“Human Rights in the OSCE
Region: Europe, Central Asia and North America.
Report 2003 (Events of
2002)”:
Bosnia and Herzegovina
March 2003
IHF FOCUS: elections and referenda; conditions in prisons and detention facilities; religious intolerance; intolerance, hate speech and hate crimes; returnees and displaced persons; international humanitarian law.
Little progress was made in terms of protecting human rights and freedoms in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2002, either concerning the responsibility of authorities at all levels of government or the international peace mission. On the contrary, the pressure of nationalists, linked with criminals, upon the most vulnerable groups, especially minority returnee groups, was heightened. Local authorities tolerated this, thereby contributing to ethnic divisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and tensions between ethnic and religious communities.
Citizens were also dissatisfied with the performance of the international peace mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which did not achieve the expected results with key points of the peace process, in particular the arrest of war criminals, mass and sustainable return, and economic transition. However, the role of the peace mission was perceived differently in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH Federation) and Republika Srpska (RS): while people in BiH Federation generally urged that the indicted war criminals should be apprehended and punished, in RS the majority of citizens still helped to keep them in hiding.
Other areas where the necessary reforms were not achieved included judiciary, military, law enforcement and education. This state of affairs could be attributed to the shortcomings of domestic authorities, who left abundant room for the intervention of international actors. All this contributed to the worsening of the overall social climate reminiscent of the pre-war situation with aggressive incidences of a chauvinist and hegemonic nature, especially in RS.
The following
influences determined the performance of the governmental authorities in Bosnia
and Herzegovina: the fact that full constitutional consolidation was not
implemented in practice; the shortcomings of the Dayton structure of the state
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which make it inflexible in adapting to integration
with European and other structures, a fact recognized by international actors
as well; disharmony in the organizational structure of government between the
two entities; the rule of various political groups with different ideologies at
different levels of government; still prevailing influence of nationalistic
ideologies in conjunction with organized crime, which maintained a climate of
violence and discrimination; incompetence of authorities at all levels of
government combined with corruption; unsatisfactory effectiveness of sluggish
and frequently even incompetent and red-tape machinery of the international
peace mission in implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement and necessary reforms in
the organization of the government, judiciary, law enforcement, economy and
education sectors.
Under
such circumstances, the high representatives of the international community
undertook a number of measures with force of law aimed at providing an impetus
to the course of reforms, strengthening the central government and preventing
the abuse of office on the part of the governing structures. Many officials
were removed from office and eliminated from the political scene. Wolfgang
Petritsch tried to develop an operative partnership with the Alliance, which
bore certain fruit. His successor in office, Paddy Ashdown, has already passed
measures to streamline the cantonal governments, strengthen the accountability
of civil servants and limit the immunity of the politicians in power.
The conduct of
the international community that contravened the provisions of the Dayton Peace
Agreement did not meet with any reaction from the local authorities, whose
behavior essentially ensured the non-observance of human rights and freedoms.
The efforts to
fully control the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina were encouraging, although
much still remained to be done to stop illegal border crossings, trafficking in
human beings, drugs,
and stolen cars and smuggling. It was clear that Bosnia and
Herzegovina was entering a crucial period in which, in a very short time, some
important, even painful reforms will have to be undertaken. The present
political situation and the election results created new ground for
interventions on behalf of the High Representative, which may mean continuing
to have a protectorate-like line of action at the expense of stimulating
responsible actions taken by a democratically established government.
Persons in
responsible positions in religious communities acted more as political
dignitaries than as religious ones, contributing to the incitement of
religious-ethnic and ideological intolerance, instead of working on the
principles of return, tolerance and reconciliation. Their share in the dismal and
conflict-laden situation was also determined by the politically controlled
media and nearly all of the so-called independent newspapers, which identified
themselves with the electoral interests of particular parties and their
leaders. They compromised their position as objective information providers and
commentators on the political reality in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The fact that
nearly half of the voters did not turn up at the polls, combined with the
electoral results, was a succinct commentary by citizens with regard to the
performance of the authorities and the internationally guided peace process
seven years after signing the Dayton Agreement. The electoral victory of the
nationalist parties revealed how resilient the (pre)-war hegemonic projects were,
the full reassertion of which was prevented only by a fear of international
sanctions.
