore Ombudsman deals with both infringed rights resulting from wrong law
enforcement and violations or breaches of rights incurred by inadequate and
non-purposeful enforcement of provisions or by inefficient work. By and large
his role is to protect individuals from bad administrative work. Ombudsman is
not entitled to take decisions relating to quality of any administrative
matter, or to repeal administrative acts. At the most he can give
recommendation as to removal of infringement and criticise the oversights and
errors. He can also institute disciplinary, misdemeanour and criminal
proceedings against administrative employees and officials and also proceedings
for their dismissal (Article 6)
He
is authorised to institute proceedings before the Constitutional Court and
those relating to adoption or amendments to the laws and provisions in force.
Ombudsman's opinion must be obtained in the process of adoption of laws and
provisions relating to protection of human rights and freedoms. He is empowered
to submit amendments to Bills and to take part in parliamentary sessions
(Article 7).
He
has access to all data available to administrative bodies. He also has access
to all administrative bodies premises. Ombudsman is authorised to effect
control over institutions for law-enforcement measures (prisons) and to have
private interviews with those deprived of liberty (Articles 8-9). Top
power-holders are duty-bound to receive him whenever he so requires within the
legally prescribed timeframe. (Article 10).
Procedure
Popular
Lawyer has the right to act upon his own initiative or on received complaints.
Procedure was stripped of unnecessary formalities and excessive costs, which
made the institute of Ombudsman more accessible to citizens. . But the
institute's position within the system imposed some conditions for the right to
address Ombudsman. Proceeding before Popular Lawyer are instituted only when
all other legal remedies for removal of breach have been exhausted or when they
are not stipulated under the law. Hence Ombudsman's intervention is subsidiary
and is not a proxy for the existing institutes and protection mechanisms. In
exceptional cases he can institute proceedings before all other remedies have
been exhausted, notably if he assesses that a complainant could sustain major
damage. Deadline for submitting a complaint is at the latest one year from the
commission of breach or passing of the last decision on the disputed matter.
(Articles 11-14)
Ombudsman
shall dismiss a complaint which does not meet conditions for
proceedings-institution, and duly notify the complainant of the foregoing, and
of other possibilities for the protection of his right. (Article 15). If the
complaint is not dismissed, Ombudsman starts the procedure of establishment of
facts. During that procedure he may ask administrative bodies to forward him
all the necessary data. Upon establishing that there were no violations of
rights or other irregularities in the work of administrative bodies, Ombudsman
notifies of the foregoing both the complainant and administrative body which
had been subjected to investigation. But if Ombudsman establishes that certain
breaches or certain irregularities in the work of administrative bodies, have
not affected individual rights, he writes down his opinion and recommendation
for future procedure to be pursued by administrative bodies. 15 days after the
receipt of that opinion, administrative body is duty-bound to notify Ombudsman
on measures taken in line with his recommendation. If administrative body fails
to do either, Ombudsman notifies of those failures a monitoring body. But if
that last warning fails to elicit a good response by administrative body, then
Ombudsman may notify the public of the whole matter. (Article 20)
Once
a year Ombudsman submits a report to Parliament on the status of human rights
in the Republic, and he may also submit a special report if situation so
requires. Report is published by the "Official Gazette of the Republic of
Serbia" and by print media. (Article 22 and 23). The public play an
important role in the functioning of Ombudsman institute. Since he is not
empowered to pass legally binding decisions, he ensures his public influence by
publication of his recommendations.
Election and Dismissal
Ombudsman
is elected by the two-third parliamentary majority for a five-year term of
office, at the proposal of parliamentary Committee for Justice and
Administration. Limited mandate
should pre-empt political influences on that institute, and subjugation thereof
to private interests and other negative phenomena. By rule in the comparative
legal solutions that mandate lasts longer than the one of MPs. This makes the
election of that institute less dependant on the parliamentary political will.
Ombudsman is eligible for another term of office. He is relieved of his duties
by parliament, at the proposal of one third of MPs. Reasons for dismissal are
determined by the competent parliamentary commission.
Ombudsman
has maximum 5 deputies. They are elected for a five-year term of office by
parliament at Ombudsman's proposal. Powers of deputies are equal to those of
Ombudsman and their duties are determined by Ombudsman. (Articles 25 and 26)
Ombudsman
and his deputies are not allowed to discharge any other public function, or
professional activity or to be members of political organisations and trade
unions. (Article 29).
Expert Services
Popular
lawyer sets up expert services tasked with performing administrative and
technical jobs. Those services are headed by a Secretary, appointed by
Ombudsman. Ombudsman takes decisions relating to employment and dismissal of
employees and passes an internal act on organisation of those services. Funds
for the work of Ombudsman are provided from the republican budget.
Conclusion
Initially
opinions were divided over the number of so-called specialised Ombudsmen. But finally
the law-maker opted for one Ombudsman for the whole Serbia. It is realistic to
expect that his office at the very outset of his work shall be swamped by
letters/complaints of citizens. Hence it shall be interesting to monitor his
work, in order to see how successfully he copes with quite a workload.
Status
of Non-governmental
Organisations
in Serbia
There are no changes in the area of registration of
NGOs and legislative framework for the work thereof. The Act on NGOs has not
been passed. NGOs are still registered as associations of citizens. Hence equal
registration conditions are applied to patriotic or kinologic organisations, on
the one hand and organisations dealing with the protection of human rights, on
the other hand. Bill on NGOs was drafted long time ago, but it is yet to be
debated by parliament. Procedure of registration of NGOs as association of
citizens is simple and cheap. Aside from formal, law-stipulated conditions, the
executive bodies don't have discretionary rights to limit the NGO activities.
We don't know the exact number of NGOs because of the aforementioned reasons,
or rather because a distinction cannot be drawn between registered NGOs (in the
narrow sense of the word) and associations of citizens (grassroot). But the fact is that the number of registered NGOs is
very large, and well above several thousand.
NGOs
face no obstacles in communication, association and co-operation with akin
organisations outside Serbia. The only obstacles are the visa regimes, poor
transport routes, etc.
Activists
of human rights organisations are not subjected to organised persecution by the
state bodies. On the contrary, the state endeavours to provide for an adequate
protection of NGOs. They are free to engage in their activities, and their
members and activists have not been arrested or detained on grounds of nature
of their activities. But NGO activists have been repeatedly targeted by both
some informal and registered associations and organisations. The clerical,
far-right organisation "Obraz" has used both verbal and physical
violence against NGOs. Moreover some incidents provoked by "Obraz"
and akin, violent and aggressive organisations have been encouraged and backed
by parties in power, opposition parties, church dignitaries and prominent
intellectuals.
Some
prominent organisations, including the Helsinki Committee, received threats by
phone, and on the walls of the building housing their premises derogatory
graffiti were written ("We don't want sects in Serbia", "Out
with Helsinki Committee"). Such incidents were frequently encouraged by
NGO smear campaigns launched by some media. Most of the smear campaigns were
highly intolerant, and even life-threatening. Hate speech directed against some
NGOs is still a favourite tool of some former Milosevic political cronies, but
some opposition and liberal politicians and their parties engage in it too.
Serb authorities and state bodies have taken a
double tack to co-operation and support to the third sector. The authorities
did not legally restrict NGO activities, on the contrary numerous meetings with
a view to enhancing co-operation between NGOs and authorities were organised.
But what is evident is the regime's division of NGOs into "good" and
"bad" ones, or those "which work in the interest of Serb
society" and those whose activities and underlying concepts have been
assessed as "counterproductive and harmful for the state." In fact
the criterion for that unofficial division is the NGOs position on authorities:
those critical of government work are deemed "less compatible or
suitable" than those sitting on the fence. The authorities don't hamper
activities of "incompatible" NGOs, but they try to minimise their
importance and to favour the loyal NGOs whose members often occupy high governmental
posts. By extension some "loyal" NGOs are subsided by the state. In
collusion with some "co-operative" NGOs the authorities floated the
thesis that "NGOs should primarily engage in those sectors and areas in
which their work could be more efficient than the one of governmental
organisations." It is in fact a blatant attempt to reduce NGOs work to
mere services of the governmental sector. The authorities are not willing to
recognise that one of key roles of NGOs, is the criticism of some negative social
phenomena for the sake of betterment of general social situation. In Serbia,
unlike in many democratic countries, the state-funding of NGOs is still
inconceivable.
The
reasons behind non-adoption of the NGO Act are not quite clear, but many
suspect that key one is the state's intention to keep a firm control over the
third sector in an "unregulated" milieu. Namely the budgetary
allocations for the non-governmental sector in 2003 amount to YUD 2 billion.
Any new act on NGOs would have to determine the criteria for distribution of
those -meagre funds. And in absence of any pertinent act the Serb government
may distribute the funds according to its "likes and dislikes" and
mostly to NGOs deemed most co-operative to date.
And
finally the authorities introduced a stricter regime of control of NGOs
financial operations, but failed to introduce tax relief measures for
individuals and organisations financially supporting the NGO work. Moreover the
government tried to put in place the Act on Donations stipulating that only
those organisations deemed to be working in the public interest be exempted
from taxes on donations. The foregoing amply demonstrates the persisting bias
of the authorities, or rather, their favouring of "compatible" NGOs.
In the face of the international pressure, the authorities backed down on the
idea of the Act on Donations. But the bitter fact remains that that they had
previously turned a deaf ear to all domestic NGOs protests against the proposed
Act.
PART 
FOUR
National Minorities
The
desire to normalize relations with the international community and to improve
the position of Serbia and Yugoslavia within it, the need to secure not only
foreign finance but also foreign political support for reforms, and the wish to
see Yugoslavia as a member of respectable associations, have made it imperative
for the new Serbian government to adopt a fresh attitude toward the national
minorities. The authorities have demonstrated their readiness to participate in
creating a new policy on national minorities above all by their efforts to
underline their break with the old regime. This need is quite understandable,
for whereas the old regime pushed the country into isolation and conflict, the
new one is eager to project itself as a respectable and co-operative member of
the international community. With this aim in view, the new authorities have
come to realize that the task of addressing the minority question has presented
them with the opportunity to put across two messages: the one, addressed to the
international community, is that the new elite is prepared to abide with
international standards; the other, addressed to the minorities themselves, is
that the attitude toward them is changing, that they are no longer considered a
public enemy but a partner and a valuable collaborator in building a different
and more tolerant society.
To be sure, Serbia’s minorities have had less and less cause for fear ever
since the October 5 change of government. For one thing, widespread repression
of minorities is a thing of the past though, of course, this does not mean that
all ethnically motivated violence has disappeared. The key question is whether
such violence as still obtains is sponsored by the state and its agencies or is
the doing of private individuals acting out of ethnic motives. Nationalism, a
force which exerted such a strong influence on developments in Serbia and on
the position of its minorities, is still in evidence because it has not been
defeated once and for all. Today it strives to accommodate itself to the new
situation, to consolidate, and to clothe itself in a liberal, democratic
rhetoric. What Serbia can offer Europe and its own minorities today is
precisely the normalization of the various nationalisms. These nationalisms,
above all that of the minority nation, are no longer as bloody, brutal and
violent as they were. Although Serb nationalism continues to be obsessed by its
pet subject of territory and borders, it has realized, under outside pressure,
that it does not do to harp upon such themes; therefore its fight for ethnic
borders has assumed the form of a struggle for the preservation of culture,
language and alphabet. In view of this, its preoccupation with the past,
manufacture of new moral paragons such as Nikolaj Velimirović,
reinterpretation of history, and rehabilitation of the Chetnik movement are not
unexpected and surprising. Nationalism has permeated every pore of society and
established itself as part of officially-promoted culture. For all their
occasional protestation of sovereignty, the nationalists are forced to make
continuous concessions and meet the conditions imposed on them by the
international community.
The
demand to co-operate with the Hague Tribunal is beyond doubt the most important
of the conditions being put to Serbia and Yugoslavia.
One might say that co-operation with the Hague Tribunal is a reality of
Serbia’s ‘new policy’ in general and therefore also of its policy toward
minorities, for the minorities cannot possibly be fully integrated if all who
have participated in crimes against their members are not extradited to the
Hague Tribunal. The readiness for full co-operation with The Hague is clearly
one of the elements which lend credibility to the new policy toward the minorities.
However, the contradictory statements being made regarding this co-operation
are rather confusing and raise doubts as to the real intentions and the
sincerity of the new elite. Other than co-operating with the Tribunal, the
country must fulfil other conditions before it becomes a member of the Council
of Europe, i.e. it must ratify the Charter of Regional and Minority Languages,
adopt a constitutional charter for the state community, reform its judiciary,
etc.
At
the beginning of the year the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was
presented with a major condition for being admitted to the Council of Europe
when, at the end of February, the Federal Assembly adopted a Law on the
Protection of Rights and Liberties of National Minorities. The adoption of the
Law drew a favourable response particularly from the international community:
for instance, in its letter to Minister Ljajić, the OSCE Mission hailed
the Law as ‘one of the most liberal and comprehensive in Europe’.
Domestic politicians were also full of praise: Tamas Korhec, the provincial
Secretary for National Minority Rights, declared that ‘the FRY could be said to
have the most advanced minority law in Europe’.
Nevertheless,
a number of objections have been raised about the Law above all by minority
representatives themselves. But before these objections are specified and the
substance of the Law explained, it is necessary to consider a very important
fact if only very briefly. This fact, which must not be overlooked, is that the
Federal Assembly passed the Law without a dissenting vote. How is one to
account for this sudden consensus of opinion between the otherwise discordant
factions of the political elite? Had the deputies become finally aware of the
importance of the minority question and its strong potential to undermine the
legitimacy of the authorities? Or was it perhaps that, in view of the facts
that the federal state would not survive the New Year and that its
administration wielded no real authority in some domains of importance for minorities,
the deputies pushed through a piece of legislation in the belief that it would
serve as mere window-dressing for the eyes of the Council of Europe?
Adhering
to either of the above possibilities would be too simple and partial. An
ethnically heterogeneous state clearly must attach considerable importance to
solving its minority question because problems in this sphere, if neglected,
tend to generate frustration and radicalize minority demands. Radicalization of
minority demands itself is a bad sign that a country lacks the political will
to address such problems, indicating a weakness of its democratic potential and
therefore impeding its integration into the international community and its
associations – in this case into the Council of Europe. While there is no doubt
that some members of the political elite are aware that solving the minority
problem is of great importance for the general democratization of the country,
one wonders how powerful and influential they are, in the present correlation
of forces, to translate the need for a new policy on minorities into a living,
valid concept.
The
new DOS government has pointed out repeatedly that although the passage of the
Law on the Protection of Rights and Liberties of National Minorities was a necessary
step, it alone was not sufficient for creating a new policy toward minorities.
Federal Minister Rasim Ljajić says that the new policy must entail
establishing new institutions, reforming the educational system and eliminating
from it everything which encourages discrimination, and transforming the
complete social climate.
The last consideration is very important in view of the pronounced ethnic
distance characterizing Serbian society. A public opinion poll commissioned by
the Federal Ministry of National Minorities found an extreme distance toward
minorities in 3.3 per cent of respondents, a pronounced distance in 28 per
cent, a moderate distance in 54.8 per cent, and none whatever in only 10.3 per
cent. Over 70 per cent of respondents in central Serbia, Belgrade and Vojvodina
believed that one should be on one’s guard with Albanians, 50 per cent with
Croats and Bosniaks, and 30 per cent with Roma. In the south of Serbia, for
instance, 73 per cent of Albanians and 61 per cent of Serbs exhibited ethnic
distance: 56 per cent and 43 per cent respectively did not think they could be
friends, and as many as 96 per cent and 95 per cent respectively would forbid
their children to intermarry.
Minister Ljajić found it particularly disturbing that people between the
ages of 20 and 29 should exhibit greater ethnic distance that those between the
ages of 50 and 57.
It
comes as no surprise that, in a society weighed down with considerable mistrust
and hatred of foreigners, certain politicians like Velimir Ilić should
seek to make political capital of such problems. Instead of striving to bridge
the distance and build confidence, they appeal to the prejudices of the most
conservative segment of society, insisting that the key posts in the state be
made the ethnic monopoly of members of the largest nation to which they belong.
‘Who on earth are [Miroljub] Labus, [Mlađan] Dinkić and little
[Božidar] Đelić, where do they come from? Who’s Kori Udovički to
land in a minister’s armchair right out of nowhere? I’m with Voja [Vojislav]
Koštunica because he’s a Serb and comes from Šumadija,’ Ilić, leader of
the New Serbia party, once said. ‘Since Serb national interests are at stake,
all the patriotic forces must rally under one, Serb banner...If we from the
patriotic bloc remain disunited, the Serb-haters alone stand to profit.’
Ilić accused the TV channel B92, whom he called traitors, of paying
attention ‘only to that Antichrist Labika [Miroljub Labus] and his Dinkić
and Đelić. The only thing that’s important to them are those
anti-Serb and sectarian organizations which...are tearing Serbia to pieces
under the bogus banner of a civil option.’
During a visit to Australia, Ilić went on to discredit people on the basis
of their ethnicity, attributing the allegedly poor performance of the Serbian
government to, among other things, the Croat origin of the Minister of Energy,
Goran Novaković, and the Muslim origin of the husband of the Mayor of
Belgrade, Radmila Hrustanović. Srđa Trifković, the former
secretary of the office of the Crown Prince Aleksandar
Karađorđević and another Serb nationalist who appears every bit
as vigilant as Ilić, is concerned about the ‘questionable loyalty of
Tito’s Croats Vatroslav Vekarić and Vladimir Vereš, high SMIP [Federal
Ministry of Foreign Affairs] officials, Ivo Visković, the Yugoslav
ambassador to Slovenia, Dejan Janča, the ambassador to Hungary, and
others.’
Although the liberally-minded public and politicians have strongly criticized
this intention to capitalize on prejudice and negative political sentiments, as
well as condemned the appearance of neo-Nazi symbols and messages,
the competent bodies, notably the prosecuting authorities, have unfortunately
failed to react appropriately. Punishment for hate speech still appears to be
frowned upon as an undemocratic measure and a relic of the Communist past
rather than endorsed as a something which must be strictly enforced if one is
to build a well-ordered society.
The failure of the state authorities to act appropriately was criticized by,
among others, the Society for Truth About the Anti-fascist National Liberation
Struggle, in connection with an incident during which copies of the dailies Danas and Politika were publicly torn up in the main square in
Čačak by members of the Ravna Gora Movement ‘Sloboda’ [Freedom]
commemorating an anniversary of the death of General Draža Mihajlović.
‘We’re
not against media freedom,’ members of the Movement said and justified their
gesture by alleging that ‘these newspapers say the vilest things about the Serb
traditions, religion and nation. They are anti-Serb newspapers imbued with hate
speech. Their hatred is directed in the first place against Bishop Nikolaj and
the Ravna Gora Movement of General Mihajlović.’ Another reason why the
newspaper copies were destroyed, according to Vladimir Stegnjajić, the
president of the District Board, was that Danas
and Politika wrote critically about
the Mayor of Čačak, Velimir Ilić. ‘We regard any malicious
article about him as an attack on Čačak,’ he said. Stegnjajić
described his appeal to the residents of Čačak to boycott Danas and Politika as ‘just a beginning’.
The sequel that came shortly afterwards bore witness to how rife right-wing
radicalism was in Čačak.
First
a panel discussion on anti-Semitism was disrupted by visitors who not only
opposed such a topic being discussed in Čačak but called Jews the
most corrupt and filthiest race on earth.
Another incident followed shortly when a member of the local extreme Right, who
objected to the staging of an exhibition of works by the American photographer
Ron Haviv under the title ‘Blood and Honey’, beat the exhibition organizer and
activist of the Civil Parliament of Serbia, Ivan Zlatić.
Similar
incidents occurred in other towns in which the exhibition was staged, notably
in Užice and Kragujevac, where supporters of Radovan Karadžić chanted
nationalistic slogans, insulted visitors and prevented the opening of the
exhibition. There were also incidents in Novi Sad where, according to Dnevnik, some twenty young members of
the Fatherland Movement ‘Obraz’ [Dignity] and the Serb National Movement
‘Svetozar Miletić’ were prevented by a strong police force comprising both
uniformed and plainclothes officers from disrupting the opening ceremony.
Before and during the opening of the exhibition, protesters distributed
leaflets stating ‘This exhibition is in the service of filthy anti-Serb
propaganda’ and scrawling various messages on the exhibition boards next to the
photographs such as ‘Suck them off, Ustashas!’, ‘Kill the balija [a derogatory
term for Muslim]!’, ‘Down with [Nenad] Čanak!’, ‘We are Serb children’,
‘The more of them are killed, the less work there is for us’, ‘What about Serb
churches and icons?’, ‘Death to the traitors!’, ‘Death to Čanak!’ and so
on. Next to a caption asking ‘How long should wars go on?’ someone wrote ‘Until
the minorities realize that the Serb people are the majority people in the Serb
state and that they do not want to become a minority’; also the board
displaying a photograph of Arkan bore the messages ‘May his memory live’ and
‘The Serb hero – we’re all Arkan’s’. The Novi Sad exhibition was opened by
Nenad Čanak, the president of the Vojvodina Assembly, and Slaviša
Grujić, editor of the TV channel Apollo. After the exhibition was declared
opened, Grujić was insulted by a group of protesters for ‘not being a true
Serb’ and for ‘having a Hungarian wife’.
Indicatively,
the New-York-based organization Human Rights Watch also found it necessary to react
to the activities of extreme nationalists and their efforts to disrupt the
exhibitions of Ron Haviv’s works. In the opinion of Elizabeth Anderson, HRW
executive director, the failure of the authorities to react to such abuse meant
that they tolerated it. The HRW attributed the problem to the government’s
refusal to get to grips with the issue of war crimes committed in the former
Yugoslavia.
Indeed, incidents accompanying the Haviv exhibition as it toured Serbia – in
Prokuplje, for instance, the difficulties of the organizers to find appropriate
premises amounted to an unofficial ban – bore evidence that every effort to
publicly debate and raise the question of responsibility for recent crimes was
not only resisted but came up against a campaign in support of people accused
of war crimes. In all large towns, for instance, the Serb Fatherland Movement
‘Obraz’ put up Radovan Karadžić’s portraits bearing the caption ‘Every
Serb is Radovan’.
After
the opening of the exhibition, the organizers
addressed a letter to the highest officials of the country – federal President
Vojislav Koštunica, Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić, Serbian
Justice Minister Vladan Batić, Serbian Public Prosecutor Siniša Simić
and RTS editor-in-chief and managing editor Bojana Lekić – in which they
informed them about the incident and posed the question: ‘Why do you keep
silent in the face of such nationalistic and chauvinistic outbursts? Why do you
ignore this problem, which obviously is not an isolated incident but a
well-considered, financed and organized campaign?’
The
revival of radical nationalism prompted a group of intellectuals at the end of
October to issue a ‘Letter of Warning to the Serbian Public’ in order to draw
attention to a number of disturbing developments. The authors warned against
the unjustifiable delay in confronting the evil and condemned in particular the
encouragement of a school of historical and historiographic revisionism, the
promotion of conservative organicistic thought, the rehabilitation of
collaborationists of the occupying forces, and the shift toward ‘a new
conformity...marked by the totalitarian and undemocratic ideology of Milan
Nedić and Dimitrije Ljotić and by the triumph of the provincial
philosophy of Nikolaj Velimirović.’
Addressed to the Serbian intellectual elite and public in general, the letter
elicited various response: some who do not even live in Serbia, i.e. Predrag
Matvejević and Mirko Kovač, agreed while others tried to refute the
allegations.
The Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC), which was specifically named in the letter,
dismissed all the arguments and accused the authors of having brutally attacked
the SPC and all its believers. The SPC Information Service stressed in a
statement that the authors had made absurd allegations, charged the SPC, the
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), the Army and political leaders
with conspiring against their own people, and accused the people of nationalism
and Nazism. The SPC also charged that these intellectuals were out to remodel
cultural values on themselves and those whom they consider as representing the
Serbian intellectual elite, rather than following the examples of St Sava, the
composer Stevan Mokranjac, the scientist Mihajlo Pupin, the rebel Hajduk
Veljko, the violinist Stefan Milenković and the basketball player Dejan
Bodiroga.
The SANU too published a statement in which it condemned the letter as a
pamphlet and denied any connection between itself with the ideologies of
Ljotić and Nedić. It also told the authors that it did not consider
them qualified to discuss the topics raised.
The
nine authors stressed that a change of the cultural model was a precondition of
all change, as in the spheres of politics and economy, so too in the sphere of
culture itself. Until such time as this model is transformed, they said, Serbia
will go on responding inadequately to the challenge of modernization, thus
condemning itself to backwardness, provincialism, nationalism and strife.
Federal
Minister for National Minorities Rasim Ljajić told a panel discussion in
Bački Petrovac that the trial of Slobodan Milošević before the Hague
Tribunal was partly to blame for the radicalization of the social climate in
Serbia because it had caused distrust, frustration and a distance in the
relations between the majority nation and the minorities. The grave economic
situation also fuelled nationalism by causing individuals to turn to
manipulated identity references as a way out of their present difficulties.
This trend became obvious following the entry into force in Hungary of the
Status Law, a law designed to protect Hungarians living in neighbouring
countries. The Status Law, adopted by the Hungarian Parliament,
seeks to preserve the national identity of Hungarians living in Slovenia, Croatia,
the FRY, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine, to slow down or halt their emigration,
and to promote their spiritual and political integration without a
rectification of frontiers. The Status Law provoked a stormy reaction abroad
and was resisted on three grounds: first, that it was extraterritorial in
character; second, that it was designed to differentiate between and
discriminate against citizens on the basis of their ethnicity; third, that its
implementation had been entrusted to a non-governmental organization instead,
as had been expected, to a government agency.
Unlike
the sharp reactions of the Slovak and Romanian governments, the response of the
Yugoslav authorities was one of utmost reserve. At the middle of the year,
media reported, without elaborating, that at a conference in Belgrade Federal
Foreign Minister Goran Svilanović had set out certain objections to the
Status Law. When asked explicitly by a number of non-governmental organizations
to declare its position on it, the federal government failed to respond.
Participants in a round table meeting in Novi Sad, organized by the local
office of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia to discuss its
implications of the Status Law after it had taken affect, found it inexcusable
that the citizens of this country should be better informed about the opinion
of Bratislava and Bucharest than about the position of their own government on
the issue. They complained that the government’s policy of ignoring
non-governmental organizations in this respect was incompatible with its
oft-repeated assurances of transparency,
and warned that such an attitude on the part of the government could hardly be
expected to offset the spread of anti-Hungarian sentiments. That anti-Hungarian
feelings were on the rise was testified to by, among other things, inquiries
made at the Helsinki Committee’s Novi Sad office, with callers seeking
information about the Status Law and asking questions such as ‘How long will
Serbs continue to be discriminated against in this country?’ and, considering
that the Status Law provides for certain benefits including the possibility of
temporary employment in Hungary, ‘What kind of democracy is this, given that
Hungarians can work in both Hungary and Serbia while there is no work for Serbs
even in Serbia itself?’ Of the six offices set up to deal with applications for
Hungarian documents, those in Bečej and Sombor received anonymous threats,
their employees being warned that bombs would be thrown into the premises
unless they stopped receiving applications.
The opening of the KMH office at Temerin was resisted by the local Radicals who
saw the move as a ploy to ‘wrest land from Serbs.’
A
similar concern about the future of the country was expressed by the anonymous
authors of a leaflet distributed in a part of New Belgrade, in which they
warned the residents against ‘the yellow peril’. Urging the residents to
‘boycott immigrants’, the authors insisted that ‘foreigners from Asia are
getting rich on our troubles’ and that no one may remain indifferent to ‘mixed
marriages between Chinese and Serbs being financially encouraged although there
are fewer than ten million of us and more than one billion of them’.
During the first four months of the year, an organization calling itself the
Patriotic Wing of Young Serb Skinheads circulated in Belgrade a proclamation
insisting that skinheads were ‘neither beer-guzzlers nor haters, but young
people who champion the interests of the healthy Serb community’. The
objectives of this ‘healthy’ segment of Serb youth, enumerated under the slogan
‘Serbia for Serbs’, include regeneration of the Serb family, survival of the
white race and restoration of its racial pride, and a crusade against the new
world order, drug addicts, homosexuals, the mixing of races and the deluge of
coloured people.
The nature of this struggle became clear when two Chinese shops were burned in Kragujevac
at the end of the year. The violent attitudes and undisguised racism in relation
to foreigners bear out the findings of the sociologist Srećko
Mihajlović presented at a round table on ethnocentrism. Mihajlović
drew attention to the fact that ‘hatred of foreigners is more common among
Serbs than fear of them. The attitude that all things foreign are dangerous and
suspicious, and that therefore one should have no close connections with
foreigners, is in evidence in nearly all research into the matter so far. For
instance, the assertion that foreign influence is dangerous for our culture is
shared by as many as half the citizens of Serbia...The height of absurdity is
the fact that one-quarter of the citizens look upon foreign investment as a
danger to our country.’
Nationalism,
hatred of foreigners, hate speech and ethnic violence were widely in evidence:
at the beginning of the year, a girl conversing with a friend in Hungarian was
slapped in the face in a bus in Novi Sad;
at the middle of March, a certain Momir Vujić, who had been harassing the
Gojak family of Petrovaradin for three years and threatening to ‘burn their
house because it resembles a mosque’, assaulted Aziz Gojak with an axe and hit
him in the face.
Prompted by such incidents, the Ministry for National Minorities decided to
devote efforts to promoting tolerance in society. As part of a well-advertised
campaign, the Ministry produced an attractive spot,
put up billboards and provided T-shirts and other promotion material.
Furthermore, brochures on tolerance were promoted at a number of panel
discussions of which the one in Novi Sad was addressed by quite competent
people. Nevertheless, one should not expect the campaign to produce spectacular
results especially because the target society rests on a political culture
which did and does not set much store by tolerance as a social value. According
to Županov, tolerance may produce beneficial, prophylactic and therapeutic
effects only within the framework of a non-authoritarian political culture,
whereas within an authoritarian culture its effects are practically nil. Admittedly,
people in the Ministry for National Minorities are also aware of this. At the
panel discussion in Bački Petrovac mentioned above, Minister Ljajić
said that constructing a legal foundation for advancing minority rights was the
easiest part of the job. ‘We may have the best laws, but unless we have
democratic institutions and change the social climate and culture, they will
remain a dead letter,’ he said.
The
foregoing relates above all to the Federal Law on the Protection of Rights and
Liberties of National Minorities adopted early in the year. The Law itself was
both criticized and commended. The arguments of its critics were as follows:
the debate on the draft was not broad enough; the Law itself is excessively
declarative; its lack of punitive provisions throws doubt on the determination
of the drafters to enforce what is nominally granted; the Law does not identify
the national minorities by name; the term ‘national minorities’ is not
appropriate and should be replaced by the term ‘minority nations’; the
implementation of the Law presupposes the adoption of the new Serbian
Constitution; the minimum requirement entitling a national minority in a basic
self-governed unit to the official use of its language and alphabet was set too
high at 15 per cent of the population; the exercise of fundamental human rights
must not be made conditional on the numeric strength of a minority; the state
must undertake the obligation to provide minority-language information as a
form of positive discrimination; the matter of cultural autonomy is entrusted
to the republics; literal application of the Law might be construed as
violation of the federal and republican constitutions and statute. Considering
that Montenegro does not implement federal provisions, doubts were also raised
as to the territory in which the Law would be implemented.
On
the other hand, the most favourable verdicts were pronounced by representatives
of minorities participating in the exercise of government at all levels, as
well as by those who either took part in the drafting of the final version of
the Law or those whose word carried the most weight during that stage.
Admittedly, some of the provisions deserve to be upheld and commended. This
applies above all to the provision granting equal status to national minorities
and ethnic communities; this means that the Roma community’s demand to be
elevated to a national minority has finally been met. Incidentally, the Roma
are the only minority the Law mentions by name; professing a disinclination to
arbitrate, the legislators missed this opportunity to specify the minorities to
which the Law applies. Another very important matter concerns the members of
those communities which were recognized as nations before the former state fell
apart but are now in the position of unrecognized minorities. The Croats, for
example, were granted the status of a national minority, but this immediately
caused an asymmetry of rights between the ‘new’ and ‘old’ minorities. A third
important feature of the Law is the establishment of a Federal Council for
National Minorities,
a Federal Fund for National Minorities
and, most importantly, National Councils of National Minorities.
The Law also guarantees the following minority rights: choice and use of proper
names (Article 9), use of the mother tongue (Article 10), official use of the
language and alphabet (Article 11), fosterage of culture and traditions
(Article 12), education in the mother tongue (Article 13), use of national
symbols (Article 16) and information in the minority language (Article 17).
As
regards the right to education in the mother language, members of a national
minority are entitled to be trained and educated in their language, the
requirement being that the instruction programme deal extensively with the history,
art and culture of the national minority. Where instruction is given in
Serbian, the instruction plans and programmes are expected to include, for the
purpose of encouraging tolerance toward national minorities, subject matter
dealing with the history, culture and situation of national minorities as well
as subject matter promoting mutual tolerance and life-together. The Law also
stipulates that, where a minority language is in official use, educational
institutions and schools providing instruction in the Serbian language should
also teach the language of the national minority.
The
National Councils are the key institutions established by the Law because it is
through them that minorities exercise their self-government rights in spheres
of great importance for the preservation and development of their national
identity, i.e. education, information, culture and official use of the
language. As Article 19 of the Law stipulates, the Council represents the
national minority in all spheres, participates in the decision-making process
or decides issues falling within these spheres, and establishes relevant
institutions. A council may be entrusted with some other responsibilities
connected with these spheres on condition that the state provide the necessary
funds. Article 19 states that the rules for the election of national councils
will be regulated by a law; however, Article 24 provides that, until such a law
is enacted, the national councils will be elected by the national minority
electoral assemblies. This indirect method of election has been most criticized
as impermissibly flawed. Thus the conclusions of the first regional conference
of national minority non-governmental organizations
underline that the election of a national council through such electors is
neither democratic nor free nor direct, and that it gives too large a role to
political parties at the expense of the civil sphere and the citizens. In the
opinion of the conference participants, national councils should be elected at
general, free and direct minority elections, and the election rules should be
laid down by the present Law and not a separate one.
Among
the many commentaries and criticisms were charges that the national councils
would serve to legitimatize the final division of the post-October plunder of
Serbia and that in addressing the minority question priority had been given to
satisfying the interests of the minority elites. Some of the warnings that the
constitution of national councils might lead to a polarization within minorities
themselves and challenge their very legitimacy were soon borne out. Even before
the Law was adopted, the Democratic Party of Vojvodina Hungarians (DSVM) warned
against a ‘political compromise existing between a part of the Serbian
political elite and the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM)’ whereby the
latter strove to achieve lasting political dominance within the Hungarian
community itself. According to the DSVM, a pattern of relations between
government and minority communities was being established in order to
effectively legalize firm state control over the latter.
In support of its demand for another model, based on personal autonomy,
the DSVM petitioned the Federal Constitutional Court asking it to verify the
constitutional validity of Article 24 of the Law on the Protection of Rights
and Liberties of National Minorities.
The intention of the DSVM had been to challenge the legal grounds for the
operation of the National Council set up by the Vojvodina Hungarians in
Subotica on September 21. Of the 541 electors present at the electoral
assembly, the list of proposed council members headed by Laslo Joza,
vice-president of the SVM, was upheld by 421 electors. The election of the
first minority National Council in the FRY was attended by Rasim Ljajić,
Federal Minister for National Minorities and Ethnic Communities, and numerous
guests from the country and abroad.
Soon
after the Vojvodina Hungarians, the Ruthenians, Romanians and Croats elected
their national councils on November 2 and December 7 and 15 respectively.
As was to be expected, the Vlach question was raised at the Romanian electoral
assembly. A spokeswoman for the Federal Ministry for National Minorities
replied on that occasion that ‘Yugoslavia does not recognize Vlachs as
Romanians’ and advised them to establish a Vlach national council. Her reply,
however, raised another issue: if the Ministry does not recognize Vlachs as
Romanians, why did it grant them over 30 mandates to elect the constituent
assembly of the Romanian minority’s National Council?
It
is quite clear that the Ministry has no transparent and firm position on this
issue, as well as that the establishment of national councils is bound to be
accompanied by problems. In an interview with the daily Danas, Minister Ljajić discussed the difficulties and said
that, in his opinion, ‘the chief problem is not the Law nor the Ministry nor
the Government nor the state, but the political disunity within the minority
communities and the impossibility of reaching consensus of opinion. In the
logic of things, political parties in a dominant position within some
communities wish to have a monopoly in their national councils. This is
something we can’t avoid. We for our part have created a legal framework for
the minorities to organize themselves through their national councils. The
responsibility now rests with the national communities themselves.’
Having read this explanation by Minister Ljajić, one cannot help being
astonished and worried by the fact that the Ministry is not only prepared to
disown all responsibility but to shuffle it off onto the minority communities
themselves. The chief problem is not the disunity of the minorities, as the
Minister suggests, but the legal foundation which perpetrates this disunity by
formalizing the aspirations of some political parties to dominate and
monopolize. Whatever the Minister may say to the contrary, the fact is that the
aspirations of some political parties are thus not only formalized but also
favoured. ‘We don’t favour anybody. The fact that the SVM more or less played
the chief role in the formation of the National Council of the Hungarian
community and that it dominates it does not make us happy, but that is not our
problem. The Law gives equal chances to all parties but, in the logic of things,
the party with the most councillors and deputies has better chances of having
more seats than others.’ The reference to equal chances is not clear in view of
the fact that the legal framework makes is possible for political parties with
the most councillors and deputies to dominate a national council.
One
also wonders whether the procedure for electing national councils is not
incompatible with Article 19 of the Law on the Protection of Rights and
Liberties of National Minorities. The Law stipulates that the ‘councils will be
formed on the principle of free choice, eligibility, proportionality and
democracy.’ The indirect method of electing members through electoral
assemblies is flawed precisely because it prevents the realization of the above
principles.
An alternative solution insisted upon by some minority political
representatives and calling for the preparation of separate minority voter
rolls and the holding of special direct elections of national council members
was rejected because, in the opinion of Minister Ljajić and some members
of the expert group, it would be ‘lead to the segregation of minorities, a view
also supported by the OSCE.’
As regards the OSCE position on the matter, a number of conflicting statements
were made. In contrast to the above allegation, the view was put forward at a
round table organized by the Helsinki Committee that while the OSCE was not
opposed to making minority voter lists, it did not recommend taking this step
without the consent of the minorities in question, an indication that such
lists could be established on the principle of free choice.
Finally,
one may ask why the establishment of national councils constituted the very
first step in implementing the Law. Two considerations – one political and the
other utilitarian – appear to have been of decisive importance in determining
the priorities. The first can be attributed to the authorities’ dire need to
establish an address in minority territory for communication and dialogue while
not bothering too much about the legitimacy of such a body. The other reflects
the aspiration of the minority elites to get hold of some of the post-October
booty in order to reward their following with editorial, managerial and
administrative positions. Naturally, one cannot help wondering whether this
internal distribution of prestigious appointments, privileges and sinecures
will appease the various appetites or whether it will cause further frustration
and bickering, and what its real objective is. There is no doubt that it has already
produced many malcontents and critics. As to the objective itself, it is
apparently to buy the loyalty of the elites and through them the allegiance of
the minorities. In other words, the priority in dealing with the minority
question is to satisfy the interests of narrow groups within the minorities
themselves. In all probability, the manipulation of the minority problems by
elites bent on pursuing their narrow selfish interests is that ‘logic of
things’ Minister Ljajić talked about, a policy whereby society as a whole
is relieved of inter-ethnic tension by generating intra-ethnic tension within
minorities themselves.
The
Law on the Protection of Rights and Liberties of National Minorities, passed in
2002, is doubtless the most significant law concerning national minorities. The
Serbian Assembly also passed several other laws that year which are of interest
to national minorities. The Law on
Self-government provides for the establishment in a nationally-mixed
municipality of a council for inter-communal relations made up of
representatives of all national and ethnic communities concerned. The council
considers questions of realization, protection and promotion of national
equality and may institute proceedings before the Constitutional Court with the
object of verifying the constitutional validity and legality of a decision or
another general enactment of the municipal assembly if it believes that a right
of a national or ethnic community represented on the council is thereby
directly violated. The council may also, under the same conditions, institute
proceedings before an administrative court where it believes that a decision or
another general enactment of the municipal assembly is incompatible with the
municipal statute. The Law on Broadcasting was another law passed by the
Serbian Assembly. Since the situation in this sphere, which is of great
importance to all including the minorities, had often been described as chaotic
and compared to a jungle, the determination to regulate it and wrest broadcasting
from the centres of political power is quite justified. Nevertheless, some of
the provisions have given rise to concern, especially the one providing for the
obligatory privatization of municipal media, its critics fearing a reduction of
minority language programmes in the conditions of widespread commercialization.
Republican
laws as subordinate legislation ought to be compatible with the Federal Law on
the Protection of Rights and Liberties of National Minorities but unfortunately
this is not always so. The Law on Local Self-government and the Law on
Amendments and Supplements to the Law on Elementary and Secondary Education
ignore some provisions of the federal law on minorities. Article 16 of the
former ignores the right of minority members to use national symbols and
Article 15 of the latter their right to establish private educational
institutions, schools and universities. Both these laws were adopted after the
Law on the Protection of Rights and Liberties of National Minorities was passed
by the Federal Assembly. The Federal Ministry for National Minorities
petitioned the Federal Constitutional Court because such legislative practice
prevents the implementation of the federal law on minorities.
It should be noted that the aforesaid laws are not the only ones which infringe
the rights of national minorities. A study conducted last year by the Helsinki
Committee and the Humanitarian Centre for Integration and Tolerance identified
several other laws which either contain discriminatory norms or enable discrimination
indirectly. The reader is referred for details to the book National Minorities and the Law published by the Helsinki Committee
last year.
The laws in question are the Law on the Election of National Deputies, the Law
on the Official Use of Language, the laws regulating the right to receive
education in minority languages and those on elementary, secondary and high
schools, the Law on the Promulgation of Federal Laws and Other Regulations and
General Enactments, the Law on State and Other Public Holidays in the Republic
of Serbia, the Law on the Establishment of a Museum for Victims of Genocide,
and the Law on Underdeveloped Regions in the Republic of Serbia Until 2005.
Identification of these laws and their disputable provisions is important not
only because they obstruct the implementation of the Law on the Protection of
Rights and Liberties of National Minorities, but also because a wider issue is
involved: the existence of discriminatory norms and laws calls into question
the constitutional principle of the equality of citizens because, if the
citizens are not equal, the idea of human rights comes to nothing. Other than
bridging the gap between the normative and the actual, elimination of
discriminative norms and acts would improve the performance of the legal system
and strengthen the integrative capacity of Serbian society.
The
last consideration is especially important with regard to members of the Roma
national minority. The question of their integration is very important, the
solution of their position being among the requirements for admission to the
EU. This minority community languishes on the fringes of society in conditions
unworthy of human beings living at the end of the twentieth century.
For example, a report published in Dnevnik
describes the conditions in which Roma live as follows: ‘The settlement of
Veliki rit in Novi Sad houses some 4,000 Roma and Ashkalis in improvised mud or
cardboard huts without electricity, water and heating...They eat from refuse
bins. However, they say that even such food is not easy to come by because
skinheads are given to attacking and beating them in the urban parts of the
city. Lately, they say, it has not been easy even to beg. The police arrest and
keep them up to ten days in prison. The children do not go to school and their
parents say the schools would not admit them anyway because, as there is no
access road, water and electricity, the children are dirty and muddy.’
It would, of course, be totally wrong to generalize and believe that this description
applies to the whole Roma population. In common with other minority
communities, the Roma are highly differentiated in terms of their lifestyle,
means, housing, integration and assimilation, religion, etc. Nevertheless,
unlike other communities such as Hungarians, Slovaks, Romanians and Ruthenians,
the Roma are distinguished by stronger population resources.
On the other hand, they are handicapped in many other ways and are especially
deficient in education. According to the Roma Cultural and Publishing Society,
as many as 80 per cent Roma are totally or practically illiterate while 78 per
cent Roma children drop out of elementary school, 37 per cent do not speak any
Serbian, and 46 per cent have only the most rudimentary general knowledge.
Many Roma children have their first contact with the exercise book and pencil
in school, a place where, regrettably, they are subjected to numerous
indignities both by their peers and by their teachers. The local correspondent
of the daily Danas, in an article describing
the harsh realities of the Roma in Prokuplje, writes that ‘in nearly every
class in which there are Roma children, the back desk or “dunce’s seat” is
reserved for them. Disorderly non-Roma children are punished by the teacher by
having to sit there next to a Gypsy.’
Roma children are also abused, insulted and maltreated by their peers: for
instance, O.Š., a pupil at the ‘Đura Jakšić’ primary school in
Kikinda, was forced by a group of boys, on pain of being beaten, to kiss the
sneakers of one of them.
Roma parents are inclined to withdraw their children from school because they
do not want them to be ridiculed, humiliated and discriminated against, but
also because their aspirations and expectations are low.
Because Roma children start their education from a very low social and cultural
level, and because they are illiterate and linguistically handicapped, they
often end up attending special schools. According to YUROM, young Roma account
for between 50 and 80 per cent of entrants of these school, which further aggravates
their social handicap and reduces their chances of escaping the vicious circle.
This vicious circle, which keeps the Roma down and consigns them to the fringes
of society, must be broken by someone who has the power to do so, and this
someone is the state.
At
the end of September, representatives of the Federal Ministry for National and
Ethnic Communities, OSCE, UNHCR and OCHA signed an agreement on setting up a
group of experts to work out a comprehensive strategy for Roma integration in
the FRY. In the words of Minister Ljajić, the strategy should help find
adequate solutions to Roma problems in education, housing, health care and
social insurance, as well as problems facing the Roma refugees from Kosovo.
Although the deadline for completing and adopting a draft strategy was set for
the end of the year, it is not clear whether it was met. Unofficially the
strategy is said to have been completed. Jelena Marković, Assistant
Federal Minister for Minorities, announced in November that the Ministry and the
British organization Oxfam had launched a campaign entitled ‘Rom means man’ to
help create a more tolerant climate toward the Roma. No matter how attractive
such campaigns appear when advertised, one should not place too much hope on
their changing the general attitude of the non-Roma environment, for attitudes
developed over years or decades under the strong influence of prejudice are not
easily discarded. Deeply ingrained prejudices not only generate hatred of Roma
but are cited as an excuse for frequent violent acts committed against them.
Roma are the victims of violence committed both by private individuals – early
in November a Roma named Istvan Ziga was brutally beaten by two hooligans in
Vase Stajića street in Novi Sad
– and by members of the police force. For instance, the Humanitarian Law Fund
filed a criminal complaint against unidentified policemen from the police
station in Petrovaradin who on November 11 and 14 abused Jovan Nikolić
while trying to make him confess the theft of a television set, a power
generator, tyres and other items. Nikolić was slapped on the face, batoned
on the shoulder and beaten on the buttocks and thighs with a shovel. When he
threatened to take the policemen to court, he was detained for 48 hours.
Another Roma, Stevan Dimić of Lok came off worse when Novi Sad police
tried to make him admit to raping a fifteen-year-old girl. The policemen made
him lie on the floor and positioned a chair on his back; one policemen sat on
the chair and struck him repeatedly with a baton and an iron rod while another
stepped on his head. Next he was forced to keep his handcuffed hands on a
clothes rack and spread his legs so he could be kicked in the testicles. During
detention, which turned out to be unlawful, he was repeatedly insulted on
account of his ethnic background; while other detainees were handed their food
properly, he had to pick up his from the floor where it had been thrown.
