The Vlach Connection and
Further Reflections on
Roman History
Whether what the emperor Justinian did, in
recovering North Africa and Italy for the Empire, was a good idea is still argued by historians. At the same
time, it is a bit ridiculous to sneer at the Eastern emperors because they
weren't properly Roman, somehow, and then simultaneously fault the one
who goes out and recovers nearly half of the old West
from the Germans. Nevertheless, what Justinian was and what he did
contain important elements of how the mediaeval world was becoming different
from the ancient, and how the later empire was different from the earlier.
What Justinian was is a large but little noted part of the story. He is
supposed to have come from a Latin speaking family in Macedonia. Now, a Latin speaking family in, say, Spain
would mean people whose language would eventually evolve into Spanish; in Gaul, into French; etc. A Latin speaking
family in Macedonia would thus be people whose language would eventually evolve into the
Romance languages called "Vlach" south of
the Danube and, north of the Danube, Romanian. So, in short, Justinian was a Romanian, whether in
the modern or the ancient sense. A Romanian emperor of Romania.
This leads into several issues.
- Vlach is itself an interesting word. It seems to be a
derivative from the same Germanic word cognate to welsch
in German and Welsh in English, both meaning Roman, whether
the Romans be Latin-speaking or Celtic-speaking. Vlach itself is Slavic (taking that form in
Czech) and could mean Italian or Romanian, though the same word, with
appropriate case endings, turns up in mediaeval Latin (Blachi)
and Greek (Blakhoi, pronounced Vlakhi), only applied to the Romance speakers
of the Balkans. It also occurs in Polish as Wloch,
in Hungarian as Olasz, in Russian as Volokh, in Yiddish as Walach,
and in various other forms even in those same languages (cf. "Vlach," A Dictionary of Surnames, Patrick
Hanks and Flavia Hodges [Oxford University
Press, 1988], p. 558). Vlach also
significantly turns up in the name of the first Romanian principality: Wallachia
(or sometimes "Walachia"). Thus, we can imagine the word being left behind in the
Balkan Sprachbund by the German tribes
during their stay in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
For many centuries Vlach
was a spoken and not a written language. When it was committed to writing, the
Cyrillic alphabet was used, in line with the Orthodox faith of the people.
Later, a national consciousness arose in the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, where the language came to be called "Romanian." The name
was at first itself influenced by Turkish pronunciation, as Rumanian or Roumanian, but along with the adoption of the Latin
alphabet and an attempt to Latinize the language more, the name also was more
Latinized. For clarity, the language of modern Romania can
be called Daco-Romanian. Several
islands of Vlach speakers survive in Greece, Albania, and
the former Yugoslavia, though the use of the word "Vlach"
for these is dying out. Two islands of speakers in Albania and Greece are
now said to speak Arumanian, while another
island of speakers in Greek Macedonia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are said to speak Megleno-Rumanian.
The Megleno-Rumanian speakers thus might be thought
of as the descendants of Justinian's own people.
- This throws an important perspective on the Eastern empire through the rest of its history. When Greek
replaces Latin as the Court language under the emperor Heraclius,
historians begin to think of the empire as a Greek empire, even as
Western Europeans (Franks) tended to think of everyone in the empire as
Greek. But of course nothing of the sort was true. Greek stood to the
later empire just as Latin had stood to the earlier: the language of
higher culture and universal communication, but not the spoken language of
all the ethnic components of the whole. Greek had a bit of that role in
the earlier empire as well: Marcus Aurelius did not become Greek because
he kept his diary in that language. At the same time, real Mediaeval
Greeks were even hesitant to call themselves Greeks: Hellenes,
the Greek word for "Greeks," tended to imply the ancient pagan
Greeks. Christian Greeks didn't need to call themselves anything but
"Romans."
Besides Greeks, the later empire had a
very large element of Armenians, other groups whose languages were not written
until later, like Albanians and Vlach speakers, and
finally other indigenous ethnic groups to whom there are occasional references,
like the Isaurians and Phrygians, whose languages are
not well attested and who actually disappear completely in the course of the
Turkish conquest of Anatolia. Indeed, it is not clear just how and when many of
the ancient indigenous peoples of Anatolia disappear or are assimilated -- people like
the Phrygians, Lydians, Dacians,
Galatians (who were Celts), Cappadocians, etc. After
Basil II had finally conquered Bulgaria, a large Slavic element of Bulgars and Serbs,
centuries after their having broken through the Danube frontier, was finally
also integrated into the empire. Even the Latin Emperors in Constantinople, aware of
the history and multi-ethnic nature of the Empire, still called it Romania.
Thus, while the modern Romanians preserve
that identity as speakers of a Romance language, mediaeval Romania
meant an empire of many peoples, united by the history of the Roman Empire and the Church,
and simply governed in Greek. The greatest "Byzantine"
dynasty, the Macedonians, starting with Basil I, seems to have
actually been Armenian in origin, even as two of the in-law emperors in the
same dynasty, Romanus I and John Tzimisces,
were also. In this respect, again, the Roman Empire had assumed
more fully the characteristic of a Hellenistic state -- which simply meant that
anyone who learned Greek gained full political equality.
- There is finally the mystery of the Daco-Romanian
speakers in their current territory. The Romance speakers of the Balkans
enter history in the 12th century as the Vlachs:
When the second Bulgarian
kingdom broke away from Romania in 1186, the revolt was led by the Asen
brothers, who were Vlachs themselves. John Asen styled himself, in Latin, imperator omnium Bulgarorum et Blacorum. When the
German emperor Frederick
Barbarossa passed through in 1189, the Vlach element seemed predominant, since John
was referred to as "emperor of the Vlachs
and of the most part of the Bulgarians," "emperor of the Vlachs and Cumans," or
"emperor of the Vlachs who was called by
them emperor of Greece" [History of the Byzantine Empire, A.A.