The overall
status of human rights and freedoms in Bosnia and Herzegovina was determined by
the poor results of the peace process along the key lines of implementing the
Dayton Agreement (including the failure to put in place a constitutional and
legal order, partial and unsafe return, failure to arrest war criminals,
contradictions and failed attempts in making reforms in key areas); unregulated relations with the neighbouring
states, which still conveyed negative messages concerning the existence of the
state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example, the FRY Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjic
on several occasions openly promoted the idea that the RS should be granted the
same status as Kosovo. Moreover, the international climate
after September 11, instead of encouraging full engagement in the protection of
human rights, lead them to be relativized and more poorly protected.
Changes and amendments to the
Constitution of the RS and the BiH Federation meant that a part of the
decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the
constitutive nature (equality) of all three peoples (Bosniaks, Serbs and
Croats) was applied in the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
constitutional amendments, and this particularly refers to the RS, were not the
result of a process of political maturation and voluntary acceptance of the
Constitution of BiH as a supreme legal instance, but were rather brought about
through the interventions of international authorities. Thus, the
constitutional changes were a combination of the decisions of the entity
parliaments and of the high representative’s imposition of part of the
amendments. In the RS, part of the changes implemented under external pressures
was the result of the agreement of the most influential parties reached outside
the parliament. The constitutional revision was not complete as of the end of
2002 because the final verification of the constitutional changes, which, inter
alia, guarantee representatives of all three peoples
participation in the legislative, executive and judicial branches of power,
regardless of the outcome of elections, had yet to be conducted.
The
constitutional changes were a significant step forward on the road toward
consolidating the legal and political system in the country and providing
formal legal guarantees that provide for equality and equal rights for all
persons. However, the elimination of discriminatory provisions from the fundamental
body of laws of the entities were not reflected in practice, since the
discriminatory attitude toward individuals and minority groups on the basis of
ethnic, religious and political affiliation still prevailed. Ethnic minority
returnee groups were particularly vulnerable.
The violation of
human rights and freedoms was a salient feature characteristic of the entire
territory of BiH. In some areas the violations of human rights and freedoms
escalated, particularly in the territory of RS, but in the BiH Federation as
well. The Democratic Alliance for Changes, which was in power at the national
level and in the BiH Federation, contrary to expectations, did not show
sufficient sensitivity regarding the issue of human rights and freedoms.
The political
and legal and security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the
RS, was burdened by the fact that International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indictees Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic were still
at large. The local and international authorities did not respond adequately to
the activities of the nazi-fascist organizations and individuals. Members of
the Ravnogorski Chetnik movement (Serb chauvinists) were particularly
aggressive, and during the elections there were cases where Ustashas (Croat
chauvinists) also demonstrated violence. Radicalization among Islamists in
Bosnia Herzegovina was also noticeable.
The residue of the
pre-war situation was reflected in the results of the general elections that
were organized, mainly successfully, for the first time by domestic
authorities, under international surveillance and with the active participation
of NGOs. The national parties (the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action,SDA; the
Serb Democratic Party, SDS; and the Croat Democratic Union, HDZ) again won the
majority vote, while the Social Democratic Party, which was the strongest party
at the national level two years ago and was the leader of the Democratic
Alliance for Changes, experienced a real a collapse. A large number of voters did
not turn up at the elections, indicating a feeling of resignation among
citizens, who had the impression that real progress in the country could not be
achieved because there was no solid democratic alternative to the nationalist
parties. This position was strengthened precisely because citizens abstained
from voting.