Besides being verbally and physically abused, Roma are also widely
discriminated against; according to Nataša Rašić, who provides legal
counsel to Roma, there is not a Roma who has not been humiliated in some way or
another at least once in his life. Discrimination starts at the nursery and the
primary school and continues at the place of work. Rašić says that a Roma
woman doctor who had applied for work at a health centre in Niš was told by the
governor quite openly that he would give her a job ‘when a health centre is
opened in the gypsy quarter.’
At the end of December, a Belgrade resident of Cuban descent, Jenny Grant, was
discriminated against on account of her colour while trying to enter the
Greek-owned hypermarket Veropoulos in New Belgrade. A guard mistook her for a
Roma woman, barred her way and directed her to the junk-market across the road
because, he said, ‘that’s where the gypsies do their shopping’.
Roma
disunity makes it even harder to deal with the problems facing the Roma
population today. The mutual envy and unhealthy competition of the Roma leaders
is one of the reasons why the minority has not yet formed its national council.
Another reason, according to Dragoljub Acković, spokesman for the
Anglupine coalition of Roma organizations and societies,
is lack of adequate help from the competent Ministry. Instead of helping to
overcome the present conflicts and disagreements, he says, the Ministry’s
officials ‘merely deepen our disunity by supporting now one and now the other.’
Emancipation of Vlachs
There
is a considerable controversy about the origin of the Vlachs. While some
contend that the Vlachs are a separate ethnic identity, others insist that they
are Romanians; and there is, of course, a third answer, namely that they are
romanized Serbs. Interestingly, during the last population census, there
appeared in the media a text alleging that ‘certain Vlach leaders are today
picking up where the local Communists left off shortly after the [1945]
liberation of the [Vlach-inhabited eastern Serbian region of] Timok Krajina. At
that time a party commission was set up in [the town of] Zaječar with the
task of studying the Vlach question, producing a Vlach grammar and making sure,
with a view to suppressing alleged Serb hegemony, that the Vlachs should become
a nation. The members of the commission had, by virtue of their assignment, to
designate themselves Vlachs...but the drive fell through owing to lack of
popular support.’
The above passage bears out the observation in the Helsinki Committee monograph
on national minorities that the Vlach question is subject to rather earthy
politicization, with some media going so far as to charge the Vlachs with
separatism. Thus, in a highly sensationalist article, Nedeljni telegraf accused them of threatening armed rebellion,
saying they are buying arms in Romania and are merely waiting for a signal from
their leaders to use Kalashnikovs.
Quite naturally, some Vlach leaders dismiss such allegations as ‘nonsense and
absurdity’.
All the same, articles which accuse the Vlachs of plotting to destabilize
Serbia on the lines of the Kosovo model, bear out a deep and far-reaching
problem, i.e. the lack of readiness of Serbia, or at least of a part of it, to
come to terms with pluralism, to respond productively to the process of
national diversification, acknowledge national emancipation and support the
political promotion of minorities in order to rid itself of an unnecessary and
burdensome nationalistic encumbrance.
What
do the Vlach representatives actually want? The non-governmental and political
organizations of Vlacho-Romanians of north-eastern Serbia, at a meeting in
Zaječar early in May, adopted a Declaration stressing that the solution of
the ‘Vlach question’ presupposes instruction in the mother language at school,
use of the mother language in the media and in public, the introduction of
worship in the mother language, and state participation in the financing of
activities and projects aimed at improving the position of the Vlacho-Romanians
of the region and promoting their culture.
As the Declaration points out, the Vlachs attach great importance to worship in
their mother tongue. During a ceremony commemorating the tenth anniversary of
the Movement of the Romanians of Yugoslavia, a member of the Christian
Democratic Party of Serbia prevented a priest from Vršac from carrying out the
wish of the organizers to read service in Romanian in an adapted church at
Slatina.
The
Declaration was also addressed to the office of FRY President Vojislav
Koštunica and to other federal, republican and local authorities with a request
for help in dealing with the Vlach question. Having been subjected to
assimilation for decades, the Vlachs are justified in requesting assistance so
that they could preserve their identity. A study carried out in the course of
the year by the Helsinki Committee reveals an appalling state of affairs as far
as their collective rights are concerned: the Vlach language is not in official
use in any municipality in eastern Serbia; there are no schools providing
education in this language; the state has never helped them to exercise their
right to be informed in their language; there are no Vlach primary and
secondary school governors.
The granting of these and other rights would not only enable the Vlachs to
preserve and promote their identity but bring Serbia’s society closer to the
ideal of ethno-cultural justice.
New Minorities
Unlike
the Vlachs, the members of the Croat national community are better organized
through they are yet to achieve unity. Their problems include lack of
institutions and organizations, vain leaders, reluctance of young and educated
people to commit themselves, no consensus of opinion on what is to be done.
But these are not their only problems: before and during the war in Croatia,
prejudices were encouraged and negative stereotypes manufactured to fan an
anti-Croat hysteria and incite persecution of Croats. Commemorating on May 6
the tenth anniversary of the expulsion of the Croat population of the village
of Hrtkovci – this name being ‘synonymous with the expulsion of the Croats from
Srem’ – the Vojvodina Reformers evoked the days when the state did nothing to
protect its citizens of other nationality or religion and urged the authorities
to hold the engineers of the ‘humane population transfer’ to account.
It should be noted that prejudice and hatred engendered by this sinister policy
toward the Croats are unfortunately still in evidence.
The
most drastic incident involving an outburst of anti-Croat sentiments occurred
on the centenary of the Croat cultural-educational society ‘Stjepan
Radić’, established in Novi Slankamen in 1902. The society was resuming
its activities after eleven years and the organizers of the commemoration had
prepared a varied cultural-artistic programme. However, no sooner had the
tamburitza ensemble struck up than Serb neighbours responded by singing ‘Get
ready, Chetniks’. More Chetnik singing was heard coming from the balcony of the
local hospital, where several women in hospital uniform stood and chanted ‘Down
with the Ustashas!’, and firecrackers were thrown around. Reporters saw the banners
of the Serbian Radical Party and some Chetnik unit being paraded through the
village. A score of youths wearing Serb military hats and badges of the
Fatherland Movement ‘Obraz’ and another badge bearing the message ‘Every Serb
is Radovan [Karadžić]’ argued that ‘as soon as there is a Serb club in
Borovo Selo [in Croatia] named after Puniša Račić [the deputy who
assassinated Radić in the National Assembly in 1928] they can have their
own club in Serbia, on the principle of reciprocity.’
Dinko Palmar, the local parish priest, said that these excesses could be
understood but not justified. He is nevertheless of the opinion that things
have been improving since October 5. This view is shared by other members of
the Croat community, who describe the provincial administration’s attitude
toward them as positive. Croatian was the fifth language to come into official
use in Vojvodina;
an enterprise called ‘Hrvatska riječ’ (Croat word) was established to
publish a newspaper and a scientific-cultural journal in Croatian; and classes
were opened in several schools so that Croat children can be taught in their
mother language. The community’s leaders view the adoption of the national
minorities law as a positive move and even a ‘revolutionary turning point’
and believe that for all its flaws and contradictions it would help them to
improve their position.
For
all the efforts to improve the position of the minority, certain problems
persist. For instance, the Divani
television information programme for the Croat minority in Vojvodina was twice
suspended by the Novi Sad TV channel. On the first occasion it decided not to
show a report on the incident coinciding with the resumption of work of the
Stjepan Radić cultural-educational society in Novi Slankamen, the oldest
Croat society in Vojvodina, on the absurd excuse that the nationalistic slogans
which could be seen and heard in the report amounted to hate speech.
The second time, the broadcasting of a Divani
programme entitled ‘Are the Bunjevacs and Šokasc Croats?’ was banned because
there were no Bunjevacs among the guests, the explanation being that the
programme was partial and that the Bunjevacs had been denied they right to say
who they are. However, Karlo Blesić, the president of the Bunjevac
Cultural and Publishing Society, says that although he and other Bunjevac
representatives were invited by the production team, they agreed not to respond
because the invitations had not been extended ‘in the proper manner’.
The
justification of the first ban is of some interest although any detailed
discussion of it would be beyond the scope of this report. One cannot help
wondering, however, whether or not reporters are to be prevented from informing
the general public about nationalistic slogans which incite hatred. This may be
answered in the affirmative only if the intention of the reporters is to
humiliate or frighten a particular group. Whether there was such an intention
on the part of the Divani crew is
hard to say. If so, the ban was justified; if not, then action ought to have
been taken against the hate-mongers, not against the people who recorded the
sights and sounds of what went on.
The second ban raises the delicate question of who the Bunjevacs are. Are they
a separate, distinct ethnic identity or are they a part of the Croat national
body? In common with the Vlachs, the Bunjevacs themselves are divided on this
score. The controversy was heightened during the 2002 population census with
both Croats
and Bunjevacs
regarding each other as the favoured group. The two camps, both drawing on
history to support their arguments, are actually telling basically the same
story: the Croats insists that the Bunjevacs are being manipulated to
fragmentize the Croat community and to facilitate its assimilation;
the Bunjevacs for their part complain that their individuality is stifled
through their assimilation into the Croat national body.
Determined to preserve their particularity, the Bunjevacs have announced that
they will demand the same rights as other minorities, including separate
schools in the Bunjevac language, and establish their own national council.
The Bunjevac question is obviously largely politicized. In dealing with it, one
must bear in mind that a person’s nationality is the result of both objective
and subjective criteria and that therefore it is entirely up to each individual
to register either as a Bunjevac or as a Croat.
During
the 2002 population census the members of the Bosniak national minority were
entitled to choose a name by which they wished to be identified and recognized.
Unimportant though it may seem, the issue is highly explosive because if the
name chosen by a community is ignored, its members may construe this as a
negation of their identity. On the other hand, the decision to allow the
Bosniaks to identify themselves was a sign of both political prudence and
respect because it will facilitate their integration and give them a feeling of
being accepted and equal with the rest of society. At a meeting in August,
representatives of non-governmental organizations based in Sandžak recognized
the intention of the authorities to improve the position of the Bosniaks by
enlisting their help within the Commission drafting the Constitutional Charter.
However, a number of problems were also indicated concerning the exercise of
the collective rights of the Bosniaks to use their language officially, promote
their culture, and be adequately represented in relevant institutions. For
instance, the obligation to bring the language and alphabet of a national
minority into official use where applicable was not carried out in all Sandžak
municipalities (Priboj and Prijepolje), nor did the municipal authorities carry
out their statutory duty to determine the minority languages and alphabets u
official use in their territories. It should be pointed out that the use of the
Bosniak language and alphabet is a very delicate issue because it is primarily
a political, not a scholarly problem. The misunderstanding stems from failure
to acknowledge the right of the Bosniaks to call the language they speak and
write after their name. That language as a means of mutual understanding and
communication can become a source of misunderstanding was borne out at the
session of the Novi Pazar municipal assembly held early in May: the Serb
deputies walked out in protest at the decision to bring into official use, on
terms of parity with Serbian and the Cyrillic alphabet, the Bosnian language
and the Latin alphabet as the language and alphabet of the Bosniaks.
Obviously, the policy of identification and the obsession that a language must
be named after the nation speaking it produce bad consequences. On the other
hand, in view of the consensus of political opinion that Serbian and Croatian
are two languages, there is no reason why a Bosnian language or even a fourth
language, i.e. Montenegrin, should not be recognized. Insisting on the
establishment of a special, artificial language and then on special rights on
that account is more dangerous that merely naming a language. The Bosniaks also
lack a network of institutions to help them preserve as well as develop and
promote their culture and identity.
An
analysis carried out in the second half of the year by two non-governmental
organizations, the Helsinki Committee and the Humanitarian Centre for
Integration and Tolerance, established that the Bosniaks are inadequately
represented in certain important institutions.
For instance, Serbs occupy more judicial and prosecutorial offices in Sandžak
than Bosniaks do although the opposite could be expected in view of the ethnic
composition of the population. The preponderance of Serbs in the police force
at all levels is the result of the policy of the previous regime, which not
only suspected the loyalty of the Bosniaks but also employed the police to
torture and harass them. That this policy continues is testified to by the case
of a Bosniak by name Murat Pepić, who was beaten without cause by
policemen on January 1.
In the second half of August, Bosniak non-governmental representatives were
told that some 17,000 Bosniaks were beaten, detained, maltreated in various
ways and dismissed from work under the Milošević regime. Such personnel
changes as had been made in the police force were regarded as inadequate
because the bullies kept their jobs and only a few had been criminally charged.
A similar situation prevails in the economic and banking sectors. The
predominance of Serbs in banks and the republican administration may be viewed
as a leftover from the previous period when key posts were apportioned by the
central government. Data on the ethnic composition of representative and
executive government bodies also bear out the fact that Bosniaks are
underemployed.
This
state of affairs is the source of discontent among Bosniaks, who complain that
‘it still does not appear that this state accepts us as its citizens’
and that Sandžak is being neglected as a region.
Sandžak was and still is synonymous with underdevelopment and backwardness in
terms of economy, culture and education. In the aforementioned discussion with
non-governmental organization representatives, the backwardness of Sandžak was
attributed to, among other things, the policy of the previous and present
governments. A participant in the meeting had no other explanation for the fact
that the law is designed and implemented in such a way as to favour Serb
settlements.
Why is there no commercial court in Sandžak although one is long overdue? Why
is the territory of Sandžak divided between the districts of Raška and Užice
instead of being a district in its own right with a full complement of
institutions? In the opinion of the participants in the meeting, the
institutional neglect of Sandžak and the discrimination against Bosniaks call
into question the efforts of post-October Serbia to constitute itself
democratically and to gain legitimacy. An even greater obstacle to these
efforts is the unwillingness to review the policy of the former regime and to
punish all who committed crimes against Bosniaks in pursuit of that policy.
Doubts were aroused by the fact that only two of the four persons indicted in
connection with the October 1992 kidnapping and murder of 17 Bosniaks from
Sjeverin had been arrested,
as well as that only one person had been convicted in connection with the
February 1993 kidnapping at Štrpce station and later execution of 19 passengers
from a Belgrade-Bar passenger train.
Šefko Alomerović, president of the Helsinki Office for Human Rights in
Sandžak, accused the authorities that, in connection with Sjeverin, they did
not want to try all the kidnappers; he also perceived in the fact that Ranisavljević
alone was tried in connection with Štrpce
the ‘intention of the authorities to cover up the real motives for the
kidnappings and the identity of the chief perpetrators and the people who gave
the orders’, i.e. ‘to cover up the policy in implementing the programme of the
state – the ethnic cleansing of Sandžak.’
In a meeting with S. Sanino, the OSCE ambassador, representatives of the
Sandžak List coalition aired many Bosniak grievances such as underemployment,
inadequate participation in government, tardiness in solving crimes and
processing perpetrators, neglect of the region. They warned that the Serbian
government’s quiet boycott of Sandžak and Bosniak interests was causing
frustration
and giving rise to discontent, which could easily turn Sandžak into a new, very
serious hotbed of crisis. The incidents which occurred in Novi Pazar during
2002 are a clear indication of a radicalization of the situation. The
scandalous rooting by the local Bosniak audience for Turkey in a women’s
handball match against Yugoslavia was condemned in a flood of statements by
political, civil and religious organizations. On the other hand, The Party of
Democratic Action of Sandžak saw the outcry as a demonization of the Bosniaks
as Muslims, alleged that the statements had been commissioned, and observed
that their authors had neglected to mention the ‘fact that, during the playing
of the [official] anthem “Hey, Slavs” before the final match with Greece, a
part of the audience sang the [Royalist] anthem “God give us justice” and went
on to sing [the Chetnik song] “From Topola to Mt. Ravna Gora”’.
A new incident occurred nearly two months later, when police had to intervene
to break up clashes between groups of Serb and Bosniak nationalists in the
centre of Novi Pazar after Yugoslavia had won the gold medal in the world
basketball cup. Next day two Serb youths were beaten outside a cafe in the town
centre, ‘for which reason Serbs blocked a cross-road in Šestovo suburb the same
night and kept it closed until 3 a.m. Tuesday passed as the Novi Pazar
municipal leaders, political groupings and parties and non-governmental
organizations talked, negotiated and issued statements. All of them were
unanimous in condemning the incidents’
but not as to who was to blame. While the Bosniak National Council of Sandžak
talked of a ‘planned and co-ordinated action of Serb extremists from the ranks
of the Novi Pazar police department and nationalists who had arrived from the
direction of Raška in vehicles with Kraljevo and Kosovska Mitrovica licence
plates,’
the Committee for Protecting the Rights of Serbs blamed the incidents on
extremists belonging to the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), saying the party
wanted to win back voters and sympathizers by provoking disorders.
In a joint statement the ‘Serb parties’ – the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS),
the Party of Serb Unity (SSJ), the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and the Serb
National Party (SNS) – found it deplorable that ‘we are not free to rejoice in
our own state.’
At a meeting of municipal committee representatives of the New Democracy party,
the Sandžak Democratic Party, the Democratic Party, the DSS, the SDA of
Sandžak, the SSJ, the Party for Sandžak, the Liberal Bosniak Organization, the
Social Democracy Party and the Democratic Alternative party, as well as of
representatives of the Sandžak Intellectual Circle, the Helsinki Committee and
G-17, it was concluded that the ‘incidents were aimed at provoking disturbances
and creating sore spots’. The participants called on cultural workers and
public figures, non-governmental organizations, religious communities and other
institutions to ‘make an effort toward creating the conditions for a
life-together and tolerance’. In the opinion of Žarko Korać, the Serbian
Deputy Prime Minister, the incident was engineered outside Sandžak and
deliberately provoked ‘because a strong radicalization of young Muslims in
Serbia suits somebody’s book.’
That
such radical young Muslims exist and operate was testified to by leaflets found
by the residents of Priboj, Prijepolje and Nova Varoš in their letter-boxes;
the leaflets urged Muslims to boycott their Christian neighbours’ festivities
so as ‘not to serve Shaitan [Satan] by celebrating the Christmas holidays’.
These leaflets, signed by the Organization of Active Islamic Youth, were
condemned by both political and religious organizations as provoking
inter-confessional and inter-ethnic intolerance.
The
emigration of Serbs from Sandžak is a development which ought to be pointed
out. Neither Serbs nor Bosniaks deny this as well as the fact that Serbs are
moving out also under pressure. In an interview with Danas, the Mufti of Sandžak, Muamer Zukorlić, confirmed this
undeniable fact but attributed it to the ‘vulnerability of the minority,
something which obtains in all situations’, an ‘atmosphere of economic
competition’ and fears of a ‘great many people who behaved badly toward and
even beat Bosniak people in the time of Milošević.’ Economic reasons for
the emigration were also cited by the prior of Sopoćani Monastery, Mihajlo
Tošić: ‘Land is being sold on a massive scale at 10,000 euro an are, and a
flat in Novi Pazar is worth three in Belgrade and five in Kragujevac. But there
are also pressures of other kinds, starting with the harassment of children.’
The British Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) was among others to
draw attention to the Serb emigration from the region, noting in a report that
the process accelerated following the October changes in Serbia, after the SDA
had emerged victorious in local self-government elections. A thousand Serbs or
so have emigrated from Novi Pazar alone in the past two of three years. The
IWPR warned that intensive Serb emigration might bring about a major Balkan
crisis.
The
Position of Religious Minorities
Multinational
communities are all the more complex because they are often religiously
heterogeneous. This is why the position of religious minorities is important
and must be mentioned in this report. This all the more necessary as religious
minorities and their facilities were the target of frequent attacks in the
course of the year. On St John’s Day, a Sunday, one or several unidentified
persons broke into the Adventist church in Bačka Palanka and wrecked its
interior. Građanski list wrote
that religious intolerance in the town had assumed alarming proportions and
that a similar incident occurred almost every week. Of the twenty or so
religious communities operating in the territory of the municipality, most were
attacked. Interestingly, none of these communities nor the authorities
condemned the Adventist church attack.
The next incident occurred in Nova Pazova, where posters bearing the word
‘Sect’ had been pasted on the facades of several small religious community
buildings during the night, the same word having been scrawled in spray on the
yard walls. In Sremska Mitrovica in May, a drunk man named Žarko Vukovac jumped
over the fence of the local parish office, smashed the windscreen on the
parish’s car with a metal bar and tried to light a rag sticking from a bottle
containing some petrol. Having failed to make it burn, he tossed the bottle under
a window and walked off.
Early in May a group of unidentified youths stoned the front door of the
Adventist church in Borča and smashed the glass. Hooligans struck again at
the middle of July, permanently damaging the aluminium church door and writing
on it ‘Get out of Serbia’ and ‘Seventh-day sectarians’.
Small religious communities were often branded as sects which resort to all
kinds of insidious practices. When early in April Olga Ivaniš of Inđija
jumped from a third storey, media quoted people as saying she had been under
pressure from a sect but nobody could say which.
A particularly serious incident occurred in Belgrade towards the end of the
year when a group of some thirty youths prevented an Anglican priest and about
twenty adherents including the British ambassador, Charles Crawford, from
entering the Serbian Orthodox Church Patriarchate to attend a traditional
Christmas Eve service. The incident was given wide media coverage and condemned
by the SPC, non-governmental organizations and political parties.
Interestingly, the Serbian Minister for Religious Affairs, Vojislav
Milovanović, inexplicably
called the affair a ‘left-over from the Communist past’ although the youths
gathered outside the building did not chant Communist slogans but sang church
canons and hymns. Were they taken for Communists merely because they did not
back down when the Patriarch himself came out to intervene? Does Mr
Milovanović see vestiges of Communism each time a demand by the Church is
ignored? If his criteria are anything to go by, then Serbia is still deep in
Communism. However, during the drafting on the Law on Broadcasting, nobody
objected when the SPC insisted on being allotted air-time by the state RTS
channel; it also wanted the drafters to throw in a provision making it
obligatory for republican and provincial broadcasting authorities to reserve
four hours of prime-time broadcasting a week for religious programmes anytime
between 4 p.m. and 10 p.m. on Fridays, Saturdays and Sundays. The request,
signed by Patriarch Pavle, also insisted that service broadcasts should not be
interrupted by commercials.
These
and similar demands should be viewed within the context of the general
post-October clericalization of Serbian society, with the SPC in particular
striving to go beyond its purview and impose itself as an influential social
and political factor. The SPC dropped all pretence and caused a scandal marring
the commemoration of the anniversary of the World War Two ‘Novi Sad raid’ when
it threatened to stage an event of its own if the scheduled gathering were
addressed by Nenad Čanak, the President of the Vojvodina Assembly. The
determination of the SPC to arbitrate and to decide which state official may or
may not speak at a public event testifies to its manifest political ambitions.
When
the Serb National Movement ‘Svetozar Miletić’ held it second assembly in
Novi Sad at the end of the year, it was addressed by, among others, the Bishop
of Bačka, Irinej. He alleged that the ‘idea of Serb unity and assembly has
been imperilled from within’ by ‘people devoid of conscience, by impious ones
who treat the Serb people with the epithet fascist and who blaspheme their holy
Church by calling it clero-fascist.’
The statement provoked stormy reactions above all from the ruling DOS
parliamentary floor group in the Vojvodina Assembly, which asked ‘the Church to
desist from interfering in politics...and to apologize to the citizens of
Serbia for the insult and calumny.’
The SPC replied in a statement released by its Information Service that it
failed to see justification for the reaction of the Vojvodina Assembly because
the words of the Bishop of Bačka ‘could not have related to the Vojvodina
Assembly, which is not Serb since Serbs are in a minority there.’
Changes in Ethnic Structure
One
can refute the above allegation in the SPC Information Service statement if one
merely looks up the national structure of the Vojvodina Assembly: of the 120
deputies, seventy-eight or 65 per cent designate themselves Serbs. Therefore,
neither are Serb deputies in a minority in the Vojvodina Assembly, nor are
Serbs in a minority in Vojvodina. In a study of Serb population trends in
Vojvodina between 1888 and 1991, Miroslav Samardžić asserts that the
process of Serb ethnic preponderance in Vojvodina had been completed during the
1990s, having reached 50.4 per cent already in 1948 and increased to 56.8 per
cent in 1991. According to the latest data of the Serbian Statistical Office,
Serbs at present account for 65.05 per cent of the province’s population, which
is for all intents and purposes identical with the percentage of their deputies
in the provincial Assembly.
The
demographic picture of Vojvodina was inevitably affected by the warlike policy
pursued during the previous decade. While the population as a whole increased,
reflecting an increase in the number of Serbs, the minority population
decreased in numbers. Apart from the above reason, the decrease may be
attributed to a negative birth rate, economic migration and other causes. It
should be borne in mind that the minorities themselves have paid the price of
ethnic homogenization and the completion of nation-states. Compared with the
population census of 1991, the number of Hungarians fell from 339,491 to
290,207, Croats from 74,808 to 56,546, Romanians 38,809 to 30,419, Slovaks
63,545 to 56,637, Ruthenes 17,652 to 15,626, Germans 3,873 to 3,154, etc. In
the case of minorities, the cultural and intellectual drain is no less
important than demographic decline. Emigration of young and educated people has
thinned the minorities’ intellectual elite necessary for the preservation and
development of their identity and culture.
But
nowhere was the decrease as drastic as in the case of Yugoslavs, once the third
largest community after Serbs and Hungarians. Their number fell from 174,295
(8.56 per cent) in 1991 to only 49,881 (2.45 per cent), rendering them less
numerous than Serbs, Hungarians, Slovaks and Croats. It would be interesting to
find out what caused 124,414 Yugoslavs to ‘disappear’ between the two censuses.
The assumption that a great many Yugoslavs were among those who had emigrated
is not to be ruled out. Compounded by other causes, repudiation of war and of
narrow-minded nationalistic policies, existential uncertainty and fear must
have caused many Yugoslavs to leave the country. The population movements in
the former Yugoslavia set into motion by war and spurred by violence and
threats assumed a strong ethnocentric character: Serbs left for Serbia and
Croats for Croatia. However, an ethnic structure can be changed without people
actually leaving their homes: at a time when nationalistic conflicts gain in
intensity and the public is manipulated to turn against particular ethnic
communities, individuals resort to ethnic mimicry after weighing the pros and
cons of their declared nationality. For a threatened member of a minority
group, changing over to Yugoslav nationality provided a refuge from
persecution.
There
is nevertheless yet another thing, which should be borne in mind: a regular
concomitant of nationalistic policies is an inverse nationalism manifested as
hatred of ‘renegade’ members of one’s group. Nationalists tend to regard
Yugoslavs as such renegades and consider them even more dangerous than their
ethnic rivals because, in their opinion, Yugoslavs undermine the nation from
within, weaken it demographically, contaminate it culturally and deprive it of
political clout.
It therefore comes as no surprise that, during the preparation of the
population census, the ethno-nationalists referred to the Yugoslavs as an
invention and a fraud
and offered to take them back into the warm ethnic fold. Apart from
nationalistic considerations, they were prompted to adopt this line by the law
on minorities, which makes the use of a minority language and the exercise of
other collective rights conditional on certain percentages.
The disappearance of Yugoslavs is not only a sign of a changed ethnic structure
of the population but of the rise and victory of chauvinist
(ethno-)nationalists.
Today,
two years since the October 5 overthrow, it is clear that the debacle of the
Serb greater-state project has not brought about the collapse of nationalism.
There is always a future for nationalism in a society plagued by a devastated
economy, great ethnic distance, massive pauperization and severe welfare
problems. What is more, nationalism is consolidating, with political, church
and civil actors working hard at its normalization. Today’s Serbia is truly a
multi-cultural society if by that one means a society of nationalists of all
kinds. Some analysts say that nationalism has lost in intensity but has gained
in breadth. It is penetrating the very depths of society and spreading among
all the ethnic communities. There is some ‘consolation’ in the fact that the
nationalists as not as prepared as they were before to enter into mutual
conflict and confrontation; instead, they are forced to compromise, form pacts
and share material and political gains. Their ambitions are directed above all
toward their own ethnic space, the object being to put it under their control,
eliminate all competition and establish themselves as the true champions and
interpreters of their respective communities. These days they preach pluralism
within society as a whole while promoting one-party rule within their own
communities. The league of multi-nationalists is leading Serbia towards a state
of apartheid where small ethnic communities will fall prey to deals between
larger, stronger and better organized nationalists and nationalisms.
Conclusions and
Recommendations
Despite
the political turnaround which brought about positive changes in the area of
protection of minority rights, nationalistic stances of the majority population
still prevail in normative regulation of minorities status. Xenophobia,
intolerance of 'other'
peoples and ethnic centrist-position are the
main hurdles to implementation of the Act on Minorities. Added to that a series
of legal acts contrary to the spirit of the Act on Minorities
are in place.
Radicalisation
of the majority inevitably led to radicalisation of minorities, entailing their
closing of ranks and in within the narrow ethnic framework. Consequently social
ties are weakening and inter-ethnic solidarity in the society is growing
feeble. In such a situation mediation of the international community, notably
of Council of Europe and OSCE is necessary.
Extremist incidents staged by some
groups notably, Obraz, Svetozar Miletic, Skinheads, are on the rise, and remain
unsanctioned. Added to that the broader community has failed to adequately
respond to such incidents.
Prevailing over the entrenched
positions of minorities and majority is feasible only if a comprehensive
strategy is put in place. That strategy must be geared toward building of
confidence measures through education and creation of new political culture and
values with the focus on tolerance and dialogue. In those terms a co-ordinated
action by domestic and international institutions is necessary.
Status
of Refugees
Introduction
In
resolving the refugee issue in the territory of former Yugoslavia the
authorities are primarily guided by their interest to round the ethnic
territories. This also applies to repatriation to domicile states. In view of
enormous humanitarian aid earmarked for that most vulnerable category of
population, the authorities in all the newly-emerged states had enough
manoeuvring room for constant manipulation. In the past decade the Belgrade
authorities engaged in twofold manipulation: firstly they depicted Serb
refugees as victims and encouraged their integration, and secondly, obstructed
their return. Such a tack proved to be lethal for refugees, for it increased
their confusion and prevented them from taking a firm decision either on return
or integration. Such persistent instrumentalisation of which refugees have been
fully aware, produced their sanctimonious relations with the authorities, for
the latter was to the only viable means of survival and adjustment to the
circumstances.
DOS
emulated the refugee policy of the Milosevic regime, although that ruling
coalition accelerated the citizenship-granting proceedings. DOS strategy
heavily reliant on foreign donations, proved to be unrealistic. As regards
refugees the new authorities showed only interest in having a large number of
refugees permanently settle in Serbia, but failed to tackle in a comprehensive
way a host of refugee-related problems. DOS turned a deaf ear to refugees' wish
to return, and consequently did not adequately engage in repatriation-related
talks with domicile countries.
Results
of the March 2002 census in Serbia best illustrated the fear of national
masterminds and strategists of Serbs "becoming a national minority"
and consequently their wish to keep all refugees in Serbia. Vojvodina which for
decades has been recording a sharp fall in birth rate, according to the last
census had 58, 120 more citizens, thanks to an enormous influx of refugees.
What makes the Serbian policy paradoxical are consistent efforts of national
strategists to retain large parts of territories, regardless of an
ever-dwindling number of Serb inhabitants living in them. Thus the reality is
at odds with the vision of an ethnically clean Serbia. Belgrade's Kosovo policy
should be also viewed in that light. Hence insistence on the return of Serbs to
Kosovo is also part of hypocritical policy of Belgrade. It aims at discrediting
and blackmailing the international community, and effecting the division of
Kosovo.
Prospects
for a satisfactory resolution of refugees' problems are bleak, in view of
Serbia's poor transition potential. Unresolved state status of Serbia
additionally compounds the refugee problem, for ambivalent signals and messages
sent to the refugee population only increase their confusion and make them
unsure of direction of their orientation. However it bears saying that the loss
of image or status of "innocent victims" in the wake of numerous
testimonies before the Hague Tribunal has created psychological problems in
relations with both the refugee and indigenous population (the latter has been
trying to shift the blame for the wars in Bosnia and Croatia on the former).
Refugee-Related
Legislation
Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) acceded to the Convention on the Refugee
Status on 15 December 1959, and to the Protocol on the Refugee Status on 15
January 1968. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, FRY, accepted all the
international acts which constituted the SFRY legal order. Hence its legal
obligation to implement and honour both the Convention and Protocol on the
Refugee Status. In view of non-promulgation of the Asylum Act,
provisions of the 1980 Act on Movement and Stay of Foreigners
are enforced in cases of all asylum-applicants. In the chapter titled "The
Right to Asylum" the Law spells out all conditions for asylum-granting,
the body granting that right to applicants/asylum-seekers, accommodation,
social and health care, and bodies granting right to both social and health
care and extent thereof, and second-instance body dealing with applicants appeals.
This Act does not contain the rules of "the safe country of origin"
and "the safe third country", nor it is fine-tuned to the
Convention's and Protocol's provisions on conditions under which some persons
may seek protection in the territory of the Federal Republic of Serbia.
If the asylum appeal is rejected, final decision is to be taken by the FRY
government.
Due to evident incompatibility between the FRY legislation and international
standards, notably European ones, in the area of protection of asylum-seekers
and immigrants, the Federal Interior Ministry as early as in 2001 started
working on the Asylum Bill and amendments to the Act on Movement and Stay of
Foreigners.
However both the Bill and amendments are yet to be adopted. The FRY is a transit
area for immigrants on their way to the Western and Central Europe.
In
the course of the year 2000 and 2001 about 200 such individuals sought asylum
in the FRY. But before pertinent decisions were taken, they had continued their
journeys to the aforementioned countries.
Because of an unstable economic and political situation in the FRY it still
does not represent a country fit for asylum-seekers and other kind of
protection envisaged under the international acts.
In
1992 the Republic of Serbia passed the Act on Refugees.
It covers only refugees of Serb and other descent/nationality who had residence
permit in the territory of the former Yugoslavia (SFRY)
Refugee status of individuals who did not have residence permits in the
territories of other republics of the former Yugoslavia is covered by the 1980
Act on Movement and Stay of Foreigners.
Regulations of that Act are not fully compatible with the provisions of the
Convention and Protocol on the Refugee Status. The 1980 Act on Movement and
Stay of Foreigners only regulates the right to obtaining the status as defined
under Article 50: "A foreigner who has abandoned the country of residence,
or the country whose citizen he or is, or who was a permanent resident of that
country but without citizenship in order to avoid persecution on grounds of his
or her progressive political views and leanings or national, religious, or
racial descent may be recognised the status of refugee in the SFRY." The
Act furthermore envisages the body competent for taking decision on recognition
of the refugee status, second-instance body for taking decisions on granting or
depriving of refugee status, provision of funds for accommodation and
subsistence for two years from the day on which application for the refugee
status has been submitted, and conditions governing the loss of the refugee
status. Other rights envisaged under the Convention and Protocol are not
regulated either by the federal nor or republican rules.
The
1992 Act on Refugees of the Republic of Serbia was applied only on residents
from territories of the republics making up the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. It was revised by the Federal Constitutional Court decision.
Amended were articles relating to the military service obligation of refugees,
which used to be equal to the one of domicile conscripts, and those relating to
the loss of the refugee status in case of non-fulfilment of military
obligation. That Act envisages conditions under which the refugee status is
obtained, the body competent for establishing the refugee status and loss
thereof, the body in charge of taking decisions on appeals against first
decisions, identification documents, provisions on accommodation of refugees,
financial assistance rendered to refugees, obligation to register and
de-register place of residence, the right to health care, education and
employment, the labour obligation, protection of collective and individual
rights of refugees, competence and prerogatives of bodies dealing with refugees
(the Commissariat for Refugees), manner of obtaining funds for the refugee care
and accommodation
The
republican Commissariat for Refugees is currently working on a refugee-related
Bill, while the other bill is being drafted at the proposal of the UNCHR and
Association of Refugees. Branko Radujko, adviser to the government of the
Republic of Serbia announced the adoption of the new Act on Refugees, and
formation of the action group tasked with fine-tuning the pertinent proposals.
Dario Karminati, President of the UNHCR in Yugoslavia, announced passing of the
new Federal Act on Refugees, regulating the status of individuals with
residence permits in the states outside the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
The FRY in the meantime was elected a new member of the Executive Board of the
UNHCR.
Sandra
Raškovic-Ivic, the republican Commissioner for Refugees, in the late June 2002,
stated that the republican government was preparing the Act on Displaced
Persons, aiming at regulation of property and social rights of displaced
persons from Kosovo.
This Act like the Act on Refugees, the Federal Act on Refugees, the Act on
Asylum, is yet to be passed.
National
Strategy
Sandra
Raskovic, the republican Commissioner for Refugees, presented the National
Strategy for Resolution of the Refugee and Displaced Persons Issues in June
2002. According to then disclosed data the FRY is the country with the largest
number of refugees and internally displaced persons in Europe. According to the
last census carried out in 2001 in Serbia there were 377,000 registered
refugees from the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, about 230,000
internally displaced persons from Kosovo and about 75,000 war-affected persons.
The government's strategy is two-tiered: resolution of the status of refugees
and of the status of internally displaced persons from Kosovo.
Strategy
related to refugees is based almost exclusively on personal orientation of
refugees. During the census refugees faced two options: repatriation/return or
stay in Serbia. The census results indicated that over 60% of them wanted to
remain in Serbia, while only 5% opted for return. 35% were undecided.
On the basis of the said findings the National Strategy laid the emphasis on
the resolution of the refugee problem through integration.
As
regards internally displaced persons from Kosovo, the strategy does not base
resolution of their problems on their wishes/orientation (return or
integration) but exclusively on the process of return to Kosovo. This tack is
compatible with the strategy of the government of Serbia for the resolution of
the status of Kosovo. Prime Minister Đinđic stated:" We demand
that Serbs in Kosmet be a constituent element and be granted collective, and
not individual rights. I for one think that the time is running out, and that
the resolution of that issue in the province must be accelerated. Therefore I
demand an immediate debate on the resolution of the status of Kosmet. In two
years time, any such solution would turn out to be tardy, in view of Kosovo's
gradual morphing into the state."
However
the government's position on return of displaced persons from Kosovo is not
shared by Sandra Raskovic,
the republican Commissioner for Refugees The forgoing essentially indicates two
different views on the problem of Kosovo. According to Sandra Raskovic
"the state's insistence on displaced persons' return is immoral, for in
the meantime the authorities don't even try to provide them with opportunities
to find permanent solutions in Serbia. They are facing the fourth winter of their
exile here and they must ponder their own and the their children's future
instead of waiting for an uncertain return. It is immoral to let people wait
for 10 years, and only then tell them: "Results were not good, let's now
look for a new solution."
While
conceiving its national strategy the government of Serbia failed to consult
refugees or their associations. Milorad Muratovic, President of Association for
Assistance to Refugees and Displaced Persons, voiced his doubts regarding the
veracity of the Commissariat figure on potential returnees. He said that those
willing to return outnumbered those officially declared as potential returnees.
He said that the "local integration was not successful, therefore the
return is the only solution, as indicated by the poll in which 259 refugees of
a total of 281 respondents were in favour of return.
This Association communicated to the general public that "the conservative
practice of exclusion of wishes of refugees continues, although the
repatriation process primarily hinges on the will, interests and possibilities
of refugees proper."
Dusan Banjac, President of Association "Return of Expelled
Krajisniks" raised similar objections. Namely he underscored "it is
only natural that the majority of refugees opted for the 'local integration' on
the census ballot, for they expect assistance from the state. On the other hand
it is also natural that the majority of expellees have an ambivalent position
on the return.."
Belgrade
weekly "Vreme" carried out a poll on refugees' views on the national
strategy. Neither refugee associations nor psychologist took part in
elaboration of the official strategy, although they could have given valuable
recommendations on behalf of refugees. That caused major suspicions of refugees
and by extension called into question the relevance of the project. Strategy is
based only on last year's registration-related figures "when people opted
for stay in Serbia or return to Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those who
decided to remain did not inquire about further plans, that is, where they
would live, what they shall do."
Radenko
Popic, representative of the Regional Committee for Assistance to Refugees
living in Vojvodina, was the most vocal faultfinder of the national strategy.
According to him that strategy was very bad for it did not reflect problems of
refugees, and "every delay produces new problems." He also said, that
"the state and competent bodies failed to contact persons familiar with
refugees problems and in the provincial government no-one is in charge of
refugees and displaced persons issues. That amply indicates the official
negligence and disregard for the fact that half of recent refugees live in
Vojvodina."
Other
indicators call into question 60% refugees inclined towards integration into
Serbia. For example by the end of 2001, 17,000 owners of houses and flats
applied for restitution of their property in Croatia. Those applicants took on
the obligation to return to Croatia if the local authorities repaired and
renovated their houses.
OCSE maintains that 50,000 Serbs from the Republic of Croatia would go back
with their families if their flats were restituted. All the foregoing indicates
that a considerable number of refugees are yet to take a final decision on
integration or return, pending on their interests in Serbia or in Croatia.
There
is still much confusion regarding the number of refugees with refugee status
living in Serbia and the number of those who according to the UNHCR, and the
government of Serbia have returned to the Republic of Croatia. According to
UNHCR of 200,000 Serbs who fled Croatia in the wake of the 1995
"Storm" Offensive, 90,000 have returned in early 2002. In 1996-early
2002 period the Croat authorities have registered about 29,000 returnees from
the Republic of Serbia.
According to the estimate of the Commissariat for Refugees of the Republic of
Serbia in 1996-2002 period 30,000 refugees from Serbia returned to the Republic
of Croatia.
According
to January 2002 UNHCR data 425, 307 displaced persons and 385, 788 refugees
returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is: 271,078 displaced persons and
352,863 refugees returned to Federation and 146,405 displaced persons and
32,925 refugees returned to Republika Srpska. UNCHR established that among
returnees to B&H there were 500,000 Bosniaks, and about 180,000 Serbs. Of
minorities, most numerous were Serb returnees to Federation (42,669), while in
the course of 2001 16,600 Serbs returned to Sarajevo.
According
to UNHCR in 2002 5,600 displaced persons returned to Kosovo from Serbia,
Montenegro and Macedonia. 60% of them were Serbs.
On
the basis of the divulged data one can note that a large number of refugees
shuttles between Croatia and Yugoslavia and B&H and Yugoslavia. This is due
to the fact that many refugees who have attained their status rights still face
unresolved property problems in Croatia (they were either stripped of those
rights or their property has been seized). Thus they still live in Yugoslavia
waiting for better repatriation conditions.
However
Milorad Muratovic stressed that the official bodies of Serbia and FRY
Yugoslavia did not disclose the real number of returnees, or "even tend to
intentionally reduce it." According to his estimate the number of
returnees is five times superior to the one registered during census. In his
opinion the most serious problem is lack of subsistence of refugees upon their
return. He mentioned the protest of 25,000 returnees to Sarajevo who in their
open letter to the public stated, that "they would be compelled to sell
their flats in Bosnia in order to survive."
Obstruction
of property restitution process, notably in Republika Srpska affects
repatriation in the part of B&H. According to Radenko Popic "the
ongoing practice of marginalisation of refugees by official institutions should
be stopped."We insist on concrete measures by each municipality aiming at
accelerating the return and attainment of property rights of refugees and
displaced persons in Republika Srpska and consequently in the whole territory
of B&H."
He criticised Serb and Yugoslav state institutions for failing to render
support to refugees associations. In his words "as uncooperative are
institutions in Republika Srpska." His words were backed by the following
statement of Drago Vuleta, Deputy Minister for Refugees and Displaced Persons
in Republika Srpska "of 105, 554 applications/claims for property
restitution in Republika Srpska only 52,974 were resolved by August 2002".
Integration-minded
national strategy has two goals: accommodation/housing of refugees and
employment of the poorest refugees. The latter is resolved by dint of so called
in- kind grants, granting of basic labour means, loans for setting up and
developing small-scale companies, employment in the successful companies, interest-free
micro-loans and grants given to the young and vocational re-training of
workers. The government plans to find permanent housing for 240,000 refugees
from Croatia and Bosnia by purchasing land allotments and holdings and
distributing building material for adaptation or building of houses.
Refugees
who have sold their property in B&H and started building single-handed new
houses shall get packages of building material. Refugees from collective
centres shall be taken care of through the program of social flats (yet to be
built) or through re-settling the elderly and infirm in gerontology centres or
rest- homes. Financially solvent refugees would solve their housing problem
through housing loans/mortgages (up to 20 years). It is estimated about $ 680 million
are needed for implementation of this program and that the process of
integration would last 8-10 years.
$600 million are needed for housing of 170,000
refugees in the next three years. $500 is expected from the international
community, while $ 100 million shall be provided from the republican budget.
In 2002 Serb government earmarked $ 5 million for housing of refugees. But
foreign donations, alike the government funds for that purpose were scarce.
Even the earmarked funds were not used for the original purpose, due to a
disagreement with the Commissariat for Refugees. Sandra Raskovic Ivic stated
that "the government's project was discontinued,
for the Commissariat assessed that funds incompatible with the projects of
national strategy would be squandered." She also complained that she was
under much criticism for allegedly "favouring other projects", which
in her words had been agreed upon before adoption of the national strategy.
Commissariat
tried to build 100 flats and purchase 230 holdings through the "PMC
Engineering" Company. But according to Sandra Raskovic "the
government did not want mediation of a military construction company." She
maintains that "the project was suspended because she, as a member of
Democratic Centre Party supported the DPS presidential candidate Mr.
Kostunica."
Branko Radujko denied her assertions and stated that the project suspension was
due to some vague implementation criteria."
Expected
foreign donations (to the tune of $ 500 million) did not materialise, due to
non-holding of relevant donors' conference. EBRD's 20 million EURO (for
building of 1,500 flats for refugees accommodated in collective centres) was
not granted because of Serbia's failure to accede to Council of Europe. Italian
NGO "Cooperazione Italiana" pledged funds for building of 700 social
flats in the territory of Republika Srpska, 70% of which would go to refugees
living in collective centres. But implementation of that project was postponed
for March 2003.
In
the course of 2002 ECHO distributed about 1,000 building material packages to
refugees.
ECHO and the Norwegian Council for Refugees financed adaptation and expansion
of rest-homes in Smederevo, Bečej, Šabac and Kanjiza accommodating about
150 elderly and infirm refugees.
German organisation ASB with UNHCR allocated EURO 400,000 for construction of
24 flats, 17 for refugees and 7 for homeless people in municipalities Bujanovac
and Medveđa.
The Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation together with UNHCR and
Municipality of Nis ensured funds for construction of 20 flats in Nis, to
provide housing for 85 refugees.
According to Sandra Raskovic Ivic in 2002 200 houses for refugees were built.
She failed to name the area and the financier.
She added that Commissariat together with Board for Reconstruction and Recovery
purchased 50 flats for refugees. However she failed to mention the location,
the nature of funds and flats (HP flats or gratis flats).
Results
of national strategy in 2002 were very modest. According to Mileta Dakic,
President of Association for Assistance to Refugees from the Republic of
Croatia, "the core issue are intentions of the domicile state. If the
construction of flats for refugees continued at the current pace, housing
problems of all refugees would be resolved in 700 years. We know that the FRY,
ravaged by sanctions, does not have the funds for helping integration of
refugees, but it is doing very little to help the return of of Serbs to their
homeland currently under the Croat sovereignty."