Vasiliev, University of Wisconsin Press, 1964,
p.442]. The Asens may have emphasized the
Bulgarian element simply because that was the independent institutional
precedent, of state and church, that they were
claiming.
Since we do not previously hear about
Romance speakers in the Balkans in any mediaeval history, and Vlach at that point was still not a written language, these
people seem to just pop up out of nowhere. Much the same is true of the
Albanians. Even more mysterious is the appearance of the Romance speakers north
of the Danube, which had largely been terra incognita for the previous
thousand years. Thus, anyone would wonder what had happened. Romance speech means
Roman colonization, and we have to go back all the way to the 2nd and 3th centuries to find out about that.
Since Romanian nationalism naturally
identifies itself with the present land of Romania, and also
with the pre-Roman inhabitants of Dacia -- the plateau protected on south and east by the Carpathian moutains -- it stoutly maintains that Daco-Romanians
have occupied the same territory continuously. On the other hand, the
Hungarians, who ruled Transylvania (the same plateau) from the founding of their own
state all the way, except for the Turkish occupation, to 1918, like to claim
that they were actually there first, and that the Romanians came in later.
These competing political claims, which often have overtones of self-interested
ethnic myth-making, make it very difficult for outsiders to evaluate the
arguments -- anyone might be reasonably suspicious of what any of the Daco-Romanian or Hungarian sources say.
What we know from Roman sources is that
the province of Dacia, conquered and colonized by Trajan in 106,
was abandoned around 271. This was, as we have seen, a very bad period for the
Romans, and Dacia was
a salient into territory mostly surrounded by increasingly active enemies. With
the Roman withdrawl, the area drops out of recorded
history for many centuries, and notice of Romance speakers there doesn't occur
until something like the 14th century. Texts in the Vlach/Romanian
language don't occur until the 16th century. Across the void of the
Transylvanian plateau and Carpathian mountains, mediaeval historians only
notice the passage of nomads -- Germans (Goths and Gepids),
Huns, Avars, Bulgars,
Magyars, Patzinaks, Cumans,
and, last but not least, the Mongols. The locations of Wallachia and Moldavia seem like virtual nomadic no-man's lands during much of the Middle Ages, with no literate culture and no civil
organization or political authority apart from the nomadic empires.
While the Romans withdrew their legions,
administrators, and many colonists, it does seem unlikely that all the
inhabitants of Dacia,
which before the Roman conquest had been a fairly unified and formidable state,
would have left. Any unassimilated rural population, especially, would have had
no particular reason to leave -- rule by some Germans might not have seemed worse,
and perhaps better, than Roman rule. The archaeology reported by modern
Romanians indicates a continuity of the material culture, even if urban areas
decline precipitiously and there is little in the way
of epigraphic material. Romanians like to point out that rural costume even
today looks like the Dacian costume of Trajan's Column in Rome. Coin
hoards indicate, especially for the 4th century, a continuing cash economy,
which means continuing trade contact with the Empire. That even allowed for the
penetration of some Christianity. What percentage of this remaining population
was Latin speaking, and what percentage was still using the old Dacian language, is impossible, in the absence of the
records of a literate culture, to say.
The withdrawn colonists, probably all or
mostly Latin speaking, were settled just across the Danube in the Roman province of Moesia Superior (Upper Moesia). That province was later subdivided into Upper Moesia (Moesia I) and, of all things, Dacia.
This is now in the part of Serbia
south of the Danube and east of Belgrade. This Dacia was
later subdivided in two. These provinces were then collected, with Upper Moesia and other nearby provinces into the Diocese of Dacia.
In late Roman times the area was Latin speaking and outside where Greek was
commonly used (cf. A History of the Byzantine State and Society, Warren Threadgold [Stanford University Press, 1997], p.6). It is
not hard to imagine the contacts that continued between the inhabitants north
of the Danube, Romanized to a greater or lesser extent, and those who had withdrawn
to the south, even as late Roman trade crossed back and forth all along the
Rhine-Danube frontier.
Not only did the original Dacia drop out of history in 271, but the later Dacias did so also, after the Avars and Slavs
breached the Danube frontier and poured into the Balkans in 602. Only the conversion of Bulgaria to Christianity in 879, with the introduction of the Cyrillic alphabet,
returned the region to literacy. As it happens, only one other place in the Roman Empire dropped out
of history in quite the same way. That was Britain. The
withdrawl of Roman forces in 410 drops Britain into a
void very similar to that of the Dacias, and for a
while all that is apparent is the descent of sea-going Germans -- the Angles,
Saxons, and Jutes. When literate culture returns, dramatically evident in the
history of the English church written by the Venerable Bede
in 731, we suddenly see the results. Roman Britain has disappeared from most of
the island, with Romanized Celtic speakers pushed into Wales and Cornwall. The
Cornish were under such pressure that many of them crossed over to Brittany. The Celtic
speakers of Cornwall have today disappeared, but the Bretons are very much alive and aware
of their past. Although the Angles and Saxons inherited the old Roman place
names, and came to tell the King Arthur stories by which the conflicts of the
5th century were vaguely remembered, Saxon England owed little enough to the
culture it had displaced.
Roman Britain survives in Wales and Brittany. Even
pre-Roman culture survives in Spain,
where the mountains in the North harbor the Basques, whose language has
no obvious affinities to any other. This is revealing. The geography of England
poses few obstacles to conquest, but both the Welsh and the Basques held out in
mountains -- relatively modest mountains perhaps, no more than 3000 feet in
Wales and not much more than 7500 feet on the south side of the Ebro valley in Spain (though over 11,000 feet in the nearby
Pyrenees), but something that could impose significant costs to invaders -- in
the Middle Ages, the Basque country was the basis of the long independent
Kingdom of Navarre.
