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<DOC\2001\cdl-inf\021_Inf_e.doc>
OPINION
ON THE ELECTORAL LAW
OF
Adopted by the
at its 48th Plenary
Meeting,
(
Based on comments by:
Mr Giorgio MALINVERNI (member,
Mr Jean-Claude SCHOLSEM
(member,
Introduction
1.
1.
On
2.
2.
The request
therefore has to be understood in the framework of the accession procedure of
BiH to the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe made the adoption of an
election law a condition for the accession of BiH to the Organisation. The
Council of Europe considered that a normal functioning of the democratic
institutions in BiH could not be expected if parliament was not even able to
adopt an election law.
3.
3.
However, certain
political forces in BiH contested the draft election law prepared mainly by
OSCE as discriminatory and in contradiction with Council of Europe and other
international standards. OSCE considered that there was no alternative solution
for the contested provisions since these provisions precisely reflect the
provisions of the BiH Constitution.
4.
4.
This impasse led
to an initial rejection of the draft election law within the Parliamentary
Assembly of BiH in June 2001. Since this development put into jeopardy the
accession of BiH to the Council of Europe, the Secretary General of the Council
of Europe, in a letter dated
5.
5.
In this context
the Venice Commission sees as its present task not to provide a comprehensive
technical assessment of the electoral law but to examine whether some of the
electoral rules are inconsistent with Council of Europe and international
standards. Other, more technical, aspects will only be briefly mentioned at the
end of the opinion (paragraphs 29 to 31).
The standards to
be applied
6.
6.
The provisions of the
Election Law have to be examined before the background of Council of Europe and
other international standards of equality, non-discrimination and participation
in public affairs. It should be noted in this context that not only are all
these standards already part of the applicable law in BiH but that the
Constitution of BiH gives constitutional rank to the pertinent international
human rights agreements. This corresponds to the general orientation of the BiH
Constitution as stated forcefully in its Article II.1:
“
7.
7.
Article II.2 of
the Constitution gives priority to the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) and its Protocols with respect to all other law:
“International Standards. The
rights and freedoms set forth in the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply directly in
8.
8.
Article II.4 of
the Constitution contains very strong language on non-discrimination and grants
constitutional rank to other international human rights agreements.
“Non-Discrimination. The
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms provided for in this Article or in the
international agreements listed in Annex 1 to this Constitution shall be
secured to all persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina without discrimination on any
ground such as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority,
property, birth or other status.”
Not less than fifteen international human rights
agreements are listed in this Annex, including the International Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Optional Protocols
thereto and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.
These international instruments contain a number of provisions on
non-discrimination and on democratic elections. Reference is made here in
particular to Article 3 of the First Protocol to the ECHR, Article 14 of the
ECHR, Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR (not yet in force), Article 25 of the ICCPR,
Articles 3 and 4 of the Framework Convention and Article 5 of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
9.
9.
The Commission, as
a non-judicial body, does not wish to enter into a detailed interpretation of
specific provisions of the international agreements. This should be left to
future decisions of the competent bodies. Following ratification of the ECHR in
particular the European Court of Human Rights may well have to decide on the
compatibility of the Election Law with the ECHR. There are also a number of
technical differences and problems specific to each provision. For example,
Article 3 of the First Protocol to the ECHR applies to legislative bodies only
and Protocol Number Twelve was adopted after the BiH Constitution and has not
yet entered into force. There can nevertheless be no doubt that the combined
result of these provisions is that all citizens, irrespective of ethnicity,
must have an equal right to vote in and stand as candidates for elections. The
most comprehensive text is probably Article 25 of the ICCPR:
“Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the
opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2[1][1]
and without unreasonable restrictions:
1. 1. To take part in the conduct of
public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
2. 2. To vote and to be elected at
genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and
shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of
the electors;
3. 3. To have access, on general
terms of equality, to public service in his country.”
While this text
appears broader than that of the ECHR, it should be noted that the latter
clearly provides (Art. 53) that “Nothing in this Convention shall be construed
as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms
which may be ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any
other agreement to which it is a Party.” Furthermore, among the three core
values upheld by the Council of Europe is respect for the rule of law. An
essential part of states’ observance of the rule of law is their respect of the
international agreements to which they are parties. The Commission will examine
the most important provisions of the Election Law in accordance with these
standards, and in particular whether the provisions in question guarantee an
equal right to vote and stand for election.