National
strategy is obviously unrealistic for integration is obviously based on
expectations of major foreign donations, amounting to EURO 500 million, geared
for housing of refugees. Even the amount of $ 5 million ensured by the
government of Serbia was not used for that purpose, because Sandra Raskovic
Ivic had tried to implement projects out of sync with the strategy of
integration. She stated that "the Commissariat did its best, but the
projects were rejected on grounds of their incompatibility with the
government's national strategy. But in my mind that strategy is not a constitution.
We should first cater to the needs of refugees."
Thus
unrealistic expectations of international community's further refugee-target
assistance covering 240,000 people are out of sync with the Spirit of
Convention on the Status of Refugees, and fundamental logic. Statement of
Mileta Dakic that "the media focus on refugees only through the strategy
of integration, although that document has not been fully disclosed" best
attests to the refugees' perception of the very strategy." According to
Dakic "the strategy's principal goal should be preservation of our (Serb)
national territories, or our 88% strong- land register in Krajina, for no
people on the earth pursue the strategy of renunciation of their lands."
Resolution
of the issue of displaced persons from Kosovo is exclusively tied to the return
to Kosovo, which indicates that the current, like the former authorities, have
accorded the same treatment to refugees. To put it briefly, refugees and
displaced persons are treated as an instrument for attainment of political
goals and state interests.
Life
in Serbia
Twenty
thousand refugees and 11,393 internally displaced persons are currently
accommodated in refugee centres.
Government of Serbia plans to close down all collective centres by the year
2005 "which presupposes a timely accommodation of current residents of
those centres."
Commissariat and Serb government plan to close by the end of 2003 98 of a total
of 343 collective centres in Serbia. 6,363 refugees would be moved out from
those collective centres. 1,408 displaced persons would be accommodated in
other collective centres, while a permanent solution for housing of refugees
would be sought. The Commissariat pledged to those refugees awaiting
restitution of their property, monetary assistance, food provisions for three
months and paid removal expense.
Government
of Serbia and the Commissariat for Refugees announced revision of collective
centres and re-assessment of status of refugees. This prompted Sandra Raskovic
Ivic to state that "Many refugees with the refugee status managed to have
their whole or part of property back. Some elderly refugees even managed to
leave their flats in Bosnia to their sons and daughters while still exercising
their refugee status."
Life
or refugees fits into the general socio-economic picture of Serbia. It has been
ascertained that 70% of refugees and displaced persons are black marketeers.
Quality of life in collective centres depends on the accommodating capacity and
the actual number of refugees living in them. Let us touch on the situation in
Kraljevo and Kragujevac, the two towns impacted by the influx of displaced
persons from Kosovo. Displaced persons from Kosovo have been recently bringing
pressure to bear on the municipal commissariats to accommodate them in
collective centres.
Situation in those centres is additionally exacerbated by the decision of many
international humanitarian organisations to downsize or stop the aid to
refugees in collective centres. WFP decided to continue distribution of aid only
to most vulnerable refugees in 2003. After that all its aid programs in Serbia
would be suspended.
Kevin Menion, Head of ECHO in Belgrade announced withdrawal of humanitarian
organisations from Serbia, for, as he put it, "we cannot continue to
finance humanitarian assistance in Serbia, in view of existence of more
threatened areas in Africa and in the Middle East. The fact is that in Serbia
the war consequences are still very much felt and that they shall be also felt
in the next five or six years, but that does not justify our further
money-spending here."
In
the territory of municipality of Zemun three make-shift refugee settlements
have mushroomed. They have all been built illegally, without corresponding
building licences. They don't have running water, electric power and paved
roads. The worst situation is in settlement Grmovac "which cannot be
legalised because houses were built on farmland. Its 1,200 inhabitants have
been without water and power for six years now."
Repatriation
Repatriation
figures vary, notably as regards the number of returnees to the Republic of
Croatia Restitution in most cases is still not feasible. Issue of tenancy
rights and restoration of destroyed houses is yet to be solved. Returnees also
face the problem of economic integration. Their predicament is additionally
exacerbated by withdrawal of many donors from Croatia. The foregoing shall make
more difficult sustainable repatriation of refugees.
The
Croat Parliament in July 2002 adopted amendments to the Act on Repeal of the Act on Interim Take-Over and Management of
Property and the Act on Compensation
for Property Seized during the Yugoslav Communist Rule. The amendments
suspended points 9,10, and 14 of the Program
on Return and Accommodation of Expellees, Refugees and Displaced Persons, and
Article 2 of the Act on Repeal of the Act on Interim Take-Over and Management
of Property. This practically indicates suspension of Housing Commissions, and
transfer of their tasks and duties to the Ministry for Public Works, Recovery
and Civil Engineering. But the novelty is the right of owner of property to
file appeals for establishment of ownership and eviction of interim lodgers to
the competent municipal court, which is duty-bound to act immediately upon such
appeals. The new Act also spells out that that the Ministry for Public Works is
duty-bound to take restitution decisions (at the latest by 31 December 2002)
relating to all owners who have not filed appeals by 1 August 2002. Under the
new provisions those refugees who had lodged appeals before 1 August 2002
should receive relevant decisions by 30 October 2002. But owners who receive
the said decisions shall not be able to enter into possession of their property
until adequate accommodation is ensured for interim lodgers. As the Ministry
for Public Works under the new law is empowered to rent the said property, this
is a new window of opportunity for accommodation of interim lodgers who cannot
be accommodated otherwise.
Amendments
to the second Act relate to the right to compensation of property owners whose
property had been seized in the post-WW2 period either by confiscation,
agrarian reform or nationalisation. Amendments also relate to the right to
property compensation of those owners or heirs who in 1991 had residence in the
UNTAES-administered territory. Thus refugees living in Serbia are entitled to
file their compensatory damage applications at the latest by 5 January 2003.
But that right was not accorded to refugees who in 1991 had resided in the
territory of Croatia, outside so-called Republika Srpska Krajina.
One
of the most salient examples of successful return is village Cukur in
municipality Hrvatska Kostajnica. According to the data of the Norwegian
Council for Refugees 80% of the pre-war population, mostly young people,
returned to the village. The obvious advantage of that village was complete
restoration of all houses by the NCR.
The
FRY-Croat ratified agreement on pension insurance (2001) is yet to be
implemented. Namely ratification instruments have not yet been exchanged.
In
contrast to Croatia, the return to Bosnia is visibly more intensive. That
large-scale repatriation was boosted by restitution of property to refugees
with tenancy rights, and restoration of destroyed houses financed throughout
2002 by numerous international organisations. Helsinki Committee for Human
Rights as an implementing partner of the International Rescue Committee
registered in 2002 over 200 families interested in return to municipality
Drvar. 80% of registered families have already returned and are waiting for the
IRC-and other international organisations-funded restoration of houses.
Thanks
to international donations for property repair, 70% of the pre-war population
returned to municipality Grahovo. We have also registered great interest in
return of former inhabitants of the current cantons 1 and 10, composed of
municipalities Bihac, Krupanj, Sanski Most, Kljuc, Kupres, Glamoc, Drvar and
Grahovo. According to Dusan Banjac nearly 80% of the pre-war residents would
like to return to their homes if they are repaired.
In
2002 repatriation to Tuzla and Sarajevo was stepped up. According to the
Association for Assistance to Refugees 300 families have filed applications for
return to Tuzla to municipal authorities in charge of housing issues, while by
mid-September thanks to mediation of that association 158 families effected
that return. Milorad Muratovic, president of the aforementioned association,
said: "My organisation has 94,000 applications for return to Sarajevo
canton."
But it bears mentioning that repatriation to Bosnia is exacerbated by a grave
economic situation and poor employment prospects, all of which lessens refugees
chances for full socio-economic integration."
Position
of Resident Population on Refugees
and
Displaced Persons
Bad
economic situation in Serbia, a difficult transition, and all the problems
stemming from the recent past, including non-facing up to war crimes and denial
of defeat led to massive rationalization, and shifting of the blame for
failures and defeat on others, including refugees. Milosevic trial in the Hague
and a large number of testimonies by Serbs from Republika Srpska Krajina and
Republika Srpska have increased the animosity towards refugees who are being
scape-goated for all troubles of Serb people. Added to that hate speech and
incidents targeting refugees from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo increased.
In
Kraljevo one citizen opened fire on the car with Kosovo license plate and
wounded four persons. That incident was provoked by interview of Ljubisa
Jovasevic, Mayor of Kraljevo to the daily "Pravi Odgovor". Namely
Jovasevic objected to employment of displaced persons from Kosovo in customs
offices, PTT, Power-Generation Company, and vocally prioritised employment of
13,000 jobless Kraljevo denizens. He said: "Kosovo Serbs have habits which
are totally contrary to habits and mind-set of domicile population. They also
brought large quantities of weapons and money obtained through plunder or sale
of their own property. They keep buying shops and flats, although they
regularly receive aid in kind, notably food provisions, from the Red Cross. But
they sell that food at local markets. All the foregoing irritates Kraljevo
Denizens and I fear that large-scale conflicts are quite possible in the near future.
Ljubisa
Tumbakovic, former coach of football club "Partizan" provoked an
incident at the 16 November press conference in Belgrade. He told a sports
reporter of RTS, Nedeljko Kovinjalo: "Listen you refugee, I shall be the
cause of your undoing here in my Belgrade!" That statement was condemned
by management of the football club, Association of Journalists of Serbia and
Association of Serbs from Croatia and B&H in Vojvodina, which furthermore
assessed that "Tumbakovic's words insulted all refugees in Serbia."
Tumbakovic subsequently tried to right the wrong by saying that he personally
helped many refuges in Bosnia and Croatia, but the fact remains that such and
similar incidents by public figures have an impact on public opinion and
heighten the tension and intolerance towards refugees.
Conclusions
and Recommendations
·
Refugees are still
politically instrumentalised in the face of de facto defeated Greater Serbia
project. This is best reflected in the integration-oriented policy of Serb
government in the face of wishes of many refugees to return.
·
Bad economic
situation in Serbia and lack of Serb funds for resolution of the refugee
problem led to an ill-designed and unrealistic national strategy exclusively
reliant on the international community's funds. But donations hinge on certain
international criteria and standards, which are contrary to Serbia's potential
and intentions.
·
Due to poor
assessments of potential international donations and insistence on integration,
refugees were denied possibility for other solutions, notably repatriation. In
fact Belgrade is compelling refugees to integration, by insisting on their sale
of property and application for tenancy rights.
·
Unless economy is
revived refugees shall remain part of pauperised population, prone to political
manipulation. Therefore the international community, notably EU should draw up
a comprehensive strategy aimed at economic revival of the region.
·
All the regional
governments alongside the international community, notably humanitarian organisations
and agencies, should focus on repatriation, due to a large number of refugees
being expressly interested in returning to their homes.
Status of Media
Introduction
Problems
in the media sphere in the second year of the DOS rule were exacerbated and
became much more transparent. The legal framework ensuring free work of media
and affirmation of journalistic profession was not put in place. In July 2002
the Act on Radio Diffusion was passed, but its implementation is still pending.
Despite numerous official announcements the Act on Public Information,
Telecommunications, and Free Access to Information is yet to be debated by
parliament. Overhaul of the key state-run media., notably of the
Radio-Television Serbia, or their morphing into the public services is yet to
be effected.
On
the other hand radical polarisation between former DOS members ( a camp
rallying around Democratic Party and a group of parties rallying around
Democratic Party of Serbia) affected the media sphere too. Most media have
divided loyalties, that is their editorial policies are either under sway of DP
or DPS. Thus numerous media have become instrumental in continuing showdowns of
officials of the two parties who tend to leak "exclusive information"
to the assorted or rather loyal media, all the while insisting on secrecy of
sources thereof. Most of thus disclosed information were run without prior
certification of their veracity. Hate speech was much used during the
pre-election race last summer, which cast doubt on the professional ethics of
journalists.
Various
key issues, notably the character of economic reforms, privatisation,
corruption, economic wrongdoing during the Milosevic era, co-operation with the
Hague Tribunal, war crimes, Kosovo, relations with Montenegro, were
overshadowed by those inter-party conflicts and showdowns. Those topics were
touched on only through various statements of representatives of the ruling
elite, or at official press conferences. This helped create stereotypical
pictures, while analytical and research journalism was totally sidelined.
Kosovo issue was treated uniformly, only within the context of problems of the
Serb national community. In competing for wider readership and better
frequencies the media make concessions to the ruling elite and consciously
renounce their key role in this stage of society's development, namely a
critical appraisal of the processes and trends which have a key impact on the
socio-political scene and the future position of Serbia.
Number
of criminal proceedings against the media is very large (about 200), and
journalists are tried under the Penal Act envisaging even prison terms or under
the Act on Obligatory Relations, envisaging exorbitant fines. Political
pressures on the media notably in some provincial milieus are frequent. On the
other hand many media engage in gutter journalism in a bid to ensure better
sales and wider readership. Uncertified information given by certain interest
groups is prioritised in material breach of the journalistic professional code
and at the expense of reputation and interests of certain local bodies, parties
and individuals.
Research
journalism is almost non-extant, not only because of poor media-related
legislation, and not very auspicious social climate for that kind of media
genre, but because of the situation in the media proper. Other most conspicuous
reason is self-censorship. According to Safeta Bišovac, journalist of
"Danas",
"Journalist tend to draw a line, and limit the contents and style of their
articles. Many journalists are loyalists of the old and new regime, and their
positions have nothing to do with the authorities pressures. Thus it is
unrealistic to expect more serious media in Serbia."
Mirjana
Vujovic, journalist of "Danas" and Belgrade's correspondent of TV
B&H explains that "journalists are aware of the fact that certain
structures of the former regime have not been placed under control of the new
state bodies. Therefore they are not ready to put their lives and careers on
the line."
Vujovic added: "Recently I was tasked with taking photographs of the house
in which Ratko Mladic was allegedly hiding. I was terrified for none of
by-passers or residents was willing to let on anything, or show me that house,
his hiding place. Thus I don't believe that any journalist would get an
adequate protection from his medium, or any other organisation if something
untoward befell him or her." She went on to note: "Many journalists
say that the riskiest task is the one involving writing about alleged connections
between the new authorities and mafia. Recently an editor-in-chief refused to
publish a scoop, because, in his own words 'why would we disclose it and risk
to have a bomb planted in our office, while the Interior Secretary keeps
mum."
On
the other hand, underpaid staffers are not motivated enough to tackle certain
topics. Large number of journalists employed by the state-run media gained
their professional experience only through press conferences and press
releases/communiques.
Numerous
media, notably the electronic ones, are barely surviving. In the imminent
future, following the enforcement of the yet-to-be-passed Act on
Radio-Diffusion, their number shall be halved. Many TV and radio stations face
an uncertain future. They don't know if they shall be privatised, transformed
into the public service, or closed down due to insolvency. The unresolved
ownership issue also burdens development of media, which stand good chances of
being greenlighted by the new Act.
The
market conditions are not equal, and competition is tough, for many media are
in a better position because of the large capital amassed thanks to their close
ties with the former regime. On the other hand the new authorities have not
taken steps to probe into the origins of that capital. TV Pink is the most
conspicuous example of the foregoing. That TV station, unlike other stations,
notably the national RTS, thanks to its state-of -the art technology is in the
position to develop constantly. It adjusted its editorial concept to the ideas
of the ruling party. The latter shall ensure its survival and good changes for
getting the national frequencies. When some media raised the issue of the
background of TV Pink's capital, that TV station launched a smear campaign
against its opponents. The footage shown included details from private lives of
Pink's opponents, and its structure and contents were reminiscent of police
files (sources of the broadcast information were not disclosed). Added to that
TV PINK tried to demonise its main rival in the competition for national
frequencies, and to induce a divide in TV B92, by airing by airing footage on
the TV-B92 privatisation scandal.
Media-Related
Legislation
Since
5 October 2002, only one law was passed. Namely in July 2002 the Act on
Radio-Diffusion was adopted (but not enforced). The Act on Public Information,
Telecommunications and Free Access to Information is yet to be passed.
The
last deadline for election of the Council of the Agency for Radio-Diffusion was
27 October 2002.
Ivan Andric, president of the parliamentary Committee for Culture and
Information, stated in late October that "the reason for this delay was
very simple: parliament was not convening."
This council shall have 9 members, a mandate for granting of national
frequencies, and a series of other important powers.
Originally
a 15-member Council (two members to be proposed by the government of Serbia and
Executive Council of Vojvodina) was planned. Its subsequent downsizing 9
members, under the final bill, indicates an increased influence of the state
(four members are to be proposed by assemblies of Serbia and Vojvodina,
government of Serbia and Executive Council of AP Vojvodina.) Other members
shall be appointed by University, the SOC and religious communities, NGOs,
journalistic, radio-diffusion, and professional associations of journalists,
artists and composers. It is paradoxical that professional associations of
journalists (three altogether) together with radio-diffusion companies and
associations of dramatic artists and composers are entitled to have only 1
appointee to the council, as do representatives of all religious denominations
in Serbia. Therefore the voice of the media representatives in the body dealing
with media has the same importance and weight as the voice of representatives
of church and religious denominations. Final say about the council's members
proposed by NGOs and institutions shall have Serbian parliament. That means
that the council's composition shall depend on the balance of power in
parliament. Eight members are to be elected by parliament. While one, from the
Kosovo, shall be elected by Council (and all this in the situation when the law
cannot be enforced in Kosovo).
Council
of Agency for Radio-Diffusion must be unbiased, for its main task is to halve
the existing number of radio and TV station and decide which stations are to be
closed down. Ivan Andric, President of the parliamentary Committee for Culture
and Information stated that in Serbia there were more than 1,200 radio and TV
stations, while there is need for only about 200-300. According to estimates
those "surplus" stations employ about 10,000 people, who shall
consequently become redundant. 3,500 RTS employees shall be axed. In Belgrade
currently operate 83 radio stations, while in London there are 17 and in
Budapest 23.
The
fact is that some stations, former stooges of Milosevic regime, thanks to the
amassed wealth and state- of-art technology and production facilities shall be
prioritised in frequency-granting. Hence that process may be very manipulative
and represent a source of future political influence on the media. Federal
Secretary for Information Slobodan Orlic stated that for the time being
frequencies are guaranteed only to the two channels of Radio Television Serbia.
He added that no radio stations were given guarantees as to getting the wanted
frequencies at the tender.
According to Orlic there are four national frequencies. The stations competing
for the national frequency must meet certain technical, program and financial
standards. In Orlic's opinion most likely candidates in that regard are B92, TV
Pink, TV BK, YU Info, and the Third Channel. "But as there are only four
frequencies, one TV station is in a no-win situation. That is why I suggested a
merger between YU Info and of the Third Channel, and their common bid at the
tender."
Due
to the postponed introduction of subscription for RTS, no transformation of
this state-run media house into the public service was effected. It shall be
subsidised from the republican budget, which in turn means, that it would
remain under control of the republican authorities. According to Vice Prime
Minister of Serbia Zarko Korac, the aforementioned delay was due to "a
delay in enforcement of the Act on Radio-Diffusion." He noted: "We must
first constitute the Council of Agency for Radio-Diffusion and make it take on
the role of the state in that area. Introduction of subscription was not
adequately presented to the general public and RTS leadership should organise a
campaign indicating clearly the whys and wherefores of that civil financing of
the future republican and provincial public service (into which RTS and TV Novi
Sad would be morphed."
Korac added that "subscription was unpopular because it had been once
introduced by the previous regime. Therefore we must present to citizens new,
non-commercial programs of RTS in order to stimulate them to help that media
house. Under the radio-diffusion law, 70% of money collected through
subscription in Vojvodina would remain in the province and would be used to
better the RTV Novi Sad programs, while 30% would go to Serbia."
Ownership
status of the state-run media is yet to be defined. Federal Information
Secretary Orlic stated that the national news agency Tanjug should be retained
in the new, common state, with 51% of the state capital (49% of its shares
should be privatised.) He added that the state would continue to subsidise
Radio Yugoslavia "for it is a short-wave radio station, whose counterparts
exist in many developed countries in Europe." Media house Borba was
transformed into three companies: Novosti with 70% private and 30% of state
capital, the printing house (80% state owned and 20% in shares) and 100%
state-owned "Borba" (but according to Orlic that company would be
shortly put on sale.)" We shall learn more about the fate of the federal
media, after enforcement of the Constitutional Charter.
Task
of elaboration of the Bill on Public Information was taken on by the Culture
and Information Ministry of Serbia. According to Deputy Minister for Culture
and Information Tamara Luksic-Orlandic legal experts and Independent
Association of Journalists of Serbia forwarded to the Ministry two different
versions of the Bill.
She added that thanks to mediation of international organisations positions of
the two groups were finally fine-tuned and the new version was drafted. She
also noted that the bill put forward by journalists was "shorter and
simpler" Gordana Suša, member of the journalistic team (Media Centre and
Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia) thus commented the
differences in the two bills: "Bill proposed by legal experts is
complicated and self-regulating. Our bill has 40 articles less, is more
succinct and -practical."
Public
debate on both bills began in June 2002. In the first bill legal experts over
insist on copious regulations and judicial arbitration in numerous instances,
while the second bill, proposed by journalists, is very much reliant on thecode
of ethics of the journalist trade. Legal experts' bill foresees ban on distribution
of a paper, or on broadcast of a program if they incite to violence. According
to Rade Veljanovsk and Miroljub Radojkovic, authors of the journalists' bill
"those provisions are conducive to censorship and technically not
feasible."
Freedom
of the Press
According
to findings of Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia
94% of respondents (polled journalists) consider that the print media are
restricted in conveyance of information (26% think that those restrictions are
minor, 34% both don't see and see restrictions, 28% see considerable
restrictions, while 6% talk about large restrictions). Over half of respondents
(62%) stated that they personally felt those restrictions (34% saw them as
minor ones, while 7% talked about considerable restrictions.) According to
respondents principal sources of restrictions were political pressures on
editorial policy of their media, auto-censorship (lack of courage, conformity),
editorial policy (based on political grounds), editorial policy (based on commercial
reasons) and lack of personal courage of editors and editors-in-chief.
President
of Association of Journalists of Serbia, Nino Brajovic, argues that
"officials if dissatisfied with some articles telephone to journalists and
editors to criticise or even threaten them. Our members often mention such
occurrences."
Journalists
and editors also spoke about restricted freedoms. Vladan Alimpijevic,
editor-in-chief of RTV Pancevo, stresses "we are still frequently used as
someone's mail-box. Radical shift in politicians' tack to media and journalist
is neded."
Alimpijevic went on to note that "journalistic freedoms are mostly
obstructed by the ownership structure of electronic media, but in Serbia no
information TV channel can bring profit to its owner." This
means that owners, have private, state or para-state interests and use
journalists only as simple bolts in a large machinery. Very much threatened are
informative media of local communities. They often face budgetary threats,
politicised editorial boards and inaccessible sources of information.
Daily
Politika in its editorial
underscores that work of journalists under conditions of "legal void"
is conducive to self-censorship. "Journalists independently assess how far
they can go in their critiques of negative trends and developments in society
and political arena."
Research
of the Belgrade Centre Marten Board
International, a licence partner of London-based British Research Bureau (done for daily "Blic") indicated
that 67.3% respondents thought that media did not have a critical stand on
authorities. (Research was carried out in 8-10 April 2002 in Serbia without
Kosovo.)
Most
institutions have not changed their position on journalists. Although most of
them, notably the Interior Ministry (Police) introduced press conferences, they
were turned into pulpits for praising successes of institutions proper. Other
relevant information are not accessible to journalists. Adoption of the Act on
Free Access to Information would help resolve many pertinent problems.
Verbal
attacks of local authorities on journalists in some milieus are a salient
problem. The next few examples indicate that journalists who touch on
"unpleasant topics" or dare pose more in-depth questions bear the
brunt of animosity of local authorities. Mayor of Čačak and President
of Nova Srbija Party (member of DOS), Velimir Ilic, became renowned for his
hate speech and verbal abuses of journalists. On 11 October, in his link-up to
the program "Front-Page" aired on TV Čačak he engaged in a
lengthy harangue against that station for alleging that the recently murdered
Sredoje Šljukic, a criminal, was the member of Nova Srbija. He threw insults at
the journalists of that station and threatened to replace them with "true
professionals".
He also accused them of being under the influence of Democratic Party. That TV
stations, part of publishing house Čačanski
glas, is financed from municipal budget. The presenter interrupted the
program and in the first news program the TV station's communique was read.
Namely TV Čačak asked the authorities, representatives of municipal
assembly, president of Management Board of TV station and Director of
Publishing House Čačanski Glas, to respond to that incident.
A
day later (12 October 2002) Velimir Ilic and his bodyguards forcibly entered
the offices of TV Čačak and started insulting journalist and editor
Vesna Radovic, and Jelena Katic, presenter of the program
"Front-Page". He told Radovic that "she'd better give a wide
berth to TV Čačak from now on."
That violent behaviour of Ilic was supported by editor-in-chief TV
Čačak, Predrag Urosevic, who banned re-broadcast of
"Front-Page" and airing of press release related to the second
incident. That press release signed by most staffers read: "We appeal to
the general public to protect our professional and personal integrity." In
the wake of the second incident Ilic continued to insult journalists of TV
Čačak and vilify them as "notorious junkies" At a press
conference which Ilic held together with director of Čačanski Glas and Acting Editor-in-Chief of TV
Čačak Ilic said that "Vesna Radovic and Jelena Katanic tried to
discredit Nova Srbija Party and him personally during the electoral silence,
because of his pro-Kostunica activities during the presidential campaign.
Ilic also said that he would file misdemeanour charges against Vesna Radovic
and Jelena Katanic for "breaching the electoral silence" and
"divulging misinformation."
He added that editor of TV Čačak and director of Čačanski Glas told him they would suspend both women.
Ilic also accused the Belgrade news agency Beta of "taking an active part
in the whole scandal." Federal Information Secretary Slobodan Orlic
admitted in his press release that "unfortunately there are many similar
abuses of power in local milieus. That last outburst of Velimir Ilic should be
condemned by democratic public opinion and adequately punished by those who are
in charge of protection of journalists and respect of laws."
This
trend of arrogant and threatening behaviour by the state and officials was best
illustrated by the response of Serbia's Interior Secretary Dusan Mihajlovic to
the "unpleasant question" of Radio
Belgrade 202 journalist. Namely at Mihajlovic's press conference the
journalist asked him: "Is it possible that you, as a member of the
Management Board of "Jugoimport" (the state-owned company dealing in
arms exports) , were not informed about illegal arms sales to Iraq?". And
Mihajlovic retorted: "If you want to be brazen, I can sue you for slander.
I have repeatedly denied my involvement, and now I don't have to prove anything
to you. If you have any relevant information, go an disclose them, and I shall
be grateful to you for that."
President
of the Executive Board of municipality of Pozarevac and member of Democratic
Party Zoran Marjanovic slapped "Danas" correspondent Mileta Veljkovic
during an impromptu interview. After a shooting incident targeting Robert
Vesic, the owner of the jewellery shop, Veljkovic tried to interview at the
scene of incident several local DP officials. In view of the recent murder of
an unidentified male, Veljkovic asked local power-holders what was happening in
the town and how they accounted for the two successive incidents, Marjanovic
retorted: "I am sick and tired of you," and then slapped the
journalist.
Veljkovic said that he would file charges against the local power-holder. Zoran
Zivkovic, Vice President of Democratic Party, condemned that incident and told
daily "Danas" that Marjanovic would have to be punished for his
misdemeanour. Popular Movement Otpor publicly
demanded that the competent bodies institute proceedings against Zoran
Marjanovic, President of Executive Committee of Pozarevac Municipal Assembly
and asked the municipal MPs to relieve Marjanovic of his duties.
On
10 May 2002 a hand bomb exploded in front of the family house of Goran
Đurđevic, Acting Director of Radio-Publishing Company Novi Put and MP of Jagodina municipal
assembly. According to Đurđevic the bomb was planted because of his
recent appointment to the post of director of local media house.
"Many are against any probe into their past activities. Our staffers
received threats too. This is an attempt to intimidate them even more. If the
police continue to turn a blind eye to such threats and perpetrators go
unpunished, I shall not be able to give sensitive assignments, notably probes
into misuses of power and criminal, to my journalists, for it would be too
risky.", Đurđevic told "Blic". A year ago
"Večernje Novosti"'s correspondent Milan Pantic was killed in
Jagodina. He was then engaged in a probe into financial mishandling of local
power-holders. Police are yet to disclose the results of their investigation
into that murder.
Vojislav
Šešelj recently made a statement, carried by daily "Danas" (28
December) on its front-page, which epitomises the most rabid hate speech:
" 'Danas' is the prime example of gutter journalism in Serbia. It is the
most lurid paper. When I see their obituaries I know that a very bad person has
died." Grujica Spasojevic, editor-in-chief of "Danas" filed a
slander suit against Šešelj on 13 September 2002 because of Šešelj's statement
ran by weekly "Svedok" that " 'Danas' is a US medium edited by
the CIA." Spasovic's lawyer Goran Draginic explained that the lawsuit was
filed against Šešelj and not "Svedok" for " 'Danas' does not
want any other paper to be punished in view of it recent past which saw it
involved in many similar lawsuits and -paying exorbitant fines."
Judicial
Proceedings Against Media
Outlets
and Journalists
In
2002 many proceedings were instituted against the media and journalists. Of
great concern is the fact that some lawsuits filed before 5 October 2000 by
members of the former regime were finally handled by courts of law. The
foregoing is due to the fact that in Serbia the media-related legislation still
has not been put into place. Charges against journalists are filed under the
Act on Criminal Proceedings, Article 92 relating to slander. That article
envisages fines, but also up to 3-year prison terms. The Act on Contractual
Relations foresees non-financial compensation for sustained mental pain and
suffering and damages to personal reputation, honour, freedom and rights. The Act
on Contractual Relations spells out exorbitant fines. But the aforementioned
number of lawsuits indicates that the media are not yet ready to embrace
"responsible journalism" and the pertinent ethic code.
According
to "Glas javnosti"
200 proceedings against journalists are under way before courts of law in
Serbia. The gravest punishment was meted out to Stevan Niksic in January 2002
(the then editor-in-chief of weekly "NIN") in a slander lawsuit filed
against him by Aleksa Đilas, a publicist. He was sentenced to five months
prison term, that is, 2 year conditional prison term.
Rudolf
Mihik, director of Hungarian language paper Magyar
Szo, was fined with 15, 000 dinars, for a slanderous commentary
"Guests at Don Corleone's Dinner Party". Charges were filed by
Miroljub Aleksic, the then director of Subotica plant "Pionir", who
hosted that dinner -party for members of Serbian government. Dmitar Šegrt,
former high official of the Socialist Party of Serbia and director of company
"Toza Markovic" took to court Željko Bodrozic, editor of local paper Kikindske novine for a slanderous
article "Born for Reforms." Bodrozic was fined with 10,000 dinars.
Former Prime Minister of Serbia and official of the Socialist Party of Serbia
Mirko Marjanovic took to court Zorana Šuvakovic, journalist of
"Politika" for a slanderous text "Terror Campaign in Knin"
in which he was portrayed as "a cloned politician with villas, bodyguards
and luxurious cars." Marjanovic is demanding 3 million dinars as compensation
for his tainted reputation. High DP official and adviser to the Federal
Interior Secretary Goran Vesic filed a libel lawsuit against tabloid
"Nacional" for alleging that he "criticised editor of magazine Hasler for running a text on
Čedomir Jovanovic." According to Glas
Javnosti daily Blic is currently
involved in fifty lawsuits, Danas in
nearly fifty and Glas javnosti in 31.
On
order of municipal court in Kragujevac company "Svetlost" publisher
of a weekly "Nezavisna
svetlost" was fined 270,360 dinars
for running a slanderous article on a Students' Hostel in Kragujevac. Dragan
Marisavljevic, former director of that Hostel and member of SPS leadership in
Kragujevac filed a lawsuit against "Svetlost" in summer 1995. The
publishing company's appeal to the Supreme Court of Serbia is still pending.
Director
and editor-in-chief of Pozaervac "Radio Bum 93" Milorad Tadic
received a court ruling obliging him to pay the court-determined fine, or-to
serve a month long prison sentence. Radio Bum 93 and Milorad Tadic were
punished in June 2000 for "not possessing a broadcasting licence"
(charges filed by the federal Ministry of Telecommunications)
(This is a very conspicuous case of selective punishment, for at the time 500
electronic media were operating without corresponding licences.)
Daily
"Danas" was fined with Euro 5,000 as compensation for inflicting
psychological pain and suffering to author Dobrica Cosic. Cosic filed a libel
suit against "Danas" for publishing a commentary alleging that
"Ćosic, the then FRY President ordered shelling of Vukovar". The
article was penned by Milan Čolic. The fact is that "Danas" made
a gross professional oversight, for during the shelling of Vukovar Ćosic
was not discharging any political function. But Association of Independent
Media also assessed that Danas ran
the controversial text without editorial board commentary and position, but
also ran Ćosic's disclaimer, thus providing him with an opportunity to
rebut accusations contained in the text. AIM states in its communique
that "in line with international standards courts of law in such cases
must take into consideration the fact that "too heavy fines generate
danger of self-censorship, which then jeopardises freedom of press and public
information." The role of courts of law in this area is still important
due to absence of the Act on Information. Therefore courts should carefully
ponder their rulings, and take into account the impact of their decisions on
the important social interests."
Scandal-Mongering
Politicians
exert influences on media by leaking "exclusive information" about
scandals relating to various misuses of the top state institutions or
high-ranking state officials. Those information don't result from genuine
research journalism efforts. Various economic and political centres deftly leak
them, thus ensuring their subtle sway over both print and electronic media. On
the other hand journalists and editors frequently deny that such a mechanism is
in place. Media frequently mention "anonymous sources", and as
frequently fail to check the veracity of provided information and tend to
disregard its true purpose (such 'scandalous' information are often used in
showdowns between political parties and their leaders). The two most powerful centres
which hold sway over media are the Bureau for Communications of Government of
Serbia (its former Secretary Vladimir Popovic-Beba) and Cabinet of the FRY
President Vojislav Kostunica (that is, Kostunica's spin-doctor Aleksandar
Tijanic).
Zarko
Korac, Vice Prime Minister of government of Serbia in charge of media, told a
journalist: "Can't you see that in Serbia some media charge for running
some articles? Don't you know that some journalists are on the pay-rolls of
powerful parties and groupings?"
On
order of the District Public Prosecutor Rade Terzic the police interrogated
editor-in-chief of weekly Reporter
Vladimir Radomirovic because of the allegation contained in the text
"Interception-Monitoring Services in the Government Building", namely
that "in the building housing the Communication Bureau of government of
Serbia there are monitoring devices." Radomirovic told Radio B-92:
"The police came to interrogate me after intervention by Vladimir Popovic
-Beba, Đinđic's spin-doctor, that is, his letter to Reporter warning the weekly that it
would be taken to court because of allegations contained in the controversial
text." In his letter Popovic
noted that "the term 'protected source', frequently used in journalism in
recent times, cannot be an excuse for covering up a grave criminal offence,
including unauthorised bugging. I am sure that you will reach a deal with
police and prosecution in order to protect the identity of your source."
District
Public Prosecutor Rade Terzic, who asked that the aforementioned allegations be
checked, told Beta that "in that
way I wanted to find out a perpetrator of the criminal offence, if any."
He added that Reporter was asked to
check to sources, and existence of the bugging devices in the Bureau's
building. Radomirovic argued that the police was interested only in the author
of the text and the sources.
Founder and director of Reporter Perica
Vucinic said that the police came twice to bring pressure to bear on staffers.
He added: "The regime intends to constantly pile pressure on media. They
are very much interested in the identity of our sources."
Police interviews or interrogation of journalists is not clearly defined under
the law. According the Act on Criminal Proceedings, Article 96, "any
person may be summoned as a witness if it is believed that he or she could
provide information on the criminal offence, circumstances and perpetrator
thereof." Article 97 also explains who the privileged witnesses are, that
is spells out that "the nature of persons who are not duty-bound to
disclose what they have uncovered in performing their duties." Journalists
are not explicitly quoted as privileged witnesses, and that role of theirs
depends on "interpretation of law."
On
order of prosecutor Rade Terzic, "Danas" journalist Nataša B. Odalovic
was summoned to the police interview on grounds of allegations exposed in the
column "The Cage Looks for a Bird". She said that the police was
mostly interested in her allegation that Kostunica's spin-doctor Aleksandar
Tijanic accused her of being a close friend of Serb Prime Minister
Đinđic and his media adviser Beba Popovic, termed by Tijanic
"close friends of mafia clans." After reading her a line "There
shall be more ordered assassinations, and Tijanic shall keep mum", the
police asked her: "Where did you get that information?" Odalovic said
that she admitted having received that information from Dusan Mihajlovic, Serb
Interior Secretary. "When they asked me when, I said that Mihajlovic made
that statement at his press conference." She added: "in the country
in which murders are becoming commonplace, one should no longer keep silent
about Tijanic's allegations that Prime Minister orders Surčin gang to
commit murders through his spin-doctor Popovic." Tijanic accused Odalovic
of having disclosed parts of their private conversation and in what the DOS
Women Political Network termed as 'virulent hate speech' against the journalist.
Both
scandals (Reporter and the
Odalovic-Tijanic clash) took place on the eve of presidential pre-election
race. At the time conflict between DOS and DPS escalated and some other
scandals were mongered ("General Pavkovic Affair"). All those
scandals received wide media coverage. At the same time some thorny social
topics were sidelined. Milica Lučic-Čavic, President of Independent
Association of Journalists stated that "the media in some cases are prone
to manipulation. They get some fishy information and they pursue it, instead of
acting as the public service of all citizens of this country, that is, devoting
their attention to key social issues."
Case
"Odalovic-Tijanic" like some others, raised the issue of disclosure
of private conversations and furthermore indicated that the journalistic code
of ethics should be urgently adopted. Independent Association of Journalists is
working on a draft thereof in line with the newly-emerged circumstances. (the
code in place was adopted in March 1994). In 2002 the new code of ethics of
electronic media was adopted by presidents of Independent Association of
Journalists of Serbia, Association of Independent Electronic Media and
Association for Development of Private Radio-Diffusion "Spektar."
Underpaid
journalists are an easy prey to manipulation. According to the survey on the
financial status of journalists carried out by Independent Association of
Journalists of Serbia (July 2002), which covered 790 respondents, regular
monthly pay of 84% of journalists was between Euro 35 and 260, while the
average one was Euro 130. One third of the polled journalists don't enjoy paid
social and health benefits.
Media
Position on the Recent Past and
The
Hague Tribunal
After
the June 2001 hand-over of Slobodan Milosevic to the Hague Trbunal, all the
state-run media attempts to more seriously deal with or probe into war crimes
committed against non-Serb civilians were foiled. For example, the state-run
RTS suspended live broadcasts of Milosevic trial. It turned out that articles
on discovery of mass graves in Serbia were used only to bolster public support
for Milosevic's hand-over. Politicians and elite opted for bowing to the
prevailing public opinion, instead of exacting changes thereof. This prompted
many independent media to follow suit. They realised that their struggle for
frequencies, large distribution and ads would be more successful if they did
not rock the boat too much. But few independent media did not renounce their
facing projects (some of which are flawed and bereft of the true understanding
of the topic).
In
his defence of editorial policy of "Vreme" Cerovic maintains that
"The Hague Tribunal is the instrument of the very forces which dropped
humanitarian bombs on all parts of Serbia. I fear that in Serbia the faith in
the Hague Tribunal is not likely to increase." Many share his opinion,
which indicates that the print and electronic media don't see themselves as key
protagonists in building a positive image of the ICTY and in encouraging the
facing of the Serb population up to their moral responsibility for atrocities
and wanton destruction committed in their name.
In
2002 coverage of the ICTY developments slowly dwindled and was transferred from
international affairs pages to those dedicated to internal ones.
Issue
of media's position on crimes committed against non-Serb population, was for
the first time tackled in weekly "Vreme", renowned for its anti-war
position during the war in Bosnia. But the polemic was launched only in
response to the statement of Chair of Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in
Serbia Sonja Biserko, and not by the weekly itself. Namely Sonja Biserko
pointed out that "media tend to generalise and relativise crimes and take
a negative stand on the ICTY. At the time when the crimes are increasingly coming
to light, and evidence becomes more accessible, Serb society, or to put it more
precisely, its elite, are making concerted efforts to relativise and de-ethnify
war crimes. The way that "new truth" is marketed via media, notably
via so-called independent media, spearheaded by B 92 or Vreme, is as
totalitarian as was nationalism which recently fuelled the war machinery."
Provoked
by that statement, editor-in-chief of "Vreme" Dragoljub Zarkovic
wrote editorial "De-Helsinkization of Ms. Biserko". According to him
that editorial was written in defence from "terms used by Ms.
Biserko." After that editorial (ran in early August 2002 by
"Vreme") the polemic evolved on the pages devoted to the column
"Letters and Reactions". It lasted nearly 4 months. 77 letters and 50
authors took part in it. Editorial board ended the polemic on 28 November by
stating "we are still receiving letters, but only those in support of our
editorial policy."
Debate on positions on crimes spread to some other print and electronic media
(Nin, Blic News, Danas, B92) but in another shape (interviews or articles on
the controversial issue along with quotations from the Vreme-ran polemic or
statements of protagonists).
In
the early stages of the polemic the focus shifted from "personality of
Sonja Biserko" (attack and defence) "to her positions, that is to the
following issue: is her statement that Serb elite and independent media (Vreme
and B 92) do their best to relativise and de-ethnify the crimes true or
not?". And then the two lines of thinking crystallised: one advocated by
"Vreme" and its defenders who floated the thesis of objective
coverage of the weekly and necessity to de-ethnify crimes, for their
ethnification was tantamount to "the collective guilt of the whole people",
and the other advocated by defenders of Biserko's positions namely that
ethnic-cleansing cannot be de-ethnified, for at issue is the moral
responsibility of the whole society, and not "collective guilt of the
people."
Thus we saw the two confronted positions on the near past, or on war crimes and
importance of their disclosure for the future and present of Serb
society."
Most participants in the polemic used to be the like-minded thinkers who made
up the nucleus of anti-war opposition during wars in Croatia and Bosnia.
Media
used to attach more importance to Milosevic's denials than to testimonies.
Lawyer Srđa Popovic, in analysing the Hague coverage of "Vreme"
noticed an inadequate title: "Milosevic Says that the YPA Did Not Kill
Prisoners in Vukovar". Popovic stressed that the news was not Milosevic's
"response to the testimony" but the "very testimony of Croat
President Stjepan Mesic". Therefore, according to Popovic the headline
should have been: "Mesic Says the YPA Killed Sick Civilians in
Vukovar." He went on to note: "That may impact the court's decision,
and not Milosevic's naked, and procedurally irrelevant denial of veracity of
that testimony. The two headlines surely influence every reader
differently". Popovic also added that " a number of other, publicly
accessible, sources prove Mesic's claim."
Nearly
all the media, including those which gained prominence by their anti-war and
anti-nationalistic editorial policy during B&H war (but not during the
Kosovo crisis) relativise moral responsibility of Serb people by extensive
coverage of statements of advocates of the thesis that "there were crimes
everywhere", "why there aren't more Croat war crime indictees"
(and consequently "Croats have a better tack to the Hague Tribunal").
Some media devoted more attention to "the post-WW2 Communist crimes"
than to causes and consequences of recent wars. In other words coverage of the
former intentionally aims at minimising the latter, or the 90's crimes.
Unfortunately that policy was adopted by some media which were expected to deal
more seriously with the recent past.
Hints
that the popular TV station Pink would broadcast a serial on responsibility of
journalists for the recent wars, was condemned by the very elite which was
opposed to Milosevic in the 90's. That elite thought that the move would be
hypocritical in view of close links between owner of that TV station Zeljko
Mitrovic with the former regime (Mitrovic was a high official of the Associated
Yugoslav Left). And that serial was never broadcast.
Testimonies
of two journalists from Serbia, Dejan Anastasijevic and Jovan Dulovic before
the Hague Tribunal were resented and criticised by their colleagues.
Editor-in-chief of "Blic" one of the largest-circulation dailies,
said that "journalists are not second or first-rank citizens, therefore
they should not be accorded a special treatment during their testimonies."
In his opinion "it is up to a journalist to take or nor take on the role
of witness." Simonovic also said that "A separate issue is the impact
of such testimonies on their profession … it would not be good if journalists
were viewed only as witnesses during such events." Dragan Vlahovic, deputy
editor- in-chief of Glas javnosti is absolutely against such role of
journalists "for such a duty is not envisaged by their job
descriptions."
Editor-in-chief of NIN, Slobodan Reljic, thinks that "journalists should
only exceptionally take on the role of witnesses…which was not the case with
Dulovic and Anastasijevic, for they only echoed common denominators". One
of the proposals of the Information Act (to be debate shortly) is that "a
journalist may disclose his source of information only if at issue is a
criminal offence entailing a prison term of over 5 years."
Dilemma
of testimony-giving by journalists was pondered also by some international
journalistic organisations. Radomir Licina, President of Board of the Media
Organisation of South East Europe, stated that his organisation thought that
"journalists have the right and obligation on professional grounds to refuse
to testify before the court, but those who want to do that, deeming such
appearance their personal moral obligation, must be allowed to testify."
According
to claims of NGO "Toplica Initiative" local authorities banned
broadcasts of the film on massacre of 16 Muslims and the film
"Friends" on recent wars in Yugoslavia. Speaking about the mechanism
of banning those films, Executive Director of Toplica Initiative Igor Kostic
says that institutions with adequate premises should not be allowed to rent it
without permission of the local authorities. "They are throwing the court
in someone else's courtyard, while we all know that president and vice
president of municipality always have the final say," says Igor Kostic.
President
of Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia, Milica
Lučic-Čavic stated that the top editorial and other positions in
media were still occupied by the most vocal "war-mongering"
journalists.
She assessed that DOS did not distance itself from them, which "encouraged
the latter and make them launch a major counter-offensive."
Conclusions
and Recommendations
In
order to create conditions for free functioning of media and affirmation of
journalistic profession laws on public information, telecommunications and free
access of information should be urgently adopted, and the Act on
Radio-Diffusion should be implemented. Within that context it is necessary to
carry out transformation of the state-run media, notably of Radio-Television
Serbia, into a public service.
Every
journalist must have the rights which ensure and guarantee publishing of his
articles of public interest, but must be also aware of his/her personal
responsibility in regard to the contents of his articles. Editors and
journalists shall contribute to betterment of their profession if they check
their information before publishing it. That is one of the subtle ways of
countering manipulations to which they are subjected by the political and
economic elite. Current situation in Serb media demands holding of public debates
on professional ethics in journalism.
Radicalisation
of situation and contradictions of the transition process in Serbia necessitate
more analytical and research journalism. In view of major personnel problems
and those related to training of journalists there is much need for staging
courses of analytical and research journalism in co-operation with the
international media institutions and houses. .
Facing
up to the past and the negative portrayal of the Hague Tribunal by media is
increasingly becoming the issue of morals, and the one of a clean break with
the policy of former regime. Position on that issue shall determine the future
of Serbia and its relations with neighbours. Therefore it is important that
both the print and electronic media start tackling that topic with more
understanding.