Americans need only remember how the Appalachians, which don't get much over 6000 feet, originally hindered westward
movement. The Transylvanian plateau, in comparison to these, provides a
formidable redoubt. The Danube River itself
tells the tale, since it must make a broad detour to the south, around the
whole area. The southern branch of the Carpathians, the Transylvanian Alps, has peaks
over 8000 feet high, and even the western side goes up to 6000 feet in the Bihor mountains. This makes it
immediately obvious why nomads tended to pass around, like the Danube. Nomads like flat
grasslands, which are present on the Hungarian plain and in the Danube Valley
of Wallachia, but not in the mountains or up on the
Transylvanian plateau. We should expect to find an autochthonous population in Daco-Romania just as must as in Wales or Navarre.
Consequently, it is no more difficult
imagining the Dacians surviving than it is explaining
the Welsh or the Basques. On the other hand, this makes it somewhat more
difficult to explain why the original Dacian language
would not have survived. The area of Daco-Romania
was under Roman rule for a shorter time, about a century and a half, than Britain,
about three and a half centuries, or than Spain, more
like six and a half centuries. A Romance language did not take root in Britain, and
even all the Romance dominance in Spain
failed to entirely displace Basque. So why does the pre-Roman language not
survive in modern Romania? The relatively brief Roman occupation hardly seems like the kind of
thing that could have done so thorough a job, especially in the face of the
organization and resistance that the Dacians
originally offered. Nor was it Roman policy to deliberately stamp out local
languages -- that was just a side effect of Roman colonization and the use of
Latin as the administrative, literary, and, later, religious (i.e. Roman
Catholic) language. The dominance of Romance speech in Daco-Romania
thus might require some other impetus of Latinization.
We may find that by asking what happened
to all the Latin speakers south of the Danube, in the later Dacian provinces and diocese. If we look there now, one
thing we find is that there are still Romance speakers. In the bend of
the Danube River, where it breaks through the mountain barrier at the Iron
Gate, which corresonds to the north part of the Roman
Province of Dacia Ripensis,
there is a Daco-Romanian speaking area even today,
as part of Serbia. These are people who need not have moved in 1700 years. But
most of the area of the Roman Dacias is occupied by
speakers of Serbian or Bulgarian. On the other hand, the Vlach
languages to the south, as I understand it, do not betray the influence of
Greek that they should, had they originated in Macedonia and Albania. And there is, of course, the pocket of Istro-Rumanian,
which is all the way West in Istria, which was
part of Austria until World War I. Since all the Romance languages of the Balkans
appear to come from one proto-language -- Proto-Romanian -- the dispersed
pockets, like Arumanian, in Albania and Epirus, and
Istro-Rumanian, must have originated in the same
area. That looks to be the Late Roman Dacias. The
event to have have scattered the languages would have
been the Avar/Slavic breakthrough in 602.
Some of the people stayed more or less
put, like the Welsh, while others scattered in the face of the invaders, like
the Bretons. Since there are no historical records of this, as there are none for the Slavic migration itself, we are left with
nothing but the evidence of the results. From Istro-Rumanian,
we know that some went West. From Megleno-Rumanian
and Arumanian, we know that some went South. However, the most obvious thing for them to do would
have been to go north-east right back into the original Dacia. This was now no worse than heading south or west, which offered no
real refuge (Roman authority having collapsed so completely), and could easily
have been considered better, since they likely would have known from rumor that
the invaders had mostly passed around the highlands.
Hidden from history, like other Dark Age
migrations, the Roman evacuees from Dacia could well
have, in returning, provided the additional impetus of Latinization
that erased the vestiges of the ancient Dacian
language. Nor need this have been an all-at-once process. It looks like
mediaeval Serbia started a bit west of the Moesia region, in
modern Bosnia, and gradually moved east. In the meantime, the Roman Dacias, which included parts of modern Bulgaria, like the city of Sofia (Roman Serdica), could well have remained
largely Vlach. This seems to be no less than what we
see in the age of the Asens. As the second Bulgarian
empire declined, however, the Serbs pushed to the east. This may have motivated
continued Vlach exodus. The continued movement of
peoples even in the modern period is a claim of the Serbs themselves, who say
that Albanians moved into Kosovo after the Turkish conquest. This is
very possible. It also makes possible the movement from the Roman Dacias.
If this view of events is correct, then
both Romanian and Hungarian nationalists are, after a fashion, correct. There
was continuous Daco-Romanian occupation of Transylvania, and
there was migration from what had been Roman Moesia,
south of the Danube. Not south by much, however. The areas are still contiguous today. This
is worse for Hungarian claims than for Romanian. What continued migration
explains is the purely Romance character of Daco-Romanian.
It also explains something else,
however, which is the nature of the Romanian Church. The early Daco-Romanians of Transylvanian did not convert en masse
or in any organized way to Christianity, or we would have heard about their
bishops at the Ecumenical Councils, and they very well could have been Arians, like the Goths.
Nor did Daco-Romanians acquire the religion of the
Hungarians, for that would have been allied to the Church of Rome, not of Constantinople. Instead,
the Romanian Church goes back to the conversion of the Bulgars.