Elections which appear unproblematic from the
point of view of international standards
10.
10.
The provisions in
the Law for a number of elections make no ethnic distinctions among voters or
candidates and do not seem to present any problems of principle from the point
of view of domestic or international human rights standards. This concerns:
·
·
Subchapter 11.B on
elections to the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH;
·
·
Chapter 12 on
elections to the House of Representatives of the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina;
·
·
Chapter 13 on
elections to the National Assembly of Republika Srpska;
·
·
Chapter 14 on
elections to Cantonal Assemblies, Municipal Councils/ Assemblies, and City
Councils/ Assemblies.
Elections not
covered by the Election Law
11.
11.
The Election Law
of BiH provides for detailed and comprehensive general rules applicable to all
elections in BiH as well as for rules applicable to specific elections at the
State, Entity, cantonal and municipal level. With respect to the Entity level,
some elections are however omitted pending a harmonisation of the Constitutions
of the Entities with the Decision of the Constitutional Court of BiH on the
issue of the constituent peoples (CDL(2000)81).
With respect to the institutions affected, Article 18.12 of the Transitional
and Final Provisions provides:
“The provisions regulating the
election of the President and Vice President of the Republika Srpska, President
and Vice President of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the
election of the delegates to the House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
shall be adopted by Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, after
completion of harmonisation of the entity constitutions with the Constitution
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, pursuant to the decision of the Constitutional Court
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
12.
12.
The Venice
Commission has already adopted an opinion on the implementation of the decision
of the Constitutional Court (CDL-INF(2001))
a Commission participated in an International Task Force which made proposals
for the implementation of the decision (CDL(2001)23).
The present rules in the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina on the election of the Federation House of Peoples and the
Federation President and Vice President provide for a privileged position of
two of the three constituent peoples of BiH, the Bosniacs and Croats, in these
elections and are therefore indeed incompatible with the reasoning in the
decision of the Constitutional Court which requires an equal status of all
three constituent peoples throughout BiH (see in particular paragraphs
50-74 and 125-126). It appears fully justified to wait with the introduction of
new electoral rules for the revision of the Constitution of the Federation.
While there is no necessary legal link between the decision of the Court and
the election of the President and Vice President of Republika Srpska, a parallel
approach to these institutions would appear justified.
13.
13.
While it seems
appropriate to postpone the adoption of the respective electoral rules pending
the adoption of the amendments to the Federation Constitution required by the decision
of the Constitutional Court, the Commission wishes to draw attention to the
need to finally implement the decision of the Constitutional Court. This
decision brings BiH closer to Council of Europe standards and appears of
decisive importance for the future functioning of the institutions in BiH.
Other elections
14.
14.
There remain two
elections for which ethnic references are made in the Law:
·
·
The elections to
the Presidency of BiH in Chapter 8 where ethnic references, based on Article V
of the Constitution of BiH, are made in the text of the Election Law;
·
·
The elections to
the House of Peoples of BiH where Subchapter 11.A and Article 18.16 of the
Election Law refer to the provisions of the BiH Constitution:
“Until the final regulation of
the procedure for the election of the delegates to the Parliamentary Assembly
of BiH, their election shall be conducted in accordance with the Constitution
of BiH.”
Though both the above sets of provisions use
ethnic references, it may be observed as a preliminary remark that the terms
Bosniac, Croat and Serb, used throughout the relevant texts, may be more
flexible than they appear, as there is no constitutional or legal definition of
who is a Bosniac, Croat or Serb. Current electoral rules simply require
electoral candidates to make a declaration as to their ethnicity.
The BiH Presidency
15.
15.
According to the
Election Law, which in this respect faithfully reflects the provisions of the
Constitution, the Presidency is elected as follows:
·
·
There are three
members of the Presidency, one for each of the three constituent peoples; no
member of the Presidency may be a citizen not belonging to one of the
constituent peoples.