PART 
FIVE
Integration of Region on
New Foundations
(Sustainability of the State Community
of Serbia and Montenegro)
1. Historical Background
Serb
nationalists have always treated Montenegro as the Serb ethnic territory, which
made Montenegro the first target of any Serb national program or expansion
campaign. Montenegro attained its statehood in the 20th century for
the second time in the Second Yugoslavia. Then Montenegrins were emancipated as
a nation, and asserted that emancipation under the 1974 Constitution. Serb
nationalists viewed the Montenegrin statehood as "de-Serbisation of
Montenegro." After suspension of autonomies of Kosovo and Vojvodina
Montenegro bore the brunt of anti-bureaucratic revolution and Belgrade's
anti-Yugoslavia campaign. At the 1991 Hague Conference which offered a
framework for preservation of the Yugoslav state community, Montenegrin
leadership together with other republics (barring Serbia) signed the proposed
agreement on the loose federation. But after Belgrade's enormous pressure,
Momir Bulatovic was compelled to withdraw his signature and Montenegro from
then on became an accomplice of the Serb project (until 1997).
After
its refusal to take part in the Kosovo war Montenegro became an independent
partner of the West (notably during the intervention and until October 2000).
Since then the process of emancipation of Montenegro was accelerated and it
peaked following the April 2001 and October 2002 (at which the sovereignty-minded
block scored major victory) parliamentary elections.
However
after 5 October 2000 international community recognised the FRY, although its
legitimacy was controversial in view of Montenegrin developments. That
recognition on the one hand made easier relations with the former Yugoslav
republics and cleared the way for normalisation of relations in the region, but
on the other hand generated new confusion and threatened to exacerbate
relations with Montenegro. And those relations indeed grew sour in the past
three years. As regards Montenegro recognition of the FRY was seen also as a
pressure on that republic to check the process of independence-gaining, which,
as things stand now, is unstoppable.
In
the past three years Montenegro has via
facti grown independent, and the federal state in fact stopped functioning
in the territory of that republic. After passing amendments to the 2000
Constitution by manipulating federal institutions, the FRY, as defined under
the 1992 Constitution, ceased to exist, due to suspension of equality of
member-countries which constituted the gist of the FRY. At the 1992 referendum
Montenegro opted for living in a common state, but expressly as a
"sovereign republic", in line with guarantees enshrined in the
Constitution. Montenegro did not recognise forcible amendments to the 2000
Constitution and subsequently 24 September 2000 elections and institutions of
the federal state stemming from the then election results. A large majority of
Montenegrin voters by boycotting those elections backed the decision of legal
Montenegrin bodies and thus obtained legitimacy for their country and
simultaneously denied the FRY legitimacy.
However
the Serb political prime movers failed to face the reality and the state of
affairs, notably the fact that Montenegro and independent Serbia were a natural
epilogue of the collapse of former Yugoslavia. In its insistence on the common
state DOS relied on the Western, that is, European position. DOS formalised
continuity with Milosevic's regime by setting up federal institutions with the
Montenegrin Socialist Popular Party, which as a former coalition partner of the
Socialist Party of Serbia and the Serb Radical Party ensured its influence in
Montenegro. Despite favourable circumstances for Serbia, sustainability of
community between Serbia and Montenegro is becoming increasingly problematic.
The foregoing is best illustrated by a very ambivalent character of the
Belgrade Agreement of 14 March 2002, by which, thanks to the EU brokering, the
FRY was morphed into the union of two states.
Position
of the Belgrade regime on Montenegro enjoys large backing of the Belgrade
media, whose role in promoting Greater Serbia ideas has not essentially
changed. Belgrade media showed very little sensibility for Montenegro and its
idiosyncrasies. Their anti-Montenegrin stand is reminiscent of the late 80's
campaign against Slovenians, Croats and Albanians. The entire media scene
favours and even panders to pro-Serb forces in Montenegro, while the official
Belgrade backs them through the Federal Parliament and bankrolling the media
run by the Montenegrin opposition coalition which represents that republic in
the federation. The largest backing in that regard is provided by V. Koštunica,
the FRY President, his cabinet and party, the Army of Yugoslavia and the Serb
Orthodox Church (the SOC).
SOC takes a specific stance on Montenegro.
Namely it treats Montenegro as the Serb ethnic territory and often interferes
into issues of great political and state interest. Such trends usually become
conspicuous during Christmas celebrations when the SOC directly confronts
increasingly popular Montenegrin Orthodox Church and frequently even on the eve
of elections.
Yugoslav
Army during Milosevic's regime piled pressure on Montenegro, notably after
Đukanovic took office in January 1998. Pro-Serb opposition then organised
protests and demonstrations, and did the same thing during the NATO
intervention. However, today there is no danger of direct military operation in
that republic. Thanks to presence of NATO forces in the region, use of force in
Montenegro is not possible. Army has not longer the role it had during the
recent wars, and cannot wage wars. SOC took on the role of the key advocate for
preservation of the Serb ethnic territory which explains it aggressive conduct
in every day life.
In
taking an uncritical stand on Belgrade after 5 October 2000 the international
community sidelined the Montenegrin authorities, whereas EU together with
Serbia piled pressure on them. Pressure of international community, Belgrade
regime and SOC was excessive in view of a real importance of Montenegro. In the
face of that pressure and blackmail of international community, which in a very
unselective way tackled the issue of corruption among the Montenegrin prime
movers, Montenegro managed to preserve its independent position and won its
right to independence.
Legacy
of Milosevic's regime, lack of readiness of DOS to make a clean break with
Milosevic's policy, and above all refusal to co-operate with the Hague Tribunal,
have slowed down transition in Serbia and subsequently led to change of
position of the international community on Serbia, that is Montenegro. The
Belgrade Agreement on the Union of Serbia and Montenegro brokered by Xavier
Solana, due to the aforementioned circumstances, produced major concessions for
the Montenegrin side. Morphing of the FRY into the two-state union flexibly
envisages a referendum on independence of Montenegro within three years.
Objective weaknesses of Serbia have stripped the Belgrade regime of legitimacy
in defining the new state community. Despite the initial pro-common state EU
position, developments are favouring Montenegro's option for independence, for
the latter confirms the inevitable logic of the final dissolution of the SFRY.
2.
Belgrade's Attempts to Retain Montenegro
in
the State Community along
the
Unitary Principle
By
the FRY or Serbia's re-applying for the UN membership, the process of
independence-gaining of Montenegro has been temporarily halted, but at the same
time the process of crystallisation within Montenegro proper has been
accelerated. By applying for re-admission to the UN Serbia acknowledged all
that the international community had been in vain demanding Serbia to do in the
past decade: the international community's stance that disappearance of the
Yugoslav state, the SFRY did not result from secession, but from disintegration
of all its ingredient parts (6 republics), along with recognition of the
republican borders as the state ones, was finally certified. That was also a
genuine proof of the role of the 1974 Constitution, for the FRY fell apart at
the seams due to some main points of that constitution.
In
adhering to the fact that the FRY was internationally recognised, the new Serb
authorities have not essentially changed their position on the common state,
that is, have not renounced their unitary concept. This provoked major
discontent in Montenegro and subsequently boosted appetites for its
independence. Milosevic's policy in Montenegro was continued by considerable
financial, personnel and media backing to the pro-Yugoslav forces in
Montenegro. Territorial claims to integrity of Montenegro also gained ground.
Actions in that regard were stepped up in underdeveloped North and coastal
area, notably in Boka Kotorksa due to its geo-strategic importance.
DOS
and Milosevic's stance on Montenegro are quite similar. The only difference is
DOS's awareness of non-feasibility of new wars. However in the past three years
DOS endeavoured to preserve status quo, that is the state of affairs
consolidated by Milosevic by the July 2000 constitutional coup. By suspending
some parts of still valid federal constitution Milosevic prevented
representation of the majority, that is legitimate Montenegro in any federal institution
(barring the Supreme Defence Council). Thus the opposition coalition headed by
Predrag Bulatovic was enabled to maintain the semblance of preservation of the
FRY at the federal level. After taking power DOS never raised the issue of
major and comprehensive amendments to the Constitution (which that coalition
used to criticise during the Milosevic era), but instead tended to take to task
the official Podgorica for failing to take part in the September 2000
elections.
More
marked pressures on Montenegro began when it became clear that that the
majority of population was independence-minded as confirmed by the results of
22 April 2001 parliamentary elections (a genuine referendum on independence).
However the international community's position on preservation of the state
community that is "democratic Montenegro should remain in the democratic
FRY" favoured the Serb nationalists positions advocated by the three
parties, Socialist Popular Party of Predrag Bulatovic (SPP), the Serb National Party
of Bozidar Bojovic (SNP) and the Popular Party (PP) led by Dragan Šoc, and
stimulated them to step up their (Coalition "Together for Yugoslavia)
activities in the territory of Montenegro. That coalition also took part in the
federal elections on the eve of 5 October changes in Serbia and later forged
the alliance with DOS.
Much
pressure was piled on Montenegrins living in Serbia (about 130,000 of them).
The then federal Prime Minister intimidated them by maintaining that "they
would have to go to Montenegro with passports and shall be foreigners in their
own country." He also reiterated that "the common state is needed for
separatism is an obsolete phenomenon."
Numerous, similar statements of the Montenegrin opposition leaders were
intended to persuade the Montenegrin general public that "Montenegro must
continue to live together with Serbia in a common state." As the
minorities at elections backed the idea of independent Montenegro, opposition
tried to impose its position that "the state status should not be decided
by Muslims and Albanians for if that is allowed then preconditions for
independence of Kosovo shall be being created."
Belgrade
media also took part in attempts to antagonise the Montenegrin majority and pit
it against the minority population by marketing misinformation about sightings
of the KLA members in the mountains surrounding Gusinje. Despite official
disclaimers, such misinformation, implying similar scenario in Montenegro, were
marketed in the midst of the Albanian offensive in Macedonia and OVPBM
activities in South Serbia.
The
aforementioned attempts failed, thanks to stability of multi-ethnic relations
in Montenegro. Albanian politicians in Montenegro, notably Ferhat Dinosa,
President of the Democratic Union of Albanians (DUA) immediately reacted to
such insinuations and accused some media, notably Glas Grnogoraca and Dan, of
"favouring the anti-Albanian mood in Montenegro in order to weaken the
pro-independence forces in Montenegro." In that minority-centred battle
the official Montenegro scored a major victory, by reiterating the data about
solidarity between the Montenegrin and Albanian people. Namely after NATO
intervention there were about 90,000 Albanians in the territory of Montenegro,
but that tinder-box climate "did not produce any incident…for extremism
was not backed by Albanians in Montenegro, as proved by the election results.
Namely in Albanian-majority municipalities civil-minded parties won most seats.
The same thing happened in the Muslim-dominated municipalities in Montenegro."
Statements of some Albanian leaders notably of Fuad Nimani, President of
Democratic Union of Albanians (DUA) that "Albanians shall vote in
referendum for independent Montenegro" confirmed that Albanians viewed
Montenegro as their state.
Elections
in 2001 were a clear indicator of a growing importance of the pro-sovereignty
block, as confirmed by the survey conducted by the Podgorica CEDEM (Centre for
Democracy and Human Rights.) According to the then CEDEM findings 55% of
population favoured the independence and 44% were against it.
This trend additionally frustrated some political parties in Serbia, notably
Democratic Party of Serbia, which thought that such development would imply or
entail many uncertainties including the resolution of the status of Kosovo.
3.
Role of the Serb Orthodox Church
SOC
played a major role in creation of the Greater Serbia project. As the war
option is no longer feasible, the SOC took on the role of the key advocate of
preservation of the Serb ethnic territory. In those terms SOC openly lays claim
to Montenegro by persistently denying the existence of the Montenegrin nation.
Extent of SOC's interest in Montenegrin developments is also amply indicated by
continuous and aggressive activities of the Serb Orthodox Church on the whole
Montenegrin territory. Before 2001 elections Patriarch Pavle sent a message to
all citizens of Montenegro to "act peacefully and in a dignified way at
the forthcoming elections", to representatives of authorities to "do
their best to carry out democratic and fair elections, and to prospective
victors to "to act in a dignified and chivalrous manner."
Patriarch
of Moscow and whole Russia Alexei Second joined the said appeal, and sent a
special message to "Together for Yugoslavia" Coalition: "Momentous
tasks lie ahead of all of us and peoples of Serbia and Montenegro: original
culture, untainted Orthodox faith must be preserved and state institutions must
be consolidated " Patriarch also went on to say: "I am backing
efforts geared towards revival of spirituality, cultural, economic, social and
political unity of brotherly peoples of Montenegro and Serbia united in a
common Yugoslav state."
Key
exponent of SOC in Montenegro is Mitropolite of Montenegro and Coastal Area
Amfilohije Radovic who uses every public occasion to stress "identical
features of the two peoples, Serbs and Montenegrins." He openly interferes
into the state and political issues although Montenegro is a secular, civil
state. Montenegrin Orthodox Church (MOC) was abolished after annexation of
Montenegro by Serbia, that is coming into being of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes in 1918. Every year at the time of Christmas Holidays SPC fans
nationalist Serb feelings and tensions in Cetinje. SOC also engages in plunder
of the MOC institutions over which its has no authority. It tries to
religiously unify Montenegrin people by highlighting the thesis that Serb and
Montenegrin people are "one people, with the same faith and
language". In those terms, according to Amfilohije "one should not
even ask the Church if it is for the common state of Serbia and Montenegro, for
they have voted many times in favour of that unity and togetherness, not by
casting referendum ballots, but by swearing allegiance to the very being of
Montenegro, its saints and kings, and age-old aspirations of its people."
Mitropolite
Amfilohije on numerous occasions stated that the "Montenegrin nation is a
Communist invention, "Tito's and Đilas's bastard" and that
"Montenegrins who don't fell like Serbs are fans of Tito". This
implies that Tito has invented Montenegrins. Montenegrin intellectuals often
reacted to those statements. A publicist Novak Adžic was so outraged that he
said that "the Montenegrin state was not created by Serbs, but rather by
local, indigenous peoples living within the Montenegrin boundaries, peoples of
Zeta and Duklja. He also cautioned that Amfilohije's statements about
non-existence of Montenegrin people were untrue and "only one in a series
of destructive Greater Serbia attacks on the national identity and statehood of
Montenegrin people. Those attacks make part of the project and system
expressing a hegemony- and assimilation-minded policy and ideology towards
Montenegro bearing all hallmarks of centralism and unitarism, and aiming to
discipline and subjugate Montenegro." However in the Serb media such
stances were never disclosed or covered, unlike those advocated by Mitropolite
Amfilohije (his words usually receive wide coverage by daily
"Politika").
4. Patriotic Associations in
the Service
of the Serb Nationalism
So-called
patriotic associations are often mouthpieces of official claims towards
Montenegro. One of the most active ones is the Association of Bokelji, which in
its resolution warns that "Boka Kotorska, in case of Montenegro's
secession, shall leave Montenegro and unite with Serbia."
Belgrade print media widely covered excerpts from that resolution and
highlighted that "Boka Kotorska is refusing to play the role of the second
fiddle and the one of a silent observer of the secession-minded campaign of the
current Montenegrin leadership… Before proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes, Bokelji voted for the union with Serbia…Montenegro annexed
Boka in an unlawful, undemocratic and according to many forcible way, as amply
proved by historical facts." Nedeljko Zoric, president of Bokelji
Association in Belgrade, explicated the thesis about "irregular annexation
of Boka by Montenegro" on the basis of the minutes of the District
People's Liberation Bureau dated 8 April 1945 which reads: " because of
insistence of the Political Secretary of the Provincial Committee of the League
of Communists of Yugoslavia for Montenegro and Boka, the issue of Boka, which
was not on agenda was forcibly tackled. And then it was decided that Boka
Kotorska be territorially annexed to the then federal unit of Montenegro."
Boka
Kotorska is treated in the same way by the Serb Popular Party of Montenegro.
Nikola Mestrovic, president of the SPP's regional committee for Boka Kotorska
and Budva explains that "the age-old aspirations of Bokelji were realised
in 1918 and that Bokelji also this time around shall "succeed to defend
themselves from Duklja and Montenegrin attacks" and if "Montenegro
secedes we shall launch an initiative for re-examination of relations between
Boka and Montenegro, that is for secession from Montenegro."
Youth
branches of those associations also took part in a genuine campaign against
referendum on independence. They kept warning about "dangers awaiting
Montenegrin students if Montenegro seceded," namely "after possible
secession tuition fees for about 14,000 students from Montenegro could be
increased from the current $11,000 to $70,000".
Members
of SAAS (Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences) of Montenegrin descent are actively
involved in the Montenegrin developments, notably through various patriotic
associations. Matija Beckovic, academician, was particularly vocal in denying
the Montenegrin identity. At a conference he said: "the whole world has
finally realised that Montenegro cannot survive without the common state with
Serbia… for if it could have survived as an independent state it would have
never united with Serbia or any other state… like Boka it preserved its
specific features thanks to having Serbia and Serb people as its
hinterland."
Belgrade
used its well-proven methods: it threatened to create autonomous areas in
Montenegro, notably in North of the country. Belgrade media not only openly
backed such ideas, but also raised the issue of so-called Plevlje Republic.
Added to that the Belgrade-based Association of Plevljani received large media
exposure. In its declaration the association announced referendum for secession
of Plevlje from Montenegro if the latter opted for independence and highlighted
"unbreakable ties with our brethren in Serbia." Declaration also
condemned Montenegrin separatists who persistently endeavour to "isolate
municipality of Plevlje from Serbia, to turn Serbs into Montenegrins, and to
de-Serbise Montenegrins."
During
elections in 2001 the Fund for Defence of Equal Rights of Citizens of
Montenegro was set up with the idea to empower Montenegrins living outside
Montenegro, and not only citizens of Montenegro, to vote in a referendum. The
Fund spearheaded by academician Ljubomir Tadic via church very aggressively
called on Montenegrins to remain in the common state. Through the Fund
Montenegrins were invited "to join a common prayer for salvation of state
and people" at the Grand Easter Rally organised by Mitropolite Amfilohije
Radovic. Similar appeals were made by President of the Yugoslav Movement of
Montenegrins, Milija Zecevic, who stressed that "Montenegrins in Serbia
wish that Serbia and Montenegro live for ever in a common state."
Čedomir Čupic was one of the rare Montenegrin intellectuals in Serbia
who raised his voice against manipulations by patriotic associations and warned
that no serious political figure in Serbia condemned such statements of the
Fund for Protection of Rights of All Montenegrin Citizens.
In
addition to patriotic associations the Serb diaspora also engaged itself in
active monitoring of situation in Montenegro. But its lack of understanding of
the process of dissolution of the SFRY and notably of situation in Serbia soon
became manifest. It was frequently more radical than the elite in the country
and endeavoured very hard to ensure its influence through the church. In
criticising the official Montenegrin policy, diaspora maintained that
"Serb Orthodox Church and the Serb Academy of Science should draw up the
Serb national program."
Activities
of "patriotic associations" were sharply criticised by Montenegrin
authorities, who also stressed Serbia's behind-the-scene efforts to
"compel Montenegro to remain in the interest sphere of Serbia and to win
over the obedient politicians in Montenegro instead of respecting the will of
democratic ones." Montenegrin officials seized every opportunity to
denounce Belgrade's covert actions in Montenegro and kept stressing that
"the political concept of Greater Serbia cannot protect the Serb national
interests… even Slobodan Milosevic failed in that intent, for any such project
was doomed due to it obsolete character."
Milo
Đukanovic also cautioned against the same danger and maintained that
citizens on 22 April 2001 would have the opportunity to choose "either the
option offering continuous peace, inter-ethnic harmony, referendum and
integration into Europe, or a loss of state and absorption by Serbia as its 27th
region."
Kostunica's
insistence on "non-change of borders" and pact-making with the
pro-Serbs parties in Montenegro, implied his advocacy of a strong and unitary
state and a stiff opposition to sovereignty of Montenegro. This provoked many
Montenegrin politicians to accuse him of "selectively honouring the FRY
Constitution" and Milo Đukanovic to argue that "18 times larger
Serbia shows no understanding for Montenegrin needs and deprives the latter of
equality."
Đukanovic went as far as to accuse Kostunica "of interfering into the
pre-election race in Montenegro… and is more interested in the neighbouring
republic than in Serbia proper."
5.
Belgrade's Financial Backing
of
Montenegrin Opposition
Leading
Montenegrin politicians maintain that as early as in 1997 "Belgrade
dictatorship tried to establish control over the Montenegrin state and civil
interests and by the 6 July 2000 unlawful amendments to the constitution the
FRY was relegated to history." Hence the position of democratic Montenegro
that "after 6 July 2000 Yugoslavia ceased to exist."
To
preserve its positions in Montenegro Belgrade generously bankrolled its
partners-Coalition "Together for Yugoslavia" from the federal budget,
notably on the eve of Montenegrin elections.
According
to sources from the Montenegrin Democratic Party of Socialists, Belgrade
transferred large quantity of foreign currency to them on the eve of
Montenegrin elections, and in early April 2001 "Bulatovic and Šoc were
able to dispose of large quantities of illegally transferred money."
Podgorica branch office of "Ekos bank" also engaged in such illegal
transfers, by providing self-styled saviours of Serbhood in Montenegro with
large amounts of foreign currency.
The foregoing was confirmed by Đinđic's Democratic Party. Its
officials admitted that the federal administration was very generous towards
the Montenegrin opposition and media under its control. DP officials also
disclosed that "Dan" (a daily under influence of Predrag Bulatovic's
Socialist Popular Party) was given gratis large quantities of paper worth DM
800,000 by paper plant "Matroz."
6. International Community
Actions Play into
the Hands of the Serb
Project Masterminds
Both
Belgrade and international community brought pressure to bear on Montenegro on
the eve of elections in 2001. Belgrade media gave much prominence to
information relating to meetings with international representatives and
depicted their presence as a sign of support to the survival of the FRY. Thus
for example the Bijelo Polje meeting between federal Prime Minister Žižic and
the Russian Ambassador Jegoskin was hyped by headline "Our victory
preserves Yugoslavia".
At the pre-election rally of Coalition "Together for Yugoslavia" the
Russian Ambassador stated: "it is in the interest of Montenegro, Serbia
and Russia to preserve the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." After the
rally Žižic announced his imminent visit to Moscow. At the same time the
Contact Group re-launched its formula on "the need for democratic
Montenegro to remain in democratic Yugoslavia." and suggested continuation
of dialogue between Serbia and Montenegro with the goal of re-definition of
relations between the two republics of the FRY. EU called on Belgrade
and Podgorica to "reach acceptable constitutional solutions for Montenegro
and Serbia by dint of an open, democratic procedure."
Such
stances encouraged Montenegrin opposition. For example federal Prime Minister
Žižic then maintained that "after 10 April EU shall warn Đukanovic to
refrain from one-sided moves aimed at effecting secession of Montenegro,"
and "Milo Đukanovic is not in the position to integrate Montenegro,
for he is sowing hatred and discord in a bid to disintegrate the FRY."
Predrag Bulatovic made similar claims and cautioned Muslims and Albanians
against backing Đukanovic "for he tried to sow division on religious
grounds among his people by establishing the Montenegrin Orthodox Sect."
Position
of the Contact Group "Democratic Montenegro within democratic
Yugoslavia" was condemned by the Montenegrin authorities and caused a deep
frustration among them. Milo Đukanovic reiterated to foreign press
agencies his disappointment with such a stance of the international community
and reminded them how independent Montenegro enjoyed international backing
while Slobodan Milosevic was at the helm of Yugoslavia. He also stated that the
aforementioned international stand was tantamount to support to the Serb
nationalism.
Other politicians were frustrated too and oft maintained that "EU economic
pressure on the republic would be futile and nonsensical for it would be
tantamount to pressure on those who largely contributed to toppling of
Milosevic and proved their partnership to the international community in
affirmation of democratic, multi-national and multi-denominational tolerance
and of economic reforms in this territory."
West
put a special pressure on M. Đukanovic by according him a less favourable
treatment. For example in February 2001 Colin Powell refused to see
Đukanovic during his Washington visit, and stated that the US would like
to see Montenegro in the FRY.
That stance was also taken by former US Ambassador to the UN, Richard
Holbrooke, though he made it clear that the US and EU would accept independence
of Montenegro if so chosen by Montenegro. He reminded of the fact that
Đukanovic bravely put up resistance to former FRY President Milosevic
during the Kosovo war and thus helped NATO. At the same time EU espoused a much
more rigid stance. Head of Austrian diplomacy Benita-Ferrero-Valdner opposed
independence of Montenegro and urged, like other EU member-countries a more
constructive dialogue between Belgrade and Podgorica.
In
the face of such international stances, public opinion polls in Montenegro
after the 2001 elections indicated that a very large percentage of population
would vote for independence. Added to that a survey of the US NGO National
Democratic Institute for International Relations indicated that as many as 58%
of citizens would say "yes" to independence versus 31% refusing it.
Moreover 40% of citizens would vote for the union of the two internationally recognised
state founded on the basis of negotiations between Serb and Montenegrin
governments, and 37% against it.
Contrary
to the Bush Administration, some circles in the US favour the Montenegrin
independence. One of prominent Washington analysts James Hooper Director of the
Group for International Law
thinks that "democratic changes in Serbia and Montenegro would be slowed
down if they stayed together". He also thinks that "Kostunica is bent
on preserving the FRY for he believes that via federal institutions he can slow
down changes and weaken democratic forces in Serbia and Montenegro."
Hooper is also of opinion that "independence of Montenegro would suspend
anti-democratic federal institutions and thus provoke liberation of Serbia and
accelerate the latter's democratisation. In my mind the Bush Administration
should publicly voice its neutral stance on the issue of Montenegrin
independence."
International
Crisis Group voiced its scepticism regarding sustainability of the new
community, for "the agreement which replaces the FRY with the new state
community-union of states called Serbia-Montenegro resulted from the EU resolve
to halt the Montenegrin separatism." However according to the ICG
"the agreement did not live to EU expectations for it failed to ensure the
existence of the federal state or end the debate on the status of
Montenegro." ICG thinks that "the agreement is incomplete, and its
provisions failed to meet many demands made by both republics." In its
recommendations ICG states that "no Agreement on Association and
Stabilisation with EU is possible until the status of all three entities,
namely Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, is resolved."
7.
Army – a Stumbling Block
In
recent years speculation was rife as to a possible, army-assisted coup against
the Montenegrin president. Most direct confrontation between Đukanovic and
Milosevic had happened during NATO intervention, but a direct military
influence on Montenegrin political
developments was expected after Đukanovic inauguration, in January 1998.
Then
opposition tried to occupy the parliament building and military aircraft were
seen over Podgorica and other Montenegrin towns for many days, as a specific
form of threat. However that attempt of army to intervene against the official
authorities in Montenegro was condemned by the international community. The
Supreme Defence Council, the only federal body in which Podgorica was only
formally represented, somehow managed to thwart an open engagement of the army.
That is why Vojislav Kostunica applied other means in disciplining Montenegro.
In fact he reckoned that unitary goals and creation of Greater Serbia with
small Montenegro may be attained by peaceful means.
Montenegro
has been de facto independent for
three years, it pursues and autonomous foreign policy, has its own system of
security and independent foreign trade and customs systems. It lacks only the
army to round its sovereignty. On the other hand the Yugoslav Army is the only
link between Serbia and Montenegro. That is why announcement of Montenegrin
officials that independence of the republic would entail creation of
Montenegrin army caused outrage among federal military circles and among the
ranks of the ruling coalition-DOS. As early as in his pre-election campaign
Milo Đukanovic announced formation of "Montenegrin army" and
"establishment" of control over Montenegrin skies and airports.
Belgrade press highlighted his part of statement on "Montenegrin defence
ministry, national army… Montenegrin citizens shall serve the army in their own
country."
That statement was condemned notably by military circles. Milovan Čorugic,
Federal Defence Secretary, immediately stated "we don't fear Serbia, but
Montenegrin existence without Serbia" and "Montenegrins are proud of
the Yugoslav Army." He also maintained that "separatism is not in the
interest of people of Montenegro."
The
need for formation of the Montenegrin army was affirmed by the Montenegrin
Prime Minister Filip Vujanovic. Namely he promised that "Montenegro shall
have its army, and shall not allow to be without it, for there is no need for
anyone else to determine the military budget of Montenegro and appoint army
commanders."
The Montenegrin pro-sovereignty block always feared the army. Hence the
statement of Đukanovic that "Bulatovic, Šoc and Bojovic are planning
to provoke unrest and abuse of the Yugoslav army with DOS assistance" was
not surprising. Đukanovic also said that "the opposition might act as
a rabble-rouser, after its electoral defeat, in order to convincingly formulate
an alibi for that debacle."
On
that occasion Vojislav Kostunica and Zoran Đinđic issued a joint
statement: "DOS shall in no way interfere into Montenegrin elections. In
case of Montenegrin decision to remain in the common state with Serbia DOS
shall promptly embark upon a dialogue on re-arrangement of a federal state, as
it is convinced that the concept of a minimal, but functional federation is the
best framework for a true prosperity of Serbs and Montenegrins and other
citizens of our country."
At
the peak of the 2001 pre-election campaign, DOS offered a platform on
re-definition of relations between Serbia and Montenegro as a kind of
"basis for a minimal and functional federation with the joint authority in
the provinces of defence, foreign policy, transport, human rights, and
economy." Montenegrin officials turned down that offer with justification
that it was of a political and not state nature, and that only the two
governments could agree on that redefinition. Statements that after
redefinition of those relations Montenegrin borders would be guarded by the
Yugoslav Army caused a veritable uproar. Montenegrin members of the Commission
maintained that "guarding of borders was not the topic of the
Constitutional Commission, but was nonetheless indirectly discussed. Nowhere in
the world army guards borders. It is the duty of police."
The federal top leadership rejected the possibility that the said issue be
deliberated by the two republican governments, for according to Slobodan
Samardžic, political adviser to the FRY President Kostunica "behind the
so-called political proposal there is whole Serbia and part of Montenegro,
while behind the so-called political proposal is only part of Montenegro. And
that point should be taken into consideration."
8
Unitary Pressures on Montenegro
Re-definition
of relations between Montenegro and Serbia became the key topic of Belgrade
media. In that informal dialogue, which included coverage of statements of
officials on both sides, Belgrade's orientation towards a unitary arrangement
of the new community was crystallised. Dragan Marsicanin, Vice President of the
Democratic Party of Serbia, in espousing the DOS stance stated that "all
talks on preservation of relations between Serbia and Montenegro are possible
only if they centre on preservation of the common state." He also stated
"Serbia does not even ponder a kind of mock federal state imagined by
Montenegrins for if Montenegro secedes Serbia shall take time to decide with
which neighbouring states it shall co-operate. We care more about the railway
line Belgrade-Thessaloniki than about the Belgrade-Bar one. The FRY has not yet
collapsed and I don't think it shall happen. Like in the past, leaders of
Democratic Party of Socialists are likely to radically change their stances in
due course. We should wait for the Montenegrin election results, though I think
that whoever wins them is not likely to embark upon breaking up the federal
state." Čeda Jovanovic, an official of Democratic Party and head of
MP club of DOS, stated that "the coalition wants the state resting on
commonly pursued monetary policy, foreign policy, defence, and joint framework
for respect of human rights. If Montenegro finds it unacceptable, we shall
agree with its stance. There are no conditions for any confrontation. We shall
effect an amicable and civilised parting of the ways, or we shall build a
civilised new society."
Nebojsa Covic, Vice Prime Minister of republican government, urged preservation
of the joint state, but also admitted that he was ready to accept "an
amicable parting of the ways between the two states, but not of the two
peoples, for it is a dangerous historical hypocrisy."
Federal
leadership and Kostunica's inner circle tirelessly promoted the common state
and in that propaganda used all the media and other means available. Slobodan
Samardžic (DPS) highlighted that Serbia would renounce the common state
"if there were an anti-federal state mood in Montenegro." The media
accused Montenegro of delegating responsibility to the other side, and its
offer to postpone talks on the union of the two states until two chairs in the
UN are granted, was rejected with the excuse that "political forces in
Serbia and federation urge the common state."
Mlađan Dinkic, the NBY Governor, also thinks that independence-gaining of
Montenegro is not necessary, for "costs of independence would be higher
than the benefits thereof" in view of the FRY's accelerated reforms and
integration with the world.
Zoran
Zivkovic, Federal Interior Secretary, stressed that "Serbia would accept
any legitimate decision taken at democratic elections, but in that case
citizens of Serbia should have a say too. All statements of Serb politicians
had a negative charge and were riddled with threats and warnings. Zoran Zivkovic
also said " I personally don't want to live in a union with a sovereign
Montenegro, and would prefer a union with some other countries. If Montenegro
goes independent citizens of Montenegro living in Serbia would become
foreigners, and would have to apply for citizenship of Serbia. That procedure
would take a long time to resolve. DOS shall respect the will of citizens of
Montenegro."
Dragoljub Micunovic, President of Federal Assembly, took a very hard-line
stance on that issue, and reiterated that "federal parliament shall exist
as long as Yugoslavia exists, and tensions shall stop in case of victory of
Coalition "Together for Yugoslavia. If the other side wins, then they will
have to start talks with the FRY and Serbia."
After
the April 2001 elections the Montenegrin opposition "Together for
Yugoslavia", backed by DOS, continued its pro-Yugoslavia activities. The
majority Montenegro and official Podgorica were still not represented in any
federal institution barring the Supreme Defence Council. Such illegitimate
state obviously suited DOS. Serb hegemony-minded officials continued to pursue
the same-means policy.
After
elections in 2001 almost all Serb prime movers openly criticised the ideas of
independence of Montenegro or a state union with it. They advocated
preservation of the federal state bereft of federal features, because official
Podgorica did not have its representatives in any federal body. Citizens of
Serbia continued to finance the existence of the two Serb governments and both
the federal and republican administration. In alluding to that fact, Zoran
Zivkovic, Federal Interior Secretary, argued: "we need an alliance with
the state which can help us, and not with the state which we should help."
Other
parties floated also an anti-independence stand. For example Nada Kolundžija,
Vice President of Democratic Alternative (DA) stated: "It is not in our
interest to have an union of the two independent and internationally recognised
states. If Serbia were to take a responsible stand on its interests then we are
not interested in any union with Montenegro, at least not with that republic.
We are interested in survival of federation with the minimal authority, but
union of internationally recognised states is not something we would take into
consideration even within 50-100 years."
DPS representatives reiterated that "after Montenegrin elections there
shall be more room for talks between federal and republican officials and
Montenegrin representatives, in order to lay the foundations of the new
state."
Vojislav Kostunica explained that the outcome of Montenegrin elections
represented a clear message and support to efforts of authorities in Serbia and
the FRY to find "a formula for togetherness of Serbia and Montenegro and
high level of independence of the state with a small, but efficient number of
functions." He urged a quick resolution to the issue and said "it is
clear that there is no danger of use of military force in resolution of
Serb-Montenegrin relations, for anyone who even ponders such a possibility
shall face something stronger than any force, namely, the will of people".
9.
Independence - An Epilogue to the
FRY
Disintegration
Serb
elite does not want to face up to the fact that the process of
independence-gaining of Montenegro is underway. Consequently it avoids an open
dialogue with the winner of elections, Coalition "Montenegro shall
win." Serb elite is still trying to re-shape the Montenegrin political
scene and its territorial and state integrity in collusion with the Montenegrin
opposition. But official Podgorica refuses such a "deal" as indicated
by the following statement of Miodrag Vukovic: "Text of the platform is of
a unitary character. It is a proof that local unitarists and nationalists still
aspire to a unitary state. Their starting point is an original sovereignty of
Yugoslavia, and not an original sovereignty of the two old states, Serbia and
Montenegro."
Vukovic pointed out that "Serbia and Montenegro have only things in
common, the civilian air traffic control and the army. Montenegro shall not
accept any modern federation, for Montenegro and Serbia cannot function as
Yugoslavia."
Milo Đukanovic additionally clarified that stand: "In the face of the
ruins of the two failed Yugoslavia and the illusion of the current one, Montenegro
cannot and does not want to join the community of European nations in the way
it had done in 1918, without its national name, and its Montenegrin state.
Yugoslavia cannot exist without all South-Slav peoples. There can be no
two-member Yugoslavhood, unless, as the 13th July rebels have put
it- it is formed under the dictate of the dominant member."
Branko
Lukovac, Montenegrin Foreign Secretary, appealed to the international community
to renounce the stand on "democratic Montenegro within democratic FRY"
and called on Group 8 to "abandon and forget that illusion for it has
become nonsensical in view of its non-feasibility. " He also stated that
Montenegro viewed that stand: "as an international recommendation for
Montenegro to become part of the Greater Serbia, and we don't plan any such
thing." At the US-Montenegrin forum in Washington Lukovac underlined that
President Đukanovic and government in Podgorica in their orientation
towards independence enjoyed the backing of parliamentary majority and of population
of Montenegro. He added that "the truth is that the FRY is just a second
name for Serbia and no-one has the right to ignore that fact. Montenegro is no
longer part of the FRY, for the April elections have practically resolved the
dilemma whether Montenegro should follow in the footsteps of former Yugoslav
republics and become an autonomous international-legal entity."
Frustrated
by failed attempts to compel Montengro to remain in the federation, some Serb
nationalist grew increasingly intolerant of Montenegrins. Academician Dragoslav
Mihajlovic thinks that "Serbia has chosen the worst way of getting closer
to Montenegro… because of differences in our mind-set, size, economy, work
ethics, and other features we would better part the ways for we Serbs should
keep in mind the fact that in the past century we suffered so much because of
the two Montenegrins at the helm of our state: King Aleksandar and Slobodan
Milosevic."
The
same line of thinking is recognisable in the following statement of Prime Minister
Đinđic: "crisis is generated in Podgorica. Đukanovic should
change his topic, for it obviously polarises and divides the nation, and opt
for the one which would unite citizens."
DPS sharply condemns all Montenegrin demands relating to independence. Its
officials say that "Đukanovic is imagining some things" and
"the minimal federation is the condition on which DOS insists when it
comes to future of federation and relations with Montenegro."
Vojislav
Kostunica constantly warns Podgorica that "Serbia cannot be the hostage to
divisions in Montenegro. Resolution of the issue must be accelerated, but not
in the way which puts on the line the survival of the common state." He
also underscored that "referendum is a must for resolution of relations
between Serbia and Montenegro",
whereby he implied the two referendums, one in Serbia and one in Montenegro.
Official Montenegro opposed such a tack, and warned that "Kostunica shall
not schedule our referendum".
Idea
of referendum was backed also by other Serb nationalists who think that
Montenegro does not have any "historical chance" to gain
independence. In those terms Gavro Perazic warns that "if a state
vanishes, like Montenegro after its unification with Yugoslavia in 1918, its
possible, later date reconstruction as an independent state, with elements
once-possessed, does not mark the state continuity with the vanished
state."
Though
the Belgrade Agreement clearly speaks about the union of two states, larger
part of the Serb political elite during talks on the Constitutional Charter
continued to insist on a unitary concept, notably with respect to economic
aspect, that is a common central bank, and manner of election of federal MPs.
Most advocates of such concept took a very hard-line stand and Montenegro was
constantly faced with "all or nothing" situation.
10.
EU Proposals
Serb-Montenegrin
political war (waged via media) on the status of the state community and
inability to reach a minimal consensus on the character of the new state led to
direct brokering of EU. But the latter was guided by the idea to prevent
referendum on independence of Montenegro. EU was against further fragmentation
of region for "it would only destabilise the region and led to creation of
economically unsustainable small of states." However contents of
Solana-brokered Belgrade Agreement signed on 14 March 2002, indicate that EU
was compelled to take a very flexible stand on the agreement and notably its
implementation. That Agreement de facto suspends
the FRY and replaces it with the new state community, a union called
"Serbia and Montenegro." The agreement is obviously against meddling
with the reached level of reforms notably in Montenegro and is observant of the
level of Montenegro's independence. It envisages a three-year moratorium on
Montenegro and rotating chairs in the UN. It is a loose union in which the two
member-states enjoy all elements of independence, barring the ones depending of
international subjectivity. Every state shall control its borders-including the
customs-and shall be responsible for its economic and internal security.
Republics shall finance institutions of union: parliament, president, Council
of Ministers, court of law and armed forces.
Neither
side was satisfied with the contents of the Belgrade Agreement. Branko Lukovac,
Montenegrin Foreign Secretary, on the eve of agreement-signing asked the US
"to remain consistent regarding its principles of justice and equality and
to be maximally cautious with respect to its support to the EU initiative aimed
at resolution of relations between the remaining two parts of the Yugoslav
federation." He stated that "Montenegro shall not renounce its
ambition to create a democratic society as a sovereign state which shall be an
equitable member of the world community." He added: "we express our
readiness to consider the EU proposal on the referendum deadline."
In
the face of an ever-increasing resistance by Montenegro political elite in
Serbia continued to openly or covertly influence or meddle in developments in
Montenegro. Such conduct characterised the new-election campaign, that is
preparations for the 20 October 2002 parliamentary elections, won by a
landslide by Đukanovic's coalition. According to coverage of Montenegrin Publika President Vojislav Kostunica
allegedly tried to "discipline Montenegro", that is issued new
instructions for activities on the ground to officials of Bulatovic's Socialist
Popular Party.
Under
the headline "Prime Movers in Anti-Montenegrin Conspiracy" the paper
ran a whole-page article dedicated to "Instructions on political actions
of pro-Yugoslav forces in Montenegro." The document contains "special
and conventional activities, including obstruction of food production, causing
of break-downs in power supply, stage-managing incidents targeting pupils and
guests from Serbia, generation of social tensions, corruption of personnel,
fanning of inter-ethnic tensions, etc. Added to that the following activity is
also envisaged: "more coverage dedicated to "Nacional" scandal.
In its commentary the paper notes that "Yugoslavia no longer exists, but
there are still vestiges of some die-hard Yugoslav parties bent on destroying
all historical, state, and national achievements of Montenegro in the name of
fervent Yugoslavism."
11.
Đukanovic Coalition is Landslide
in
the Face of Pressures
Despite
enormous pressures piled by Belgrade, international community and opposition,
majority of Montenegrin citizens at the 20 October 2002 early parliamentary
elections opted for Đukanovic's coalition. "For European
Montenegro" Coalition won 39 seats, which ensured its absolute majority in
the 75-seat parliament. The opposition coalition, headed by Predrag Bulatovic
which changed its name to "For Changes" won 30 seats, Liberal Party
won 4 seats, and Albanian parties won 2 seats. That victory of the pro-reform
forces in Montenegro is very important, for it strengthens Đukanovic's
position vis a vis Belgrade and international community.
After
three failed rounds of Serbian presidential elections, the international
community is renewing its interest in the status of Montenegro, for
Đukanovic's coalition after October elections may set up a stable
government with a four-year mandate. This represents a significant contribution
to the factor of stability and security in the region, for unitarism- and
nationalism-minded forces in Serbia and their Montenegrin partners now
constitute a minority.
Victory
of reform-minded and pro-European forces in Montenegro paves the way for a
swifter agreement-reaching between Serbia and Montenegro on re-arrangement of
their relations. Namely the work on the Constitutional Charter was blocked for
months because of hard-line insistence of Serbia unitarists on direct elections
for the parliament of the future community of Serbia and Montenegro, totally
contrary to the spirit of the Belgrade Agreement. Some DOS leaders warned that
attempts to overlook the Montenegrin realities "may only make more
difficult the process of adoption of the charter" and "undermine
relations between Serbia and Montenegro, for disrespect and non-acceptance of
election results would widen the division between the republics. An increasing
paternalistic stand of Serbia shall exacerbate position on Montenegro and
consequently admission to Council of Europe."
Prime
Minister Zoran Đinđic showed more understanding for Montenegrin
demands. This became manifest after his 25 October Belgrade meeting with
Đukanovic when the long-standing dispute was settled. The latter paved the
way for the early December adoption of the Charter. But Đinđic's
understanding for Montenegro is undermined by his views on the Dayton
Agreement. Namely in his interview to Der Spiegel Đinđic solution for
Albanians and Serbs was similar to the one implemented in B&H Federation
with respect to Muslims and Croats (every community would have their own
institutions). However if Albanians continued to insist on independence which
would constitute a "dangerous precedent for other peoples in the Balkans,
and a threat to peace in multi-ethnic Bosnia", Đinđic would then
favour a new Dayton-style conference dealing with "a complete
re-definition of borders in the region."
This statement is in line with the Serb national program as defined the last
time in 1995, as a last-ditch attempt to test the mood of the international
community. This statement was preceded by the extensive coverage of articles
heralding new Serbia's proposal on division of Kosovo and re-composition of the
Balkans.
International
reactions to this statement were very negative, notably in B&H. High
Representative for B&H Paddy Ashdown stated that "borders in Europe
are not subject of international conferences" and "status of Kosovo
shall not affect neighbouring, sovereign states." Solana's cabinet issued
a similar statement with the emphasis on the fact that "the time of
defining of the Balkans state borders is over." Representatives of
Republika Srpska however think that "Djinđic's statement should be
viewed only as an initiative."
In
the broader regional context one should bear in mind that EU insisted on
preservation of at least loose state community (the Belgrade Agreement), in
view of absence of a final answer to the Kosovo status. Montenegrin officials
therefore keep warning that Montenegro has not generated the Kosovo problem,
nor taken part in its aggravation. The issue of Kosovo may be resolved only
through co-operation of Belgrade, Pristina and Belgrade. Member of the
Montenegrin constitutional commission Ferhad Dinoša (from Democratic Union of
Albanians) resigned after the stance that "Kosovo is an constituent part
of Serbia" was included in the preamble of the Charter.
Serb
elite has not relinquished the Serb national program. It waged war for the
"Serb state" and as a historian Nikola Popovic says: "the core
problem was the West's resistance to the emergence of the Serb state within its
natural boundaries and the West's insistence on the resolution of the
Yugo-problem by dint of implementation of "the right to self-determination
of Yugo-republics and not of Yugo-peoples".
And the latter was the position taken up by Serbia in the 90's at the beginning
of the Yugoslav crisis in all inter-republican negotiations and in
international rallies on the Yugoslav crisis, including the Hague Conference.
The Serb national program was re-affirmed in 1994 when the Second Congress of
Intellectuals adopted the Resolution on the Current Serb Problem. In September
1995 the Declaration on the Serb State and National Issue was promoted by
several then opposition parties, and signed by Z. Djindjic, V. Kostunica,
Nikola Milosevic, Slobodan Rakitic, R. Ljusic, etc. That declaration inter alia
reads: "Since disintegration of the SFRY Serbs are facing two
not-so-easy-to-resolve problems. The first is the national and state one, and
it presupposes creations of the Serb state encompassing all our countries with
the majority Serb population, notably Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska
krajina, The second problem is of a political nature and its goal is
establishment of the multi-party system and the rule of democratic order."
After
victory of 5 October 2000, DOS managed to legitimise themselves as democratic
authorities and to present to the West its "civil nationalism" as
liberal nationalism. That led to shift in the West's position, notably EU's
with respect to preservation of the common state. But the initial euphoria over
changes is slowly waning and clearer signs of a more reserved attitude towards
Serbia are emerging in view of its non-fulfilment of sine qua non conditions on which its admission to Euro-Atlantic
integration hinges, notably its unsatisfying co-operation with the Hague
Tribunal and non-compliance with the Dayton Accord. Thus Montenegro once again
got the chance to preserve its independence and as the Belgrade Agreement
envisages formally have a say on its independence within three years. Logic of
disintegration of the FRY is inevitable, and external pressures making more
difficult the process of emancipation of Montenegro indicate lack of readiness
of relevant international factors to respect the former. However recognition of
the dominant process would accelerate re-integration of the whole region on the
new foundations.