The appearance of "Roumanian"
in the Cyrillic alphabet, as well as the influence of Old Church Slavonic, the
liturgical language of the Bulgarian Church, on Daco-Romanian,
are all evidence of that. After the conquest
of Bulgaria by Basil II and the century and a half of rule form Constantinople, the Bulgarian Church was revived
by the Vlach Asens, with
the Patriarchate at Trnovo. "The Primate of all Bulgaria and Vlakhia" (totius
Bulgariae et Blachiae Primas, in Latin) is
what the Patriarch called himself. This seat, and that of Russia, were the only independent Orthodox Churches authorized from Constantinople. As Bulgaria declined and Serbia
arose, an independent Serbian Patriarchate was established at Peç (Kosovo) in 1346, just in time for the coronation of Stephan Dushan
as "Tsar of the Serbs and Romans." Bulgaria, Serbia, and Wallachia, however, were soon all overrun by the Turks. By 1483, in the
still, for the time being, independent Moldavia, there was metropolitan established in Suceava
for the Romanian Orthodox Church. I have not found yet the year in which this
was actually done, but the Romanian Church has been
autonomous ever since [note]. The
Orthodox faith of Romanians in Transylvania cannot have originated there except directly under the influence
of the Bulgarians, who ruled it at the time of their conversion, or because of
migration and influence of Vlachs, who had converted
closer to the center of Bulgarian power. Once Transylvania passed to Hungary, any
influence would have been for Catholicism, which evidently is something that we
do not see.
This is about the best I can do, for the
moment, with the mystery of the Dark Ages in both Daco-Romania
and the Late Roman Dacias. It might not satisfy all Romanians,
and certainly not many Hungarians, but dealing with such an issue, outside the
sphere of historical records, is intrinsically speculative and uncertain. At
the same time, it is nice that somewhere the name of "Romania" is
preserved in a modern nation, and it is also well worth remembering that there
were people in the Balkans who spoke Latin, as we understand from Justinian's
own family.
Taxes and Survival
Who Justinian was is thus of considerable
interest; but what he did, of course, looms far larger. Of great significance
for the development of mediaeval history was the drawn out struggle to defeat
the Ostrogoths in Italy. Italy and Rome itself
probably experienced far less devastation during the original Germanic
"conquest" and the "fall of Rome" than
it did during the Roman reconquest. They certainly
represented no new source of strength to the empire, especially when, shortly
after Justinian's death, the Lombards would seize
the Po Valley and much of Tuscany and of the South of Italy. It is sad to see how far the land had fallen
that at one time could lose whole armies to Pyrrhus
or Hannibal yet quickly field entirely new ones. The city that had conquered the
world and that had long ceased to be the center of power, now was the
center of no power at all, except for such pretenses of power as the
Pope could, and would, begin to claim.
How Italy could have gone from being the populous fountainhead of Roman conquest
to being little more than a strategic liability, its fate in the hands of
others for many centuries, is the remaining question about the collapse of the Romania in
the West. Historians still are arguing over whether the population had declined
or not, after the invasions and plagues of the third century, or what it ever
even was. There was also plague in Justinian's day, and we know how devastating
that could be from our knowledge of how the later Black Death carried off a
third of the population of Europe. On the other hand, the measures taken by Diocletian are revealing in
another respect: not only did he fix prices, a typical response to the
inflation caused by constant debasement of the coinage, but he tried to fix
everyone in their occupations, especially those on the land. The repetition of
these measures is a clear indication that people were actually leaving the
land, almost certainly to escape the crushing burden of taxation that
Diocletian's new empire required.
If agriculture was abandoned because it was unprofitable, or otherwise
intolerable, for farmers, this would bode ill for the wealth, health, or size
of the population. The agricultural work force can only profitably be reduced
when agricultural productivity makes a larger work force unnecessary. There is
little in fourth century law that encourages one to believe in increased
agricultural productivity. At the same time, there is the evidence of how a
change in policy towards the land produced a change in the fortunes of empire:
The Emperor Heraclius has long been thought to have introduced the
innovation of granting small farms to individual soldiers, on the condition of
military service, created a system that would ensure not only a supply of
military men but also create incentives for productivity on the part of these
men who stood to derive all the benefit from their own labor.
This would have been a strategy exactly the opposite of Diocletian's;
and, while too late to prevent the disasters of the seventh century, it could
lay a solid groundwork for Romanian revival in the ninth and tenth. It also
protected the empire from feudalism, as the relationship of individual soldiers
was with the central government rather than with sovereign feudal
intermediaries. It's breakdown, indeed, has been
thought to have occurred in the eleventh century, even as the empire appeared
to have become invincible, when powerful families, whose names we begin for the
first time to hear in the ruling dynasties -- the Ducases,
Comneni, Angeli, etc. --
are allowed to usurp possession of the land and peonize
the smallholdings. This has been thought to have devastated the military
strength of the empire, destroying the freedom and incentives of those from
whom the backbone of the army had been drawn since Heraclius,
curiously coinciding with the first debasement of the coinage since Constantine. The roots
of Middle Romanian power were destroyed.
The whole picture of Heraclius instituting
military smallholdings, however, has now been questioned. Mark Whittow (The Making of Byzantium, 600-1025, U of
California Press, 1996) calls many of the accepted views about late antiquity
into question: There is little evidence that the plagues of the 6th century
were devastating and, especially, there is no evidence that Heraclius
introduced anything like military smallholdings. The Empire surived,
it seems, more because of institutional strength and continuity than because of
reforms or innovations. Soldiers were paid in cash and evidence about the
inheritance or sale of land reveals no hereditary obligations to military
service. These new arguments and information nicely reinforce the picture of
"Early Byzantium" as the Roman
Empire -- the army even continued to use Latin
terminology longer than the central government -- but it puts us back to square
one if we want to explain the decline in the strength of Italy. If
taxation was driving peasants off the land in Diocletian's day, this burden may
well have been mitigated by the time of Justinian. The late evidence from
places like Egypt seems to be of prosperity rather than misery.