·
·
The Bosniac and
Croat members may be elected only from the territory of the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and by the voters registered to vote there, the Serb
member only from the territory of the Republika Srpska by the voters registered
to vote there. Therefore the choice of voters is limited, as potential
candidates may be prevented from running for elections simply because they do
not identify themselves as members of the constituent peoples entitled to stand
for election in the Entity where they live.
16.
16.
In a federal State
it appears unobjectionable that officeholders be elected in a way ensuring
representation of the entities with the bigger entity being better represented.
In principle, in a multi-ethnic State such as Bosnia it appears also legitimate
to ensure that a State organ reflects the multiethnic character of society. The
problem is however the way in which the territorial and the ethnic
principle are combined. The Constitutional Court of BiH referred to this problem in the
following terms in its decision concerning constituent peoples in the Entity
constitutions:
“65. A strict
identification of territory and certain ethnically defined members of common
institutions in order to represent certain constituent peoples is not even true
for the rules on the Presidency composition as laid down in Article V, first
paragraph: “The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of three
Members: one Bosniac and one Croat, each directly elected from the territory of
the Federation, and one Serb directly elected from the territory of Republika
Srpska.” One must not forget that the Serb member of the Presidency, for
instance, is not only elected by voters of Serb ethnic origin, but by all
citizens of Republika Srpska with or without a specific ethnic affiliation. He
thus represents neither Republika Srpska as an entity nor the Serb people only,
but all the citizens of the electoral unit Republika Srpska. And the same is
true for the Bosniac and Croat Members to be elected from the Federation.”
17.
17.
If the members of the Presidency elected from an Entity represent all
citizens residing in this Entity and not a specific people, it is difficult to
justify that they must identify themselves as belonging to a specific people.
Such a rule seems to assume that only members of a particular ethnicity can be
regarded as fully loyal citizens of the Entity capable of defending its
interests. The members
of the Presidency have a veto right whenever there is a violation of vital
interests of the Entity from which they were elected. It cannot be maintained
that only Serbs are able and willing to defend the interests of RS and only
Croats and Bosniacs the interests of the Federation.
18.
18.
Furthermore,
members of the three constituent peoples can be elected to the Presidency
but they may be prevented from standing
as candidates in the Entity in which they reside if they live as Serbs in the
Federation or as Bosniacs or Croats in the RS. The Election Law (based on the
corresponding provisions of the Constitution), however, clearly excludes
Others, i.e. citizens of BiH who identify themselves as neither Bosniac nor
Croat nor Serb, from the right to be elected to the Presidency. It may raise
problems with respect to the equal right to vote and to stand for election
under Article 25 of the ICCPR or with equality under the law guaranteed to
members of minorities under Article 4 of the Framework Convention to formally
exclude members of minorities from a public office.
The House of
Peoples
19.
19.
With respect to
the House of Peoples of BiH, the constitutional provision to which Article
18.16 of the Election Law makes reference is worded as follows:
“Article IV
1. House of Peoples.
The House of Peoples shall
comprise 15 Delegates, two-thirds from the Federation (including five Croats
and five Bosniacs) and one-third from the Republika Srpska (five Serbs).
(a) The designated Croat and Bosniac Delegates from the
Federation shall be selected, respectively, by the Croat and Bosniac Delegates
to the House of Peoples of the Federation. Delegates from the Republika Srpska
shall be selected by the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska.”
It seems prima facie that:
·
·
Only citizens
identified as belonging to one of the three constituent peoples can be elected
to the House of Peoples;
·
·
Serbs can only be
elected to the House of Peoples from the Republika Srpska, Bosniacs and Croats
only from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
·
·
Within the House
of Peoples of the Federation, only the Bosniac and Croat delegates may take
part in the election; other delegates are deprived from the right to vote in
this respect.
These rules, which are
provisions of the Constitution and not of the Election Law itself, raise particular problems with respect to the
Federation. As regards the right to vote, this right applies also to indirect
elections. In the Federation not all members of the Federation House of Peoples
may vote but only the Croat and Bosniac members. There is therefore no equality
between the parliamentarians. In the RS the situation is somewhat different
since all members of the National Assembly may take part in the election
although their choice is limited to Serb candidates. Although these rules
reflect the same difficulties of mixing ethnic and territorial concepts as
expressed in relation to the BiH Presidency, it is difficult to find a legal
rationale for this different treatment of the same election in the two
Entities, especially since this question is regulated by the Constitution of
the State and not individually by the constitutions of the Entities.