Conclusions
and Recommendations
-
International recognition of the FRY and signing of the Belgrade Agreement
should not jeopardise a democratic resolution of Serb-Montenegrin relations,
even if that resolution were to lead to separation of the two states; respect
of sovereignty of the two entities is not contrary to the dominant process of
globalisation, but is rather part of that process;
-
Process of disintegration of the SFRY has it inevitable logic and completion of
that process is a pre-requisite for re-integration of the region, which is in
the interest of people in the region, but also in the interest of EU and the
US;
-
Serbia has specific problems, notably in facing up to the recent past, that is
why it should primarily address its own problems, and not those of its
neighbours. Unresolved internal problems of Serbia, notably those of internal
order (republic of monarchy), the issue of autonomy of Vojvodina, the Sandžak
issue, minorities and refugees-related issues, are specific problems which
would only encumber the transition of the state community of Serbia-Montenegro.
-
Independence of Montenegro indirectly opens the issue of status of Kosovo, but
that is not at odds with regional interests; procrastination of resolution of
status of the three de facto independent
entities-Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, may additionally radicalise all sides and
slow down an already painful process of transition; the international
community's insistence on the Charter instead on transition, has already slowed
down the process of transition in Serbia and Montenegro;
-
Mutual obstruction of the process of charter-adoption, based on different
motives, is not an expression of a true search for necessary compromise, but
rather a consequence of the fact that "the European model" of the
future state community was imposed on both sides which in fact don't have faith
in its survival. EU should stick to its role of monitor of this process, and
continue to proved logistic assistance, in view of immaturity of local elites,
but in full respect of regional logic;
-
Balkans ethnic nationalism are still eroding the social fibre of region and in
the long-term divest it of potential for integrating process due to high degree
of intolerance, xenophobia, disrespect of minority rights and insistence on
ethnic states;
-
EU-offered architecture for the Balkans to date proved to be insufficient; it
should include a comprehensive program for creation of new elites in the
region, which presupposes special EU and Council of Europe programs in their
work with young generations.
Vojvodina
The
current controversy over Vojvodina involves a clash of nationalistic and
autonomistic rhetoric. On the province’s political arena, both arguments have
their ardent champions who publicly express their concern for the interests of
Vojvodina and its citizens. There are, of course, deeper conceptual differences
behind such avowals of ‘affection’ for the province: the nationalists, who
regard Vojvodina as an exclusive Serb domain although they grant that it is
specific in terms of its ethnic heterogeneity, view the autonomy demands as a
desire to insulate the province from the rest of Serbia; the autonomists, on
the other hand, argue that greater autonomy would enhance Vojvodina’s
transition potentials and that its greater openness vis-ŕ-vis neighbours would
benefit not only Vojvodina’s citizens but all in Serbia.
At
a round table meeting entitled ‘Europe of Regions’, the leader of the Vojvodina
Reformers, Mile Isakov, warned of an impending collision between the two
concepts: one which has been trying for over ten years to persuade the Belgrade
political establishment to embark on decentralization and recognize Vojvodina’s
autonomy; the other, frustrated by the defeat of the greater-state project,
which either does not believe in autonomy or dismisses every such demand as the
ploy of Novi Sad to deprive Belgrade of its ‘Big Brother’ role. Participants in
the meeting also warned that ‘if left to its own resources, i.e. its local
elites, Vojvodina will go to ruin’.
The
Belgrade elite maintains its paternal attitude towards Vojvodina, its concern
and keen supervision reflecting doubts about the province’s rationality and
ability to look after itself. This insistence on Vojvodina’s alleged immaturity
has but one object, namely to perpetuate Belgrade’s tutelage and patronage of
the province. The Law on the Determination of Specific Powers of Vojvodina, the
so-called omnibus law, is a good example of this policy.
The
law, adopted early in February 2002, disappointed precisely those who had
initiated and submitted it to the republic’s parliament, i.e. the Vojvodina
parliament, because the law entrusts the province’s organs mostly with
implementation and Belgrade with decision-making. According to Isakov, ‘the
provincial organs will have neither power of decision-making nor freedom to
decide how the work entrusted to them is to be carried out; all they can do is
simply carry it out ’. The fact that this work is only vaguely defined
and that no finance was provided for its execution is another major cause of
discontent. ‘We were cheated yet again...Vojvodina retains its colonial
status,’
complained Nenad Čanak, Speaker of the Vojvodina parliament.
The
opposition too was dissatisfied with the law: the Socialist Party of Serbia
(SPS) described it as a ‘perfidious way of breaking up Serbia’;
the Serb Unity Party saw its passage as ‘a first step towards the separation of
Vojvodina from Serbia’;
and the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) condemned the act as having ‘opened the
door to separatism, something which will be impossible to check and control by
institutional means’.
The opposition also used the opportunity to accuse Vojvodina political party
leaders such as Čanak, Isakov and Josef Kasa of separatism. In the words
of Dušan Bajatović, leader of the Vojvodina SPS branch, ‘they are not
satisfied with the autonomy Vojvodina enjoyed under the SFRY 1974 Constitution
but demand a republic, a federalization of Serbia which, they say, will nip
every separatist aspiration in the bud. That is sheer humbug’.
In
spite of their dissatisfaction with the Government’s intervention
and their objections to the provisions of the law, the pro-autonomy deputies in
the republican parliament nevertheless voted in favour of the law. Isakov
explained that they did so because otherwise their autonomy demands would have
appeared meaningless and because the occasion might have turned into a farce.
While the deputies recognized that the vote meant a recognition of both
Vojvodina’s autonomy and the need for its enlargement, he said, they were also
aware that the law was flawed
and that the provincial elite was clearly powerless to do something about it.
Powerless
to win a higher degree of autonomy, the autonomist elite capitalized on the
passage of the omnibus law to effect a redistribution of power within the
provincial government, after which it proceeded to deal with Vojvodina’s
symbols. Under the pretext of reshuffling the provincial government, it first
made most of the fact that the deputies of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)
had voted against the law
to expel the party’s sole representative on that government.
However, the reshuffle fell short of the appetites and ambitions of the
Vojvodina Reformers because, in their view, the move benefited mostly the
Democratic Party (DS) and the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM).
The DS responded by accusing the Reformers of compromising the process of
reform by leading people to believe that the powers restored under the omnibus
law were a booty to which people could help themselves as they pleased.
Following this controversy, the question of Vojvodina’s symbols appeared on the
agenda at the end of March.
At
first, the champions of autonomy rejected the informal suggestion that
Vojvodina should have its own symbols as a currently unimportant and
‘unfounded, fanciful priority’
and insisted that priority be given to bringing together Vojvodina’s political
forces and concentrating on the struggle for full autonomy.
‘Autonomy is not established by means of symbols,’ the Reformers stressed and
advised ‘caution with regard to this initiative, because while ill-wishers will
accuse us of separatism others might content themselves with mere symbols and
thus blunt the demands for substantial autonomy’.
Nevertheless, as early as the beginning of June, the Vojvodina Coalition
submitted to the provincial parliament a draft resolution on setting up a
provisional committee to propose a coat of arms, a flag and an anthem for the
Autonomous Province of Vojvodina (APV). The coalition explained that proper
symbols were important in Vojvodina’s struggle to establish its economic
integrity.
The
move provoked a sharp reaction from the opposition and a repetition of
accusations set out on countless occasions before. The Serbian Radical Party
(SRS) saw the proposal for a Vojvodina flag as the outcome of growing
separatist demands emanating from the Vojvodina parliament. ‘This separatist
lunacy,’ the SRS insisted, ‘implies the complete destruction of the state of
Serbia and the creation of new states such as Vojvodina which, according to
this filthy programme, would have a flag, an anthem, a coat of arms, an army –
i.e. NATO troops – a police force composed entirely of LSV members, a state
television staffed by pro-regime journalists, etc’.
Dušan Bajatović of the Vojvodina SPS branch believes that ‘the emergence
of the proposal for a Vojvodina flag merely indicates that certain political
circles, above all the IČK [standing for Isakov-Čanak-Kasa, a play on
the Albanian acronym for the Kosovo Liberation Army or UCK], as well as
politically like-minded persons, are persistently and doggedly working on
creating a Vojvodina republic...It is quite clear that these forces want to
capitalize on the disintegration of the state in order to federalize Serbia, which
would have devastating effects on the Serb people’.
In the opinion of Dejan Mikavica, president of the Novi Sad branch of the DSS,
flags, coats of arms and anthems are attributes of states not provinces. ‘If
Vojvodina gets those symbols, then it should change its population,’ he said.
He argues that the insistence on particularity might be viewed as an effort to
impose psychological, cultural and civilizational barriers between the
population of Vojvodina and the Serb people in Serbia proper
and recalls that even the communists who drafted the 1974 Constitution did not
dare demand state symbols for Vojvodina.
Mikavica also announced that ‘the DSS will bring a complaint before the Serbian
Constitutional Court to challenge the constitutional validity of the decision
to adopt a coat of arms for Vojvodina. In our opinion a coat of arms with no
attributes of Serbia, i.e. the four tinder-box steels, is indefensible because
it would be a direct affront to the national and state-building dignity and
feelings of the majority population of Vojvodina’.
The DS too finds the ‘designation of state symbols for Vojvodina unacceptable’.
On the other hand, Sandor Egeresi, vice-president of the SVM and deputy speaker
of the Vojvodina parliament, was of the opinion that ‘Vojvodina needs a coat of
arms and a flag... just as it needs certain other symbols such as decorations’.
At
the end of June, the Vojvodina parliament decided, at the proposal of its
speaker Nenad Čanak, that the province should have a coat of arms as its
historical symbol
to be displayed on appropriate occasions alongside the coat of arms of the
Republic of Serbia. Quite expectedly, the DSS deputies voted against.
The
autonomist elite succeeded in scoring on the Vojvodina symbols issue to
compensate for and mask its failures in the struggle for genuine autonomy.
The Serbian presidential election further undermined the position of the
autonomists, the Reformers’ decision to back the nomination of Vojislav
Koštunica leading to recriminations
and divisions within the autonomist bloc. The Reformers explained that before
making up their minds they had talked to both presidential candidates and that
Koštunica had turned out the more accommodating of the two. Nonetheless, at a
news conference the DSS let it be known that the Reformers’ support did not
mean that the DSS was in favour of ‘full autonomy’ and that Vojvodina ‘will
never get full autonomy’ because ‘to us any reference to a full autonomy always
means a republic’.
The
autonomists also initiated a public debate on a working version of the
preliminary draft of the Basic Law of the APV.
The working version abounds in alternative provisions because the members of
the drafting commission
failed to agree above all on some important institutions such as the provincial
president and the provincial parliament,
the constitution of the province’s Supreme Court, etc. The autonomists’
opponents reacted stormily to this working version of the ‘Vojvodina
Constitution’ although they themselves recognize that Serbia is in a state of
legal chaos. ‘Coming after the omnibus law, this is a second step leading
inevitably to a third – an independent republic of Vojvodina,’ the president of
the Serb Unity Party, Borisav Pelević, warned.
He argued that as a Serbian province Vojvodina can only have a statute as its
supreme law. The provincial SPS branch said that ‘The Basic Law envisions an
autonomous Vojvodina as a state’ and warned that the province’s authorities had
up their sleeve ‘the possibility of internationalizing the so-called Vojvodina
question’.
The
President of the DSS City Board, Dejan Mikavica, believes that the omnibus law
was designed only for short-term use because even a cursory glance at the Basic
Law reveals that its provisions are directed against the Republic of Serbia as
a state. In his opinion, the Basic Law would give Vojvodina so much autonomy
that it would be impossible to identify it as a part of Serbia. The province’s
symbols would be displayed alongside the republic’s and the status of the Serb people
in Vojvodina would be ‘fundamentally different’ from that in other parts of the
country. Likewise, judicial power in the APV would culminate in a supreme
court, an unmistakable sign of statehood.
The DS too opposes the Supreme Court idea on the grounds that only a sovereign
state can have such an institution.
This view was echoed by the Serbian Minister of Justice, Vladan Batić, who
said, ‘Vojvodina is entitled to the highest degree of autonomy, but for it to
have a Supreme Court, that’s impossible’.
As to whether Vojvodina should have a unicameral or a bicameral parliament, the
Vojvodina Coalition was quite explicit: ‘Vojvodina is a civil territory which
ought to be ruled by a unicameral parliament; a bicameral parliament would
provoke conflict, destabilize the Province and break it up along national
lines’.
The DS opposes the creation of the office of provincial president and argues
that the Basic Law should have no provision to that effect. It says that the
‘idea to introduce a presidential function is being pushed by the LSV and RV
who want to see their political leaders occupying that post.’
One of those leaders, Nenad Čanak, retorted that the office was irrelevant
and that what really mattered was whether or not Vojvodina would be able to manage
its own resources.
A
group of authors from the organization ‘Forum V 21’ have worked out Vojvodina’s
losses in the past ten years at some 27 billion USD. In view of this, economic
arguments are expected to carry the most weight in deciding the autonomy issue.
However, the exploitation of Vojvodina can be viewed from different angles.
The nationalists for their part strive to devalue and ‘demystify’ the economic
argument. Thus, in an interview with the daily Večernje novosti, Academician Čedomir Popov declared that
the purpose of economic arguments was to ‘befuddle the public as to the real
indications of the autonomists’ separatist intentions, i.e. the effort to
invest autonomous territory with as many attributes of state sovereignty as
possible and to create the greatest possible number of institutions
characteristic of a state.’
The Vojvodina academician considers that such attributes of statehood will
encourage the province increasingly to draw away from Serbia and towards
neighbours, a development which could result in the complete destruction of the
Serbian state. ‘There would be a tendency for certain peoples in Vojvodina
itself to shut themselves off, vie with each other and then strive after ever
larger autonomy, with those in a position to do so openly demanding to be taken
into the fold of neighbouring states. While some would embrace the idea of a
“Vojvodina nation” others would want to remain Serbs’. In such a conflict the
religious factor would not stand idly by and ‘Vojvodina would in all
probability fall apart,’ Popov predicts.
Amid
such gloomy, apocalyptic forecasts, Vojvodina received full credit for its
post-October opening to neighbours and for its cooperation with regions chiefly
in other parts of the former Yugoslavia when, at the end of the year, it was
admitted to the Assembly of European Regions
without having to pass through an observer stage. The fear, mistrust and hatred
of the pro-Europe forces which is in evidence both in Serbia and in Vojvodina
is not surprising. A concept which draws on fear in order to establish its
identity does not make for the construction of the modern community Vojvodina
wants to become. At present the nationalists are most active in Vojvodina,
where they profess a concern for the survival of the nation and the state,
encourage anti-individualistic values and sow disbelief in the autonomy idea.
For all their pro-Europe rhetoric, the Serbian authorities lack concrete
political will to create an appropriate institutional framework to grant
Vojvodina the degree of autonomy it needs to optimize its advantages and use
its resources to the full. The Serbian political elite appears to have
forgotten that the autonomy issue is not only a measure of its European orientation
but also of its actual break with the previous regime.
In
an interview with the Novi Sad daily Dnevnik,
Nenad Čanak said that ‘we in Vojvodina lack a sufficiently concrete
political elite that could specify the collective interests of the citizens’. What
is lacking above all is a competent elite willing to and capable of formulating
such interests. The autonomist elite itself is partly to blame for the fact
that Vojvodina continues to languish as an ‘anonymous part of Serbia deprived
of any rights’
because so far it has failed to examine its own conduct and to explain why, in
the conflict involving two key political figures in Serbia, it has taken the
side of one ‘whose attitude towards Vojvodina boils down to “steal whatever you
can”’.
Two
extremes mark today’s political scene in Vojvodina: on the one hand, Belgrade
attempts to keep the monopoly on the province’s economic and financial
resources, while Vojvodina, on the other, endeavours to open up European vistas
for itself through joining regional initiatives. Besides, Vojvodina’s political
realities are highlighted by minorities’ ever more active attitude when it
comes to their own positions and that of Vojvodina as a region. Large-scale
regional initiatives that are underway additionally crystallize Vojvodina’s
autonomy.
Sandžak
Long-standing
predictions of some politicians and experts about an imminent break-out of
crisis in Sanžak never materialised. 2002 was by and large a tranquil year in
that region, barring several incidents, notably the brawl between Serb and
Bosniak hooligans after victory of the Yugoslav team at the World Basketball
Championship. However strengthening of the Muslim front, explained as the
return to roots by Bosniaks, and as a looming danger of islamisation by Serbs,
is a growing phenomenon in the region. Serbs were both vexed and disturbed by
launching of open regional TV, University, foundation of sports and artistic
associations, changes in municipal statutes in Novi Pazar and Tutin,
introduction of Bosniak language as an official language, and changed names of
some streets. Some Serbs associated in the Committee for Protection of Serbs
from Raska (founded in the wake of the WBC incident) assess those moves as
separatist and see them as an embryo of the "Republic" Sandžak. Not a
single Bosniak party advocates the "Republic of Sandžak".
Demographic
Changes
Some
Serbs maintain that their many co-nationals are leaving Novi Pazar. Radenko
Jokovic
and Milan Veselinovic,
heads of Novi Pazar-based committees of the Popular Party and the Serb Radical
Party, argue that since "List for Sandžak" of Sulejman Ugljanin took
over power in Novi Pazar in 2000, about 1,000 Serbs moved out. Jokovic admits
that "Serbs are not moving out under pressure", but rather
"because of economic motives" (Novi Pazar is one of the most
expensive cities in the country, and the real estate prices are superior to
those in Belgrade) and "feeling of insecurity." Bosniak parties admit
that local population outflow, but argue that it is motivated by economic
reasons. That opinion is shared by mufti of the Islamic Community Sandžak
Muamer Zukorlic. "If a Serb sells a house or holding for EURO 250,000, for
that sum he can buy a house in Kraljevo or Smederevo and put aside the rest of
the money."
Leader
of Novi Pazar Radicals Milan Veselinovic
demanded that the republican authorities examine the origins of Bosniak money
used for "buying Serb estates." In fact he claimed that the money was
laundered or originated from criminal deals or from Saudi Arabia or other
Islamic countries donations. But Veselinovic has not offered any proof in
support of his allegations. Radenko Jokovic
thinks that the money comes from drug smuggling and demands engagement of the
US, notably DEA experts, in the region. Those claims were dismissed by Esad
Džudževic, federal MP of the "List for Sandžak Dr. Sulejman
Ugljanin": "Bosniaks also sell their houses. Money does not recognise
ethnic borders."
Rasim Ljajic, Federal Minister for National and Ethnic Communities and Leader
of Sandžak Democratic Party believes that local authorities of "List for
Sandžak" in the majority of Bosniak municipalities in Sandžak made moves
which irritated and intimidated Serbs, but he is also convinced that Serbs were
not pressured to emigrate.
Results
of the last year census indicate that the process of emigration from Sandžak
was very massive in the last decade. But judging by results of census it was
not politically or nationally motivated. Both Bosniaks and Serbs moved out of
Sandžak. The 2002 census indicates that Bosniak population in Serbia has been
halved with respect to the 1981 and 1991 censuses figures, when members of that
nation declared themselves as Muslims. If one tots up Muslims and Bosniaks
share in the total population of Serbia the percentage of under 2% emerges or
155,580 inhabitants. (During the 2002 census in Serbia 136,087 citizens
declared themselves as Bosniaks, and 19,503 as Muslims). During the last
pre-war census in 1981, there were 156,604 members of that nationality in Serbia
and Vojvodina. According to that census in 6 Sandžak municipalities which
belong to Serbia (Novi Pazar, Sjenica, Tutin, Priboj, Prijepolje and Nova
Varos) there are 235,567 citizens. There are 132,350 Bosniaks, 89, 396 Serbs
and 4,000 members of other nationalities. Bosniaks are the majority population
in Novi Pazar, Sjenica, and Tutin, and Serbs in Priboj, Prijepolje and Nova
Varos.
Of
19,982 citizens of Nova Varos, 18,001 are Serbs, 1,028 are Bosniaks, and 502
Muslims. Of 30,377 citizens of Priboj, 22, 523 are Serbs, 5,567 are Bosniaks,
and 1,427 are Muslims. Of 41, 188 citizens of Prijepolje, 23, 402 are Serbs,
13, 109 are Bosniaks, and 3, 812 are Muslims. Sjenica has 27,970 citizens of
whom 6,572 are Serbs, 20,512 are Bosniaks, and 659 are Muslims. With its
85,996-strong population Novi Pazar has remained the largest Sandžak town.
There are 17,599 Serbs, 65,593 Bosniaks and 1, 599 Muslims in Novi Pazar. Tutin
has 30,054 inhabitants, that is, 1,299 Serbs, 28,319 Bosniaks and only 223
Muslims. When compared to the 1992 census number of inhabitants of Tutin fell
by 4,600. In Sjenica that demographic decline is even more marked: before the
war its population stood at 33,000 inhabitants, while today there are only
27,970 of them. Only population of Novi Pazar increased by a mere 600
inhabitants and it currently stands at 85,996. The recent census challenged
allegations of some Serb political leaders that the number of Serbs in all the
aforementioned municipalities drastically fell. It remained the same, notably
the Serb share in total population of Sjenica is 25%, in Novi Pazar 20, and in
Tutin less than 5%.
The
2002 census was preceded by the campaign of Bosniak parties urging Muslims to
declare themselves as Bosniaks, and to register Bosniak as their mother tongue.
Since the 1971 census Bosniaks declared themselves and were recognised as
Muslims. A day before the official census kick-off (31 March), Sandžak
Democratic Party held an important meeting in Novi Pazar, at which its leader
Rasim Ljajic declared that the timing for perfect for launching the following
appeal: "After a decade of migrations and wars it is important for us to
finally learn the number of members of our nationality. Our plebiscite
declaration as Bosniaks is even more important. By re-embracing that national
name the intention of certain political circles in Serbia to turn Bosniaks into
Serbs of Islamic faith, shall be removed".
Esad Džudževic, federal MP of "List for Sandžak Dr. Sulejman
Ugljanin," went a step further by urging the OSCE observers to monitor the
census in Sandžak.
But neither OSCE nor republican bodies showed any interest in that initiative.
Muslim denizens of Belgrade and Vojvodina cities remained faithful to their old
name. Thus in Belgrade there are 1,188 Bosniaks and 4,617 Muslims. In Vojvodina
that ratio is: 417 Bosniaks versus 3,634 Muslims. But citizens of Novi Pazar,
Tutin, and Sjenica responded to the appeal of their politicians and massively
declared themselves as Bosniaks. In the Montenegrin part of Sandžak most
Muslims prefer their old names, in line with instructions of their largest
party, Democratic Party of Socialists.
Political
Life
In
contrast to Montenegro, which was totally disregarded by PDA and other Bosniak
parties in view of the allegiance of local Bosniaks to DPS and SDP, the Bosniak
parties still have primacy in the Serb part of Sandžak. That fragmentation of
Sandžak parties was party caused by Đukanovic's early opposition to
Milosevic. Bosniaks mostly sided with Đukanovic, and remained his
loyalists because of his insistence on civil option and appointment of Bosniaks
to highest party posts. Thus he managed to totally sideline PDA and furthermore
caused its split. Bosniak votes at many elections were crucial in tipping the
balance in favour of Đukanovic's party (Bosniaks make up 15% of
Montenegrin population). In a stark contrast Serb political parties never tried
to curry favour with Bosniak population. In consequence of such a policy, at
January local elections for five vacancies in municipal assembly of Novi Pazar,
candidates of Đinđic's Democratic Party were totally overran. Despite
high Đinđic's popularity (Sandžak Bosniaks favour Đinđic
over Kostunica), DP candidates spearheaded by Head of Raska District, Mile
Koricanac, won only 19 votes.
There
are 10 or so Bosniak parties in Sandžak but most of them are fictitious
political organisations. Of important parties there are: List for Sandžak Dr.
Sulejman Ugljanin, a close ally of Party of Democratic Action, and Sandžak
Democratic Party (a DOS member) headed by Rasim Ljajic, Federal Minister for
National and Ethnic Communities. The third most important party is Party for
Sandžak headed by Fevzija Muric, former high PDA official and former president
of municipal assembly of Novi Pazar. Disgruntled with Ugljanin's personnel
policy Muric and a group of like-minded politicians left PDA in 2001. His party
went furthest in demands for the highest-degree autonomy of Sandžak, and for
the referendum on status of Sandžak. But the local January elections for
several municipal posts amply indicated Ugljanin's and Ljajic's primacy in
political arena of Sandžak: Ljujic's SDP won 3 alderman posts and Ugljanin's
"List for Sandžak" won two seats.
In
2002 Ugljanin's party mostly dealt with settlement of communal problems in
three municipalities in which it enjoys an absolute majority, Novi Pazar,
Sjenica and Tutin. Added to that, its many activities in various international
fora and the European Centre for Minorities Issues aimed at bringing to the
fore the issue of the region's status. Last year at the proposal of "List
for Sandžak" and thanks to votes of its MPs municipal statutes of Novi
Pazar and Tutin were changed., as were symbols of towns, the flag and
coat-of-arms, and the use of Bosniak mother tongue and Latin alphabet became
official. Names of some streets were changed too. Serb MPs sharply condemned
those decisions. Many walked out of a session at which those proposals were
discussed. But despite appeals of local MPs of Serb parties, the republican
authorities did not respond to those municipal decisions.
Belgrade
also failed to respond to the July Declaration of the Bosniak National Council
on Rights of Bosniaks to political and national equality. Declaration reads:
"Bosniaks are European people, indigenous inhabitants of Sandžak and other
parts of the FRY, with all the hallmarks making them a distinct national
entity… Bosniak people are against disintegration of the FRY for it would lead
to destabilisation of the whole Balkans and threaten interests of all citizens
and peoples living in this territory, notably of Bosniaks".
In keeping with the will of the people expressed at the October 1991 referendum
BNCS demanded by virtue of this Declaration that "Sandžak, under the new
Constitution be arranged as a modern political, territorial unit with a
high-degree autonomy, that is self-rule" According to BNCS "the
future community should be a federal state with a bi-cameral parliament, that
is, Lower House (the one of Citizens) and Upper House (the one of States).
Within the fold of Constitutional Commission those stands were espoused by Sead
Džudževic, MP of "List for Sandžak". He joined the Commission at a
later date, at the proposal of Vojislav Kostunica. Initially only one
representative of Sandžak parties, Mujo Mukovic, Vice President of DPS and MP
of Serbian parliament made part of that Commission. But then Kostunica proposed
Džudževic as a replacement for the SPS representative (the party refused to
take part in the work of the said commission), and also on grounds of "the
commission's multi-ethnic composition." Džuđevic submitted to the
Commission BNCS proposal in the face of opposition by Ljajic's party. Then the
PDS representative Mujo Mukovic assessed that Džudževic's proposal disregarded
the fact that both Montenegro and Serbia were states, and that territory of
Sandžak was divided by the two states. Mukovic then put forward the proposal on
the status of ethnic minorities in the future state.
DPS
proposal did not mention a special status of Bosniaks and Sandžak but rather
served as a springboard for launching an open demand that the degree of
protection be on a par with the FRY and EU standards. That party also advocated
decentralisation of Serbia and its regional arrangement: "Six Sandžak
municipalities in Serbia could make up one region. The same applies to Sandžak
municipalities in Montenegro. Those two regions could co-operate on different
levels, and endeavour to constitute a kind of a cross-border region, but not a
political entity."
Rasim Ljajic and other Sandžak political leaders rejected proposal of
Democratic Party of Serbia that Sandžak be a part of Uzice region in the future
constitutional arrangement of Serbia. In early 2002 Ljajic said:
"Inclusion of Sandžak into any other region is unnatural. We shall insist
on Sandžak's regional status."
After fine-tuning of the Constitutional Charter, Esad Džudževic in a sign of
protest against "offered solutions and unfair treatment of Bosniaks and
Sandžak issue" left the Constitutional Commission. According to him
"the Charter shall not be binding on Bosniaks, since Sandžak was not
accorded the status of a distinct region."
Two
years after the political changeover, Sandžak parties are still disgruntled
with Belgrade's treatment of their region. "List for Sandžak"
maintains that DOS is "engaging in the personnel terror in Sandžak".
At the founding assembly of PDA youth in Sjenica on April 2, Suljeman Ugljanin
stated:
"DOS is discriminating us by treading upon the electoral will of our
citizens. DOS cronies follow in the footsteps of Milosevic cronies by trying to
control all spheres of life in Sandžak. We are in favour of co-operation with
Belgrade and Podgorica, but shall not tolerate dictates of either."
Rasim
Ljajic is also discontent with the personnel policy pursued in Sandžak towns.
His party thinks that DOS should consult it prior to appointment of personnel
and "our coalition partners, namely DOS are acting in collusion with
Ugljanin's on the local level". Rasim Ljajic made use of his federal
position to strengthen his party basis in Sandžak. DPS now has off-shoots in
all Sandžak towns, and moves are afoot to set them up also in other towns in
Serbia. Membership of the party has doubled, and DPS fared well at local
elections in some Sandžak municipalities. Due to failure of Sandžak parties to
agree on a joint candidate for a minister in government of Serbia, Bosniaks now
don't have their representative in Đinđic's cabinet. That ministerial
post was suggested by Prime Minister proper, for "Bosniaks are also to be
credited with toppling of Milosevic regime." Ugljanin's List of Sandžak,
as the largest and most prestigious party, suggested Bajram Omeragic, but
Ljajic's party thought that the post should go their member in view of their
participation in the ruling coalition. But as Ugljanin was adamant that his
candidate be elected minister, the deal was not reached, and Bosniaks have not
made it to the Serb government.
The
next personnel battle was waged over the appointment of head of Novi Pazar
police department. Both parties had their candidates, and their several-months
long wrangling was cut short by Prime Minister. Namely his choice fell on Suad
Bulic member of Democratic Party from Novi Pazar. Both Ugljanin and Ljajic had
to accept that choice. Ugljanin tried to prove the power of his party by
founding the regional TV and opening of the University in Novi Pazar.
Ugljanin's political opponents maintained that he turned the regional TV into
his propaganda machinery. And that allegation seems to be founded, for
Ugljanin's party pre-election campaign in Novi Pazar was very aggressive. TV
coverage of his contenders for five municipal MPs was judged excessive by many
viewers.
Higher
education in Novi Pazar and in Sandžak has always been underdeveloped. Despite
its size (over 80,000 inhabitants), in Novi Pazar until 3-4 years ago there was
no high school.. Then departments of Belgrade Pedagogical Faculty, Kragujevac
Economic Faculty, BK University and High Business School were opened. In 2002
the two universities started operating in Novi Pazard. The first one known as
the "White House of Science" is headed by Sandžak mufti Muarem
Zukorlic, while the second one was built by the municipality.
Religious
Factor
High
education institutions became the new battleground between Suljeman Ugljanin
and mufti/imam Zukorlic. That conflict dates back to several years ago when,
according to religious dignitaries, Ugljanin tried to misuse the Islamic
Community of Sandžak and to establish a firm control over it. Ugljanin
responded by counter-accusations, notably: "Islamic Community is very
meddlesome, it tries to meddle into political life of Sandžak" Discord
between the two sides became so intense that Ugljanin last year did not show up
at a Ramadan Prayer, officiated by the reis ulema Mustafa Ceric, head of
B&H Islamic Community and recognised head of all Muslim communities in
former Yugoslavia. DPS condemned appointment of mufti Zukorlic to the post of
University rector, though he said that it was only a temporary duty. At the
proposal of Zukorlic in March 2002 the Initiative Committee for the University
Founding was set up in Sandžak. The Committee elected Zukorlic first as its
President, and then as the University rector. At the inauguration ceremony in
the late summer Gaso Knezevic, Serb Education Minister said: "Government
Serbia was glad to hear that a group of people from Novi Pazar decided to found
university with their own funds and in their own town."
The university opened its doors to first students, also thanks to assistance of
the Serb government, in October. That private university has the following
faculties: Law, Philosophy, Information, Business Economy and Management.
Tuition fees for each semester amount to EUR 400-500, and university has over
200 enrolees. Students are of Bosniak nationality, but professors are both
Bosniaks and Serbs. According to mufti the multi-ethnic composition of
educational cadres demonstrates the university's open and not, as many allege,
fundamentalist character. In fall 2002 the building housing High School
institutions, notably departments of Kragujevac and Belgrade universities, was
completed by Ugljanin's party. Conditions for studying are the same like in the
rest of Serbia.
Powerful
Islamic Community has also opened a kindergarten in Novi Pazar in which
educators teach children the basic tenets of Islam. In the town there is also a
religious school, or Medressa. A growing number of "veiled" girls and
members of a rigid religious sect "vehabija" on the streets of Novi
Pazar testify to a growing influence of Islam in Sandžak. In 2002 Islamic
Community organised a round trip of a record 200 Muslims to Mecca. Several
hundred citizens prior to their departure celebrated their pilgrimage at the
central town square.
Leaflets
of the "Active Muslim Youth", a fundamentalist B&H organisation
calling on severance of all ties with Christian neighbours, have appeared in
several Sandžak towns. Mufti/Imam Muamer Zukorlic denies charges of emergence
of Islamic fundamentalism in Sandžak, and explains the veil phenomenon by
saying "every person is free to dress as he or she pleases." He
added: "Among every people there are extremists, but their influence among
Sandžak Muslims is minor… Islamic Community is trying to sideline the vahabi
sect… they are extravagant youngsters still looking for their identity. Our
Muslim Youth Club is unrelated to them."
Police
denies existence of any fundamentalist Islamic organisation in Novi Pazar,
while Episcope Artemije of Raska and Prizren cautioned that situation in
Sandžak was quite similar to the one in Kosovo before escalation of armed
conflicts. Due to several shooting incidents in the vicinity of monastery
Sopocane police for several days guarded that religious institution. Serb
Orthodox Dignitaries met in the monastery to discuss the security situation in
Sandžak. Episcope Artemije then said that developments in the Raska area,
notably those in Novi Pazar were menacing… "I wish that people came to
their senses and realised that this was the joint territory in which we all
should live peacefully."
Police claimed that the Sopocani incidents were organised by incident-prone
individuals, and not organised, militant groups. Priests and SPC dignitaries
had a different opinion. Priest Mihajlo of Sopocani assessed that the militant
Islamic faction was gaining ground in Novi Pazar. "I fear to go
there…Children spit on us, throw objects on our priests and curse us."
Muslims denied his accusations and said that he was trying to spread
anti-Muslim sentiment ( priest Mihajlo once stated: "Serbs are bothered by
loud prayers of muezzin.") Representatives of the Islamic Community and of
the SOC had regular contacts, though they tended to criticise each other via
media for "failing to rein in religious militants among the community's
ranks". For example Imam Zukorlic called on the SOC to condemn Serb
extremism and asked why the SOC was raising very high crosses in the vicinity
of Novi Pazar. He noted: "Hills are neither Serb nor Muslim." Last
year Zukorlic as a member of the Serb government delegation visited the United
Arab Emirates. This was the first time that the highest ranking Muslim
dignitary made part of a state delegation.
Sports
and other Incidents
No
major violations of human rights were reported in Sandžak last year. But
several multi-ethnic incidents were reported. During the New Year Eve
celebrations police beat up Murat Pepic,
but that incident did not have a political background. Murder of Selman Hasic,
businessman of Novi Pazar was not politically motivated either. His killer
Milovan Glisovic admitted that he wanted to rob Hasic.
In Novi Pazar and Tutin houses of several Serb police officials linked to
weapons-seizing actions were stoned.
Stoning of the house of Inspector Goran Rosic in Novi Pazar and several attacks
on policemen are seen as responses to several police interventions, involving
even beating up of several hundred Bosniaks. Last year was also marked by
several sports incidents. Young denizens of Novi Pazar massively celebrated the
victory of the Turkish Football Representation at the World Cup. They drove
around Novi Pazar, hooted their horns, waved flags and shouted "Turkey,
Turkey." In the wake of those celebrations representatives of Serb
political parties condemned that conduct as "celebration of victory of a
foreign country." Last summer the European Youth Handball Championship was
held in Novi Bazar. Bosniaks rooted for Yugoslavia, but during
Yugoslavia-Turkey match they shouted "This is Turkey" and
"Yugoslavia, Sandžak does not need you,." while cans and lighters
were hurled at young Yugoslav players. Turkish flags were waved, and young
Turkish handball players were warmly greeted every night in front of their
hotel by groups of enthusiastic citizens. Most Bosniak parties condemned that
incident. But PDA maintained: "Bosniak youngsters are free to root for
whomever they want. But the state authorities should ask themselves why those
youngsters are rooting for a rival state. The state is sovereign wherever
citizens are content, and they cannot be content with the country whose
sovereignty is ensured by police and army and other repressive measures".
Novi Pazar authorities justified the conduct of youngsters by their irritation
with the fact that one Yugoslav hand-ball raised three-fingers (a Serb symbol)
after scoring a goal. Islamic Community and most political parties condemned
the conduct of Novi Pazar audience. Munir Poturak, Vice President of DPS was
very critical: "It is shameful to hurl cans and insults at girls playing
under the flag of this country. Those hooligans projected a negative image of
Bosniaks and tried to sour our relations with our Serb neighbours."
The Turkish Embassy in Belgrade also condemned that incident Its diplomats
during a visit to Novi Pazar told representatives of Sandžak political parties
that "the use of Turkish flag is considered a misuse of symbol of the
Turkish state." Then the
basketball incident ensued. Namely about 200 Serb youngsters tried to celebrate
the Yugoslav gold medal at the World Basketball Championship in the heart of
town. They arrived at the central square and started shouting "We are the
first ones to drink Turkish blood" and "Come out to see the Serb
race.". They faced off 800 Bosniak youngsters who hurled similar insults.
In the ensuing tussle policemen, who tried to separate inflamed youngsters,
fared worst. The following day Veljko Beloica and Bojan Ilic, most vocal fans,
were beaten up in front of a Novi Pazar café. Serbs then founded the Committee
for Protection of Raska Area Serbs and erected barricades on the access roads
to Novi Pazar. Two days later Ilic was detained on grounds of weapons
possession. After talks with Rasim Ljajic, the Federal Minister for Ethnic and National
Minorities in Novi Pazar and a meeting with Prime Minister Đinđic in
Belgrade, Serbs renounced the idea to erect new barricades and demand for
instalment of new authorities in Novi Pazar and dismissal of Dusan Mihajlovic,
the Interior Secretary and Suad Bulic, Head of Novi Pazar Police Department. At
a joint Bosniak-Serb meeting Novi Pazar political parties condemned the
incident "as an attempt to cause massive unrest and create a new
flash-point."
Serb parties stated that the incident was organised by PDA, while the latter
scapegoated "the Serb militants who came from afar on orders of the forces
defeated on 5 October." According to Minister Ljajic "the incident is
clearly an attempt by both Bosniak and Serb political forces to homogenise the
electorate on ethnic grounds and use it later as alleged protectors of their
interests." Ljajic admitted that the incident was indicative of a high
level of inter-ethnic intolerance and distrust, but concluded that
"Sandžak shall not be turned into the crisis hotbed, because such a
development is contrary to interests of the Bosniak population."
Prime Minister Đinđic also tried to appease the situation by telling
the Serb delegation: "blockades can only worsen the situation ….Serbs have
no reasons to fear anything, nor do members of minorities. Both live in their
own country." Đinđic promised more assistance to that area and
probes into work of the local judicial and police forces. In mid-November a
mobile cultural container of the foundation "Defence of Our Future"
was stoned in Novi Pazar. (It first operated for nearly five weeks in Kosovska
Mitrovica). It both towns it caused different reactions. NGOs by and large
extolled its workshops, while other condemned them. After the AIDs lecture and
distribution of condoms to visitors, the Muslim Youth Centre condemned the
project deeming it a device aimed at "spoiling the Muslim Youth and
spreading immorality." MYC activists called on parents to ban their
children from visiting the Container. And many parents complied with that
"advice". Thus the number of visitors rapidly dwindled. Ahim Koh,
head of project, criticised MYC for "spreading hate speech discrimination
and racism."
MYC's President Mithad Mujovic retaliated by communicating: "We sharply
condemn all forms of violence, but also attempts at raising tensions by hyping
up minor phenomena."
Conclusions
and Recommendations
-
Inter-ethnic incidents mostly reported in Novi Pazar indicated that Sandžak is
a sensitive area. Bosniak side in the past two years responded to Serb
nationalism. Encouraging signs are at least verbal condemnations of incidents
by some Bosniak parties and Islamic community. Incidents are likely to occur in
the near future, but all steps should be taken to pre-empt their escalation,
for the latter would harm mostly Bosniaks.
-
Republican bodies should at least deliver on some promises given in the wake of
the basketball incident. Prime Minister Đinđic then promised that
"the state shall pay more attention to the area and work on development of
its infrastructure and economy."
-
The state, if it wants to curb Bosniak nationalism, should first demonstrate to
Bosniaks that it really considers them equal citizens. And that implies: fair
resumption of Ranisavljevic trial in Belgrade, and end to all judicial and
other misuses. (Ranisavljevic is charged with passengers abduction in
Sjeverin). Plus the arrest of Milan Lukic, the Štrpci case prime indictee, and
resolution of both cases.
-
The Yugoslav Army has taken into consideration the DPS request and petition for
separate sentences. Such sentencing would not be costly for the army and would
mean a lot for soldiers of Muslim faith.
-
Erhad Busek, Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact for South East Europe, warned:
"I am receiving reports on worsening of situation in Sandžak, and
Belgrade's disregard for autonomy claims."
Status of Sandžak is likely to be discussed only after reconstruction of Serbia
and settlement of Vojvodina issue. If they want Sandžak to get something,
Bosniak parties should first fine-tune their positions. But currently they are
very much at loggerheads, and such relations don't augur well for formation of
the Bosniak Council, which under the Act on Protection of Minorities, should
protect rights and interests of ethnic minorities. Under conditions of such
political division, citizens of Sandžak cannot expect Belgrade to to start
seriously considering the status of region.
ANNEX
Kosovo and Serbia
Status
through Dialogue
Between
Belgrade and Prishtine
Two
years since the overthrow of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic, Serbia is yet to
solve some crucial dilemmas in order to accelerate the process of transition.
One of them requires the ruling Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition
and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) taking a clear position on the
country’s frontiers (i.e. a position on Republika Srpska, Montenegro, and
Kosovo). This is closely related to the promotion of human rights, above all to
the question of minorities and their repatriation, i.e. the integration of the
refugees and displaced persons. The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in
Serbia considers that the issue of human rights continues being exploited for
political ends in Serbia and that the present state of affairs if anything
contributes to the radicalization of these problems. Unless the key political
actors in Serbia stop making contradictory statements and take a firm position
on frontiers, the question of refugees and minorities will remain a potential
source of crisis with unforeseeable consequences.
In this context, the question of the final
status of Kosovo must be addressed as part of a public debate as soon as
possible, with the Serbian authorities putting forward a clear position and
proposals. The matter will in all probability not be resolved at once, such as
at an international conference: it will be dealt with in a process ending in an
arrangement between the Kosovo and Serbian authorities. Such a process is
unthinkable without the active participation of the international community and
its explicit position on every issue bearing on the final status of Kosovo.
Setting up and consolidating Kosovo institutions will be a part of that
process, an activity in which substantial progress has been made since the
arrival of KFOR.
By addressing the final status of Kosovo and
initiating a meaningful discussion thereon, Belgrade would manifest its
goodwill and readiness to solve the issue; this would be favourably received by
Albanian political leaders, among others, ease the position of the Serb community
in Kosovo, and enable the return of displaced persons. There will be no return
of displaced persons to Kosovo as long as politicians keep juggling the number
of Serbs intending to go back for their own political ends.
The latest events in connection with the return drive officially sponsored by
the Return Committee, affiliated to the Association for the Return of Expelled
Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija headed by Miroslav Solevic,
bears witness to the fact that at this moment a mass return of Serbs to Kosovo
has no backing of the international community.
The first positive signals in favour of
opening a dialogue with Belgrade with a view to determining the final status of
Kosovo have already been sent by Pristina: the Kosovo Prime Minister, Bajram Rexhepi,
considers that the newly-established provincial authorities must consult with
their Belgrade counterparts on the matter.
In an interview with the news agency Beta, Rexhepi said he was sure that direct
talks with the Serbian authorities would be established soon.
At this moment, stability in the Balkans
hinges on this issue more than on any other. The radicalization of the
situation in Macedonia, as well as the still insufficiently stable situation in
southern Serbia (Presevo and Bujanovac), should be regarded in this context.
At present eight options for settling Kosovo’s
status are in circulation.
According to the United States Institute for Peace they are: 1. Kosovo remains
a protectorate Indefinetely; 2. Cantonization/decentralization; 3. Loose Federation
(Belgrade retains nominal sovereignty, but Kosovo functions as an independent
state within current borders although without separate UN membership; 4.
Commonwealth (Belgrade retains nominal sovereignty, but Kosovo functions as an
independent state within current borders and with separate UN membership (like
Canada or Australia); 5. Decesion by an international panel by a date certain,
i.e. three years (there would be no guarantee of eventual independence. The
outcome would be conditional on the performance of Serbs and Albanians with
respect to specific criteria including democratic self-government, Serb
participation in Kosovo’s institutions, respect for human rights, return of
refugees and displaced persons, and responsibility for regional behavior); 6.
Conditional independence (With unchanged borders, Kosovo would progress toward
independence, contingent on demonstrated democratic self governance, respect
for minority rights, and responsible behaviour in the region . The guarantee
that Kosovo will not return to Belgrade rule would match a commitment that
Kosovo will not seek to expand its boundaries or de-stabilize neighbours. The
international community would provide security guarantees for minorities and
refugee return… The UN special representative would retain veto power over
issues relating to protect of minority rights and external borders during the
transition period. An international forces would still be needed indefinitely
for external security.); 7. Independence within the existing borders after at a
date certain (after an agreed period of increasing self-rule under
international supervision, Kosovo would become an independent state within its
current borders. The international community would guarantee the Kosovo Serbs
their rights and a wide local autonomy. Before becoming independent, Kosovo
would establish trans-border cooperation with the neighbouring countries.
International monitoring of Kosovo would continue for a limited time after its
independence); 8. independence with Partition (the municipalities of Zvecan,
Zubin Potok, and Leposavic, as well as the northern part of the town of
Kosovska Mitrovica, would go to Serbia, while the rest would be incorporated in
a Kosovo state. On the other hand, the Albanian-predominated municipalities in
southern Serbia would be attached to Kosovo. Serbs and members of other
minorities wishing to move would be helped to do so. Those Serbs who wish to
stay would be guaranteed dual citizenship).
Although this report has been accessible to
the public in Serbia, admittedly through various interpretations, Serbian
politicians have not reacted to it publicly. Their sole discernible position on
the future of Kosovo postulates its division.
Kosovska Mitrovica dominates all utterances of
Belgrade politicians in connection with Kosovo.
During the recent UN Assembly session in New York, the talks the Yugoslav
President, Vojislav Kostunica, had there also centred on Kosovo, ‘especially
Kosovska Mitrovica’. According to the weekly Nacional,
Kostunica pointed out that singling out Kosovska Mitrovica as the greatest
problem in Kosovo and Metohija was a dangerous illusion because, unlike
Gnjilane, Pristina and Prizren, which had almost completely been ethnically
cleansed, the multi-ethnic composition of Kosovska Mitrovica had largely been
preserved.