Concerning the
international arena, the accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Council of
Europe opened prospects for the further promotion and protection of human
rights and freedoms, among other things. Relations between Bosnia and
Herzegovina and neighboring countries were still far from the mutually
necessary level of full normalization. In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY), there were again signs of aspirations to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina
and annex the RS to Serbia as a form of compensation for Kosovo, as expressed
by the President of FRY, Vojislav Kostunica, and by the Prime Minister of
Serbia, Zoran Dindic. Kostunica and Dindic denied having brought into question
the existence of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, although the Parliament
of FRY finally ratified the Dayton Accords, which implies the confirmation of
the mutual recognition between the states of Bosnia and Herzegovina, FRY and
the Republic of Croatia. The Croatian government has demonstrated a
paternalistic attitude toward Bosnia and Herzegovina, in contrast to the
attitude of the President of the Republic of Croatia, Stjepan Mesic, who stands
for full assertion of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state and for optimal
good-neighborly relations between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Of particular
concern in 2002 was the lesser involvement of international actors in Bosnia
and Herzegovina in the area of human rights and freedoms and the relativistic
attitude toward the need to protect human rights and freedoms without
exception. It was believed that order and the rule of law should be introduced
in Bosnia and Herzegovina first and that democracy and respect for human rights
and freedoms should be given attention afterwards, as if these issues were not
very closely interconnected.
After the
attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, the attitude toward the
reduction of human rights and freedoms relaxed somewhat in the USA and
elsewhere in the West, and this was reflected in Bosnia and Herzegovina as
well. It was particularly visible in the case of the deportation of the
so-called Algerian Group.[1]
·
In January, Hajj Budella, Bumedien Lakhdar, Mohammad Neshila and Saber
Lahman were transferred to US custody.
The Human Rights
Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina passed a decision establishing that the BiH
Federation and the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina had violated the guaranteed
rights of these people by unlawfully taking away their citizenship and by expelling
them and surrendering them to the USA without previously conducting correct
court procedures and despite the possibility that they might face the death
penalty in the USA. In this case, the principle of the presumption of innocence
was violated. The Human Rights Chamber obliged the authorities to pay damages
to the families of the deported persons and provide competent defense counsel
to protect the rights of the deportees. The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights
in Bosnia and Herzegovina welcomed the decision of the Human Rights Chamber,
arguing that it demonstrated that in the territory of the state of Bosnia and
Herzegovina there exist effective mechanisms for protecting rights and freedoms
in line with the principle of universality.
Because of its
involvement in the “Algerian Group” case, the Helsinki Committee for Human
Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its leadership in particular, were
exposed to fierce attacks and baseless arguments from domestic and
international actors. While the statements of the Helsinki Committee were based
on expert reasoning on the matter, many of the attacks were directed at the
Committee and its leadership personally rather than the substance of the
committee’s arguments.
On October 5,
general elections were held in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the representatives
of the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly, members of the
presidency, representatives of the National Assembly of RS, president and in
Bosnia and Herzegovina ice president of RS, representatives of the House of
Representatives of the BiH Federation parliament, and representatives in the
cantonal assemblies and the municipal council of Zepce. Out of about 2.4
million registered voters, 800,000 citizens (approximately 56% of citizens)
voted in the BiH Federation; compared with 440,000 or about 52% in the RS. Over
170,000 citizens were registered for voting in
absentia but only about 50,000 (27%) actually did so. Refugees and
displaced persons showed the least interest in voting in their pre-war
environments, and there was no adequate election motivation for of that
category of voters by the authorities and diplomatic representation offices.
The Coalition of
Non-Governmental Organizations "Elections 2002," which gathered 119
associations from the entire country, conducted a non-party campaign for fair,
free and democratic elections by motivating citizens to take part in the
electoral process; by educating the voters and promoting the Election Law; by
organizing over 100 public debates in all larger cities of Bosnia and
Herzegovina; by realizing the electoral song, leaflet and poster with the
slogan "Think for Yourself"; and by organizing press-conferences and
reacting with statements for public. It also conducted a public opinion survey
and monitored the campaigns of the political parties, media and elections as
such. The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina played
a central role in these activities and their coordination.