The Romanian Sui
Justinian, then, whether he was stuck with
a flawed engine of power or not, nevertheless possessed a vastly more
sophisticated and prosperous state than those created by the Germans. He began with a device that had been tried before, in 468, and should
have succeeded then: A naval expedition against the Vandals in North Africa. The
Emperor Leo had gotten the Western Commander Ricimer
to agree to an Eastern candidate for the Western throne, Anthemius,
and to participate in the joint expedition. This was exactly what was needed.
The Vandal occupation of North Africa had cut off grain from both Italy and
the East, and the Vandal navy had turned the western Mediterranean into a sea
of pirates for the first time in centuries. Recovering North Africa would
immediately return command of the sea to the Romans, secure the grain, and
extend Roman control all the way to Spain.
Leo's expedition should have succeeded, but it was ruined by treachery and
incompetence. It is now unimaginable how different matters might have been if
the Vandals had been removed so promptly, hardly twenty years after they had
secured their control.
So Justinian had to do it all over again, in 533, with no help from a
Western Emperor, though the Ostrogoths foolishly (for
their interest) did not oppose, and actually somewhat assisted, Justinian's move.
But this time, far from treachery or incompetence, Justinian could rely on the
brilliance of the great general Belisarius, of whom
Hannibal, who had tried to accomplish some of the same feats on the same kind
of shoestring resources, could have been proud. The Vandals, caught off guard,
fell like rotten fruit. Then it was the turn of the Ostrogoths,
whom Belisarius quickly routed, in 536, but
unfortunately could not finish off. The recovery of the Ostrogoths
led to a protracted and desperate struggle. That was not settled until
Justinian sent a new army overland with Narses, in
552, annihilating the Ostrogoths.
Thus the reconquest of the West commenced.
Curiously, much the same kind of process would begin in China in
the very same century. Before judging whether Justinian was wise or foolish,
reactionary or progressive, that comparison must be made. China had
undergone an experience similar to Rome's. At the
fall of the Han Dynasty
(220 AD), the country had split up (the Three Kingdoms, 220-265),
and then the North had been overrun by barbarians, who set up their own
kingdoms (368). In the sixth century China bore more than a passing resemblance
to Romania at the beginning of the same period, with Imperial control over one
half, barbarian control over the other. Then Yang Chien
[Jian] reunited the country and founded the Sui
Dynasty (590-618). No one calls the Sui emperors
fools or reactionaries, because they succeeded, and they were followed by the
glory of the great T'ang [Tang] Dynasty (618-906).
Romania, in
effect, had a Sui but no T'ang.
Something cut short the reconquest, and it wasn't the
Germans this time. The Romans had to deal with an astonishing Bolt from the
Blue such as never menaced the Chinese (at least until the Mongol invasion).
The Islamic Tide
Even before the unpleasant surprise of the seventh century, it was no
easy job for the Romans. There were two formidable enemies who had to be dealt
with, the Lombards and the Persians; and the success
of the empire against them, despite its ultimate futility, is testimony to the
fundamental strengths of the state as well as the occasional brilliance of its
leadership.
The invasion of Italy in
568 by the Lombards, who had previously been allies,
ended the era of Germanic movements and took the bloom, such as it was, off
Justinian's reconquest. The inability of the Lombards to reduce the whole peninsula, and the inability of the Romans to throw
them back out, created features of Italian political geography that survived
until the 19th century. The Po Valley and Tuscany were gone forever, and the Lombards broke through to establish semi-independent,
detached duchies (Spoleto and Benevento) in the South,
leaving a curious corridor of Romania between Rome and the administrative
capital, as it had been of the late Western empire, Ravenna. This corridor was
later "donated" to the Pope by the Frankish King Pepin in 754,
becoming the "Patrimony of St. Peter," or the Papal States. Although
most of it was alienated during the Middle Ages, the
warrior Pope Julius II (1503-1513) managed to get it all back together. It
survived as such until 1860, when all but the area around Rome went into
the new Kingdom of Italy, and
1870, when the withdrawal of French troops to be defeated by Prussia left
the Italians free to occupy Rome itself. The conquest of the Lombards by Constantinople, rather
than by the Franks, certainly would not have produced such secular power for
the Pope or a history of division for Italy.
That such a conquest could well have happened is indicated by the success
enjoyed by the Emperor Constans II when he moved up the Po Valley in 663. At the
time, however, his attentions already could have been better directed
elsewhere.
Even more serious, and briefly more
successful, than the Lombards were the Persians. Ever since their advent in 224, overthrowing the Philhellene Parthians and helping to precipitate the Crisis of the
Third Century, the Sassanids had aspired to
reassemble the great Empire of the Achaemenids. As it
happened, the Shah Shapur I (240-272) was the only
enemy of Rome ever to capture a Roman Emperor alive: the luckless Valerian (253-260).
Now, in league with the Avars, the ambitious Shah Khusro II (591-628) set out to accomplish this hope of
centuries, and he mostly accomplished it between 607 and 616. It was one of the
worst moments Romania ever had. The Danube frontier collapsed after the army mutinied, the worthless Emperor Phocas was elevated to the Purple, the Avars
and Slavs poured into the Balkans, all the way to the Walls of Constantinople,
the Persians occupied Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, and
a Persian army appeared across the Bosporus from their Avar allies (626).
In the midst of this disaster, Heraclius
landed from North Africa and seized the throne (610). The worst was not over, but Heraclius pursued the brilliant strategy of striking
directly at the Persian homeland (623). The defeats he inflicted there, despite
the distraction of Avar and Persian advances against Constantinople, which, as
always, was impregnable, soon led to the overthrow of Khusro
by his own nobles. Peace was made, the Persians evacuated, and by 629, the status
quo ante had been restored (except for the uncontrollable Balkans).