There is no denying the fact that a great many
Serbs have left the above-mentioned towns. However, Kosovska Mitrovica cannot
be considered a multi-ethnic town, its present division being the consequence
of violence. According to the 1991 Census, the population of Kosovska Mitrovica
consisted of 70 per cent Albanians and 10.2 per cent Serbs, the Albanians
constituting a majority on both sides of the Ibar. The northern part of the
town, currently under Serb control, had a population of 11,000 Albanians and
7-8,000 Serbs.
The Albanians are being prevented from returning to the northern part of the
town by the Belgrade-backed ‘bridge guardians’.
Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica is also
committed to preserving the status quo in Kosovo. In an interview with the news
agency Fonet, Kostunica said that 'it would not do good to rush the solution of
the final status of Kosovo', adding that 'the fight for Kosovo must continue
and will not soon be over'.
Nebojsa Covic, the Serbian Deputy Prime
Minister and President of the Co-ordination Centre for Kosovo and Metohija who
is practically in sole charge in Belgrade of the question of Kosovo, told Nacional that Serbia and Yugoslavia will
favour the partition of Kosovo ‘in proportion as the international factor
favours its independence’.
He said that ‘there will be no lasting and sustainable solution in the region
if Kosovo is allowed to become independent’, such a solution being, in his
view, an ‘ethnic division of Kosovo’.
Some time previously, at the international
conference in Belgrade in May 2001 discussing security in south-east Europe at
the threshold of the twenty-first century, Covic had tabled a plan to partition
Kosovo into two entities: a Serb entity which would comprise most Serb
historical and cultural monuments and an Albanian one where most Albanians
live. The Serb entity would be protected by the Yugoslav army and police and
the Albanian entity, which would enjoy a high or the highest degree of
autonomy, would remain under the protection of an international force, with
Yugoslav and KFOR border troops focusing on the prevention of raids from one
entity into the other. According to Covic, the proposal ‘presupposes
renunciation of the maximum demands, both the Albanian and the Serbian side
giving up the illusion that the whole of Kosovo belongs to them’.
Miroslav Solevic for his part declared that
the main condition to be presented to the international community would be to
apply the model of Kosovska Mitrovica, i.e. that all the towns be divided along
ethnic lines ‘considering that Serbs remain only in that town’.
Serbia’s political circles and elite (above
all those in the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts) have entertained the
idea of partitioning Kosovo for quite some time.
The academician Dusan Batakovic says, for instance, that when the cantonization
plan providing, among other things, the preservation of special ties of Serb
zones with the Serbian state was expounded to the Kosovo Serbs following the
entry of KFOR, it was ‘greeted with stormy approbation’. He says that Kosovo
was spontaneously cantonized in a very short time largely according to
cantonization maps embraced by the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serb
Resistance Movement from Kosovo far earlier than the outbreak of hostilities.
Of the five cantons envisaged, four remain: the largest and most significant
Serb canton in northern Kosovo encompasses the largest Serb enclave spreading
from Kosovska Mitrovica through Zvecan and Leposavic to Zubin Potok. It was
thanks to the French contingent of KFOR that the ‘reunification of Kosovska
Mitrovica’ has not been effected.
Belgrade’s espousal of a partition of Kosovo
along ethnic lines is also testified to by Belgrade’s open support of parallel
institutions as a major obstacle to the creation of a multi-ethnic Kosovo and
the final settlement of its status. The president of the Co-ordinating Centre
for Kosovo, Nebojsa Samardzic, has told Beta that as far as the Belgrade
government was concerned ‘the institutions being set up in Kosovo by the Serbs
are not parallel in nature because their object is to endure’.
Such an attitude towards Kosovo on the part of
Belgrade can only generate crisis in view of the fact that the Albanian side is
unanimous in wanting independence. For this reason one must give serious
thought to the question of whether Serbia could exist as a stable country with
10 per cent of its population opposed to the arrangement.
The idea of an ethnic division of Kosovo has
no support among the mainstream Albanian political parties. The Serb
politicians advocating the establishment of mono-ethnic structures can find
partners only among the most radical elements in Kosovo.
Even the
representatives of moderate currents in Kosovo have by now become opposed to the
prospect of Kosovo reverting to Belgrade’s jurisdiction. Proceeding from this
reality, the ‘independent Kosovo option’ and the prospects for its realization
would have to be tabled as an option in any Serb-Albanian talks on the final
status of Kosovo. This position does not seek to prejudice the final status of
Kosovo.
Kosovo analysts dismiss the position that
Albanians are incapable of running an independent Kosovo as racist logic. They
believe that the relations between Serbia and Kosovo would improve significantly
if Kosovo were to become independent.
In the view of some of them, a major international conference ending in an
agreement on the final status of Kosovo would be unrealistic. The crucial issue
is not whether or not Kosovo will become an independent state, but whether it
can survive as an independent state if it adopts an autarkic policy. For Veton
Suroi, the question of what is to be done the next day (following independence)
and how to join the European Union and integrate regionally is the key issue.
Drawing parallels between the status of Kosovo
and that of Republika Srpska, as well as the threats by certain political
circles in Serbia of annexing Republika Srpska to Serbia in the event of Kosovo
being granted independence, are inadmissible. Unlike Republika Srpska, which
came into being as the result of ethnic cleansing, Kosovo existed as an entity
both within the former Yugoslavia and within Serbia.
The international community would have to take
a position on the final status of Kosovo because it is already deeply involved
in Balkan affairs and because the talks on Kosovo’s status would in all
probability take place with its participation.
One notices two recent attitudes within the
international community towards Kosovo’s future status: according to one,
certain standards (such as establishing a democratic society, incorporating
minority representatives in political structures, embarking on privatization,
fighting corruption) must first be achieved in Kosovo before discussing its
final status; according to the other, the time for discussing the final status
of Kosovo is now.
Unless the debate along these lines leading
towards a clear international strategy on Kosovo continues, future talks
between Belgrade and Pristina will be as arduous and time-consuming as those
between Serbia and Montenegro on redefining their relationship. There is all
the more reason to deal with the final status of Kosovo promptly in view of the
prospect of a US troop pullout from Kosovo, in which case the whole burden and
responsibility for Kosovo’s stability would be shouldered by the European
Union.
In this context, it is especially worrying
that the European Union has no unanimous position on Kosovo's status either.
Morton Abramowiz, member of the Executive Committee of the International Crisis
Group, and Hether Hurlburt, until recently deputy director of the ICG, point
out: "...Brussles has apparently decided that the Balkans' future lies
with a strong Serbia and fewer statelets – meaning that Serbia must be joined
to Montenegro, and, apparently to Kosovo as well. Certanily no one who has
spent any time in the region believes that Kosovo can again be ruled from
Belgrade. This camp includes reformist Serbian leaders, who say that holding on
to Kosovo will slow down, not speed up, their progress toward EU membership.
Yet France, Italy, and Greece, among others, have signaled that the province
must remain part of Serbia, with no protest from other EU goverments. Thus, the
EU now refuses even to open a discassion on final status for Kosovo".
Thus, the want of harmony in the positions of EU members merely provides the
Yugoslav and Serbian authorities with leeway to manipulate the issue of
Kosovo's status. The need for pressure from the international community in
order to make progress in the Balkans is, unfortunately, not a thing of the
past.
The question of Kosovo has only sporadically
been raised during the Serbian presidential election campaign, and that almost
exclusively with a view to gaining voter support.
Addressing the question of Kosovo’s final
status, as well as reaching agreement primarily between Serbs and Albanians,
would not only enhance regional stability by preventing a radicalization of the
situation in southern Serbia and Macedonia, but also solve numerous questions
of international concern. One of these questions involves cross-border
cooperation in fighting terrorism and organized crime as a condition of
economic advancement throughout the region. An early start on settling Kosovo’s
final status will lead to an early establishment of cooperation between
Belgrade and Pristina; once the borders are defined and a legal framework for
the development of all relations in the region established, the road to
economic prosperity of Balkan states will be open.
Conclusions
and Recommendations:
- A dialogue between the Serbian and Kosovo
authorities in the presence of US and EU representatives must be launched
immediately. Any delay of such dialogue will slow the transition and economic
development of the region and will affect Balkan stability.
- Any further support for the parallel (Serb)
institutions in Kosovo, the Belgrade authorities’ manipulation of the number of
displaced persons who would want to go back, and demands for a partition of
Kosovo radicalize the situation and render the final solution ever more
improbable. It is of exceptional importance that the Kosovo Serbs should take
part in campaigning for local elections due in Kosovo in October on time, which
is one of the conditions for opening a dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina.
- A unanimous position of EU members on
Kosovo’s final status, as well as further cooperation between the US and the
EU, are still essential. If there is no such position, and if the US pulls out
of Kosovo, local partners in Belgrade will have ample room for speculation and
manipulation, which will not contribute to the opening of a Serb-Albanian
dialogue.
September 2002
Monthly Media Reports
January
2002
Hate-Mongering
Hate-mongering,
a feature of the Milosevic era which seemed to have disappeared with the change
of government, has been creeping back into the Serbian print media.
When
the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, DOS, coalition assumed power in October
2000, the media immediately became calmer and more measured, in line with the
style of the new authorities. Recently, however, a rhetoric of exclusion has
been finding a place on "Letters to the Editor" pages, most notably
in the daily Glas Javnosti. Parliamentary deputies, particularly those
belonging to the Radical Party, have also been using the parliamentary rostrum
to spread and incite national hatred.
The
media have not paid sufficient attention to this phenomenon and politicians
have distanced themselves from it. Journalists considered warmongers and
stooges of the former regime have started reappearing on certain television
programmes, using the same old belligerent vocabulary, under the pretext of
"explaining past events."
At
its annual assembly this month, the Independent Association of Journalists of
Serbia issued a statement that "the re-emergence of hate-mongering in the
media is detrimental to democracy", and noted that "the journalistic
profession has neither made a clean break with past practices, nor analysed
past events in depth." (Politika, 27 January)
In
view of this, the recent launch of a tolerance campaign by the Federal Ministry
for National and Ethnic Communities is no accident. The Ministry has produced
promotional materials, including coffee mugs and pencils, and a poster showing four
different cakes representing four nationalities with the message "Try
something different".
A
public information message aired extensively in the electronic media subverts
the old Serbian saying "I wish my neighbour's cow were dead". A
picture of a contented looking cow is captioned "I wish my neighbour's cow
good health and long life. Tolerance costs a little, but is priceless"
The
media started to take hate-mongering more seriously after an unexpected warning
from the Civic Alliance of Serbia, CAS, a group renowned for campaigning
against all forms of intolerance. The group was also noted for its anti-war
stance under the former regime.
All
media covered the emergency press conference held on January 15, by CAS
President and Federal Foreign Secretary Goran Svilanovic. He cautioned against
the re-emergence of hate mongering and upbraided his colleagues for glossing
over the phenomenon.
Svilanovic
said, "Recent hate mongering against Jews, Albanians, Croats and Bosnians,
plus other nationalist uproars which have featured in our media and society of
late must stop, for the politics of hatred towards other peoples will spawn new
conflicts and the disintegration of our country." (Politika, Danas, B92,
Radio-Television Serbia, January 15-16)
Svilanovic
continued, "It is shameful that state television, which is directly
financed by the federal government, could feature a tirade against Jews, which
naturally provoked a protest from the Israeli Embassy. Hate-mongering against
other peoples in Serbia has become commonplace and its consequences could be
tragic."
Svilanovic
was referring specifically to anti-Semitic statements made by Serbian Orthodox
priest Zarko Gavrilovic on YU INFO, a programme financed by the federal
government, articles run by the daily Glas Javnosti and a speech made to the
Serbian diaspora in Sydney by Velimir Ilic, President of Nova Srbija Party.
Svilanovic
appealed to federal president Vojislav Kostunica and Serbian prime minister
Zoran Djindjic to deliver on their pre-election promises that "all peoples
and citizens in Serbia shall be free and equal". His observation that
"The silence of our top leader speaks louder than the hate mongering
itself," was repeatedly quoted in the media.
On
January 15, the Ministry for National and Ethnic Communities issued a
communique (covered by all media) noting that "in recent days, some media
and politicians' statements have been redolent of a revived nationalism.".
Stopping
short of pointing a finger at individuals, the communique criticised a
discourse in which "national origins... (are used) as grounds for
political bashing and disqualification...ambassadors and ambassadorial
appointees are 'registered' according to their nationality and public figures
are berated because of the non-Serbian surnames of their spouses."
Head
of the ministry Rasim Ljajic, a Muslim from the Sandzak region of Serbia, told
Danas that he had issued the communique "because of a series of texts (in
Glas Javnosti) critical of some members of the diplomatic corps of Yugoslavia,
which made frequent mention of the nationality of those officials. We were also
compelled to react to a recent statement by Velimir Ilic, president of the Nova
Srbija party, who during his visit to Australia categorised diplomats according
to national descent."
Ljajic
continued, "We thought that after October 5 (the day of the coup) people
would no longer be judged by their national descent and religion... but it
seems that intolerance still has its uses in Serbia.".
The
January 12-13 weekend edition of Danas ran a reader's letter claiming that
"During his recent visit to Sydney, Velimir Ilic mentioned that 'Energy
minister Goran Novakovic, a Croat, is a member of the Serbian government', and
that the Mayor of Belgrade, Mrs. Hristanovic, is married to a Muslim." The
reader said these comments had also appeared on the Serbian diaspora website in
Australia.
Asked
to comment by a B92 presenter on January 18, Ilic angrily retorted, "I am
sick and tired of those upstarts." Ilic also told a press conference
(reported in Vecernji Novosti on January 22) "I did not use the language
of religious and national intolerance in Sydney, and accusations levelled at me
by Goran Svilanovic are not justified." He added, "Svilanovic should
go to Chicago and explain some personnel appointments to our emigres
there." He added that his comment "Minister Novakovic has a Croatian
passport, while the Mayor of Belgrade is a daughter-in-law of Ustashi Beco
Hristanovic", was made "in answer to questions in Sydney".
In
a January 10 feature on Yugoslav diplomacy, Glas Javnosti included criticism of
several public figures renowned for their anti-war stance during the Milosevic
era. An article headlined "The diaspora does not want Cerovic"
targeted weekly Vreme journalist Stojan Cerovic, a nominee for the top post of
Yugoslav Ambassador to the USA.
Glas
Javnosti ran a letter to President Kostunica from Professor Dr Dragoslav
Georgijevic, a Serb resident in the United States. "We oppose the
candidacy of Mr Cerovic... we met him here in America during the civil war,
when together with that great enemy of the Serbs Sonja Biserko (President of
the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia) he slung mud at the Serbian
nation."
Glas
Javnosti carried a statement by Srdja Trifkovic, "director of a Washington-based
institute", that "Cerovic gave many interviews to the US media in
support of the 'de-nazification' of the Serbian people conducted via NATO
bombs". Glas Javnosti also ran Trifkovic's allegations that "Ivo
Viskovic, a Croat, was named the FRY Ambassador to Ljubljana; Dejan Janca, a
Slovene, was appointed Ambassador to Budapest, while the FRY representative to
UNESCO will be Tito's former agent in the UN, Dragoljub Neiman."
After
Svilanovic's statement, Glas Javnosti ran several pieces on hate-mongering. On
January 17, it ran a headline "Hate speech and intolerance from
politicians are so far sporadic, but should not be ignored." It also
carried Svilanovic's comment that "politicians, not journalists, are most
responsible for hate speech...but the editor-in-chief and director of state
television should know who their guests are." [Reference to priest Zarko
Gavrilovic]
The
same article quoted vice-president of the Serbian government Zarko Korac's
warning that "hate mongering and national hysteria have become serious
problems in Serbia, for a media and society suddenly open to the world
...before standards for responsibility in public speaking have been set".
Korac thought it alarming that "there is enough public response to these
incidents... which should be publically condemned by all supporters of
democracy, especially those in power".
Rasim
Ljajic appealed to the public prosecutor to take steps against expressions of
nationalism, but told Glas that he did not expect his demand to be met. He
added "my ministry wants public condemnation of hate speech, for
nationalist-inspired rhetoric is dangerous in an ethnically heterogeneous
country. ...radical stances become entrenched and the integration of ethnic
communities into a broader milieu becomes harder."
On
January 20 Glas Javnosti published the results of an opinion poll
"Nationalism – a Cheap Commodity." Public figures and politicians
answered a series of questions, including "Who is spreading hate speech in
Serbia?" Goran Svilanovic, one of the respondents, noted that Glas
Javnosti was indiscriminate in its publication of by-lined texts and readers'
letters containing "unsubstantiated information" which was also
"nationalistically charged".
Of
the seven respondents, only Slobodan Vuksanovic, president of the National
Democratic Party, a new, self-styled opposition party, and Borisav Prelevic,
president of the Party of Serbian Unity, denied having noticed examples of hate
mongering in public life. Other respondents referred mainly to
"irresponsible politicians" or "political exhibitionism".
On
January 17, Svilanovic told the "60 Minutes" programme on TV Politika
that his message was intended for political colleagues and the media. "All
politicians should be mindful of the impact of their words. Reforms will
achieve nothing if we don't solve the human rights issues. Serbia is a state
for all its peoples. We have embarked upon a process of reconciliation which is
very difficult, but we must learn how to cohabit with others," he
explained
Svilanovic's
indictment of hate-mongering was nominated on Studio B's top programme
"Impression of the Week". Only one viewer voted for it, however.
Of
all the dailies, only Danas focused on the re-emergence of hate mongering. Its
January 17 editorial dealt with the revival of ethnic, racial and religious
hatred.
"It
has become clear that since toppling Milosevic, DOS has effected some cosmetic
changes and introduced some economic reforms...but the new authorities have
failed to tackle the root of evil in this territory once called Yugoslavia,
notably the misuse of national frustrations by political strongmen ...a misuse
which generated the most heinous crimes at the end of the 20th century."
The
editorial continued with doubts that "the new authorities ever intended to
confront that evil... had they wanted to do that, they would have done it
immediately. Criminals and stooges of the former regime would have been
arrested, or at least removed from the public arena, and calling them to
account would be regarded as 'law and justice' not 'unwarranted retaliation'
".
The
January 19-20 weekend Danas contained a lengthy commentary headlined, "Is
the spectre of extreme nationalism threatening Serbia again?" concerned
that "One can sense that some political groups are seeking to enthrone
nationalism tinged with hate-mongering as a 'logical democratic
achievement'."
On
January 25, Danas ran a letter from Jelena Minic, a researcher and analyst for
the Belgrade branch of the International Crisis Group, in which she criticised
the media for unbridled hate-mongering. She even took Danas to task for
publishing Velimir Ilic's Sydney speech without any commentary, because
"his words alone were dangerous". Glas was castigated for failing to
comment on "chauvinistic statements made by Srdja Trifkovic in the article
'The diaspora does not want Cerovic'".
Minic
concluded that "We should all be alarmed that only a minority of
individuals and organisations react to the continuing anti-Semitic, homophobic,
nationalistic and chauvinist currents in our society...and those same
individuals and organisations are vilified and berated by the media and MPs.
This alarming state of affairs is rooted in the failure a year ago to confront
the truth about recent war crimes and begin an uncompromising process of identifying
and condemning their perpetrators."
Well-known
commentator Petar Lukovic dedicated his regular column in weekly Reporter
(January 23 edition) to hate-mongering. In "The Croatian cow is alive and
well", he noted "This country needs liberation from acute
xenophobia.". Lukovic added "Minister of minorities Ljajic is right
when he speaks of widespread intolerance and chauvinist incidents, but one TV
announcement is not enough to influence the public mood."
Only
a few media paid attention to the statements made by Zarko Gavrilovic, in a
short news item headlined "Father Zarko Gavrilovic does not like Jews and
they don't like him," the recently launched daily Nacional (January 12-13
edition) remarked that "Father Gavrilovic, always adept at kicking up a media
furore, has recently found new enemies at the Embassy of the State of
Israel".
The
newspaper did not make its own comment on the incident, but wrote "Only a
few viewers saw that programme [the YU INFO programme during which the
offending comments were made], but it nonetheless served as a pretext for a
showdown between conspiracy theorists and those who think that Father
Gavrilovic represents the far-right of the Serbian spectrum."
On
January 17 Glav Javnosti ran a response from Gavrilovic in which he accused it
of trying to increase its circulation and pit him against the Israeli embassy.
"I don't hate Jews ...Serbs and Jews have suffered equally..but Serbs have
never persecuted Jews, while during the Nato campaign Jews (Holbrooke, Albright
and Kissinger) took an active part in the demonisation of the Serbian
people."
February
2002
The Trial of Slobodan
Milosevic
As
the trial of former president Slobodan Milosevic began in The Hague this month,
his popularity in Serbia has soared. The former President of Serbia and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, FRY, is facing charges of genocide in Bosnia
and crimes against humanity in Croatia and Kosovo.
In
an opinion poll conducted by the Strategic Marketing Agency, Milosevic scored
an average of 2.7 on a popularity scale of one to five, way ahead of many key
Serbian politicians. Events in the courtroom and local media coverage of the
trial have contributed to this rating.
Local
coverage of the trial has highlighted what many local and international experts
consider to be a badly prepared prosecution case. Prosecution witnesses from
Kosovo who "do not remember" or "knew nothing" about Kosovo
Liberation Army, KLA, activities, along with Milosevic's newly discovered
talent as a lawyer have dominated the reports. The events which brought
Milosevic to the dock in the first place are ignored.
Another
conspicuous omission from the coverage has been any meaningful comments from
key politicians. Only a few politicians have touched on the alleged war crimes
or Serbia's role in the wars of the former Yugoslavia. Most have confined
themselves to platitudes, with Serbian minister of justice Vladan Batic
commenting that the trial is "like any other trial" or Serbian prime
minister Zoran Djindjic comparing it to "a circus".
Before
the trial began, the media occupied itself with speculating on the possible
identity of prosecution witnesses, most notably which former establishment
figures might be making the journey to The Hague.
A
general assessment that Milosevic's indictment was politically motivated and
historically overloaded, was followed by reports that the first prosecution
witnesses had not delivered convincing testimonies, that Milosevic had gained
an upper hand during their cross-examinations, and was surprisingly well-informed.
The shattering accounts given by some of the witnesses were sidelined.
In
its 14-15 February issue, Politika ran a commentary-cum-report from The Hague,
invoking "many observers at The Hague" to conclude that "the
prosecution's opening statement was akin to mediocre journalism... devoid of
any indications as to how it would link Milosevic to all the events".
Commentator Zorana Suvakovic remarked that "the NATO bombardment, so
sensitive for Yugoslavia and its people, was presented in a superficial and
inadequate way by the prosecution team, who failed to mention that thousands of
innocent civilians died during the campaign."
The
first testimony of the trial, from former communist official Mahmut Bakali,
bolstered Milosevic's popularity rating, after the former president managed to
cast doubt on Baklali's evidence during cross-examination.
On
February 20, the daily Glas javnosti announced "Milosevic rebuts Bakali's
arguments," while Politika observed that "the cross-examination of
Bakali showed that Milosevic was right to mount his own defence." The
daily also noted "his question and answer sessions were aimed both at the
court and the domestic audience ...he addressed the latter to improve his
political rating at home".
Some
papers even used sports' jargon in their coverage. On February 20, for example,
the new and increasingly popular tabloid, Nacional, ran a front-page headline,
"Milosevic 1: The Hague 0, Rugova next in line".
Bakali's
answers in Albanian – 'po' for 'yes' and 'jo' for 'no' – became a butt of
jokes, both for journalists and ordinary citizens, while the Studio B programme
"Impression of the Week" awarded top rating to "Milosevic's deft
cross-examination of Bakali". Many viewers who called in enthused about
"Milosevic's sleight of hand" and ridiculed "Bakali's
confusion". (20 February)
Only
the daily newspaper Danas gave extensive coverage to the testimony of witness
Agim Zeciri, who described how Serbian forces killed 16 members of his family
during the NATO campaign. Glas simply wrote that "Zeciri, did not face
Milosevic while delivering his testimony". The media focussed instead on
the court's decision not to allow the main prosecution investigator, Kevin
Curtis, to testify in the courtroom.
On
February 23, with the trial well into its second week, a headline in Glas ran
"Milosevic vs Tribunal, 1:0". With a sub-heading: "First witness
knocked out, second eliminated, third fled in panic," Liljana Staletovic
alleged that the witnesses "have in front of them the statements they gave
the prosecution and are effectively reading from prepared speeches... they are
instructed how to answer, but when the cross-examination begins they fall into
traps they have laid for themselves."
The
same day, Novosti's Miroslav Zaric noted that "the prosecution experienced
a real debacle, and Mahmut Bakali left a very weak impression," in a text
headlined "Carla del Ponte not faring well".
Danas
has offered the most extensive coverage of the Milosevic trial. On many
occasions, through editorials and commentaries, it has addressed the issue of
war crimes and the unwillingness of politicians and the public to punish them
and confront the country's past.
The
February 16-17 weekend issue criticised public indifference to the opening of
Milosevic's trial, with journalist Ivan Torov stressing that "Serbia
should finally accept that Milosevic must be called to account for the years of
arrogance and violence."
He
went on: "Serbia is terrified... it does not know whether The Hague's
opening of the bloody Yugoslav file will rebound ...with disclosures of the
truth and an assumption of collective responsibility for what was done in our
name by the ruling family and the top political leadership in the final decade
of the last century."
A
February 22 editorial in Danas, headlined "The tribunal's work is
approached tentatively," described a lack of political will to explain why
Milosevic is in The Hague and what is really happening there. It was highly
critical of a recent statement from FRY President Vojislav Kostunica that
"The Hague tribunal has not made a very good impression in the early
stages of the Milosevic trial...the indictment seems to have been hastily drawn
up, there is a lot of quasi history and politicking ...the court is selective,
revolutionary and policised – in an ad hoc fashion."
Danas
also noted that the ruling Democratic Opposition of Serbia, DOS, coalition has
made no official comment on the Milosevic trial, instead leaving the people
"to assess his heroic conduct in The Hague... even though they don't know
why he is there," concluding, "If Kostunica criticised Milosevic as
often as he criticises his coalition partners, the Serbian people would realise
why Milosevic is no longer president.".
The
weekly NIN also approached the trial in an analytical way. It criticised the
"clumsy" opening statement of prosecutor Geoffrey Nice, but also took
the nation to task for failing to seriously re-examine its role in the world.
NIN's ICTY correspondent, Liljana Smailovic, noted that "Milosevic's legal
skills may have earned him kudos in The Hague... but any junior lawyer could
have told him the most important rule in the The Hague courtroom. Never speak
unsympathetically of the victims."
NIN
went on to point out how Milosevic, in a ten-minute speech, had mentioned every
brand of nationalism except Serbian, while accusing Mahmut Bakali of being
"blind to crimes against the Serbs or any manifestation of Albanian
nationalism."
On
February 28, in an article entitled "Protected lie", Smailovic
considered the Albanian witnesses and reactions to their testimonies in Serbia.
She observed "they probably received instructions on what to say, how to
say it and not to mention KLA activities on pain of death... All of this
highlights the political nature of contemporary Kosovo."
But
the commentary did not end there. "Albanian witnesses may not therefore be
intrepid moral heroes, but they are undoubtedly telling the truth about their
tribulations and suffering," she continued. Their testimonies make a
stronger impact at the ICTY than on the Serbian public, because the latter is
less sensitive to Albanian suffering than westerners. This in turn indicates
the lack of political sensitivity in Serbia and the real nature of Serbian
society".
March
2002
The Hague Tribunal (I)
The
Serbian political and media scenes were both afflicted with "Hague
fever" throughout March 2002. Unfulfilled international commitments to
cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
ICTY, once again tested relationships inside the ruling Democratic Opposition
of Serbia, DOS, coalition, while the media speculated about who would be next
to go to The Hague. In this context, issues relating to the Slobodan Milosevic
trial and the Momcilo Perisic affair were also covered.
US
financial assistance to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, FRY, was made
dependent on cooperation with the ICTY on March 10, 2001, after a bill to
facilitate the transfer of indicted war criminals was continually blocked at
federal government level. The Serbian government, whose reform programme
directly depended on international assistance, strongly backed cooperation with
the tribunal and on June 28, 2001 adopted a "Decree on Fulfillment of
Obligations towards the ICTY", on the basis of which Milosevic was
immediately handed over to The Hague. Had it failed to do this, the US would
not have approved 100 million US dollars worth of assistance, nor backed future
IMF and World Bank loans to Belgrade.
A
representative of Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia, DSS, was the only
Serbian government official to vote against that decision, deemed contrary to a
provision of the FRY constitution expressly banning the extradition of Yugoslav
citizens. Kostunica and his party continued to cite legal reasons for their
resistance to the international court. No further transfers of indictees were
made, and the cooperation decree was eventually struck down by the Yugoslav
constitutional court.
As
March 31, 2002 approached – decision day for the US Congress on the delivery of
the next installment of aid – media coverage on the issue of cooperation with
The Hague increased dramatically. Rival DOS factions – the 'reformist' wing
spearheaded by Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjic and the 'conservative'
wing led by the incumbent Yugoslav president Vojislav Kostunica – were engaged
in a veritable propaganda war, the former repeating warnings that Serbia had to
find any way to comply with its commitments, the latter insisting this was
impossible without proper legal provision.
Almost
all media ended up more or less campaigning for cooperation with The Hague,
feeling US pressure to make some progress and the Serbian authorities' fear
that failure to do so would threaten domestic reforms.
Politika's
front page on March 22 announced a "Countdown to D Day", the related
article replete with statements from US officials and US media assessments of
the "absence of cooperation between Belgrade and The Hague Tribunal."
Politika warned that, "Judging by the US media, the Belgrade authorities
cannot count on favourable assessments from the Bush administration, which are
necessary to give a green-light in the post-March 31 period to further
bilateral assistance to Serbia, and US backing of Serbia in the IMF, the World
Bank and other international institutions of that kind."
On
March 27, Glas noted the replay of last year's hesitation over cooperation with
the ICTY, with the headline "Serbia is late once again". A number of
contradictory statements by politicians were included in the piece. For
example, Kostunica said that the country would be destabilised by arrests and
handovers, while head of federal diplomacy Goran Svilanovic insisted
"co-operation was necessary".
On
March 28, Vreme's Nenad Lj Stefanovic explained that "this new
non-compliance with Hague commitments results both from the failure to adopt an
act on cooperation with the tribunal and the rather naive belief of many local
politicians that after Milosevic's handover to The Hague, pressures for further
handovers of indictees would stop".
The
media began publishing "arrest warrants", "wanted lists"
and photographs of those thought to be the most likely candidates for
extradition. It seemed as though the public was being primed for more indictees
to be handed over, and indictees were being persuaded to surrender.
The
media's three most likely suspects were SPS official and former deputy prime
minister of the Yugoslav government Nikola Sainovic, former head of the Serbian
police Vlajko Stojiljkovic, and former chief of staff of the Yugoslav army,
retired general Dragoljub Ojdanic. The "safest" indictees were judged
to be Serbian president Milan Milutinovic, "protected by the Belgrade
authorities, because of their unwillingness to call early presidential
elections", and the Vukovar three, former Yugoslav People's Army officers
Milorad Sljivancanin, Mile Mrksic and Miroslav Radic, who "are not within
reach of the police, since they are protected by the army".
Reporter
on March 19, in an article headlined "Two tickets for Scheveningen"
[Scheveningen is the detention centre at The Hague for those awaiting trial]
speculated that Stojiljkovic and Sainovic would be next, for their
arrests"carry the least risk". The paper deemed that
"Milutinovic, for the time being, and Ojdanic are the least likely
passengers to The Hague, in view of the former's current position – President
of Serbia- and the latter's military pedigree".
On
March 22, Glas wrote that "tensions are running high on the eve of the
last weekend in March", reporting a statement made by Serbian Radical
Party leader that Djindjic was preparing "weekend arrests". The
banner-style headline was "Djindjic announces a nice gift to the
Hague". Glas generally opposes cooperation with the ICTY.
On
March 28, Vecernje Novosti ran a front-page article entitled "Sainovic,
the first passenger", while on the same day, Glas announced
"Stojiljkovic, the first candidate for The Hague".
Some
media asserted that others were modifying their coverage of the Milosevic trial
to help facilitate such transfers.
At
the beginning of the month, RTS and then YU Info took the decision to suspend
live coverage of the trial due to a "lack of financial resources".
However, Vreme's Aleksandar Ciric on March 14 in "Suspension of the Hague
Trial Coverage" suggested that this was politically motivated, and that
recently announced handovers to The Hague – "non-existant deadlines"
for continuation of financial support – were not accidental either.
Reporter
on March 19 also thought the RTS decision to suspend live coverage of the
Milosevic trial was politically motivated. "Well-informed sources at RTS
maintain that 'Sloba' was taken off the air because of the alarming growth in
his popularity, as proved by some recent polls... in the wake of
Milosevic-conducted cross-examinations in the Hague Tribunal..." it
reported.
Quoting
the same sources, Reporter wrote that on those grounds RTS refused to cooperate
with B-92 (only TV B 92 continued live coverage of the trial) and IREX (the US
Committee for International Research and Exchange, an organisation which
assists the media), which offered coverage of the Milosevic trial free of
charge.
Elsewhere,
media coverage of the Milosevic trial proceedings by and large focused on the
credibility, or rather the lack thereof, of Albanian witnesses. Novosti on March
18 ran a text "Lies under solemn oath". Author Miroslav Zaric
assessed that "without any dilemma almost all witnesses of crimes and
atrocities, when they are not lying, are trying to hush up what the accused in
his cross-examination was trying to compel them to admit."
The
paper quoted several articles of the ICTY's rules of procedure on perjury and
noted that they were "a dead letter...for despite high penalties, that is,
sentences up to seven years, witnesses may lie as much as they want".
There
was no discussion of the crimes themselves, or representation of the victims'
points of view. This highlighted the motivation for the media's support of
cooperation with the ICTY – procuring financial aid, rather than justice.
Politika
on March 19 in "Hague Tribunal Chronicle", under the by-line of
Zorana Suvakovic, tried to make a connection between Milosevic's bout of 'flu',
Carla Del Ponte's visit to Washington on March 18 for talks with Secretary of
State Colin Powell and other officials, after which he stated "the US to
date has not seen any progress in Belgrade's co-operation with the ICTY, and
still has not taken any decision on further assistance to Belgrade", and
the Perisic Affair, when Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia Momcilo Perisic was
arrested on espionage charges. "It is difficult not to be tempted by
conspiracy theory when there is such an overlap between three momentous events
related to the Hague Tribunal and the ongoing trial of the century", wrote
Suvakovic, speculating that "the Perisic Affair was really about evidence
related to Milosevic's command responsibility".
Politika
did touch upon some more serious aspects of these Hague-related issues on March
18. Velimir Curguz Kazimir, in a piece headlined "The price of
reputation", noted that "fear of the past is a very rational feeling
for those who took part in many war crimes and violations of human rights. But
that fear has for years now been adroitly and persistently transferred to the
entire nation... For the sake of Serbia's future it is very important to
uncover the truth about mass graves located in many places throughout
Serbia".
Danas,
which gives most consistent coverage to tribunal and war crime issues, in its
March 22 edition included several texts dedicated to the Hague Tribunal and ran
a lengthy interview with Natasa Kandic, director of the Humanitarian Law
Centre. The headline quoted Kandic's long-standing opinion that "War
crimes trials must also be held in Serbia". The supplement also included
an interview with Sead Spahovic, Serbia's chief public prosecutor. Spahovic
stated that no such trials would be held any time soon in Serbia, in the
absence of necessary legal, technical and political conditions.
Danas
also ran an interview with Mattias Hellman from the Belgrade office of the
Hague Tribunal who thought that, in Serbia, the issue of cooperation was overly
politicised. "In the context of the Tribunal and domestic trials, it is
apparent that Serbian society is yet to seriously face up to such issues,
" concluded Hellman.
The
daily's Ivan Nikolic summed up his opinion on Milosevic's strategy so far on
March 22, saying "most legal experts think that the defence conducted by
Milosevic in person is merely a show intended for the Yugoslav public".
Apart
from Danas, which shows a real commitment to the examination of war crimes, all
media sidelined the question of culpability and the substance of the charges
against both Milosevic and indictees still at large. Instead, coverage of
cooperation with the ICTY was nearly always linked to US economic assistance,
while reports on the Milosevic trial focused on the credibility of witnesses
and the former President's behavior in the courtroom. The plight of the victims
was once again ignored.
April
2002
The Hague Tribunal (II)
The
Hague tribunal dominated the Serbian media in April, with the front pages of
all the dailies focused on tribunal-related issues. In particular, the articles
dealt with Yugoslavia's cooperation with the court. The media also covered both
the attempted suicide on April 12 of former Serbian interior minister Vlajko
Stojiljkovic, who died three days later, and the decision by former Yugoslav
army chief of staff Dragoljub Ojdanic to surrender himself to The Hague.
Following
the death of the former interior minister, all media outlets carried the
statement made by Stojiljkovic's lawyer Branimir Gugl in which he said that,
"Stojiljkovic's gesture was a protest against The Hague tribunal.
"They also ran a comment by Stojiljkovic's Socialist Party of Serbia
colleague Mirko Marjanovic, in which he referred to the suicide as a
"heroic gesture". (Novosti, Danas, April 13). A comment made by
Yugolav president Vojislav Kostunica – that Stojiljkovic's suicide should be
seen by the international community and the Serbian public as a warning that
the indictments were leading people to commit drastic actions – was also widely
covered.
A
day before his departure to The Hague, Ojdanic held a press conference in his
house. He appeared with members of his family, who embraced Ojdanic and cried.
He said he decided to go to The Hague to "defend the honour of the
Yugoslav army and to prove our innocence". The media covered the press
conference as a news event and did not offer any editorials on the subject.
On
the day of Ojdanic's departure (April 25), the media ran a photograph of the
smiling former chief of staff at Belgrade airport and covered his arrival in
The Hague the following day. A headline in Glas read, "Ojdanic today in
the dock, Milutinovic and Sainovic are expected", a reference to Serbian
president Milan Milutinovic and former Serbian prime minister Nikola Sainovic,
both indicted war criminals. Glas also ran a quote on its front page in which
Ojdanic says, "I feel like any other hero".
Alluding
to the trial of former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic, Politika's
headline declared, "The same courtroom for the two war comrades".
Blic Nacional and Danas also reported Ojdanic's arrival at the Hague on their
front pages.
Danas,
in its April 9 editorial headlined "Criminals shall stay here"
devoted the adoption of legislation on cooperation with The Hague, commenting
that the tribunal would not have been established had "Serbia (and Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Croatia) been able to try their criminals".
In
the editorial, the daily quotes findings from the Medium Gallup Agency that
showed that only 26 per cent of Serbs supported the unconditional handover of
Milutinovic, Sainovic and the recently deceased former interior minister Vlajko
Stojiljkovic to The Hague.
The
poll found that 20 per cent of Serbs think that "they should be handed
over only under threat of sanctions" while every fourth person felt they
shouldn't surrendered at all. According to the same poll, 41 per cent of
respondents are against the transfer of Ratko Mladic, former commander of the
Army of Republika Srpska. About 15 per cent support the handover if there is a
threat of sanctions and only 18 per cent think that he should be extradited
unconditionally.
On
April 11, the weekly NIN issued a special supplement entitled "War crimes:
The ICTY in Belgrade" to coincide with the federal parliament's adoption
of Hague cooperation legislation. The supplement discussed various aspects of
the act and what it would mean for Yugoslavia. NIN also reminded readers that
Serb courts are currently hearing two war crime trials, although the coverage
of these has been limited.
NIN
said that before the creation of the Nuremberg and Tokyo international
tribunals for war crimes, no state or society ever seriously engaged in the
prosecution of their citizens for atrocities committed during armed conflicts.
On
April 12, Politika ran a column by Velimir Curguz Kazimir that criticised the
general public for opposing the handing over of indicted war criminals. The
author said that, "Only a society that swiftly rids itself of its
narcissism and blindness shall have success in overcoming painful traumas of
the past."
Several
media outlets ran a news item regarding the appearance in downtown Belgrade of
posters of former Bosnia Serb leader Radovan Karadzic with the slogan
"Every Serb is Radovan". According to the reports, the far-right
organisation Obraz, Homeland Front, was responsible for the posters, which
coincided with the adoption of Hague cooperation legislation.
According
to a poll conducted by TV B92, the majority of Belgrade residents oppose the
posters and considered them detrimental to Serbia. In its April 25 issue, Vreme
ran an article headlined "Serb Talebans" that profiled Obraz and
outlined the group's racist principles. Vreme also reminded its readers that
members of Obraz, armed with baseball bats, attacked demonstrators at the Gay
Parade in Belgrade several months ago.
The
article said, "The history of Obraz reflects the society in a state of
panic. Such a society needs a scapegoat and enemies. Both are easy to find, for
the public at large has been trained for years to blame [people who are
different]."
In
addition to reporting on the appearance of the posters, the papers also
announced the launch of Karadzic's book Situvacija (Situation) on April 22.
Members of the Committee for the Truth about Radovan Karadzic held a press
conference to promote the title, which was written by Kosta Cavoski, a
professor of law at Belgrade University and a member of the committee. The
weekly Vreme ran a story under the satirical headline "Comedy for Kosta
Cavoski and Company" on its front page. Vreme also carried excerpts from
the book. Aleksandar Jovicevic, the deputy culture minister, writing in
magazine, said Karadzic's offering was "ridiculous and grotesque".
Vreme
also ran a satirical piece by columnist Ljuba Zivkov, who wrote that
"royalties from a theatre play, sale of the book, TV serial and future
film will be sent to Radovan Karadzic's address in the forest". It is
widely believed that the former Bosnian Serb leader is hiding in a heavily
wooded mountainous region of Republika Srpska.
The
media did not pay a lot of attention to the April 9 story put out by the Beta
Agency news that described what happened at the first war crimes trial in Sabac
held back in 1996, which was apparently kept under wraps by the former
authorities. Only the daily Danas ran the news on its front page. A
representative of the Sabac court told Beta that Dusko Vukovic, from Umka near
Obrenovac, was convicted of the killing of 17 Muslims in the village Celopek,
near Zvornik, and raping a Muslim woman. He was sentenced to 10 years in
prison.
Several
days later, Danas also ran a letter from a reader who criticised the court's
lenient punishment as well as the lack of media interest in the story both then
and now. According to Danas and other news outlets on April 8, the Serbian
justice ministry disclosed that in the city of Prokuplje an indictment had been
filed against two civilians, Sasa Cvjetan and Dejan Demirovic, on suspicion
that they committed war crimes. According to the indictment, Cvjetan and
Demirovic used automatic machine-guns to kill 19 people of Albanian descent on
March 28, 1999 in Podujevo. Danas was the only daily which placed this
information on its front page, while other media outlets put less emphasis on
the story.
The
higher court in Bijelo Polje is trying Nebojsa Ranisavljevic for war crimes
committed against the civilian population, namely the abduction of Muslim
passengers at the Strpci railway station.
There
is daily coverage of the Milosevic trial but the trial is not leading the
headlines. Testimony by Veton Surroi, the Albanian founder and publisher of
Koha Ditore, was widely covered although the various media outlets took
differing views of his appearance at the tribunal. On April 19, Novosti noted
that "in contrast to Mahmut Bakali, the editor-in-chief of Koha Ditore
coped better with Milosevic's cross examination". On the same day, Glas
carried a short report from the trial headlined "Surroi talked much, but
said little".
The
daily went on to note that, "it turned out that the well-informed
journalist (Surroi) did not know anything about crimes committed by the
Albanian terrorists against Serb policemen, civilians or their
fellow-nationals".
On
the same day, Politika carried a headline "Albanians rejoiced in the
bombardment" – an obvious allusion to Surroi's testimony that "most
Albanians were glad about the NATO bombing campaign". In its report the
daily stressed "Surroi, from the very outset, made it clear that he backed
the independence of Kosovo".
Glas,
which has consistently opposed The Hague, ran an interview with Jacques Verzes,
a French lawyer who is also opposed to the war crimes court, on April 18.
According to Verzes, the tribunal is "a monster above the law". The
lawyer was also quoted as saying that, "Milosevic's trial was staged to
justify the 1999 ungrounded attack on Serbia".
On
April 20, Glas ran an article by LJ Staletovic in which he said Milosevic's
"domination" of the trial was causing judges and prosecutors
problems.
"Apparently
looking disinterested, Milosevic from time to time startles those present in
the courtroom by his incredible memory and power of observation,"
Staletovic said. Glas also noted, "Milosevic's questions, full of explanations,
unnerve even the cold-blooded President of the Trial Chamber, Richard
May".
May
2002
Serbia and Montenegro
Montenegro's
political turmoil, which was triggered by an agreement to scrap the Yugoslav
federation in favour of a looser union of the two republics, had failed to
arouse much interest in the Serbian media.
However,
that was to change as the coastal republic approached is local elections on May
15, as the voting was seen as a test of the nation's political balance of
power.
The
pro-independence bloc comprising the president's Democratic Party of
Socialists, the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Alliance is on one
side, with the Together for Yugoslavia coalition led by the Socialist People's
Party, SNP, on the other.
Belgrade's
media was watching closely to see how the Montenegrin public would react to the
creation of a new joint state with Serbia.
The
SNP, the Montenegrin partner in the federal government, has fared particularly
badly in this month's news. Serbian print media blamed it for the difficulties
that have dogged the implementation of the so-called Belgrade agreement, and
most analysts agreed the deadlock would once again require the attention of the
European Union, which brokered the original deal in March.
Analysts
had predicted the Democratic Party of Socialists would suffer at the polls. For
under intense EU pressure, party leader and Montenegrin president Milo
Djukanovic had u-turned on a long-standing policy of independence and signed
the Belgrade accord, which binds the republic to a joint state with Serbia for
the next three years.
There
was very little analysis, comment or even forecasting among the Serbian media
in the run-up to polling, with all choosing to focus on agency information and
on how Montenegrin politicians reacted to the preliminary results.
In
fact, the elections have changed little. Djukanovic's so-called sovereignty
bloc took 10 municipalities, Together for Yugoslavia captured eight and the
ethnic Albanian parties won Ulcinj – a predominantly Albanian town on the
coast.
Belgrade
daily Politika reported on the results three days later. An article by its
Podgorica correspondent Dragomir Becirovic said that the "general
assessment of neutral observers is that nothing has changed on the Montenegrin
political scene". The text, however, closed with a statement from Srdjan
Darmanovic, director of the Centre for Democracy and Human Rights, who claimed
the pro-independence bloc had "emerged triumphant, since they have
conquered the most important towns".
An
article in the May 18-19 issue of Danas headlined: "Same target, same
distance", focused on the rift in the republic. "Montenegro remains
divided", wrote Podgorica correspondent Veseljko Koprivica. "Even
this time round voters did not have the strength to make the major breakthrough
– that is, a departure from the policy pursued by those in power for the past
12 years."
In
a story headed "Package Deal", Blic identified three main trends,
namely "the plummeting popularity of the coalition Together for Yugoslavia,
the consistent stance of the parties advocating Montenegrin sovereignty and a
mild swing of Bosnian Muslim voters toward the small national parties".
Political
analysts such as Nebojsa Medojevic, director of the Podgorica-based Centre for
Democracy and Transition and the newspaper Danas put the Socialist People's
Party's poor performance down to its decision to back the federal law on
cooperation with The Hague tribunal.
Once
a staunch ally of former president Slobodan Milosevic, the party had vowed to
fight the handover of any Yugoslav citizen to the international court. It
finally buckled in April after Washington threatened to withhold millions of
dollars in aid earmarked for Yugoslavia.