The Coalition and the Helsinki Committee
pointed to the fact that the electoral campaigning passed in an atmosphere in
which a large number of protagonists were trying to discredit their rivals and
on that basis to gain voter confidence. Such dirty campaigning enshrouded in
climate of low blows, inflammatory vocabulary and the language of hatred, in an
attempt to gain advantage over political rivals, resulted, among other things,
in confusing and even embittering voters, causing a considerable lack of
interest of the electoral body for the process of the campaign, which reflected
on elections as such.
Under such circumstances, the
programs of the parties remained completely in the background. On the other
hand, election candidates dealt with the issues of interest for citizens in
their speeches and debates in the electronic media (such as the issues of the
economic recovery of the country, employment, and education, and approaching
European integrations). Nevertheless, in these speeches, rhetoric prevailed
over the competence of the candidates and the seriousness and justifiable basis
of their programs.
Some religious
officials, including leaders of religious communities, were directly engaged in
promoting particular political parties, the parties with a national omen. The
parties in RS showed a special inclination towards the Serb Democratic Party.
The Riaset of Islamic Community banned political campaigning in the mosques and
other religious facilities only when campaigns to persuade religious believers
to vote for the Party of Democratic Action had been going on in its facilities
for quite some time. The priests of the Roman Catholic Church, especially in
Herzegovina, were active in favor of the Coalition led by the Croat Democratic
Union.
The written media, with few exceptions, sided with
political parties and leaders, without publicly expressing such attitudes and
without giving voters the option to make their own choices on the basis of
objectively and impartially presented platforms and candidates. The
self-regulatory concept in the area of written media demonstrated in the course
of this campaign all its shortcomings and pitfalls.
The
work of polling boards was correct and professional in the majority of cases.
However, cases were registered in which a smaller group of people cast their
votes for an entire village, and there were attempts to vote without documents.
In several polling stations, voters were assisted by the president of the
polling boards and their members, suggesting that voters vote for a certain
party. In other stations, the principles of secrecy was
violated by improper placement of screens, or the polling boards treated
relationship improperly. In some cases, non-professional work in the polling
boards was reported, and unnecessary confusion that
irritated the citizens or discouraged them from voting.
The NGO
Coalition "Elections 2002" in its 7 October public release stated
that the elections were fair and democratic, and that the observed shortcomings
did not substantially influence the results of the elections.
Bosnia and
Herzegovina proved it was able to organize the elections, with the help of the
peace mission, although the conditions still did not provide optimum safeguards
for citizens to exercise their democratic rights, particularly with regard to
refugees, displaced persons and minority returnees, who had difficulties in
exercising their right to vote.
The Electoral
Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina essentially performed its task well, and
succeeded in creating the conditions for the elections to be judged as fair,
democratic and free.
Increased
coordination with the municipal commissions, electoral boards, authorities,
NGOs,
citizens and the media could have
contributed to greater turnout and better conditions for casting the ballots on
election days.
The
international peace mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and key actors (OSCE,
OHR, SFOR, IPTF), in accordance with their respective mandates, contributed to
the democratic ripening of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Following a
monitoring mission by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia and
Herzegovina on the situation of penitentiaries, the interest of media and
public institutions increased.
After
contradictory information in the press, the Council of Ministers, on the basis
of the findings of a working group, concluded that Bosniak convicts physically
and psychologically maltreated Croatian and Serb convicts in the correctional
facility in Zenica.
As a result of
the torture that took place in Zenica correctional facility, the Council of
Ministers initiated an agreement between the entities on the eventual transfer
of convicts to other correctional institutions; thus raising concerns that the
prisons will be subjected to ethnic cleansing.