It is hard to imagine and more brilliant and tragic figure than Heraclius. The military and institutional salvation of the
empire was to his credit. Speaking Greek himself, the Roman Empire reverted to
Hellenistic form; and Heraclius even took from the
defeated Persian Shah his very title: the Great King, henceforth rendering the
Greek basileus the official translation of the
Latin imperator. Yet Fate allowed Heraclius
only five years to rest on his laurels (629-634). Then an invincible army
appeared out of nowhere: The fierce Arabs of the Caliph Omar carrying the
incomparable Message and Enthusiasm of a new religion -- Islâm.
Sassanid Persia was utterly swept away (637-651). The final Shah, Yazdagird III (632-651), was fated to be the last one for
many centuries. Heraclius was lucky by comparison,
but Palestine (636), Syria (640), and Egypt
(642) were lost to Romania, and
Christendom, forever. Sick, reviled for the sin of having married his own niece
(God seems to have changed his mind by the time Philip II of Spain did
the same in the 16th century), Heraclius must have
died a very sad and broken man. If only he could have know
that he had enabled his people to survive victorious for another four
centuries, and to endure altogether for another eight.
The True Dark Age
When the Emperor Honorius informed the
British, c.410, that they were on their own, Britain
dropped out of history into a mythic age where King Arthur and his
(anachronistic) knights bought a brief respite of peace against the tide of
Angles, Jutes, and Saxons. This sort of "darkness" wasn't quite as
bad in Gaul; but it is still hard to tell what was going on much of the time, and
the material culture evidently declined. Interesting information about the
economic level of these regions is related by Mark Whittow:
there is archaeological evidence (of the "coins lost under the
cushions" sort) that the use of copper coins declined, which indicates
when a cash economy gave way to a barter and subsistent economy. Copper coin
vanished across Britain and Gaul in the 5th century, across Italy and
the Balkans in the 6th, and finally in much of the rest of the reduced Romania in
the 7th. As this all coincides with a decline, or disappearance, of historical
records, the temptation to speak of the Dark Ages is irresistible.
A slightly different light may be thrown on this when we consider what
was happening. Britain and Gaul either passed out of or became solidly peripheral to the Roman world
during the 5th century. The new Frankish Kingdom in Gaul was at first cut off from the Mediterranean by the Burgundians and Goths and later found the Lombards hostilely interposed between them and Romania,
with whom they otherwise had cordial relations. Meanwhile, the decline of Italy
clearly coincides, not with the establishment of Odoacer's
realm and the Ostrogothic Kingdom, but with
the long war of attrition in Justinian's reconquest
and then the similar stalemate after the arrival of the Lombards. Similarly, the Balkan economy declined as Slav raiding increased and
the Roman army was distracted by various 6th century wars with Persia.
Nevertheless, Roman command of the sea after the end of the Vandals meant that
the only practical means of long distance trade, by sea, remained open. And Whittow examines extensive evidence that most of the Roman
economy in the 6th century empire was quite robust. Egypt, Syria, and
Asia Minor were as wealthy and productive as they had ever been. And there is one
striking bit of evidence that at some level an international economy remained
active even in the West: the Merovingian and Lombard Kings continued to mint
gold coins. This all represents the hope of a steady recovery of trade and
material culture in the future.
However "dark" the 5th and 6th centuries were, this would not compare with the damage about to be done.
The whole arrangement of prosperous provinces at the end of secure sea lanes
was utterly destroyed by the advent of Islam. The true Dark Age follows when
the arteries of commence are severed and the Mare Nostrum permanently
disappears as such. The rural economy of 7th century Romania
joins the low level of Britain, Gaul, Italy, and
the Balkans when communication not just with wealthy Egypt and Syria is
lost, but when any shipping in the Mediterranean becomes a perilous voyage through hostile waters.
At first, Roman control of the sea persists, as the forces of Islam are
unfamiliar with ships and such naval expeditions as are attempted focus on
Constantinople itself (674-677 and 717-718), to disastrous results against the
fearsome superweapon of the age, Greek Fire. This
allowed an amphibious counter-attack against Alexandria in 645 and
seemed to hold out hope that North Africa could be
retained. However, on land Islam would not be denied, as Egypt was
secured in 646 and, with the aid of Berber conversion to the new religion, North Africa was reduced
between 670 and 698. In the latter year Carthage, which had
originally been destroyed by Rome in 146 BC,
and rebuilt by Augustus in 29 BC, was captured and destroyed for a final time.
But, as the Arab and Berber army of the Omayyad
Caliphs crossed into Spain
(711) and hence into Gaul, the islands of the Mediterranean remained in Roman hands.
Soon, however, things began to slip. While Roman power could still be
well projected into Italy in 663 and Pope Martin I (649-654) could still be
arrested, brought to Constantinople, and exiled to the Crimea, none of this
could be done any longer as the 8th century progressed. The long stalemate with
the Lombards began to shift. Ravenna fell to them in 733, was recaptured, and finally was lost forever in
751. This was the end of Ravenna as a center of power, and thus culminates a period that began when the
Emperor Honorius retreated there nearly 350 years
earlier. It seemed that the collapse of Romanian power in Italy
would then leave the Pope and Rome itself at
the mercy of the Lombards. Pope Gregory III (731-741), however, took the fateful step of
appealing to the Franks. In both 739 and 740 Charles Martel declined to
intervene. After the final fall of Ravenna, the desperate
situation called for desperate measures. Pope Stephen III (752-757) traveled to
the court of Charles' son, Pepin (753-754), pleading for help against the Lombards. Since Pepin wanted to end the line of Merovingian Kings and become
King of the Franks himself, Stephen held out the powerful offer of Papal
blessing for this. Consequently, Pepin not only agreed to move against the Lombards, but undertook to return the entire Exarchate of Ravenna, the whole
Romanian corridor across central Italy, to
the Pope personally. Later, when Pepin's son Charles
-- Charlemagne -- actually conquered the Lombards and
permanently ended their threat, Pope Leo III (795-816) rewarded him with the
title of Emperor -- hardly the Pope's to bestow but, now well free of control
from Constantinople, not a power that any Emperor there could prevent him from claiming.