Meanwhile,
a campaign for Serbian independence launched by the Christian-Democratic Party
of Serbia was also making the headlines. Justice minister Vladan Batic leads
the party, which is a member of Serbia's governing coalition, DOS.
In
an interview with Novosti on May 8, Batic denied his party had "renounced
the DOS platform". He argued that the Belgrade agreement betrays DOS's
pledge to maintain a "functional federation" of Serbia and
Montenegro. "Hence the future state has no future," the justice
minister said.
Media
coverage of the campaign stuck to press releases and statements from relevant
parties. All media reported on a statement from the Democratic Party of Serbia,
DSS – headed by Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica – that criticised the
campaign strongly.
"This
action is geared against the agreement on the common state with Montenegro,
breaches the DOS pre-election promise to preserve such a state and threatens
the country's international standing," said the statement.
In
a widely reported response, Batic accused the DSS members of wanting to
"hold onto their federal positions". Kostunica told a press
conference on May 29 that the campaign "directly undercuts the Belgrade
agreement".
In
one of the few commentaries on the issue, the May 9 issue of Belgrade weekly
NIN condemned the independence campaign as a "destructive policy". In
a text headlined "Independent Batic", Srboljub Brankovic said the
move was "typical of a power-hungry party", claiming that an
independence referendum in Serbia could have been justified only "before
Serbia took on its international commitment to preserve the community with
Montenegro".
Having
successfully navigated the Serbian and Montenegrin parliaments, the Belgrade
agreement finally foundered in the federal parliament. The pro-Yugoslav SNP had
made extra demands – that deputies be elected to the joint assembly by direct
vote rather than simply appointed, and that the constitutional charter be
adopted instead of proclaimed by the federal parliament – in an attempt to
strengthen the new union.
The
party was also nervous about an opt-out clause within the agreement, under
which each republic would have the opportunity to leave the union after three
years. The Montenegrin leadership has already said it will take up the offer.
Blic
published an article on May 14 by prominent Serbian constitutional court judge
Slobodan Vucetic, in which he accused the SNP of playing for votes back home.
"On the eve of local elections in Montenegro the SNP's hard-line demands
are aimed at reassuring voters that the party is a genuine defender of the federation,"
he wrote.
Branding
the party "obstructive," the judge said the SNP was seeking to cover
up the fact the agreement represents a "departure from its program goals
and the joint platform with DOS on building a functional federation."
The
federal partners – DOS and Together for Yugoslavia – struck a deal on May 20 to
incorporate the SNP's demands and steer the accord through parliament. The
trade-off won cautious coverage in the Serbian media, which instead emphasised
the criticism coming from Podgorica.
On
May 17, the European Union placed an article in Podgorica daily Vijesti and
Belgrade's Blic urging the various factions to put aside their differences. The
piece was written by EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana and won extensive
media coverage.
Solana,
who played a crucial role in brokering the accord, warned it would be
"contrary to the interests of the people of both republics if progress
toward the new constitution were hampered by political rivalries".
The
following day, Belgrade daily Glas wrote that Solana had reminded the two
capitals to "quickly and decisively comply with their obligations".
The article, headlined: "Another yellow card from Solana", claimed
the EU foreign policy chief was unhappy with the pace of progress.
Serbian
state television put Djukanovic on the spot. Two days after the deal between
DOS and Together for Yugoslavia, Radio Television Serbia broadcast an extensive
live interview where RTS news editor-in-chief Bojana Lekic, drawing heavily
from televised footage, pressed the Montenegrin president to explain his u-turn
over independence.
The
Podgorica parliament adopted a series of "conclusions" on the
agreement on May 23 that differed markedly from Belgrade's interpretation of
the accord. The session and the subsequent walkout by the Together for
Yugoslavia coalition made the headlines throughout the Belgrade media.
The
following day, Danas carried an article headlined: "Opposition leaves
parliamentary session".
A
sub-heading in Politika the same day claimed: "Separatist bloc MPs adopted
conclusions they drafted themselves". According to the story, the
conclusions form the basis of the Montenegrin negotiating stance in drafting
the constitutional charter of the future state, "which are practically
contrary to the stances of the Together for Yugoslavia coalition".
The
May 25 edition of Politika devoted a whole page to relations between Serbia and
Montenegro.
In
an article headlined: "Union of Two States", Dragomir Becirovic
argued that the conclusions adopted in Montenegro resembled a new platform for
redefining relations between the two republics. "The conclusions are made
in such a way as to ensure sovereignty, that is, to lead to a union of states,
rather than a common state," wrote Becirovic.
The
story quoted SNP leader Predrag Bulatovic as saying: "We are facing
separatist conclusions heralding a union of independent states."
Politika
warned of continuing uncertainty among the people of Montenegro and claimed the
latest political manoeuvring was leading to deadlock. "One gets the
impression the international community will have to intervene," the
article concluded.
The
paper also carried a widely reported story from Brussels suggesting Solana was
"disappointed" with the conclusions adopted by the parliament in
Montenegro.
Vecernje
Novosti's May 25 edition reported on a statement by Yugoslav Prime Minister
Dragisa Pesic – a member of the pro-Yugoslav SNP – in which he accused
Montenegro's sovereignty bloc of seeking "to create a dysfunctional,
unsuccessful and unsustainable common state, thus realising their dream of an
independent Montenegro".
On
May 25-26, Danas issued a stinging attack on political obstructionism in
Belgrade and Podgorica in which the SNP fared badly again.
Under
the headline: "Vendors of fog accelerate their activities", Jasminka
Kocijan accused the party of playing for time in the run-up to "their
primary objective" of local elections. Kocijan points out that no sooner
had the polling booths closed, than the SNP and DOS struck a deal "similar
to one which had been possible two months earlier".
Danas
claimed the election campaign in Belgrade was also in full swing and that the
adoption of the constitutional charter for the new state would inevitably lose
out to the "political showdowns".
An
analysis by Belgrade law professor Kosta Cavoski in the May 27 edition of Glas
criticised the Belgrade agreement for being awash with "undefined
notions". The resultant "misunderstanding" between Montenegro's
political factions is likely to require a foreign diktat, argued Cavoski.
"But this time around it won't be Dayton-negotiated, but rather through
the Brussels-negotiated interim community," the professor added.
Politika
journalist Biljana Crepajac offered a similar assessment the following day.
"For the umpteenth time stances have been cemented and the internal
Montenegrin dilemma – union or common state – has been diluted." Serbia's
own escalating political crisis, wrote Crepajac, suggests "common ground
may be found only through EU assistance".
All
media provided extensive coverage of the federal parliament sitting on May 30
at which deputies finally adopted the Belgrade agreement. In protest, Vladan
Batic resigned from his post as head of the DOS MP club in the Yugoslav
parliament.
In
the period monitored, Montenegrin president Milo Djukanovic launched
consultations aimed at forming a new government after prime minister Filip
Vujanovic's cabinet lost a no-confidence vote. Vujanovic's pro-independence
allies abandoned him in protest at the signing of the Belgrade agreement.
Politika's
Podgorica correspondent, who is often critical of the authorities, claimed the
consultations were merely a bid to preserve a semblance of democracy in
Montenegro.
"Djukanovic
must offer something if he wants his party to have power...since his lack of
majority means he cannot demand anything," said the story, which was
published on May 27.
The
Serb media provided detailed coverage of the talks in Podgorica, however
Djukanovic's May 28 decision to reappoint Vujanovic as prime minister met with
little comment in Belgrade. Politika's Dragomir Becirovic used the reactions of
various parties in Montenegro to speculate about Djukanovic's underlying
motives.
"Djukanovic
probably knew that the Liberals would not back his proposal," wrote Becirovic.
"In fact he then had a good excuse to rid himself of responsibility for
the failure of the separatist policy."
Slavko
Perovic, spokesman for the fiercely pro-independence Liberal Alliance, was also
quoted. "No one of sound mind in the democratic world would suggest that
the former prime minister be tasked with establishing the new government,"
he said.
The
month ended in a frenzy of speculation that the Montenegrin president was under
investigation in Italy for alleged links to a cigarette smuggling ring. The
story hit the headlines in both print and electronic media.
Djukanovic's
initial response – that he was "innocent and calm" – was interpreted
in Politika with the headline: "Djukanovic couldn't care less about recent
accusations."
June
2002
Organised Crime
After
Slobodan Milosevic was overthrown in October 2000, Serbia's new authorities
promised to crack down on his most stubborn legacy – corruption and organised
crime. Such evils "threaten the very foundation of our society",
warned the ruling coalition, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, DOS.
The
government was given a bitter reminder of this pledge when top police chief
Bosko Buha was gunned down in a Belgrade parking lot in June of this year.
Having already endorsed a series of amendments tightening the country's penal
code, parliament sought to speed up the adoption of a special anti-crime law
modelled on legislation already in place in Italy, Croatia and Slovenia.
Buha's
murder brought the struggle against organised crime back into the headlines.
The government's perceived ineffectiveness was roundly criticised in the
electronic, broadcast and print media, with many reports making reference to
unsolved mafia killings of the past decade.
Belgrade
dailies Politika and Vecernje Novosti on June 15 and 17 ran feature articles on
the notorious Serbian mafia, dripping with legendary accounts of past
executions.
The
June 24 edition of Danas published an insightful cartoon by Predrag
Koraksic-Koraks in which Serbian interior minister Dusan Mihajlovic is pictured
crouched under a table eavesdropping on a meeting of mafia godfathers.
Under
the headline "Money without borders", Danas carried a commentary on
June 5 assessing that while the wars of the 1990s affected people and states,
the "business of organised crime" had emerged unscathed.
"No
one knows how much money flowed in and out of Serbia during Milosevic's
rule," wrote Danas. Even after Milosevic, it noted, "the old and new
tycoons, extra-profiteers and other 'businessmen' managed to 'inject' into
legal money flows as much money as they wanted".
Danas
noted that the Serbian government had managed to recover only a fraction of
such "grey zone" money under a law taxing Milosevic-era profiteers.
"The
authorities are not ready to face the power vested in wealth and a large
weapons arsenal," said Danas.
In
an article published on June 9, Politika's Ivan Torov tackled the issue of
organised crime from an international angle, headlined "The Balkan
squid".
Torov
cited an ongoing Italian investigation into the alleged involvement of
Montenegrin president Milo Djukanovic in a cigarette smuggling ring as
"solid indication that the international community has decided to combat
the large Balkan squid".
He
labelled the area as a haven of experimentation in human trafficking, arms
smuggling and "hair-raising" political bargaining, "the high
price of which is yet to be paid".
Torov
laid part of the blame at the door of the international community. The Politika
journalist wrote that under the Milosevic regime Serbia became the
"principal master and promoter" of arms, petrol and tobacco smuggling
and plundering of its own people. However, he claimed that this, "did not
stop the international community from pampering key figures in the regime and
treating them as unavoidable factors in regional peace and stability to prevent
the further escalation of an already grave crisis".
The
text concluded that Djukanovic, once the darling of the West by virtue of his
opposition to Milosevic, had become the latest Balkan scapegoat. "The
peacemaker is swiftly turned into the Balkans butcher when he withholds his
cooperation or obedience, that is, when he begins acting arbitrarily or becomes
a loose cannon," he wrote.
The
interior ministry's announced crackdown on cigarette smuggling consistently hit
the headlines in June. Certain media also reported on the recovery on June 11
of a large quantity of explosives and detonators stolen from the Rudnik zinc
and lead mine.
The
murder of public security deputy head Bosko Buha was largely covered in a very
professional manner. A number of articles carried quotes from key politicians
and drew parallels with a number of unsolved high-profile killings that
littered Milosevic's rule.
Buha
headed Milosevic's formidable Belgrade police brigade but famously switched
allegiances on October 5, 2000 when he kept his men in their barracks as
thousands took to the streets of the capital. He had refused to break up a coal
miners' strike in Kolubara, which was to become the prelude to mass revolt. His
appointment to a ministry desk job in early 2002 was widely interpreted as a
bid to sideline the Milosevic-era police chief.
Many
newspapers in Serbia highlighted the similarities between Buha's killing and
the notorious Belgrade assassinations of recent years. Buha was gunned down at
close range as he entered his car, having spent the evening with friends on a
Belgrade boat restaurant. Reports suggested he had paid the price of knowing
too much about the mafia.
Most
media focused on an interview Buha gave to Nedeljni Telegraf in December 2001
in which he bragged of his knowledge of the Serbian underworld. One article
that drew heavily from this interview appeared in Vecernje Novosti on June 12
under the heading "Mafia powerful even without the godfather". The
text quoted Buha as saying, "In Belgrade there are five major organised
criminal gangs at work, and about 500 in Serbia."
Belgrade
weekly Vreme warned the murder could prove a severe test of the new
authorities. The text on June 13 said Serbia's authorities "lack the
political will and courage to make a clean break once and for all with the
legacy of Milosevic's...criminal-police underworld". For NIN, also a
weekly, the murder had even greater significance since the victim "was
part of the DOS authorities and part of its system."
The
commentary in NIN's June 13 edition was critical of the anti-crime unit set up
by DOS. It also chastised the authorities for failing to establish a
"special anti-mafia squad", a special prosecutor's office or a victim
protection body. "Its methods are not much better than those used by the
Milosevic-run police," wrote Dragan Bujosevic.
A
text in NIN by Milos Vasic and Jovan Dulovic urged the authorities to confront
DOS leaders with the following questions: "Whose jeep
are
you driving? Who are your bodyguards? Who are the individuals in your inner
circle? What kind of conversations are you having with certain people and how
come your buddy has landed a lucrative contract with the state?".
Nedeljni
Telegraf claimed an exclusive on June 19 with a report that the government had
already drafted the provisions of a new anti-mafia bill that marked a
"brutal response by the state to a cruel attack by the mafia".
Telegraf
journalist Zoran Mihajlovic also claimed a special prosecutor's office was in
the pipeline that would carry "sweeping, almost limitless powers" to
destroy the very foundations of organised crime. Two days later the interior
minister confirmed the completion of an anti-mafia law "modelled on those
in place in Croatia and Italy".
The
minister's announcement of a final showdown with the mafia grabbed the
headlines of a number of newspapers the following day. The Serbian media spent
the next few days revealing various provisions of the new law and discussing
the appointment of the special prosecutor.
Vecernje
Novosti published excerpts from the bill on June 27 and reported on the
strategy of regional anti-mafia units in Italy, later emulated in Croatian and
Slovenian anti-mafia legislation. "Serbia is embarking on a legal battle
against organised crime," wrote the Belgrade tabloid.
On
June 25 Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjic said the bill would enter the
parliamentary procedure "as early as July". The media reported
Djindjic's complaint that certain institutions and instruments in the fight
against mafia and terrorism were ill-prepared for their new task.
All
newspapers carried an announcement by Interior Minister Dusan Mihajlovic on
their front pages. In his statement, he claimed to know who was behind Serbia's
criminal gangs. "We can only make that list public if their guilt is
proven during the course of investigations," Mihajlovic was quoted as
saying.
July
2002
The Process of Lustration
Lustration
– a practise in post-communist states where those who collaborated with the
former regime are purged from public life – is an inevitable part of Serbian
life after Milosevic.
However,
the reappearance of numerous Milosevic-era politicians and journalists has
pushed the issue into the news in recent months.
Media
discussion of the process was sporadic and has been complicated by political
differences and conflicting views on what lustration actually entails. Some
believe it is long overdue while the media remains divided on how to approach
it, if at all.
In
an interview in late June, Slobodan Vucetic, the president of Serbia's
constitutional court, said there was an argument for lustration within the
judiciary but only in cases where judges were implicated in human rights
violations, electoral fraud or trial rigging. Vucetic, an eminent legal expert,
was himself dismissed from the court by the Milosevic regime.
Lustration
should not become "an act of reprisal," he told Belgrade weekly NIN,
adding that the process in former socialist countries had been based on precise
legislation and thorough discussion with the people in question.
The
Independent Association of Serbian Journalists, NUNS, announced a campaign in
support of lustration legislation during a roundtable discussion in the
Belgrade media centre in May. "The adoption of the relevant law would mark
a total break with the previous regime" and "prevent a new offensive
by Milosevic's cronies and sidekicks," said NUNS president Milic
Lucic-Cavic.
Law
professor Radoslav Stojanovic argued that the Lustration Act should not only
cover the Milosevic era but also the post-1945 period.
Biljana
Kovacevic-Vuco, head of the Yugoslav Committee for Legal Experts in Human
Rights, argued that such a push for legislation was late. "There's no
national or political consensus for that process," the Beta news agency
reported on May 30.
However,
Dragor Hiber, deputy leader of the Civil Alliance of Serbia and a member of
Serbia's governing coalition, said that if Serbia wished to "build the
solid institutions of a modern legal state" it must also create a new
moral code.
"Lustration
is necessary not only because of our re-examination of the past, but also
because of our future. We must confront the former if we want to build the
latter. It is a process of purification, not a purge," he said.
Grujica
Spasovic, editor in chief of Belgrade daily Danas, said the opportunity had
been lost and warned that lustration now "would amount to opening a
Pandora's box, especially in view of the popular backing for Slobodan Milosevic
over the past decade".
Since
those journalists most likely to be targeted have already retired from the
profession, any attempt at lustration would end in "an unnecessary
witch-hunt," Spasovic told the panel.
Another
discussion of the issue was held in late June, this time in the Danas offices
in Novi Sad. Most media picked up on a statement by Lucic-Cavic in which she
claimed the "warmongering journalists of the Milosevic era still occupy
the top posts in the print and electronic media".
"Lustration
is one of the steps which we must take," she said. Such reporters, claimed
the NUNS president, had taken heart from the new authorities' soft treatment
and "plucked up the courage to launch a strong counter-offensive".
In
another widely covered statement, Lucic-Cavic complained that the Association
of Serbian Journalists, UNS, enjoyed the luxury of six-storey premises, in
spite of the fact its membership included "99 per cent of the
Milosevic-era journalists". NUNS, on the other hand, struggled to cover
the rent for its offices, she said.
The
promised debate on lustration failed to materialise in July. Instead, a series
of political scandals and the growing rift within Serbia's governing coalition
dominated the news.
Belgrade
daily Politika was left almost exclusively to deal with the issue in its Views
column. The "Yes and No" program on state television, RTS, was the
only instance when lustration was discussed in the broadcast media, while it
appeared infrequently in the primetime TV news.
On
July 3, Politika published a text by Serbian deputy justice minister Nebojsa
Sarkic, in which he opposed lustration in the courts since "the suggested
manner of lustration undercuts the very principle of the independence of the
judiciary".
Two
days later, the daily carried an article by literature professor Mirko
Djordjevic, which was originally published in monthly Republika under the
headline, "Law and sin without punishment".
Djordjevic
was in favour of the process but warned of its difficulties. "Someone will
have to open the Pandora's box of the former regime, but it is too early to
speak of the manner of conducting lustration," he said.
On
July 8, Politika carried a commentary on the police files bill under the
headline, "Soft lustration of collaborators". The text noted that the
new provisions of the legislation "forbid the candidacy of those who
violated human rights and members of the state security for any public post for
a period of five years".
The
daily did not voice its own opinion on the issue but instead quoted Vladimir
Vodinelic, the director of the Centre for the Promotion of Legal Studies, who
said, "The guiding principle of that bill is that no violator or abuser of
human rights may be elected to a public position in the future".
Slobodanka
Ast, in an article in weekly Vreme on July 4, criticised the lack of lustration
in the country's universities. "Some hoped that the adoption of the new
University Act, notably of article 141 which envisaged 'soft lustration' would
encourage a relevant discussion, that the destroyers of autonomy would be
brought to justice, as would other deans and their assistants who used to bring
the para-police squads to faculties to cruelly beat up seditious students and
harass professors," she said.
Ast
recalled the night of May 23, 2000, when masked men attacked a group of
students and professors in the Belgrade architecture faculty, "and are yet
to be held accountable".
The
journalist noted that the university "is still in a state of chaos and
does not have the strength to carry out even soft lustration". By way of
example, she pointed out that Branislav Ivkovic, once one of Milosevic's
closest aides, has been re-elected as full-time professor at the Faculty of
Civil Engineering despite outstanding criminal charges of fraud "at that
very institution".
Ast
also claimed that professors are quitting the former ruling parties to join the
burgeoning Democratic Party of Serbia led by Yugoslav president Vojislav
Kostunica, and secure their university posts.
According
to the text, the "only exception" is the medical faculty, which
conducted a soft lustration and reviewed the promotion of 60 professors and
demotion of 33 in the last two years of the former regime. The cases included
that of former Health Minister Milovan Bojic, who was reinstated in his post as
assistant professor.
In
the RTS program "Yes and No" on July 30, Gordana Susa, the editor of
the production company VIN and former NUNS president, called for "a purge
of journalist circles" but only "if backed by the general public and
a political consensus – that is yet to be reached".
Danas
editor in chief Spasovic again opposed the process. "It's first necessary
to clarify a few things and overcome the continued intention of the authorities
to control the media," he argued.
Nino
Brajovic, president of the Association of Serbian Journalists, UNS, said very
little about lustration itself, except to note that "such cleansing"
is yet to happen even in Serbia's neighbouring countries, "notably
Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia". UNS was considered one of the main instruments
of the Milosevic regime.
A
phone-in poll on the program indicated that 75 per cent of viewers favoured the
process.
August 2002
Presidential
Race
In the first half of
August, the Belgrade media was dominated by upcoming elections for Serbian president,
which are scheduled for September 29. Reports speculated on the possible
candidates in a transparent effort to remain unbiased.
In particular, media
sought to strike a balance in marketing the rival factions to have emerged from
Serbia's governing coalition, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, DOS.
They are represented
by two candidates – Yugoslav president Vojislav Kostunica of the Democratic
Party of Socialists and Federal Deputy Prime Minister Miroljub Labus, backed by
the remaining parties within DOS.
This was best
illustrated in the August 15 editions of Belgrade weeklies NIN and Vreme. Two
interviews, with Kostunica and Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjic
respectively, were almost identical in length and layout.
As the campaign picked
up pace, media and agency polls touted Labus and Kostunica as clear favourites
and predicted the election would be won in the second round. The former enjoyed
most coverage by virtue of throwing his hat into the ring in early August,
unlike the latter, who waited until August 23. The majority of commentaries
presented Labus and his programme for president in a positive light.
According to the
Strategic Marketing Agency, Labus enjoyed a total of four hours airtime on the
television news in the second half of August. Kostunica trailed with just three
and a half hours, much of which concerned his duties as head of state and his
role in drafting the founding charter of the future state of Serbia and
Montenegro.
The prime time news on
TV BK, B92 and Studio B followed Labus' campaign closely, particularly his tour
of Serbian cities. Other candidates merited only snippets of information on
their activities or summaries of their statements and speeches. State-run Radio
Television Serbia, RTS, was the most consistent, reporting on every candidate
within brief news slots.
Labus, who has based
his campaign on his economic pedigree, has the indirect backing of the media
and the financial team within the Serbian government. The economists are
publicly acknowledged as the government's driving force and in August issued a
flurry of interviews concerning the country's fiscal situation and the policies
on which Labus' campaign rests.
Ljilja Djurdjic, in
her column in daily Danas on August 13 entitled "Presidential Pas de Deux",
hailed Labus as the "absolute favourite who will allow the continuation of
reform, that is the free flow of US and European money and goods".
Kostunica, she said, "is still bargaining". The Yugoslav president
"would like to sell his highly-rated image of national saviour for a very
high price – by voting for him the people will have the impression – note, only
impression – that they are voting for Europe, and moreover, right-wing
Europe!"
Djurdjic asks whether
Serbia will finally soberly accept a servant of the international community as
president. "Is it mature enough to realise it has no other choice … or
will it embrace Kostunica's or some other leader's story that is likely to
relegate this country to political prehistory?"
A report in the August
22 edition of Vreme said it was "pretty obvious that the Serbian
authorities are behind Labus' candidacy", as illustrated by the presence
of a number of leading officials – including the prime minister – at his
campaign launch in the capital. Labus has said he is running as an independent
candidate, leading journalist Milan Milosevic to claim that the government was
"afraid of elections, hence it is hiding beyond a non-party
candidate".
Labus, the article
continues, "essentially embodies the vision of a modern, economically
prosperous state". However, "it is unclear whether he is running for
president or prime minister, since his six-point programme could fall directly
under the jurisdiction of the government".
At the end the text
mentions Kostunica, who at this point had yet to announce whether he would
stand. The journalist likens his indecision to King Petar II's message from
London – "I'm coming soon". The king never came and communist leader
Josip Broz Tito stepped into the breach.
Politika's August 26
commentary is neutral. Under the headline, "The race is on", the
daily echoes the general consensus that the election is likely to end in a
"photo finish between Labus and Kostunica". The presidential ballot,
it said, will be a test of support for the two "factions of the political
alliance which in late 2000 emerged victorious at the polls and simultaneously
trounced the Milosevic regime".
The paper believes the
race must not degenerate into "a naked struggle for power, but rather a
competition between two visions of Serbia's political future, before the
country and the world". Neither would it be wise "to underestimate or
devalue the achievements and developments since October 5, 2000 – to ignore the
fact that reforms have been initiated and that they are not easy".
While it should be
debated whether an alternative path exists, "it would be dangerous to
belittle the quantity and quality of the expert team of the Serbian government
occupying the top reform posts, with no domestic or international substitutes
at this time".
An editorial in Danas
on August 26 criticised the election frontrunners – Labus for touring factories
in the "style" of Slobodan Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia,
SPS, and Kostunica for promising "confrontation with the authorities".
In the Dialogue column of the same issue, Gordana Logar says the incumbent
president's comments on the "Colombianisation of Serbia" were
"inappropriate" for a presidential election campaign.
Such statements, says
Logar, send a bad message to potential investors. Perhaps, she adds
sarcastically, Kostunica meant that if he were elected, "Serbia would not
metamorphose into Colombia (the international home of drug-trafficking)".
All media reported on
DOS's August 18 decision to throw its support behind Labus. Belgrade daily Glas
carried the front-page headline, "DOS reluctantly backs Labus".
Vreme's August 29
issue was awash with election coverage. A caricature on its cover by Predrag
Koraksic-Koraks pictured the two candidates as athletes under starter's orders.
However, with Labus depicted as riding piggyback on Djindjic, the message is
that the Serbian prime minister is looking to reap the benefits of a Labus
victory.
Vojislav Seselj, the
presidential candidate of the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party, has long
been engaged in a hate-hate relationship with the independent media.
Although boycotted
during the Milosevic regime for threatening reporters, Seselj's statements are
now reported regularly, although he remains deeply unpopular with the country's
independent press. On August 15, weekly NIN published an archive photograph of
Seselj holding a journalist at gunpoint in the lobby of parliament.
Politika was
particularly critical on August 18, after Seselj won the official backing of
Slobodan Milosevic from his cell in The Hague. Under the headline
"Favourite opposition firebrand", Nada Kovacevic writes that in the
latest twist of his "topsy-turvy career, Seselj lands smack in the middle
of the Yugoslav Left and the SPS".
The Yugoslav left is headed
by Milosevic's wife Mira Markovic, whom the socialists have since accused of
trying to wrench control of her husband's party. The text noted Seselj's
nickname, the Red Duke, "because of his sudden and frequent shifts in
political position". Seselj, it says, entered Serbia's recent history on a
wave of nationalist romanticism. The author reminds readers of his attempts to
"re-tailor borders, threats against students and taxi drivers, and
promises to destroy Zagreb and other Croatian towns".
Vreme reported
Milosevic's August 15 call for his party to back the radical candidate.
"Seselj was the front-man of the previous regime in its struggle against
democratic parties, using strong national and anti-US rhetoric and frequently
attacking the weak", wrote Milan Milosevic.
"Slobo turns to
Seselj", was the heading of a text in NIN's issue the same week. Dragan
Bujosevic considered the possible consequences of the former's move and
concluded that the latter will reap the rewards whatever the outcome of the election.
NIN published an
interview with the radical candidate on August 22, under the headline "I
shall destroy the mafia". The interviewer reminded Seselj of his past
statements about the Milosevics and insults directed at political opponents. He
recently branded Serbian parliament deputy speaker Natasa Micic "extremely
stupid", claiming her IQ was "well below 30".
However, in the same
issue of NIN, Petar Ignja says Velimir Ilic is Seselj's most likely successor
as Serbia's most vulgar politician. In the text entitled
"Barbarogenius", the New Serbia leader is quoted as saying, "The
president of Serbia must be only a true, genuine Serb, devoted to the Orthodox
religion".
"The hatred
candidate", is the headline of a Danas editorial on August 28. The article
reports on a press conference given by Ilic in Cacak two days earlier, at
which, the daily says, he "sent a message to Labus that while he may win,
he is not likely to ever become president".
"The presidential
candidate of New Serbia could not hide his hate-driven candidacy", said
Danas. It called for a "ban on such statements and messages" and
branded Ilic "the most intolerant of the advocates of the so-called Serb
cause".
An interview by FoNet
news agency with Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjic on August 28 caused a
stir among the Belgrade media. The headline in daily Novosti picked up on his
criticism of Kostunica as "a symbol of tardiness and pessimism".
The article opened
with, "Djindjic says that by voting for Labus we vote for a symbol of
European integration, economy and a positive attitude towards life. If we vote
for Kostunica, scepticism, pessimism, tardiness, passivity and bitterness will
win".
Politika was more
measured in its interpretation of the prime minister's comments. The interview
was confined to page seven, under the headline "Serbian president just a
symbol".
"Kostunica a
symbol of scepticism", was the heading of a page two article in Glas. The
interview also made page two of Blic, with the title "Djindjic says:
Kostunica is trying to turn the elections into a referendum on Djindjic. I
don't want to try to right the wrongs, only to be proclaimed guilty if someone
hampers my efforts". His comments appeared on page three of Danas, under
the heading, "Labus a symbol of integration, Kostunica one of
scepticism".
The Socialist Party of
Serbia, SPS, hit the headlines on August 22 and 23 when it nominated popular
Serbian actor Velimir "Bata" Zivojinovic for president. Headlines
recalled his most significant film roles – Novosti, "Walter defends
Sarajevo"; Blic, "This shall be my best role so far"; Glas,
"Bata lands the lead role" and Politika, "New role for actor
Bata Zivojinovic".
"I don't make
promises, I don't lie", was the headline on the cover of NIN on August 29,
which carried an interview with the SPS candidate. Zivojinovic gave a number of
interviews and appeared on the BK talk show, "It's not Serbian to stay
silent". The popular actor won favourable treatment in the media, most
notably for his statement, "I know I won't win, but I'm testing the
strength of my party".
An editorial in NIN on
August 29 considered Milosevic's demand that the SPS back Seselj and that Mirko
Marjanovic be sacked as acting leader. In the article – headlined "After
me comes total ruin" – Dragan Bujosevic said the order to support Seselj
had a hidden motive. "Its envisaged effect or consequence was the death of
SPS", he wrote.
September 2002
Running for
Serbian Presidency
The presidential
election campaign in Serbia this year failed to dominate either print or
broadcast news for the first time since the multi-party system was introduced
in the Nineties.
Despite the
candidates' self-proclaimed historic pledges, the campaign was treated as
equal, if not secondary, to other events.
Broadly speaking,
media coverage of the election campaign was fair, with most outlets making an
effort to report on all eleven candidates alike. The state broadcaster, Radio
Television Serbia, RTS, denied its former reputation as a forum for hate
speech, and was particularly cautious, giving all candidates equal airtime.
The print media – most
notably Belgrade daily Politika – also sought to avoid favouritism either in
column-inches or layout.
In a no holds barred
campaign, the media acted as a filter for invective and harsh words, with
journalists paraphrasing speeches or simply noting that insults had been
exchanged.
Most avoided comment
when reporting on the elections. Any such opinion that did creep in was limited
to campaign policies or statements that prompted public reaction.
Both the Centre for
Free Elections and Democracy, CeSID, and the Citizens' Media Monitoring
Association, Media Works, welcomed the standard of coverage.
Just days before
polling, the CeSID research team noted that September's coverage had been objective,
and that the media had not "fallen for hate speech". On September 26,
Media Works' findings showed that campaign reporting had improved considerably
since the 2000 presidential elections.
The media kept pace
with the campaign, refrained from comment and treated all candidates equally,
said the report.
Nevertheless,
Democratic Party of Serbia candidate Vojislav Kostunica and independent
frontrunner Miroljub Labus dominated the headlines. These election favourites
also benefited from their respective roles as Yugoslav president and Federal
deputy prime minister.
Radical Party leader
Vojislav Seselj, the preferred candidate of former president Slobodan
Milosevic, also enjoyed extensive airtime and went on to score unexpectedly
well, with 22 per cent of the vote.
According to the
Strategic Marketing Agency, Kostunica filled almost six and a half hours of
television news in the latter half of September. Labus was granted three and a
half hours, with other candidates accruing much less.
Kostunica again dominated
the headlines as the campaign drew to a close, drawing much public criticism
for a number of controversial statements.
Labus enjoyed the
indirect support of Zoran Djindjic's Serbian government, and the public backing
of its expert economic team.
In mid-September the
government launched a high-profile campaign entitled "Proud of
Serbia". Since Labus was campaigning on the strength of his economic
policy, the statements of ministers and their economic assessments were clearly
aimed at defending the government.
Belgrade daily Danas
was one of the few papers to criticise the authorities for this. "The
identification of those 'Proud of Serbia' and Miroljub Labus is apparent",
wrote Bojan Toncic on September 14-15. The government can be expected to channel
all state resources into the Labus campaign, he added.
Serbian prime minister
Zoran Djindjic, who gave his personal backing to Labus, frequently appeared in
the media during the run-up to elections, prompting criticism from daily Glas.
Under the headline
"Djindjic's mask", columnist Kosta Cavoski accused the media of
letting the prime minister "run the show" instead of getting the
presidential candidates into the headlines.
Campaigning really got
underway when Yugoslav president Vojislav Kostunica entered the race in the
central Serbian town of Cacak on September 5.
The previous day, the
town's mayor Velimir Ilic – the New Serbia leader renowned for his nationalist
outbursts – withdrew from the contest and threw his support behind Kostunica.
Novosti's subheading on September 6 quoted Ilic as saying Kostunica is "a
Serb and a man from Sumadija", the area regarded as the heart of Serbia.
The bulk of
Kostunica's Cacak speech was a savage attack on Djindjic. He compared the prime
minister to Milosevic and accused him of stealing parliamentary seats from his
own Democratic Party of Serbia, DSS, and of planning fresh electoral theft. The
DSS was recently expelled from Serbia's ruling coalition, the Democratic
Opposition of Serbia, DOS, and stripped of its seats in the parliament.
Certain media, dailies
Politika and Danas in particular, were critical of the rhetoric from Kostunica,
who had generally been classified as a moderate.
On September 8, in his
regular Politika column "Between two weeks", Ivan Torov wrote that
the presidential campaign "is just one of the stronger reasons for a new
assembly and homogenisation of the forces that, as many believed immediately
after October 5, would not survive the fall of the old regime".
Torov said that
Kostunica, in a bid to placate the "genuine" small-town nationalist
Velimir Ilic and reward him for his "generous and patriotic"
withdrawal from the race, had levelled the worst possible accusation against
Djindjic – that he was conspiring to fix the elections. The Yugoslav president
pointed to the fact the prime minister was trying to get ethnic Albanians onto
voting lists.
The Cacak speech and
the "primitive, nationalist and even racist statements that Kostunica had
never once publicly distanced himself from" were further indication that
Serbia would again come apart at the hands of national intolerance, said
Politika.
The daily branded
Kostunica a leader of "democratic nationalist forces" and said that
the "apparent intellectual, national elite" – the Serbian Orthodox
Church and a section of DOS – are all ready to take the Yugoslav president's
side.
Finally, Politika
reported, "the movement behind Seselj is once again expanding and gaining
unexpected popularity with the break up of the Socialist Party of Serbia, SPS".
All media reported
Kostunica's remarks in Uzice that certain members of the Serbian government
came "from some Bolivias" – a reference to the fact that energy
minister Kori Udovicki was born in that country, and that several cabinet
ministers had enjoyed successful careers abroad. "They don't know how
Serbia lives", claimed the Yugoslav president, adding that "when they
leave Serbia they'll have nowhere to go".
The reaction of
Yugoslav National Bank governor Mladan Dinkic also made the headlines. Dinkic,
a member of Labus' campaign team, condemned the remarks as "shocking"
and said he no longer believed Kostunica was a democratic candidate.
On September 7,
Kostunica told a rally in Mali Zvornik that the Republika Srpska, RS, was
"only temporarily separated from Serbia, and is always ours".
The comment sparked a
media frenzy. Bojan Toncic said the statement was "scandalous". In
his article headlined, "From Mali Zvornik to New York" – in the
September 14-15 issue of Danas, Toncic wrote, "There is a tangible
connection between the messages that are being sent out from the political
arena and various forms of crazy behaviour that, as a rule, go unpunished and
unnoticed by society".
Blic published an
article on September 15 under the heading "Never enough of
nationalism", alongside a photo of Kostunica.
According to the text,
the president's reference to the Bosnian Serb entity "was most likely
intended to strengthen his position as a well-meaning nationalist who cares for
the Serbian tradition". Coming on the eve of elections, the remark
produced a backlash in the Bosnian media, with headlines such as "One step
away from war" and television reports referring to "Serbian
territorial claims".
Blic focused on the
response from Sarajevo, and also covered Kostunica's later protestations that
"ill-informed and malicious people" had misinterpreted him.
Vreme journalist
Teofil Pancic was particularly scathing. "Nothing Kostunica said or did
during the Nineties shows us he has ever had any serious problem with hate
speech".
Pancic condemned the
president's failure to distance himself from Ilic – whose claims include
allegations that Labus is the "antichrist" and RTV B92 is a
"traitorous television station that employs people who hate Serbs".
Instead, Kostunica brushes
the matter aside with the "red lace glove of moderate nationalism,
suggesting that the real problem is actually hidden elsewhere".
On September 15, under
the heading "Power is relish", Ivan Torov wrote in Politika that
"nationalism, in its primitive and aggressive forms, becomes a powerful
weapon in an election campaign, even when it is perfectly clear to the
post-Milosevic nationalists that their behaviour is pushing Serbia into new
trouble".
Next to a photo of the
Yugoslav president, the text reads, "[Kostunica] clearly recognises that
nationalism is music to the ears of the majority of the Serbian population. He
scores by throwing an unconnected issue such as the status and future of RS
into the boiling pre-election passions and showdowns".
Weekly publication NIN
and daily newspaper Glas adopted a very different stance on the RS story.
NIN journalist Liljana
Smailovic took a detailed look at Kostunica's visit to the United Nations'
annual assembly in New York in a three-page article headlined "The use of
America".
"New York was
Kostunica's chance for a winning combination, while his political rivals could
just bite their nails", wrote Smailovic. The Yugoslav president, she
continued, "used all the privileges of a guest in a foreign terrain, but there
was one thing he could not do – take all the weaknesses of the domestic field
with him".
The text went on to
explain that as Kostunica set off for the US, accompanied by Yugoslav foreign
minister Goran Svilanovic, media in Belgrade reported that Svilanovic had urged
his party's supporters to back Labus in the elections later that month.
Smailovic then turned
to Kostunica's comments on the status of RS, quoting from his speech in Mali
Zvornik. She included the reactions in Bosnia and the West.
His remarks, she
claimed, "created a certain momentum: this was such a good opportunity to
diminish Kostunica's presidential advantage and play down the importance of New
York that even local contenders could not resist the challenge. So, the
statement was also condemned locally as a diplomatic scandal and a red
flag".
Smailovic put the
"clumsy" statement down to carelessness. She suggested that Kostunica
had simply forgotten to add the "ritual swearing on the Dayton
Agreement", the peace deal that brought the war in Bosnia to an end.
"He had mentioned
it so many times in the past that he probably became careless and thought he
didn't have to say it each and every time", the text concluded.
The Glas editorial on
September 19 focused on Svilanovic's statement to Voice of America that the RS
comment could cost Yugoslavia the normalisation of its trade relations with
America.
Under the headline,
"Serbian elections in the middle of America", authors D. Cirovic and
B. Ristic quoted Serbian deputy minister Nebojsa Covic as saying that
Svilanovic's claim, coming in the heat of an election campaign, should be taken
with a pinch of salt.
"The inference
was, it seems, that Svilanovic was exaggerating when he spoke about the danger
to Yugoslav interests in a bid perhaps to damage Kostunica – that is, he abused
his position in order to back his choice for Serbian president", said the
text.
The article ends with
a statement by Washington analyst Obrad Kesic, that Kostunica repeated
"this seemingly harmless sentence on RS" as many as three times
during his stay in America.
The state media –
known during the Milosevic regime as the "manufacturers of hate" –
were extra careful to avoid the insults and accusations banded about between
the candidates, particularly as polling day neared.
Through editorials and
expert opinion the state media warned against the tainted political and media
language they had grown so adept at under Milosevic.
Blic quoted culture
sociologist Ratko Bozovic on September 11 as saying that "the style of
disqualification and ruthless intolerance is back on the scene once
again". This, he claimed, was the consequence of "bad habits deriving
from political extremism". He failed to provide examples to back this up.
An article in the
September 18 edition of Politika said that Serbian political tradition
consisted of conflict, celebration, singing and gunfire. Under the headline,
"Program and cabaret", Ljubomir Stojadinovic branded Seselj "the
master of primitive media manipulation". Kostunica is criticised for
"not finding the time to distance himself from Ilic's vulgar chauvinism
and anti-Semitism" and for being xenophobic.
"Tolerance in
Serbia is on the back foot – it had to withdraw in the face of aggressive party
categorisation", wrote Politika.
On September 22, in
his column "Between two weeks", Ivan Torov looked at the undesirable
language and tone of the election campaign.
With Serbia in the
grips of social and economic crisis, "it's logical that the emphasis is no
longer on the economy but on politics", he wrote in Politika. Torov added
that after a short break, hate speech – racial, ethnic, religious and political
– and all other forms of intolerance are again on the rise".
On a more positive
note, September 19's Vreme looked at the language employed by Djindjic. Biljana
Vasic claimed the Serbian prime minister was sharp-tongued, quick and most of
all figurative.
Looking at a number of
his statements, Vasic noted that the premier mainly used "La Fontaine
rhetoric". This, she added, marked a departure from the "messianic
political and rhetorical approach that characterised the Serbian political
scene in the second half of the last century".
October 2002
The Hague
Tribunal
After the limited
media interest in the Kosovo part of the Milosevic trial, progression to the
indictment for Croatia and Bosnia thrust the war crimes tribunal back into the
headlines.
Several developments
attracted particular attention in the period monitored – the decision of former
Bosnian Serb president Biljana Plavsic to plead guilty on a number of counts
against her, the appearance of Croatian president Stipe Mesic as a prosecution
witness in the trial of Slobodan Milosevic, Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte's
visit to Belgrade and, of special interest, the testimony of two journalists
from the Belgrade weekly Vreme.
In common with most
newspapers, Politika branded Plavsic's unexpected change of plea a
"sensational turn at The Hague tribunal". The former Bosnian Serb
leader, previously portrayed as an "iron lady", had protested her
innocence before surrendering to the court.
Most papers featured
headlines such as "I am guilty" and alleged that she had cut a deal
with the prosecution. On October 4, Belgrade daily Danas carried the entire
text of the agreement between Plavsic and the prosecution, noting that the
defendant could still be sentenced to life in prison.
Belgrade weekly NIN,
on October 10, published an article speculating on the reasons for her
decision, under the headline "The lady's finale". For NIN, the big
question is whether the reasons can be found in political dealings or Plavsic's
courage in facing the truth and contributing to the process of reconciliation.
"Maybe her motives are far stronger and more prosaic, maybe she is just a
crushed woman".
According to NIN,
Plavsic could prove an important witness to the prosecution, as suggested by
the protection afforded her in Belgrade since her temporary release in
September last year.
Under the headline
"More than a personal confession", Zoran Suvakovic wrote in Politika
on October 16, "Nothing will be the same in this part of international
justice after Biljana Plavsic – for some bravely, for others traitorously, for
some too little and others too much – admitted her guilt".
Politika wrote that in
sacrificing the worst charge of genocide in return for her confession to
"small genocide", analysts agree that the prosecution scored a
significant victory and may have eased its task in other trials, including that
of Milosevic.
The development, the
paper claimed, could prove the catalyst in attracting the much needed insider
witnesses in the case against the former Yugoslav president, that were so
obviously missing from the Kosovo phase of the trial.
Most papers on October
4 carried a report from Beta news agency on Milosevic's cross-examination of
Croatian president Stipe Mesic. Headlines varied, Danas – "Milosevic, JNA
did not shoot Vukovar prisoners", Blic – "Greater Serbia not the
aim", Glas – "Greater Serbia a fabrication".
In Novosti on October
4, Miroljub Zaric discussed Mesic's testimony under the heading, "Witness
ready for indictment". The sub-heading read, "The Croatian president
has found himself in a position in which he is unconvincingly justifying the
reasons why Croatia attacked Serbs and organised ethnic cleansing in zones
under UN protection, and why he personally went against decisions for a
peaceful resolution of the crisis that he, as president of the former
Yugoslavia's presidency, had signed".
"Battle without
weapons or end", was the headline of Zoran Suvakovic's piece on the
testimony in Politika on October 3. The sub-heading said it appeared "war
would again break out between the two countries if led by the same politicians
today".
Suvakovic described
events in the courtroom as "an unexpected verbal stampede" in which
for a moment one could not tell between judge, defendant and witness.
Danas took the
opportunity to remind its readers of the processes that led to the break-up of
the former Yugoslavia.
Focusing on Mesic's
testimony that the former presidents of Serbia and Croatia – Slobodan Milosevic
and Franjo Tudjman – had agreed on the carve-up of Bosnia, Danas wrote on
October 3, "A valid witness has finally confirmed in a valid place what
many in the territory of former Yugoslavia knew, but also what people across
the world, which certainly took part in the new Balkan wars, were well aware of
– that the bloody feast with its far-reaching consequences, was started by the
heads of the two leading republics of the former joint homeland".
"After Mesic's
testimony, judging today whether Milosevic could have slaughtered the former
Yugoslavia without the help of his Croatian counterpart is really of no
importance. Of course, it will be some day, when someone begins writing an
unbiased history – if such a thing exists".
For Danas, the
important thing now is whether all parties in the conflicts "will face
their own consciences and roles in drawing the bloody borders".
Carla del Ponte's
visit to Belgrade caused a stir in the Belgrade media. The chief prosecutor
said she would inform tribunal president Claude Jorda of Yugoslavia's failure
to cooperate with The Hague, which some claimed could result in new sanctions
at the UN Security Council.
Politika wrote on
October 23 that it was up to Jorda to decide whether del Ponte "is
completely correct when she talks of non-cooperation". "It is not
completely certain that this question will be raised in New York after all,
despite Carla del Ponte's warnings", said Zoran Suvakovic.
"Carla del Ponte
misses no opportunity to point out Belgrade's unsatisfactory cooperation with
The Hague", wrote Politika, adding that, "according to various
sources, she has the same problem with the American administration, but the
problem of Washington's unsatisfactory cooperation is discussed in closed
session, far from the eyes and ears of the public".
NIN took a similar
line. Liljana Smailovic wrote on October 24, "Carla del Ponte…has neither
surprised nor frightened Belgrade. Her rhetoric remains unchanged, the tone of
voice is equally raised and her behaviour is somewhat monotonous".