Religiously motivated intolerance
and violence continued in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[2]
A case in dispute is the provocative and illegal placing of religious
symbols in public places. Such a case happened on the Hum hill above Mostar,
sparking complaints from the international community, as well as the cross in
the old town above Srebrenica. In both cases, in multiethnic environments, it
was the intention to demonstrate domination of one religion and one nation. In
any case, one cannot justify the illegal demolition of such objects as it
happened in Drvar, where a cross was pulled down during Easter by a group of
young men who provoked Croats by singing Chetnick songs.
Victims of
ethnically motivated violence and discrimination were most usually returnees.
The majority of attacks took place in the territory of the RS. As before the
war, sports events were used as an occasion for such incidences.
There was also discrimination on ethnic grounds in employment,
affecting returnees in particular.
In the first
eight months of 2002, 85,189 returns were recorded (27,300 refugees and 57,889
displaced persons), mainly so-called minority returns. Until 30 September 2002,
a total of 907,968 citizens had returned. Out of that number, 414,569 were
refugees who returned and 493,399 were displaced persons. Out of total number
of returns, 675,320 inhabitants returned to the BiH Federation (373,015
refugees and 302,305 displaced persons), while 214,263 (39,780 refugees and
174,483 displaced persons) returned to the RS, and 18,385 inhabitants (1,774
refugees and 16,611 displaced persons) returned to the Brčko District.
In total, the
following numbers of persons returned had returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina by
the end of 2002: 568,073 Bosniaks (267,994 refugees and 300,079 displaced
persons); 212,612 Serbs (61,781 refugees and 150,831 displaced persons);
120,192 Croats (80,115 refugees and 40,077 displaced persons), and 7,091 others
(4,679 refugees and 2,412 displaced persons). To the BiH Federation, 442,739
Bosniaks returned (255,036 refugees and 187,703 displaced persons), and in the
RS 111,841 (12,862 refugees and 98,979 displaced persons), while to Brcko
District, 13,493 Bosniaks returned (96 refugees and 13,397 displaced persons).
As for Serbs, to the BiH Federation, 117,723 (40,863 refugees and 76,860
displaced persons) returned, while to the RS, 93,260 (20,913 refugees and
72,347 displaced people), and to Brcko District 5 refugees and 1,624 displaced
persons). Out of total number of Croat returnees, 189,958 (73,034 refugees and
35,924 displaced persons) returned to the BiH Federation, to the RS 7,991
(5,408 refugees and 2,583 displaced persons), and to Brcko District 3,263
(1,673 refugees and 1,590 displaced persons). Out of the total number of
returnees from the category of others, to the BiH Federation, 5,900 (4,082
refugees and 1,818 displaced persons) returned, to the RS 1,191 (597 refugees
and 594 displaced persons). By the end of the year, 367,938 members of minority
groups had returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 80,711 (25,293 refugees and
55,418 displaced persons) of whom returned in 2002.
The Ministry of
Refugees and Displaced Persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina claimed that about
650,000 citizens were still settled around the world with refugee status and
that there were about 700,000 displaced persons in the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The majority had resolved their status in the asylum countries,
but this was not the case in the FRY.
As for the implementation of
the property claims, out of a total of 252,933 claims in the entire Bosnia and
Herzegovina, decisions were made in 82% of cases, but the number of returned
property was only 62%. In the BiH Federation, out of 138,973 claims for return
of property, 124,076 decisions were passed, and 66% of property was returned.
In the RS, out of 107,024 claims for the return of property, 77,790 decisions
were passed and 56% was returned. In the Brcko district, out of 6,936 claims,
5,346 were resolved and property was returned in 66% of cases.
The trial of the
former President of Serbia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan
Milosevic, for war crimes committed in Kosovo and Croatia and for genocide in
Bosnia and Herzegovina was the most significant case for the mandate of the
ICTY and for the overall performance of this tribunal in regard to the
sanctioning of those most responsible for mass crimes. However, the failure of
international authorities to use the power and influence to the extent that
would be necessary to bring the FRY to full cooperation with the ICTY was
disappointing.
