Integration
of region on new foundations
(Sustainability
of the state community of
1.
Historical background
Serb nationalists have always treated
After its refusal to take part in the
Kosovo war Montenegro became an independent partner of the West (notably during
the intervention and until October 2000). Since then the process of
emancipation of Montenegro was accelerated and it peaked following the April
2001 and October 2002 (at which the sovereignty-minded block scored major
victory) parliamentary elections.
However after 5 October 2000 international
community recognised the FRY, although its legitimacy was controversial in view
of Montenegrin developments. That recognition on the one hand made easier
relations with the former Yugoslav republics and cleared the way for
normalisation of relations in the region, but on the other hand generated new
confusion and threatened to exacerbate relations with Montenegro. And those
relations indeed grew sour in the past three years. As regards Montenegro
recognition of the FRY was seen also as a pressure on that republic to check
the process of independence-gaining, which, as things stand now, is
unstoppable.
In the past three years Montenegro has via facti grown independent, and the
federal state in fact stopped functioning in the territory of that republic.
After passing amendments to the 2000 Constitution by manipulating federal
institutions, the FRY, as defined under the 1992 Constitution, ceased to exist,
due to suspension of equality of member-countries which constituted the gist of
the FRY. At the 1992 referendum Montenegro opted for living in a common state,
but expressly as a "sovereign republic", in line with guarantees
enshrined in the Constitution. Montenegro did not recognise forcible amendments
to the 2000 Constitution and subsequently 24 September 2000 elections and
institutions of the federal state stemming from the then election results. A
large majority of Montenegrin voters by boycotting those elections backed the
decision of legal Montenegrin bodies and thus obtained legitimacy for their
country and simultaneously denied the FRY legitimacy.
However the Serb political prime movers
failed to face the reality and the state of affairs, notably the fact that
Montenegro and independent Serbia were a natural epilogue of the collapse of
former Yugoslavia. In its insistence on the common state DOS relied on the
Western, that is, European position. DOS formalised continuity with Milosevic's
regime by setting up federal institutions with the Montenegrin Socialist Popular
Party, which as a former coalition partner of the Socialist Party of Serbia and
the Serb Radical Party ensured its influence in Montenegro. Despite favourable
circumstances for Serbia, sustainability of community between Serbia and
Montenegro is becoming increasingly problematic. The foregoing is best
illustrated by a very ambivalent character of the Belgrade Agreement of 14
March 2002, by which, thanks to the EU brokering, the FRY was morphed into the
union of two states.
Position of the Belgrade regime on
Montenegro enjoys large backing of the Belgrade media, whose role in promoting
Greater Serbia ideas has not essentially changed. Belgrade media showed very
little sensibility for Montenegro and its idiosyncrasies. Their
anti-Montenegrin stand is reminiscent of the late 80's campaign against
Slovenians, Croats and Albanians. The entire media scene favours and even
panders to pro-Serb forces in Montenegro, while the official Belgrade backs
them through the Federal Parliament and bankrolling the media run by the
Montenegrin opposition coalition which represents that republic in the
federation. The largest backing in that regard is provided by V. Koštunica, the
FRY President, his cabinet and party, the Army of Yugoslavia and the Serb
Orthodox Church (the SOC).
SOC
takes a specific stance on Montenegro. Namely it treats Montenegro as the Serb
ethnic territory and often interferes into issues of great political and state
interest. Such trends usually become conspicuous during Christmas celebrations
when the SOC directly confronts increasingly popular Montenegrin Orthodox
Church and frequently even on the eve of elections.
Yugoslav Army during Milosevic's regime
piled pressure on Montenegro, notably after Đukanovic took office in
January 1998. Pro-Serb opposition then organised protests and demonstrations,
and did the same thing during the NATO intervention. However, today there is no
danger of direct military operation in that republic. Thanks to presence of
NATO forces in the region, use of force in Montenegro is not possible. Army has
not longer the role it had during the recent wars, and cannot wage wars. SOC
took on the role of the key advocate for preservation of the Serb ethnic
territory which explains it aggressive conduct in every day life.
In taking an uncritical stand on Belgrade
after 5 October 2000 the international community sidelined the Montenegrin
authorities, whereas EU together with Serbia piled pressure on them. Pressure
of international community, Belgrade regime and SOC was excessive in view of a
real importance of Montenegro. In the face of that pressure and blackmail of
international community, which in a very unselective way tackled the issue of
corruption among the Montenegrin prime movers, Montenegro managed to preserve
its independent position and won its right to independence.