With Charlemagne we see one further sign of economic decline: his prized
coinage was not of gold, but of silver -- little silver pennies (denarii) and half-pennies (oboli).
Gold coinage would not again be seen in Europe until the 11th century.
Romania never sank so low, as Constantinople itself remained the center of a commercial cash economy, while, of
course, Islam never had to experience anything like a "dark age": The
prosperity of Egypt and Iraq, and the trade opened up through the whole world of Islam, kept the Middle East prosperous and creative
for several centuries. The brief "Carolingian Renaissance," although
lifting the curtain of history somewhat, could not disguise the trouble that
lack of trade, cash, cities, and education would spell for the newly
consolidated Frankish Kingdom. Lands that could not be administered by paid bureaucrats or controlled
by paid soldiers drifted away under the autonomy of feudal suzerains.
Meanwhile, Romania was losing its grip on the sea. The first of the Balearics fell to
Islam in 798, Crete was taken in 823, and Sicily was invaded
in 827. As Islam began to sweep across the Mediterranean, the West
was reduced to isolation, ringed around and punctured with devastating raids,
not only from the south, but also from the north by the newly active Norsemen
and from the east by a new steppe people bumped off into the Hungarian plain,
the Magyars. Some apparently isolated locations, as in the heart of Burgundy, were
actually raided by Moslems, Vikings, and Magyars successively. This age of
terror is sometimes called "The Second Dark Age" (cf. Martin Scott, Mediaeval
Europe, Longmans, 1964), but in an important sense it merely continues the
process that began with the original Islamic conquest of Egypt and Syria.
The unity of the Mediterranean world was now forever shattered, and we
see a strong clue why Rome never had its T'ang Dynasty: China was
not a bubble of land around a sea. All the little peninsulas, islands, and
valleys around the Mediterranean had always bred their own distinctive local cultures and civilizations.
Rome, by extraordinary determination and fortune, had united them all and in
great measure, over several centuries, had produced a remarkably united
meta-culture, complete with a brand new synthetic meta-religion. Nothing quite
so complicated had to be accomplished in China.
Then, under the extraordinary and unexpected blow of Islam, we see the old
Roman unity, maintained in theory even by the distant Franks, cracked, broken,
and then shattered. Certainly it was a drawn out enough process to suggest the
breakage of pottery; but as we draw back in time, it might seem more like the
bursting of a bubble. The sea, so easily a means of communication and unity,
also could be a fragile, vulnerable, weak center. As the predations of the
Vandals hurried the fall of the Western
Empire, so those of Islamic seafarers
permanently severed Constantinople from any chance of projecting real power to the west or south. The
naval supremacy that Rome had wrested from Carthage was now finally gone, returned to Phoenicia's Semitic kinsmen, and with it the last chance of completing
Justinian's project.
Catholic and Orthodox
When the tide of decline finally turned, prospects everywhere changed
rapidly. When the German King Otto I defeated the Magyars at the Lech River in 955, it ushered in a new era, not just of
German power, as Otto set Italy in order and obtained the imperial crown
(recently fallen dormant) from the Pope, but of the rapid spread of European
civilization. In 836 Cyril and Methodius had set out
to convert the Slavs. That had led to the conversion of the Czechs and
Croatians and especially, in 870, the Bulgarians. A Croatian, Tomislav, was recognized as a Christian King by the Pope in
924. But following Otto's victory, most of the rest of Europe followed rapidly. Poland
acknowledged Otto, and Christianity, in 966; by 1000 Denmark, Norway, and
Sweden were mostly Christian; and in 1001 the Pope recognized St. Stephen as a
Christian King of the Magyars, so that the last steppe people to ravage central
Europe became the Kingdom of Hungary. Somewhat further afield, and more under the
influence of Constantinople, St. Vladimir led Russia into
Christianity in 989. Soon, Prussia, Lithuania, Latvia, and the steppe would be the only remaining areas of paganism, all to
fall to conquest or conversion by the 13th century.
These explosive developments may be in great measure due, ironically, to
the previous ravages. The ability of the Vikings to raid right through the
heart of Europe, into the Mediterranean, through the rivers of Russia, and
up to Constantinople itself is really a great testament to their organization and
technological achievements. Like the 5th century Germans, the Vikings were a
threat because they were sophisticated, not because they were primitive. The
arrival of the Russian Vikings, or Varangians, at Constantinople in 839 led
to Romanian influence on an organized Russian state at Kiev in little
more than a century. In 957 the Regent of Kiev Olga was already travelling to Constantinople to be baptised. The nadir of the Dark Age
thus most significantly contained the seeds of its own end. While the Germans
had been folded into the Empire, degrading Roman civilization, only because of
the pressure of the steppe peoples behind them (mainly the Huns), the Vikings
and Magyars were mostly held outside and so spread rather than
undermined the centers of culture. The Norman possession of Southern Italy and Normandy, and the
brief Danish possession of England,
were thus the exceptions that prove the rule.