The Helsinki
Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina stated that for Bosnia and
Herzegovina, full truth about Milosevic’s role in the aggression against that
country was important both from the standpoint of individual responsibility and
in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina versus FRY before the International
Justice Court in the Hague concerning the charges of aggression and
genocide. Political leaders in the RS,
however, strongly opposed the bringing of charges against former FRY leaders.
The authorities
in the RS still refused to cooperate with the ICTY by failing to arrest Radovan
Karadzic, who is still escaping justice, as was Ratko Mladic.
The Croatian Government also relativized cooperation with the ICTY, which was particularly visible in the case of charges against Generals Janko Bobetko and Ante Gotovina. These persons were also very important figures for shedding the light on the role of Croatia in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war.
· At the end of 2002, the former President of the RS, Biljana Plavsic, pleaded guilty for crimes against humanity, changing her initial statement as part of the agreement with the Prosecutor's Office of the ICTY, which agreed to drop the remaining counts of the indictment, including the charge of genocide. Plavsic, previously one of the closest collaborators of Radovan Karadzic, through her defense counsel informed the public that she fully and unconditionally accepted responsibility for her acts, in the hope that this might offer some consolation to the innocent Bosniak, Croat and Serb victims of war. Plavsic invited other leaders to do some soul-searching and re-examine their acts in the hope that her own acceptance of responsibility might help her people “to overcome the pogrom that had happened during the last decade, to reconcile with their neighbors, and finally, to recover their renown as respected people.”
This admission
of guilt will also have consequences for the trials of Slobodan Milosevic,
Momcilo Krajisnik and other top Serb officials accused of the most serious
crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and elsewhere.
Missing persons
were still a painful topical issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to
August 2002 data from the State Commission for Search for Missing Persons in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, out of 27,719 missing persons recorded, 14,500 victims
were exhumed to date. The State Commission exhumed about 10,500 bodies and the
investigation team of the ICTY about 4,000. In 2002, numerous mass graves were
discovered (22 exhumations at 60 sites) mainly containing Bosniak victims
(Kamenica, the largest exhumed grave with over 500 dismembered remains of
Bosniaks from Srebrenica, and the graves in the area of Foca, Rogatica,
Zvornik, Visegrad, Cajnice, Berkovici, Kotor Varos, Bihac, Prijedor, Modrica,
Orasje, Derventa, Doboj, Brcko).
For the first time
exhumation was conducted in the neighboring Republic of Croatia, in the area of
Slavonski Brod. The remains of 93 victims were transported to Bosnia and
Herzegovina from the grave in Sremska Mitrovica in the FRY. Among those bodies
identified, there were 21 Bosniaks; the remaining persons were from Croatia.
Thanks to the
work of the International Commission for Missing Persons, the remains of about
1,000 persons have been identified during the past 12 months. However, the
problem of burying the remains of 1,550 victims from East Bosnia, presently
kept in the Memorial Center in Tuzla, has not been resolved as of yet. The
number of remains will continue to increase, but there it appeared that no
party was interested in providing them with a decent burial.
Particular indignation was caused by the report of the RS government, headed by Prime Minister Mladen Ivanic, which attempted to relativize the genocide committed against Bosniaks in Srebrenica in July 1995 when at least 7,000 people – boys, young men and elderly men - were massacred. The attempt to radically reduce the number of persons killed and to present the acts of the ICTY indictee, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the RS Ratko Mladic, almost as humanitarian action shocked and exasperated the domestic and international public.
[1] See also IHF and the Helsinki
Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “In the Aftermath of 11
September 2001: Illegal arrests, detention and deportations in
Bosnia-Herzegovina,” January 16, 2002, at http://www.ihf-hr.org/appeals/020116BiH.htm.
[2] For details on ethnically or religiously
motivated attacks in RS in 2002, please see the “List of Attacks against
Returnees in Republika Srpska in 2002,” drawn up by the Helsinki Committee for
Human Rights in Republika Srpska.
[3] Helsinki Committee for Human Rightsin Republika Srpska, “List of Attacks against Returnees in Republika Srpska in 2002.”