Legacy of Milosevic's regime, lack of
readiness of DOS to make a clean break with Milosevic's policy, and above all
refusal to co-operate with the Hague Tribunal, have slowed down transition in
Serbia and subsequently led to change of position of the international
community on Serbia, that is Montenegro. The Belgrade Agreement on the Union of
Serbia and Montenegro brokered by Xavier Solana, due to the aforementioned
circumstances, produced major concessions for the Montenegrin side. Morphing of
the FRY into the two-state union flexibly envisages a referendum on
independence of Montenegro within three years. Objective weaknesses of Serbia
have stripped the Belgrade regime of legitimacy in defining the new state
community. Despite the initial pro-common state EU position, developments are
favouring Montenegro's option for independence, for the latter confirms the
inevitable logic of the final dissolution of the SFRY.
2. Belgrade's attempts to retain Montenegro
in the state community along the unitary principle
By the FRY or Serbia's re-applying for the
UN membership, the process of independence-gaining of Montenegro has been
temporarily halted, but at the same time the process of crystallisation within
Montenegro proper has been accelerated. By applying for re-admission to the UN
Serbia acknowledged all that the international community had been in vain
demanding Serbia to do in the past decade: the international community's stance
that disappearance of the Yugoslav state, the SFRY did not result from
secession, but from disintegration of all its ingredient parts (6 republics),
along with recognition of the republican borders as the state ones, was finally
certified. That was also a genuine proof of the role of the 1974 Constitution,
for the FRY fell apart at the seams due to some main points of that
constitution.
In adhering to the fact that the FRY was
internationally recognised, the new Serb authorities have not essentially
changed their position on the common state, that is, have not renounced their
unitary concept. This provoked major discontent in Montenegro and subsequently
boosted appetites for its independence. Milosevic's policy in Montenegro was
continued by considerable financial, personnel and media backing to the
pro-Yugoslav forces in Montenegro. Territorial claims to integrity of
Montenegro also gained ground. Actions in that regard were stepped up in
underdeveloped North and coastal area, notably in Boka Kotorksa due to its
geo-strategic importance.
DOS and Milosevic's stance on Montenegro
are quite similar. The only difference is DOS's awareness of non-feasibility of
new wars. However in the past three years DOS endeavoured to preserve status
quo, that is the state of affairs consolidated by Milosevic by the July 2000
constitutional coup. By suspending some parts of still valid federal
constitution Milosevic prevented representation of the majority, that is
legitimate Montenegro in any federal institution (barring the Supreme Defence
Council). Thus the opposition coalition headed by Predrag Bulatovic was enabled
to maintain the semblance of preservation of the FRY at the federal level.
After taking power DOS never raised the issue of major and comprehensive
amendments to the Constitution (which that coalition used to criticise during
the Milosevic era), but instead tended to take to task the official Podgorica
for failing to take part in the September 2000 elections.
More marked pressures on Montenegro began
when it became clear that that the majority of population was
independence-minded as confirmed by the results of 22 April 2001 parliamentary
elections (a genuine referendum on independence). However the international
community's position on preservation of the state community that is
"democratic Montenegro should remain in the democratic FRY" favoured
the Serb nationalists positions advocated by the three parties, Socialist
Popular Party of Predrag Bulatovic (SPP), the Serb National Party of Bozidar
Bojovic (SNP) and the Popular Party (PP) led by Dragan Šoc, and stimulated them
to step up their (Coalition "Together for Yugoslavia) activities in the
territory of Montenegro. That coalition also took part in the federal elections
on the eve of 5 October changes in Serbia and later forged the alliance with
DOS.