20.
20.
With respect to
the right to stand for election, as in the case of the BiH Presidency, first of
all, persons not identifying themselves as Bosniac, Croat or Serb are
completely excluded. But not only that. Entity and Ethnicity are linked and
only Serbs from RS and Croats and Bosniacs from the Federation
may be elected. No Serb from the Federation and no Croat or Bosniac from the RS
may sit in the House of Peoples, which is a chamber with full legislative
powers. A significant part of the population of BiH therefore does not seem to
have a right to be elected to the House of Peoples.
21.
21.
The ethnic
grouping of candidates for this House is coherent inasmuch as the specific
characteristic of the House of Peoples is that delegates have a vital interest
veto in case of the violation of the interests of their respective peoples. It
is legitimate to assume that parliamentarians from the respective peoples are
the best judges on what their vital interest are. Nevertheless, granting
precisely to those people who are already dominant such a veto and not to small
groups requiring protection is a questionable practice. This issue was discussed
with respect to the Entity constitutions by the Constitutional Court of BiH, in
its Partial Decision III in Case 5/98 on the issue of the “constituent peoples”
at §§ 115-116. In particular, such a practice may raise questions under
international law, and specifically in the light of Article 5 of the
International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination that are
not saved by the exemption provisions of Article 1 para. 4 of the
Convention.
Specificities of the situation in BiH
22.
22.
It is
apparent from the above considerations that the electoral rules in the BiH
Constitution for the Presidency and the House of Peoples, which are necessarily
reflected in the provisions of the Electoral Law, appear prima facie to
exclude citizens from the right to stand for election if they belong to an
ethnic group which is in the minority where they live and would seem therefore
to be incompatible with international standards. One might however still wonder
whether under the specific, fairly exceptional, conditions of BiH such an
apparent discrimination may be justified. The European Court of Human Rights in
its decision Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium seemed willing to
leave to States a particularly wide margin of appreciation in the sensitive
area of election law. Equality of voting rights and non-discrimination are
among the most important values of a constitutional system. However, illicit
discrimination can only be assumed if there is no reasonable and objective
justification for a difference in treatment.
23.
23.
In the present
case, the distribution of posts in the State organs between the constituent
peoples was a central element of the Dayton Agreement making peace in BiH
possible. In such a context it is difficult to deny legitimacy to norms that
may be problematic from the point of view of non-discrimination but necessary
to achieve peace and stability and to avoid further loss of human lives. The
inclusion of such rules in the text of the Constitution at the time therefore
does not deserve criticism although they run counter to the general thrust of
the Constitution aiming at preventing discrimination.
24.
24.
This justification
has to be considered, however, in the light of developments in BiH since the
entry into force of the Constitution. This opinion is drafted with a view to
the accession of BiH to the Council of Europe and the country has therefore to
be assessed according to the yardstick of common European standards. It has now
enjoyed for several years an – albeit imperfect – peace. It is not up to the
Venice Commission to give a political assessment of the situation. It
nevertheless seems clear, on the one hand, that there has been an evolution in
a positive sense, and on the other, that there remain circumstances requiring a
political system that is not a simple reflection of majority rule but
guarantees a distribution of power and positions among ethnic groups. It
therefore remains legitimate to try to design electoral rules ensuring
appropriate representation for various groups.
25.
25.
This can, however,
be achieved without entering into conflict with international standards. It is
not the system of consensual democracy as such which raises problems but the
mixing of territorial and ethnic criteria and the apparent exclusion from
certain political rights of those who appear particularly vulnerable. It seems
possible to redesign the electoral rules to make them compatible with
international standards while maintaining the political balance in the country.
26.
26.
As regards the
Presidency, a multi-ethnic composition can be ensured in a non-discriminatory
way, for example by providing that not more than one member of the Presidency may
belong to the same people and combining this with an electoral system ensuring
representation of both Entities. The same applies to the House of Peoples where
for example a maximum number of seats for members from one people could be
fixed. Other solutions could also be envisaged. The legitimate aims of the
rules can in any case be attained without entering into conflict with the equal
right to vote and stand for election and the present rules of the Constitution
and the Election Law cannot in the long term be justified as necessary under
the specific conditions of BiH.