Looking at the
pressure on Zagreb to extradite former generals Janko Bobetko and Ante
Gotovina, NIN accused del Ponte and the international community of employing
the same methods as the Tito era, symmetrical tools of education for all of
their ill-fated protégés, "regardless of their current
improprieties".
According to NIN, the
Europeans have taken over from the Americans in the task of "teaching
Serbs and Croats good manners". The weekly quotes EU special advisor
Stefan Lehne during his visit to Belgrade in September that Yugoslavia's
accession to the Council of Europe relies on improved cooperation with The
Hague tribunal. The Europeans, says NIN, are looking for some other way
"to please the Americans besides backing them in their war games against
Iraq".
On October 28,
Belgrade daily Glas published an opinion piece by Kosta Cavoski entitled
"Foreign Mercenaries", a reference to Yugoslavia's incumbent
authorities. Cavoski reminded readers of the suspects Belgrade has so far
extradited, and of Zagreb's refusal to hand over former Croatian chief of staff
Janko Bobetko. He criticised del Ponte's "understanding" for Zagreb,
while Belgrade's "power-holders obey all orders from abroad".
The appearance of
Vreme journalists Dejan Anastasijevic and Jovan Dulovic as prosecution
witnesses in the trial of Milosevic sparked discussion of whether reporters
should testify in such cases. The profession's unions were divided.
In a statement on
October 11, the state Association of Serbian Journalists, UNS, urged its
members against testifying in court, including The Hague tribunal, "so
that their professional mission does not become a court-investigative
one".
Journalists
"should not become professional insider witnesses, since, in doing so,
they could lose credibility and throw into question the possibility of any form
of investigative journalism".
Milica Lucic-Cavic,
the president of the Independent Association of Serbian Journalists, NUNS,
criticised the UNS statement. "If a journalist wants and wishes to testify
they should testify, because they are an eye-witness, because they have seen
things done in the field and because they can help find true answers to the
questions posed in connection with the defendants and the crimes that took
place in this region", she told B92.
Instead of a report
from The Hague, Vreme's October 17 edition published Dejan Anastasijevic's
"Hague Diary" – his encounters with the prosecution, his personal
feelings and impression of Milosevic – as well as a commentary by
editor-in-chief Dragoljub Zarkovic in which he argued that it should be left to
the individual journalist to decide whether or not take the stand.
Zarkovic argued that
the unions had no right to impose their will on their members, but should stick
to the protection of journalists and their integrity.
He revealed that on
the day of Anastasijevic's appearance in court, Vreme received numerous phone
calls criticising his decision and threatening the magazine.
On October 18,
Politika carried two texts on the appearance of the Vreme journalists.
Referring to Anastasijevic's "Hague Diary", Zoran Suvakovic noted
that BBC journalist Jacky Rowland had done a similar thing, disclosing
"insider details that ordinary reporters from The Hague trials have no
access to".
The sub-heading was
particularly critical, "Witnesses in the trial should not sign up for this
race just so that they could publish their insider experiences right
after". The article noted that the international media and journalists are
also divided on the issue of whether reporters should testify.
In the same issue,
Ljubodrag Stojadinovic wrote an opinion piece entitled, "Maybe it was
worth it". Stojadinovic said that although his colleagues from Vreme were
in for a rough time, "if their testimony helps shed even a little light on
the darkness indicating that the Balkan war mafia really did lead true patriots
into death while committing crimes all over the place – then it was worth
it".
On October 18, in its
regular column, "Personality of the Day", Danas published an article
by Ivan Nikolic on Jovan Dulovic's claim that he went to The Hague to
"wash" his biography. Citing "many colleagues of Dulovic",
the text says his appearance in court was an attempt "to improve his
rating in his older years". It adds that Dulovic, as a former Ekspres
reporter, was "part of Milosevic's propaganda machinery" through
1991.
Under the heading,
"Undesirable witnesses", Danas on October 21 said that the
testimonies of Anastasijevic and Dulovic had caused "an avalanche of
mainly negative reactions and moralising on the journalistic profession, which,
by choice, rules out the possibility of facing The Hague Tribunal in the
capacity of witness and revealed the thin line that separates and joins
together the profession of journalist and direct participation in an event –
two inseparable areas that everyone doing this job has faced".
While the Vreme
journalists decided to tell the tribunal of what they heard on the battlefield
and in different headquarters, "various committees and militant
associations are asking the journalists to keep quiet about war crimes like
doctors about a patient's venereal disease".
Danas concludes that
the issue is not the courage of the witnesses, but the intention of the Serbian
people to forget everything they took part in, either actively or passively.
"Unfortunately, this is Serbia after October 5 – a state in which
journalists are a pebble in a patriotic shoe".
Glas Javnosti
published a number of letters from readers branding the journalists as
traitors. On October 21, the daily devoted an entire page to a letter written
by Ljubisa Vukasinovic, "an eye-witness to events". The text – headed
"Dulovic's Munchhausen-like recollection" – was highly critical of the
journalist and his testimony.
Vreme reacted
strongly. Its front page on October 24 was a collage of clippings from various
papers which had been critical Anastasijevic and Dulovic.
Under the heading
"The public and witnesses", Vreme journalist Milos Vasic said it was
not just about journalists but about any anyone that the prosecution brought
before Milosevic. "The more accurate and reliable the witness, the greater
the public criticism".
"There must be a
reason", said Vasic, why the Vreme journalists came in for such fierce
attack.
"What crawled
into the mouse-hole on October 5, covered its ears and tried to be more silent
than the grass, is now slowly crawling out and holding its head high,
encouraged by [Yugoslav president] Vojislav Kostunica's moderate nationalism
but also by Velja Ilic's 'small-town fascism'."
November 2002
Relations
between Serbia and Montenegro
Coverage of
Serbian-Montenegrin relations was limited to factual reports on the drafting of
the constitutional charter and the activities of the Christian-Democratic Party
of Serbia. The party, headed by Serbian justice minister Vladan Batic, has been
a long-term advocate of independence for Serbia.
According to the
Strategic Marketing Agency, 12 per cent of news time was dedicated to the
federal shake-up, and as much again to the constitutional charter. None of the
four major Serbian television stations – RTS, BK, Studio B and B92 – chose to
air any special programmes on relations between the two republics.
Media blamed the
failure of constitutional negotiations and the subsequent deferral of Council
of Europe membership on Belgrade and Podgorica. Some singled out Montenegrin
president Milo Djukanovic as the main culprit.
In an opinion piece on
November 11, Danas claimed that the problem with the charter was of a
political, rather than legal nature. "The work on the charter reflects the
interests of those in power and of the contenders for key political
posts", wrote Danas, under the heading, "All or Nothing".
An editorial two days later
warned that, "the chaotic status of Belgrade-Podgorica relations will
probably continue, in view of the new thesis on the existence of Yugoslavia,
launched by the constitution makers". Consequently, "there is no
urgency to adopt the charter at this moment in time".
According to Danas,
the "October 5 coup brought about a distribution of power that obviously
suits many…hence their indifference to a swift, new constitutional
arrangement". This manner of governing society "is totally unrelated
to genuine democracy".
Glas, in its November
11 edition, predicted that the Montenegrin president, "after his sweeping
election victory, will play a key role in the fate of the charter and in the
election of the new Serbian president".
Under the headline,
"Serbia in Milo Djukanovic's hands", Vinko Duric argued that the
adoption of the constitutional charter would "hinge on the goodwill of
Djukanovic". With his "strengthened negotiating position he can
insist on the solutions that suit him best".
Forecasting that Djukanovic
would not allow direct parliamentary elections in a joint state, Glas claimed
this would "embolden Djindjic to postpone elections and adopt the charter
and Serbian Constitution without these provisions".
The daily recalled the
1996-1997 findings of the IMPRES Information Agency that Montenegrins in Serbia
enjoyed 7.44 times the political and economic influence relative to their total
share of the population in Serbia.
Since the Second World
War, wrote Glas, "our fate has been linked to the intentions of the
Montenegrins". Serb people "are still struggling to find their own
political identity, while all neighbouring peoples found their own a long time
ago".
Belgrade weekly NIN
laid the blame for the constitutional debacle on Djukanovic, and to a lesser
extent Yugoslav president Vojislav Kostunica and Serbian prime minister Zoran
Djindjic. The editorial on November 14, headlined "Waiting for
Solana", accused Djukanovic – whose party won a majority in elections in
October – of intentionally delaying the adoption of the charter in order to
undermine the joint state and justify his bid for independence.
"According to
Djukanovic's dream scenario, Serbia will run out of patience, denounce the
entire proceedings, and thus Serbia, not Montenegro, will declare its
independence".
NIN claimed that,
"due to complications in the negotiating process, for which the
politicking of both sides is mostly to blame, the Serbian prime minister
believes it is best to give up in the face of Djukanovic's demands".
A declaration adopted
in the federal parliament, calling on The Hague tribunal to release Slobodan
Milosevic for medical treatment in Yugoslavia, prompted a special opinion piece
on Belgrade-Podgorica relations in Danas on November 15.
The declaration was
proposed by Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia and the Radical Party, and
backed by Montenegro's Socialist People's Party and the Yugoslav Left.
"Despite all the talk about transition and reform, Belgrade has not moved
an inch from the policy of the red-black coalition".
"The spirit of
that coalition still prevails in Serbia, while Podgorica at the last elections
said a historical 'no' and delegated in a single move that burden to Belgrade,
unwilling to continue along the path of October 5".
Belgrade daily Blic –
under the headline, "Presidential elections next on the agenda" –
wrote on November 17 that "Djukanovic's absolute election victory caused
considerable confusion among his opponents, the pro-Serb Coalition for Change
and the independence-minded Liberal Alliance".
The text forecast a
vote of no confidence in Predrag Bulatovic, leader of the Socialist People's
Party, the coalition's largest member.
Politika's Podgorica
correspondent, Dragomir Becirovic, says that, "even foreign diplomats are
not allowed to say anything resembling criticism of the current
authorities".
The claim came in an
article on the reporting provided by Podgorica-based Publika, which, according
to Politika, "reflects the policy of Montenegro's leadership".
Publika, it said, even criticised Britain's ambassador in Yugoslavia, Charles
Crawford, for his claim that "rampant smuggling of cigarettes and other
goods has destroyed economic development and political life in
Montenegro".
Publika wrote,
"Crawford is supposed to elect a presidential candidate for Montenegro
prepared to work on the elimination of Montenegrin statehood and national
identity for the sake of the promotion and supremacy of Serb nationalism".
Politika's response
was, "At issue is not Crawford's Greater Serbia nationalism, but his words
on organised crime and the destruction of economic and political life. Such
words ought not be mentioned in Montenegro, and hence why Crawford was
immediately labelled the 'leader of Serb nationalism'".
NIN's November 21
issue focused on the question of Serbian independence. A survey of political
analysts concluded that the campaign launched by the Christian Democratic Party
of Serbia, DHSS, was an expression of resistance to Milo Djukanovic.
The issue contained an
interview with DHSS leader and Serbian justice minister Vladan Batic. In his
introduction, interviewer Dragan Jovanovic noted parliament's recent decision
to postpone a debate on a referendum on Serbian independence. Jovanovic
emphasised Batic's decision to set up a separate MP caucus and his threat to
quit the government unless the initiative was discussed within the year.
Batic stressed again
that no one had asked Serbia whether it wanted to be part of the new joint
state. He drew attention to an earlier poll by the Strategic Marketing Agency,
in which 57 per cent of those surveyed said they were in favour of independence
for Serbia. (The percentage rose to 66 per cent in a second survey).
All media covered the
agreement of the constitutional sub-commission on the election of
representatives to the future federal parliament. Negotiators agreed on
November 21 that deputies should be elected by parliamentary ballot for the
first two years, and then direct elections. It was noted that Montenegro's
ruling Democratic Party of Socialists, DPS, had insisted that the election of
deputies be an integral part of republic law, not of the charter.
"To the utter
disbelief of all the parties involved and the general public, [DPS member]
Dragan Kujovic assessed that the charter would be debated by deputies within 10
to 15 days", wrote Vecernje Novosti.
Javier Solana's
arrival in Belgrade on November 28 inevitably made the headlines. A statement
by the EU foreign policy chief that agreement had been reached on the political
aspect of the charter drew little attention, since Djindjic had made a similar
statement the day before.
Politika journalist
Ivan Torov said Solana had reprimanded all the key players, before finally
announcing the deal.
"Now the key
question is: does this European diplomat possess the mechanism to keep Serbian
and Montenegrin negotiators in line, or will negotiations collapse the moment
he leaves?"
Belgrade media are
generally sceptical of the deal reached on the constitutional charter,
particularly considering the time it has taken and the reluctance of the main
players to reach agreement without the involvement of Solana.
December 2002
Sex
Trafficking, Police Methods
and a Crime
Pyramid
December was a tough
month in Serbia and Montenegro. The Belgrade-based media paid close attention
to the issue of crime and adopted an analytical approach rather than covering
one particular incident.
The majority of
articles were critical of the police service for its inability to get to grips
with the mafia. Many warned of the enduring ties between organised crime and
the authorities, which dates back to the Slobodan Milosevic regime.
Montenegro's sex
trafficking scandal provided the spark for the close interest in crime. For
days, the story was headline news in all Belgrade media as they closely
followed the account of a Moldovan girl and her experience at the hands of the
traffickers.
In looking at the
issue in Serbia, most of the press concluded that the larger Yugoslav republic
was just a transit region for the slave trade – a route to Montenegro, Kosovo
and Albania.
In an article filed
from Bujanovac, a town near Serbia's administrative border with Kosovo,
Belgrade daily Novosti reported that Serbia had become one of the main transit
centres for the white slave trade. South Serbia, he wrote on December 5, was an
oasis for the slave trade.
Citing police sources,
Novosti claimed that no fewer than eight highly-organised white slavery routes
in south Serbia had been severed last year alone. The region, the text added,
was a stopover to "104 bars in Kosovo…where forced prostitution is one of
the major problems despite the new UNMIK decree on human trafficking".
In a text from
Bijeljina, a Bosnian town near the Serbian border, daily Blic claimed Belgrade
was the largest regional sex trafficking centre. Blic wrote that in the past,
live auctions had been organised at the Arizona market, where "traffickers
of women" picked out girls for their bars or for their employers.
The daily quoted Mara
Radovanovic, head of Bijeljina non-governmental organisation Women's
Association Lara, as saying that Belgrade was now the largest regional sex
trafficking centre with routes to Bosnia and Hercegovina, the Arizona market,
Montenegro and Kosovo, and then further west.
On December 11, Nedeljni
Telegraf printed a three-page feature on forced prostitution under the
headline, "Horrible". The text claimed that 60 women and girls had
gone missing in Serbia in the space of just nine months this year. It featured
an account of a woman whose daughter had gone missing in Nis. The article
echoed familiar stories of mental and psychological problems, drug and alcohol
abuse.
The death of Milan
Jezdovic during questioning at the Belgrade police department – the third such
case in 2002 – prompted Blic and other media, to look at the methods used by
police when dealing with suspects.
Blic opened the issue
on its front-page on December 10 with the bold heading, "Questioning in
the police department with a bag over the head".
The text claimed that
the autopsy report blamed Jezdovic's death on the injuries and the physical
harassment he had been exposed to. It quotes Veroljub Djukic, a lawyer with the
Humanitarian Law Centre, who said, "police torture is present in all
cities".
Blic picked up the
story on December 13 with a statement from Aleksandar Draskovic, one of the men
arrested with Jezdovic, who described in detail the alleged torture they had
been subjected to.
Early the same day,
Radio B92 broadcast statements from detainees who claimed that they had been
exposed to "electric" torture and suffocated with plastic bags placed
over their heads.
Nedeljni Telegraf,
which is known for its close ties to the police, devoted its December 4 issue
to the problem of crime.
Yugoslav interior
minister Zoran Zivkovic said in an interview that criminals in Serbia were
building a new pyramid of power. The minister added that he believed there was
less room for organised crime now because the police and state were actively
fighting it.
Dobrivoje Radovanovic,
the director of the Institute of Criminal Research, claimed the mafia was
blackmailing the government. The current authorities, he said, had made a
"big mistake" on October 5 when they organised "a
mini-revolution with the help of the underworld".
He continued,
"These things are done in the world, but once the job is done, those who
gave the orders pay the underworld and then no longer owe it anything. Over
here, instead of getting money, the executioners received promises that they
would either be exempt from criminal prosecution or awarded with some
business".
Writing in Belgrade
weekly Vreme, Milos Vasic said that frequent street killings – such as those of
Nenad Batocanin, deputy head of the federal police first department, and Zeljko
Skrbic, a businessman "already known to the police" – had left
ministers baffled, the police losing patience and smart gangsters fleeing the
country.
"All this will
not end well", warned Vasic in the December 5 text. Pointing to other
countries in which reprisal killings had spread, Vasic commented, "If it
comes to that, may God help us".
On December 12, Vreme
published an interview with the Serbian deputy interior minister, Nenad Milic,
in which he branded the judiciary the "bottleneck" in the fight
against organised crime. The prosecution of many cases, he said, is taking far
too long – possession of illegal firearms takes on average two years to
prosecute – while any objections are seen as interference in the judicial
process.
Five days later, Blic
reported the adoption of "anti-mafia" changes to the law on criminal
proceedings by the federal parliament, under the heading, "Go-ahead in the
fight against mafia".
The same day, the
magazine Reporter published an interview with Serbian interior minister Dusan
Mihajlovic, in which he promised "major results" in a number of
investigations once the law on organised crime was adopted.
Mihajlovic's claim
that the police knew who killed Slavko Curuvija – gunned down in broad daylight
in Belgrade in 1999 – also caught the eye of other Belgrade media. Although he
refused to disclose whom he had in mind, the interior minister was confident
that as soon as the legislation was adopted, "they will have Curuvija's
killer in court".
In its column Glas
Investigates on December 29, Belgrade daily Glas published a series of
interviews with analysts specialising in crime and the military. The feature
concluded that the spiral of violence would continue.
"The authorities
will have to make arrests, and the criminals will fight back even
stronger", read the sub-heading, announcing the arrival of the FBI and
other foreign police agencies, as happened in Prague, Budapest and Moscow.
Marko Nicovic, the director of the SIA and a former criminal investigator, is
quoted as saying that organised crime groups will openly attack the
authorities, their facilities, police chiefs, the prosecution service, and
disclose potentially damaging information.
An explosion at a
private asphalting company on December 21 kept crime in the headlines. Owned by
controversial businessman Ljubisa "Cume" Buha, the Defence Road
company had become famous for winning the asphalting contract for the whole of
Serbia, thanks, some allege, to Cume's close friendship with Prime Minister
Zoran Djindjic.
On December 23, under
the headline "Explosives at 20 locations", Politika revealed on its
front-page that Cume's company was based in Surcin, a village on the outskirts
of Belgrade known as the centre of the car mafia.
Novosti on December 23
claimed the explosions at the Defence Road company were almost certainly the
work of "top professionals". Danas concurred, quoting Dobrivoje
Radovanovic, the director of the Institute for Criminal Research, as saying
that the attacks were carried out by the same group of people who killed police
chief Bosko Buha earlier in the year. According to Danas, the explosion could
mark a mafia showdown over the distribution of business or territory, and even
an attack on the reputation of the Serbian government.
Politika columnist
Ljubodrag Stojadinovic warned that the fight against mafia was useless without
the authorities knowing who it is they are fighting against. "Chaos
everywhere has the law and order bodies up against the wall: they don't know
what is happening. And if they do, they won't say", he wrote on December
25.
Regardless of what the
police say, Politika continued, they are being "rocked by crimes that they
are unable to cope with and by scandals within".
Stojadinovic too
believes the Defence Road bombers had to have been professionals, but adds that
they "must have learnt their craft in the police or the army". He
rubbished police claims that no one was untouchable or protected by the
authorities. Such individuals do exist, he wrote, and "the police know
this very well".
Vreme looked at the
issue on December 26. The front-page carried the heading, "Paving the sky
with asphalt", while the sub-heading to Dejan Anastasijevic's text inside
read, "As long as politicians and police try to convince us that there is
no organised crime, Belgrade will be rocked by spectacular explosions".
In his column in the
same issue, Stojan Cerovic comments dryly, "we are not dealing with
terrorism here, but just a case of misunderstanding between business
partners". For him, the expected dismissal of Interior Minister Dusan
Mihajlovic is not enough.
"What
is needed is at least some kind of distinction between the police and the
underworld. The police must collect evidence of something that everyone knows
about", he concluded.
Activities
of the Helsinki Committee
in
2002
|
Title
|
Place
|
Date
|
Descript.
|
Participants
|
|
Act on National
Minorities
|
Novi Sad
|
03.2002
|
Round-table
|
Jovan Komšić, Andraš
Agošton, Stanko Pihler, Miroslav Samardžić, Laslo Vegel, Slavko Almažan,
Zoroslav Spevak, Mihajlo Ramač, Đorđe Subotić, Tomislav
Žigmanov, Pavel Domonji, Andreas Birgermajer, Antal Bozoki
|
|
Cohabitation in
Multi-Ethnic
Communities
|
Nova Varoš
|
05.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Mirko Djordjević,
Mihailo Mihajlov, Esmedin Jukić, Ismet Bihorac, Milanka
Šaponja-Hadžić
|
|
Republic or Monarchy
|
Belgrade
|
17.01.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
|
|
Democracy and Corruption
|
Subotica
|
25.01.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Srećko
Mihajlović, Nemanja Nenadić, Nikola Perušić, Branimir
Đorđević, Paval Domonji
|
|
Anti-Semitism Today
|
Sombor
|
26.01.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Aleksandar Lebl, Mirko
Đorđević, Milenko Perović, Pavel Domonji
|
|
Unlearnt Lesson
|
Belgrade
|
29.01.2002
|
Promotion
|
Lazar Vrkatić, Pavel
Domonji, Sonja Biserko
|
|
Vojvodina Today
|
Belgrade
|
07.02.2002
|
Round-table
|
Stanko Pihler, Stevan
Šogorov, Laslo Vegel, Sonja Biserko, Lazar Vrkatić, Pavel Domonji,
Đorđe Vukadinović
|
|
Problems of Local
Self-Rule
|
Sombor
|
14.02.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Snežana
Đorđević, Stanko Pihler, Jovan Komšić, Gojko
Mišković, Pavel Domonji
|
|
Act on Hungarians Living
in Neighbouring Countries
|
Novi Sad
|
19.02.2002
|
Round -table
|
Miroslav Samardžić,
Laslo Galamboš, Tomislav Žigmanov, Zoroslav Spevak, Ivan Petrović,
Slaven Dulić, Janoš Oros, Pavel Domonji
|
|
Media on the Brink of
Profession
|
Belgrade
|
07.03.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Sonja Biserko, Snježana
Milivojević, Gruja Spasovič, Petar Luković, Milanka
Šaponja-Hadžić
|
|
Hate Speech and National
Minorities
|
Novi Pazar
|
07.03.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Nenad Daković, Mirko
Đorđević, Ramiz Crnišanin, Mehmed Slezović, Pavel Domonji
|
|
Serbia and the Hague
Trials
|
Sombor
|
08.03.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Latinka Perović,
Sonja Biserko
|
|
Measures of
Confidence-Building Between the Young Elites
|
Novi Sad
|
26.03.2002
|
Seminar
|
Božidar Jakšić,
Stanko Pihler, Alpar Lošonc, Milenko Perović, Janja Beč, Matijas
Helman, Svenka Savić, Čedomir Čupić, Laslo Vegel, Mihail
Ramač, Mirko Đorđević, Pavel Domonji
|
|
Corruption -Challenge of
the New Authorities
|
Belgrade
|
28.03.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Božo Prelević, Nenad
Konstantinović, Čedomir Čupić, Jelisaveta Vasilić,
Djordje Djurišić, Dobrivoje Radovanović
|
|
Constitutionality of
Peoples of B&H
|
Belgrade
|
08.04.2002
|
Promotion
|
Predstavnici Srpskog
građanskog vijeća iz Sarajeva
|
|
Journalists at the
Accused' Benches
|
Belgrade
|
11.04.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Snežana Milošević,
Milan Mišić, Grujica Spasović, Petar Luković, Vojin
Dimitrijević, Sonja Biserko
|
|
New Pressures on the
Media
|
Novi Pazar
|
18.04.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Šaban Šarenkapić,
Svetlana Jajić, Aida Ćorović, Milanka Šaponja-Hadžić
|
|
Human Rights in
Transition
|
Belgrade
|
22.04.2002
|
Promotion
|
Predstavnici Helsinškog
odbora, autori izveštaja
|
|
Rules of Procedure of
Organisation and Work of Elector Assemblies for Election of National Councils
of National Minorities
|
Novi Sad
|
24.04.2002
|
Round-table
|
Vladimir Đurić,
Miroslav Samardžić, Pavel Domonji, Andreas Birgermajer, Janko Kubinjec,
Stanko Pihler, Kukurović, Zoroslav Spevak, Laslo Vegel, Nikola Šanta,
Antal Bozoki
|
|
Local Self-Rule
-Challenges and Possibilities
|
Preševo
|
26.04.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Nikola Perušić, Riza
Halimi, Zeqrija Fazlin, Ljiljana Palibrk
|
|
Is There a New Minority
Policy?
|
Bački Petrovac
|
26.04.2002
|
Lecture
|
|
|
Revision of History
|
Belgrade
|
15.05.2002
|
Panel-discussion
|
Latinka Perović,
Olja Milosavljević, Olga Popović, Todor Kuljić
|
|
Roots of Evil
|
Belgrade
|
17.05.2002
|
Promotion
|
Olga Popović, Žarko
Korać, Nebojša Popov, Ivan torov
|
|
Minorities and
De-nationalization
|
Novi Sad
|
23.05.2002
|
Discussion
|
Slavenko Grgurević,
Andreas Birgermajer, Nikola Šanta, Antal Bozoki, Slaven Dulić, Pavel
Lomanski, Ivan Petrović, Karolj Bereš, Tihomir Ungar, Miroslav
Samardžić, Pavel Domonji
|
|
Facing the War Crimes
|
Bujanovac
|
24.05.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Nenad Daković, Mirko
Đorđević, Agim Ymeri, Fatmir Asani, Ljiljana Palibrk
|
|
Education in Minority
Languages
|
Novi Sad
|
30.05.2002
|
Round-table
|
Miroslav Samardžić,
Stanislava Pribiš, Srđan Šajn, Mihalj Kočiš, Jakov Kišjuhas, Marija
Puja Badesku, Janko Ramač, Viera Boldocka, Zoroslav Spevak, Branimir
Andrić, Marton Matuška, Slaven Dulić
|
|
Disintegration of
Yugoslavia
|
Belgrade
|
30.05.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Ivo Banac, Latinka
Perović, Olga Popović, Olja Milosavljević
|
|
NGOs and Urban Culture :
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia
|
Novi Sad
|
05.06.2002
|
Lecture
|
|
|
Army, Police and Civilian
Society
|
Preševo
|
07.06.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Stipe Sikavica, Filip
Švarm, Nadir Sadiku, Shaip Kamberi, Ljiljana Palibrk
|
|
Lustracija – Yes or NO?
|
Novi Sad
|
10.06.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Stanko Pihler, Jovica
Trkulja, Slobodan Antonić, Mirko Đorđević, Pavel Domonji
|
|
Media and Transition
|
Bujanovac
|
11.06.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Božidar Andrejić,
Mirjana Vujović, Sevdail Hyseni, Mikirem Ahmeti, Ljiljana Palibrk
|
|
Life in Multi-Ethnic
Milieus
|
Prijepolje
|
13.06.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Tomislav Žigmanov, Mirko
Đorđević, Alija Halilović, Pavel Domonji
|
|
Problem of National
Identity in Multi-Ethnic Society
|
Preševo
|
14.06.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Tomislav Žigmanov, Jan
Briza, Ćani Osmanović, Arben Jusufi, Ljiljana Palibrk
|
|
Rights of the Child and
Democracy
|
Vrnjačka Banja
|
25.06.2002
|
Lecture
|
|
|
Serbia Between Past and
Present
|
Stara Pazova
|
27.06.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Mihajlo Mihajlov, Nenad
Daković, Đorđe Vukadinović, Mirko
Đorđević, Pavel Domonji
|
|
The Hague Conference –
the Last Chance for Yugoslavia
|
Belgrade
|
15.07.2002
|
Panel Discussion
|
Ljubivoje
Aćimović, Milan Šahović, Vladimir Bilandžić, Sonja
Biserko
|
|
Act on Radio-Diffusion
|
Novi Sad
|
06.08.2002
|
Round-table
|
Rade Veljanovski,
Slobodan Budakov, Đorđe Subotić, Miroslav Samardžić,
Branislav Dragaš, Mirko Mandrino, Laslo Galamboš, Perica Luković, Ana
Makan, Marija Tot, Tomislav Žigmanov, Vlada Miljković, Zoroslav Spevak
|
|
Media and coverage of the
1991-1999 wars
|
Belgrade
|
15.08.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Mirjana Vujović,
Safeta Biševac, Petar Luković, Teofil Pančić, Pavel Domonji
|
|
Lustration
|
Belgrade
|
02.09.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Stipe Sikavica, Jelena
Milić, Dragoljub Todorović, Zoran Lukić, Pavel Domonji
|
|
Facing up to the Past: Do
We Need That Process?
|
Belgrade
|
16.09.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Nenad Daković, Mirko
Đorđević, Jelena Milić, Srđa Popović, Pavel
Domonji
|
|
National Identity and
Multi-cultural Society
|
Belgrade
|
01.10.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Tomislav Žigmanov,
Branislav Dragaš, Slavija Stanojlović, Olga Popović-Obradović,
Pavel Domonji
|
|
The Vlasch Issue
|
Novi Sad
|
02.10.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Čedomir
Čupić, Dragomir Dragić, Lučijan Marina, Pavel Domonji
|
|
In Nationalistic
Tradition
|
Belgrade
|
19.10.2002
|
Promotion
|
Latinka Perović,
Olja Milosavljević, Đorđe Vukadinović, Dubravka
Stojanović
|
|
Cultural Production and
Nationalism
|
Belgrade
|
20.10.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Mirko
Đorđević, Filip David, Slavija Stanojlović, Pavel Domonji
|
|
Minorities: From
Assimilation to Affirmation
|
Bor
|
21.10.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Pavel Domonji
|
|
Facing the Past- Yes or
No?
|
Vršac
|
24.10.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
|
|
Serbia and national
minorities
|
Dimitrovgrad
|
01.11.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Pavel Domonji
|
|
Road to Wasteland
|
Sombor
|
01.11.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
|
|
Media
|
Stara Pazova
|
02.11.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
|
|
Culture
|
Novi Sad
|
05.11.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
|
|
Politics and Policy
|
Belgrade
|
07.11.2002
|
Promotion
|
Miodrag Marović,
Nebojša Popov, Dragoš Ivanović, Sonja Biserko
|
|
Resistance to Facing
|
Inđija
|
19.11.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
|
|
Stereotypes about Us and
Others
|
Subotica
|
22.11.2002
|
Promotion
|
Olivera
Milosavljević, Dubravka Stojanović, Latinka Perović
|
|
Lustration
|
Kikinda
|
29.11.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
|
|
Civil Society and
Transition
|
Belgrade
|
03.12.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Tanja Petovar, Vladimir
Bilandžić, Latinka Perović
|
|
The Other Serbia-Ten
Years On
|
Belgrade
|
07.12.2002
|
Promotion
|
Ivan Čolović,
Filip David, Borka Pavičević, Aljoša Mimica, Obrad Savić,
Seška Stanojlović, Petar Luković
|
|
Media and War
|
Kraljevo
|
09.12.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
|
|
Stereotypes in Works of
Serb Intellectuals of the 20th Century
|
Niš
|
11.12.2002
|
Promotion
|
Latinka Perović,
Olja Milosavljević, Dubravka Stojanović
|
|
Democracy or Nationalism
|
Stara Pazova
|
17.12.2002
|
Panel Discussion
|
|
|
Intellectuals and War
|
Kragujevac
|
18.12.2002
|
Promotion
|
|
|
In the Nationalistic
Tradition
|
Kragujevac
|
24.12.2002
|
Panel discussion
|
Latinka Perović,
Olja Milosavljević, Dubravka Stojanović
|
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Journalists as
Testimonies
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Kragujevac
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27.12.2002
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Panel discussion
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Dejan Anastasijević,
Jovan Dulović, Ljiljana Palibrk
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Publishing Activities in 2002
Annual report for the year 2001
Human Rights in Transition - Serbia in
2001
(in Serbian and English)
Helsinki Files
No. 11 (in
Serbian and English)
Olivera Milosavljevic, Todor Kuljic,
Olga Manojlovic-Pintar: The Balkans Rachomon - Historic and Literary
Perception of the SFRY Disintegration;
No. 12 (in
Serbian and English)
Minorities and Transition
(contributions from Conference "Transition and Status of Minorities",
Belgrade, 8-9 November 2001);
No. 13 (in
Serbian and English)
Vladimir Vodinelic: The Past as a
Challenge to the Law - Serbian Side of the Legal Coping with the Past (co-publisher-
Centre for Advanced Legal Studies);
No. 14 (in
Serbian and Romanian)
Dragomir Dragić: Vlachs and
Romanians from Eastern Serbia and the "Vlach Issue";
No. 15 (in
Serbian and English)
Jan Briza, Miklos Biro, Mirej
Grčki, Nataša Novakovic, Ljiljana Palibrk, Pavel Domonji: National
Minorities and Law;
Testimonies
(All in Serbian)
No. 9
Bogdan Bogdanovic: Mire and Blood;
No. 10
Ivan Stambolić: The Root of
Evil;
No. 11
The Last Chance of Yugoslavia
(the 1991 Hague Conference);
No. 12
The Other Serbia - 10 Years On
(compendium);
Experiments
(All in Serbian)
No. 1
Olivera Milosavljevic: In the
Tradition of Nationalism or Stereotypes of Serb Intellectuals of the 20th
century on "Us" and "Others";
No. 2
Miodrag Marović: Politika and
Policy;
No. 3
Todor
Kuljic: Overcoming the Past
Formed in the tradition of Saint Sava, Nikolaj Velimirović articulated
himself as an organicist faithful to the spirit of Slovenophile tradition. He
believed that to get in touch with cultures outside the Serbian and Slovene
cultural circle would be harmful for the national organism. In recent Serbian
history he saw a conspiracy of the West aimed at “turning the just liberated
Serbian folk (raja) into the folk of the rotten West”. His ideas were, and
still are, the foundation of an extreme nationalistic ideology. He does not
believe in individual human rights and he stresses – “No one is going to have a
more reserved and skeptical attitude towards some ‘empty phrase’ declarations
of human rights as the new young Balkan man".
He
was a passionate anti-Semite. Jews present a danger not only to Serbs but also
to Europe as a whole, as the Jews “and their father the Devil, through their
slow and long-term poisoning of the soul and heart of the European people,
managed to deter it from genuine worship of God and make it bow in front of the
idol of culture”. He believed that all “modern mottos were created by Jews, who
crucified Christ: democracy and strikes, socialism and atheism, tolerance of
all faiths, pacifism and overall revolution and capitalism and communism”.
Saint Justin Popović did not make a sufficient distinction between the
church and the state. He believed that all members of other Christian religions
formed a “heretical-schismatic legion”. In one of his well-known essays printed
in 1928 he adopted the traditional Russian Slovenophile dogma on culture which
“made the man himself become a thing”. He also viewed the church as a model the
most admirable human association, that is the state, had to be shaped after.
D. Ljotić expressed his ideas most vividly in the Laws of Life (Zakoni života).
Starting from the triad God-king-host and echoing the common belief that “there
is no deed without a host”, he characterizes the Serbian people as the “host”
people functioning as an organism. In one of his texts from 1994 he stated:
"Fascism is the deification of a state, and Hitlerism the deification of a
race. For Slovenes the importance of the race parallels the one of the state.
We are against the parliamentary regime, but not the parliament itself”. He was
an anti-Semite, in correspondence with A. Hitler. However, Ljotić was wary
of using a tone of pogrom against Jews, although he supported “crushing,
breaking and breaching of Jewish plans”. He was obsessed by the typically
organic idea of a “national conservative revolution” and derived everything from
the nation as an organism following the principles of biological determinism.
In his writings the idea of a social state has been raised to the ideology of
salvational paternalism and corporativism, and "national values" were
perceived as absolute, the use of violence understood in their defense, because
it is necessary, as is the militarization of public life.
The letter was signed by: Mirko Đorđević, Milan
Đorđević, Filip David, Dragan Velikić, Predrag
Čudić, Vladimir Arsenijević, Bogdan Bogdanović, Radmila
Lazić, Laslo Vegel.
Interview of Patriarch Pavle given to Danas,
January 5-7, 2002.
Nacional, September 23, 2002.
Pravoslavlje, 847, July 1, 2002.
The hard nationalistic strand gained domination in the SOC at the eve of
Yugoslav wars. Pavle, the bishop of Raška and Prizren was elected patriarch in
December 1990, although German was still alive, which was a precedent within
the SOC. During the same Congregation Amfilohije Radović was elected
metropolitan of Montenegro and the Coast and Irinej Bulović bishop of
Bačka. In May 1991, Artemije was elected bishop of Raška and Prizren, and
Atanasije Jeftić bishop of Banat. In his memoirs, Days-Remembrances,
academician Dejan Medaković witnesses a great and in his opinion decisive
influence of certain academicians on personal questions in the top hierarchy of
the SOC during the last thirty years. According to his memoirs the election of
Patriarch German was “directly influenced by Dobrica Ćosić”, while
Medaković himself, as far back as 1976 tells the Patriarch that the aged
Montenegrin metropolitan Danilo should be replaced, after he dies, by
Amfilohije Radović, and that preparations for this change should start
immediately. And all that in the context of expectations that after the death
of Danilo “pressure” will come to grant independence to the Church in
Montenegro. (See feuilleton Days-Remembrances, Politika, March 23,
2003).
Pravoslavlje, 813, February 1, 2001.
Danas, September 2, 2002.
Thus the Patriarch teaches the believers that women should only exceptionally
be allowed to wear trousers, and never for reasons of “fashion or an erroneous
understanding of the equality of sexes”; further on, that they are not allowed
to expose their hair, unless it is cut short. As to the prohibition to enter
the church during their period, which was very strict before, the Patriarch
says: As “modern hygienic devices are capable of effectively preventing... I
believe that there are no obstacles for women to enter the church during their
period, and with necessary caution and hygienic measures, kiss the icons, take
the wafer and holy water, as well as participate in chants”. However, “in that
condition she could not take the Communion or be baptized. Although, in case of
deadly illness she could take the Communion and be baptized.” Vreme, December 19, 2002.
Danas, January 5-7, 2002.
Pravoslavlje, 776, July 15, 1999.
Danas, January 5-7, 2001.
Svedok, September 10, 2002.
Pravoslavlje, 843, May 1, 2002.
Novosti, January 22, 2002. On the
same day the award for the contribution to the unity of Orthodox people went to
Russian President Vladimir Putin, whom Patriarch Alexei the Second called “the
greatest orthodox statesman in the modern world”.
Nacional, August 12, 2002; Borba, August 16, 2002; Novosti, August 13, 2002.
Danas, March
8, and April, 13-14, 2002.
It is interesting, for example, that journalists who write about the Church in
some daily newspapers contribute at the same time to the SOC journal Pravoslavlje. (See e.g. the interview of
the Danas daily journalist
Jelena
Tasić with Amfilohije Radović, Pravoslavlje,
844, May 15, 2002 and the article by the same journalist The Speech of Amfilohije Radović in Danas, March 22-23, 2003).
According to Miodrag Isakov, President of Reformers of Vojvodina, "by one
legislative-speculative move" the five old Vojvodina
banks-Vojvođanska, Novosadska, Panonska, and Kontinental banks from Novi
Sad and Pančevacka bank,- "were practically nationalised, for the
state agency with the excuse of settling state debts, acquired half of their
shares." Pro-autonomy forces in Vojvodina also protested against that
move, and termed it "the NBY-sponsored centralised privatisation of the
banking system and economy in Serbia."
"The Past as a Challenge to Law: Serb Side of Dealing with the Past,"
law professor Vladimir V. Vodinelic, publisher Centre for Comparative Law of
Serbia and Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, page 86.
Politika, 24 December 2002.
Novosti, 6 December 2002.
Tanjug, 24 February 2002.
Banja Koviljaca Rally, source: B 92.
Politika, 26 September 2002.
Politika, 21 September 2002.
CESID-Centre for Free and Democratic Elections (NGO).
Nacional, 16 October 2002.
A reference to the old DOS coalition, whose member at municipal administration
level was DPS. (Remark of author).
Politika, 17 October 2002.
During an Art TV interview he said: "As regards refugees, returnees to
Croatia… Honest people don't go back. Only criminals return to Croatia."
The reasoned opinion in writing of the Supreme Court reads: "The fact that
an ID number was wrongly entered, did not imply that the owner of ID was
excluded from voting, that is from going to the polls, presenting another ID
and casting his/her ballot."
In his interview to "Nacional" Hrair Balian, Head of ODIR department
of OSCE or of Commission for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, stated.
"All parties were aware of status of voters' lists at the time of election
calling. This is, in fact the third round, so they must have been aware of
problems beforehand. By putting up his candidacy V. Kostunica in fact agreed to
electoral conditions, so his complaints are belated. On the other hand DPS has
the legitimate right to challenge the electoral process... We cannot now strike
off citizens who had cast their ballots just because of the wrong entry of
their ID number. The foregoing would threaten their fundamental rights."
The court made it clear that management and updating of electoral lists was
within an exclusive competence of municipal administrative bodies.
Nacional, 17 October 2002.
This citation and further text concern Serbia without Kosovo.
2001 UNHCR ECRE Report titled "Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia" accessible on site www.ecre.org/country
01/FRY.pdf.
Article 44 of the 1980 Act on Movement and Stay of Foreigners
defines conditions for asylum-granting: "A foreigner persecuted on grounds
of his democratic views, and advocacy of democratic movements, social and
national liberation, freedoms and rights of individuals, and freedom of
scientific and artistic creation shall be recognised the right to asylum in the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."
2001 ECRE Report of the UNHCR.
Act on Refugees of the Republic of Serbia published in
the "Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia," no. 18/92.
Article 1, paragraph 1 of the 1992 Act on Refugees of
the Republic of Serbia defines which individuals under this act have the right
to be granted or recognised the refugee status in the Republic of Serbia.
The said decision published in the "Official Gazette of the FRY"
42/2002-10 establishes that Article 1, para.2, article 18, para. 2 and article
18 para. 1 are not compatible with the FRY Constitution and the Convention of
the Refugee Status.
"Blic" of
25 September 2002, article titled "Government Disgruntled with the
Commissariat Work", page 7.
"Politika"
of 9 May 2002, article headlined "Responsibility for the Refugee
Care," page 10.
"Glas" of 26 June 2002, article titled
"Return Shall Last Many Years."
"Blic" of
26 June 2002, article titled "Return Shall Last Many Years."
"Politika"
of 9 May 2002, article headlined "Responsibility for the Refugee
Care," page 10.
"Blic" of
17 January 2003, article titled "Kosovo Evolves into the State", page
3.
www.icty.un.org Sandra Raskovic as a
psychiatrist and psycho-therapist
specialising in traumas of raped women, was a defence witness in the Hague
courtroom on 12 December 2000. She then, inter alia, stated: "I could not
detect grave consequences of the event described by witnesses. Quid non es in
actus non es in mundo, therefore, what is not written in medicine, has never
happened." This statement essentially confirmed non-existence of the
post-traumatic syndrome among the raped women, or the fact they the had not
been raped, for they could not present medical documentation on psychiatric
treatment."
"Glas" of
11 October 2002, article headlines "State Turns Displaced Persons into
Hostages."
"Danas" of 13 March 2002, article headlined
"Authorities Act as if We Were Invisible".
"Politika" of 17 June 2002, article headlined
"Representatives of Refugees Should Have a Say Too."
"Politika" of 24 October 2002, article
headlined "Young People -Driving Power Behind Advocacy of Return",
page A9.
"Vreme" of 28 March 2002, article titled
"Opting for the Social Spotlight" , pages 34-36, author Jelena
Grujic.
"Politika" of 28 March 2002, article headlined
"National Strategy for Refugees", page 10.
Interview with Sandra Raskovic-Ivic ran by
"Politika" on 22 July 2002 under the headline "Willing to
Remain, Unwilling to Return."
"Reporter" of 23 January 2002, article titled
"My Dear, Long-Suffering Friends", pages 19-21, penned by Vesna Tasic
and Miodrag Markovic.
Interview of Sandra Raskovic-Ivic, ran by daily
"Novosti" of 24 June 2002, under the headline "Empty
Plates."
"Blic" of 28 December 2002, article headlined
"Displaced Persons Prioritised Recipients of UNHCR aid.", page 7.
"Reporter" of 25 June 2002, article titled
"Aid Ends in Hands of Others," page 35-37, penned by Ejub Stikovac.
"Danas", of 6 February 2002, article
"Unsustainable Sidelining of Returnees."
"Blic" of 2 August 2002, article
"Accelerated Restitution of Property to Displaced Serbs," page 6.
"Blic" of 30 May 2002, article "$ 680
Million Needed".
"Blic" of 26 June 2002, article "Return
Shall Last Many Years."
"Novosti" of 22 September 2002, article
headlined "Harsh Winter Is Setting In.", page 3.
"Blic" of 25 December 2002, article
"Government Disgruntled with the Commissariat's Work", page 7.
Sandra Raskovic actively participated in Kostunica's
presidential campaign and called on all refugees to vote for Vojislav
Kostunica.
"NIN" of 3 October, article "Prime
Minister Versus Commissioner", penned by Biljana Mitrinovic.
"Blic" of 12 November 2002, article
"Integration Impossible Without Flats and Jobs" page 8.
"Politika" of 17 October 2002, article
"No-one Shall Remain Homeless".
"Blic" of 17 May 2002, article "Loans for
Refugees" page 7.
"Glas" of 6 July 2002, article "You Are
No Longer Refugees".
"Blic" of 15 May 2002, article headlined
"20 Flats for Refugees".
"Danas" of 1 July 2002, article headlined
"Flats for Refugee Families".
"Vreme" of 19 September 2002, article
headlined "Who Am I Bothering?", pages 24-25, penned by Jelena
Grujic.
"Nedeljni Telegraf" of 19 June 2002, article
headlined, "New Blockade at River Drina Is Being Put in Place", page
33, penned by Radosav Mikic.
"Vreme" of 19 September 2002, article
"Who Do We Bother?", pages 24-25, author Jelena Grujic.
"Politika" of 22 July 2002, article headlined
"More Willing to Remain, Then To Return".
"Politika" of 17 October 2002, article
headlined "There Shall Be No Homeless."
"Glas" of 15 December 2002, article titled
"New Accommodation for Refugees".
"Glas" of 16 September 2002, article headlined
"Imminent Revision of Refugee Status".
"Politika" of 20 June 2002, article titled
"Trouble with Rents".
"Politika" of 27 April 2002, article headlined
"Assistance Only to Refugees".
"Danas" of 8 March 2002, article headlined
"Next Year Donations Shall Ebb".
"Danas" of 13 November 2002, article titled
"Forgotten in the Wasteland", page 11.
"Blic" of 31 July 2002, article titled
"Restitution of Expellees Property Facilitated".
"Reporter" of 19 September 2002.
"Politika" of 24 October 2002, article titled
"Young People-Driving Power Behind Return".
"Blic" of 18 November 2002, article titled
"Sports Journalists Refuse Apologies".