Although the southern littoral of the Mediterranean was lost to
Christendom forever (except as imperial possessions for a while), Christian
states on the northern side consolidated and expanded, including Romania
itself, which returned as far as Antioch in Syria and regained the Danube
frontier, against the now Christian Bulgarians, in the Balkans. Nevertheless,
there was an increasing estrangement and differentiation between East and West,
between Romania and Francia. The West was, as it happened,
doing rather better than the East, spreading more broadly and developing
faster. This would soon stand revealed in the most dramatic fashion, as Romania
endured a catastrophic defeat and collapse while Francia
surged back with a spectacular display of its strength and potential. The
fortunes of Islam also figure in this; for although the losses of Romania
would become the gains of Islam, there was overall merely a kind of rotation in
the possessions of the Faith: As one ancient heartland of Christianity, Anatolia, slowly slipped under
the Turks, so did one early conquest of Islam, Spain,
slowly fall to the Reconquest. This process is curiously
reciprocal, if we compare the red letter dates in the rise and decline of
imperial Spain and Ottoman Turkey:
Turkey
|
Spain
|
The Rise
|
Battle of Manzikert,
Seljuks open Anatolia to
Turkish settlement
|
1071
|
Fall of Toledo, beginning of Reconquista
|
1085
|
Seizure of Constantinople by Fourth Crusade, Romania fragments
|
1204
|
Battle of Las Navas
de Tolosa, Almohad power
broken
|
1212
|
Fall of Constantinople to Mehmet II
|
1453
|
Fall of Granada, Reconquista complete
|
1492
|
Turkey
|
Spain
|
The Decline
|
Second Seige
of Vienna, Turks defeated
|
1683
|
Battle of Rocroi, Spain defeated by France
|
1643
|
Battle of Navarino,
British intervention, Greek Independence
|
1827
|
Mexican Independence, Monroe Doctrine
|
1821
|
Balkan Wars, World War I, loss of
European and Arab possessions
|
1912-1918
|
Spanish American War, loss of Cuba and Philippines
|
1898
|
Thus, when the army of the Emperor Romanus
Diogenes was destroyed by the Seljuk Turks at Manzikert
in 1071, enabling the Turks to sweep over Asia Minor all the way to the shores
of the Bosporus, the fall of Toledo to the Christians, though not seeming
anywhere near as significant at the time, began a process that later could be
recognized as the Reconquest. Within a couple of
centuries, Islamic Spain collapsed into a tiny remnant: In 1212 the last major
Islamic power to span the Straits of Gibraltar, the Berber Almohad
dynasty, was defeated at Las Navas de Tolosa just as catastrophically as Romanus
had been defeated at Manzikert. Indeed, there was
soon much less left of Islamic Spain than there had been of Romania, though
little enough, in fact, was left of Romania at that time, since a
treacherous blow had cut through to the heart of the empire. But that is to get
a little ahead of the story.
Of equal significance in the 11th century was the schism between the
Eastern and Western Churches. Even the terminology of the schism betrays the same kind of Western
bias as the use of the term "Byzantine." The single, true, and
orthodox Church of the Roman
Empire was the "Holy Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church." The
term catholic itself was Greek, katholikę,
"on the whole, in general" i.e. "universal" -- one of the
Early Romanian Greek terms eschewed by Latin scholar purists. Nevertheless,
when the Church split in 1054, the Pope somehow managed to retain the
"Roman Catholic" label, while Romania was
merely left with being "Greek Orthodox." Thus Whittow
casually refers to "the fundamental division between the Roman and
Byzantine worlds" [p. 161], despite Francia
truly being "Roman" in no remaining recognizable sense except that it
contained the City of Rome. (Mediaeval Europe, indeed, is never called "Roman" any more than the empire of Constantinople is --
"Latin" West and "Greek" East is more common and more
appropriate, at least in being linguistically descriptive.) While the Roman
Empire derived its name from the City, which subsequently lost its identity to
the Empire itself, the Roman Church, beginning as the identity of the Empire,
with no particular connection to the City (all the Ecumenical Councils were
held at Nicaea, Ephesus, Chalcedon,
or Constantinople), ultimately loses its identity, ironically, to the City --
all because of the Schism of the Church and the success of Papal claims in the
West. (That those claims were eventually rejected by Protestants meant that the
Christian Church was no longer Roman at all, in terms of either Empire
or City.)
Like the luckless Mensheviks who foolishly began calling themselves
what the Bolsheviks called them, the "minority," the Greek Orthodox
Church even calls itself this, despite having as good a claim to "Roman
Catholic" as the Pope and despite being no more "Greek"
historically than was Justinian or Leo V, the Armenian. Being
"orthodox" is, of course, a nice twist since, if the Greek Church is
Orthodox, does this make the Pope's Church .... Heterodox? The term "Orthodox" has clearly come to
mean absolutely nothing except to distinguish, in a polite way
("Schismatic" is the impolite way), the Eastern Churches from the
Western. Thus it is even applied to Monophysite
Churches, like the Copts or Armenians, who were considered Heterodox ever since
the Council of Chalcedon in 451. The final irony, or insult, is when "Greek Catholic" is used to
apply to Greek Orthodox Christians who convert to Papal doctrine and authority
but retain the rites of the Eastern Church. If we see the struggles of the Mediaeval Church as a
propaganda war, the Papacy won it hands down (only to lose it, later, in Germany).
The consequences of the disaster at Manzikert
and the schism of the Church were vastly magnified, however, when it was clear
what Francia could actually do if properly motivated
and unified. When the Emperor Alexius Comnenus
asked for some help against the Turks, he did not expect the Crusades,
which suddenly swept over the Holy Land and soon enough swept over Romania
itself.