27.
27.
In the light of
the above considerations it appears that it will be necessary to address the
question of revising the relevant rules of the Election Law and the Constitution.
It should nevertheless be emphasised that constitutional change in any
democracy requires reflection and consultation, particularly when central
power-sharing institutions are involved. The Commission cautions against undue
haste in undertaking such revisions, which may in itself cause problems with
regard to the respect of the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It
notes that Article 25 ICCPR includes the right to periodic elections on an
equal footing with the other electoral rights protected, and therefore finds
that it would be advisable to continue to hold elections in line with the
electoral timetable foreseen on the basis of the provisions currently in force,
until such time as the relevant provisions of the Constitution have been amended
and the Electoral Law amended accordingly to take account of the issues raised
above.
Other remarks
28.
28.
Having regard to
the specific purpose of this opinion, the Commission does not wish to enter
into technical details of the Law. It would however like to draw attention to
the composition of the election commissions and polling station committees.
According to the Law (articles 2.5 and 2.14) their composition has to reflect
the ethnic composition of the country or respective area. There is no provision
requiring that its composition should ensure political pluralism and
representation of the main political parties. The assumption seems to be that
ethnicity determines political allegiance. With the increasing emergence of
multiethnic parties this situation may change and the composition of election
commissions and polling station committees may need to be re-examined.
29.
29.
The Law also
contains complicated provisions as to the place where a person may vote.
Displaced persons may vote either in their place of residence or in the place
where they currently live (Article 18.8). The overall goal of the provision, to
solve the property question, is defensible. However, under the current legal
and technical circumstances, a certain number of issues raised by this rule
need to be addressed. The provision is confusing due to its vague wording,
although some guidance may be found in Article 18.9, which serves a similar
purpose but for persons running in elections. Technically, implementation will
be very difficult, as the voters’ register and housing registers are not
compatible: the voters’ register is centralised, whereas the housing registers
are decentralised to the municipal level and equal standards are not applied.
Furthermore, due to the unwillingness of many municipalities to issue any
eviction orders, there is a risk that the provision may be politically misused,
with the effect that people may be treated unequally and thereby discriminated
against.
Conclusions
30.
30.
The Commission
finds that for the most part, the Election Law provides an acceptable legal
framework for the holding of democratic elections in BiH. However, some
questions are raised by the constitutional and legislative provisions governing
elections to the Presidency and House of Peoples of BiH. As a consequence, the
Commission finds as follows:
-
-
it is essential
that the Entities proceed with the process of constitutional revision in order
to implement fully the “constituent peoples” decision of the Constitutional
Court of BiH as soon as possible, and in particular inasmuch as this is the
precondition to revising the provisions governing elections to the Presidencies
of the Entities which do not currently figure in the Election Law;
-
-
the provisions of
the Election Law governing elections to the Presidency and the House of Peoples
of BiH raise questions as to their compatibility with international standards.
Any deviations from the principle of the equal right to vote and stand for
election are however due to explicit rules in the text of the Constitution.
Curing such deviations would require amendments to the Constitution which will
then have to be reflected in the electoral law. Nevertheless, such revisions
could be carried out in a manner which would safeguard the position and
equality of the constituent peoples by maintaining the multi-ethnic character
of both institutions;
-
-
the holding of
elections that fall due under the normal electoral timetable should not be postponed
pending the amendment of the Constitution and Election Law, but elections
should be carried out on the basis of the provisions in force until such time
as they have been amended;
-
-
the implementation
of Article 18.8 of the Election Law should be closely monitored to ensure that
it is not applied in a discriminatory manner.
31.
31.
Finally, the
Commission emphasises that its recommendations cannot be implemented overnight
but in some cases may require serious institutional adjustments. These should
be closely monitored by the Council of Europe both before Bosnia’s accession to
the Council and after it, in the context of post-accession monitoring
procedures. The Commission stands ready to assist the relevant bodies in this
process.