Much pressure was piled on Montenegrins
living in Serbia (about 130,000 of them). The then federal Prime Minister
intimidated them by maintaining that "they would have to go to Montenegro
with passports and shall be foreigners in their own country." He also
reiterated that "the common state is needed for separatism is an obsolete
phenomenon."(1) Numerous, similar statements of the Montenegrin opposition
leaders were intended to persuade the Montenegrin general public that
"Montenegro must continue to live together with Serbia in a common
state." As the minorities at elections backed the idea of independent
Montenegro, opposition tried to impose its position that "the state status
should not be decided by Muslims and Albanians for if that is allowed then preconditions
for independence of Kosovo shall be being created."(2)
Belgrade media also took part in attempts
to antagonise the Montenegrin majority and pit it against the minority
population by marketing misinformation about sightings of the KLA members in the
mountains surrounding Gusinje. Despite official disclaimers, such
misinformation, implying similar scenario in Montenegro, were marketed in the
midst of the Albanian offensive in Macedonia and OVPBM activities in South
Serbia.(3)
The aforementioned attempts failed, thanks
to stability of multi-ethnic relations in Montenegro. Albanian politicians in
Montenegro, notably Ferhat Dinosa, President of the Democratic Union of
Albanians (DUA) immediately reacted to such insinuations and accused some
media, notably Glas Grnogoraca and Dan, of "favouring the
anti-Albanian mood in Montenegro in order to weaken the pro-independence forces
in Montenegro." In that minority-centred battle the official Montenegro
scored a major victory, by reiterating the data about solidarity between the
Montenegrin and Albanian people. Namely after NATO intervention there were
about 90,000 Albanians in the territory of Montenegro, but that tinder-box
climate "did not produce any incident…for extremism was not backed by
Albanians in Montenegro, as proved by the election results. Namely in
Albanian-majority municipalities civil-minded parties won most seats. The same
thing happened in the Muslim-dominated municipalities in Montenegro."(4)
Statements of some Albanian leaders notably of Fuad Nimani, President of
Democratic Union of Albanians (DUA) that "Albanians shall vote in
referendum for independent Montenegro" confirmed that Albanians viewed
Montenegro as their state.(5)
Elections in 2001 were a clear indicator
of a growing importance of the pro-sovereignty block, as confirmed by the
survey conducted by the Podgorica CEDEM (Centre for Democracy and Human
Rights.) According to the then CEDEM findings 55% of population favoured the
independence and 44% were against it.(6) This trend additionally frustrated
some political parties in Serbia, notably Democratic Party of Serbia, which
thought that such development would imply or entail many uncertainties
including the resolution of the status of Kosovo.(7)
3. Role of the Serb Orthodox Church
SOC played a major role in creation of the
Greater Serbia project. As the war option is no longer feasible, the SOC took
on the role of the key advocate of preservation of the Serb ethnic territory.
In those terms SOC openly lays claim to Montenegro by persistently denying the
existence of the Montenegrin nation. Extent of SOC's interest in Montenegrin
developments is also amply indicated by continuous and aggressive activities of
the Serb Orthodox Church on the whole Montenegrin territory. Before 2001 elections
Patriarch Pavle sent a message to all citizens of Montenegro to "act
peacefully and in a dignified way at the forthcoming elections", to
representatives of authorities to "do their best to carry out democratic
and fair elections, and to prospective victors to "to act in a dignified
and chivalrous manner."(8)
Patriarch
of Moscow and whole Russia Alexei Second joined the said appeal, and sent a
special message to "Together for Yugoslavia" Coalition:
"Momentous tasks lie ahead of all of us and peoples of Serbia and
Montenegro: original culture, untainted Orthodox faith must be preserved and
state institutions must be consolidated " Patriarch also went on to say:
"I am backing efforts geared towards revival of spirituality, cultural,
economic, social and political unity of brotherly peoples of Montenegro and
Serbia united in a common Yugoslav state."(9)
Key exponent of SOC in Montenegro is
Mitropolite of Montenegro and Coastal Area Amfilohije Radovic who uses every
public occasion to stress "identical features of the two peoples, Serbs
and Montenegrins." He openly interferes into the state and political
issues although Montenegro is a secular, civil state. Montenegrin Orthodox
Church (MOC) was abolished after annexation of Montenegro by Serbia, that is
coming into being of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918. Every
year at the time of Christmas Holidays SPC fans nationalist Serb feelings and
tensions in Cetinje. SOC also engages in plunder of the MOC institutions over
which its has no authority. It tries to religiously unify Montenegrin people by
highlighting the thesis that Serb and Montenegrin people are "one people,
with the same faith and language". In those terms, according to Amfilohije
"one should not even ask the Church if it is for the common state of
Serbia and Montenegro, for they have voted many times in favour of that unity
and togetherness, not by casting referendum ballots, but by swearing allegiance
to the very being of Montenegro, its saints and kings, and age-old aspirations of
its people."(10)
Mitropolite Amfilohije on numerous
occasions stated that the "Montenegrin nation is a Communist invention,
"Tito's and Đilas's bastard" and that "Montenegrins who
don't fell like Serbs are fans of Tito". This implies that Tito has
invented Montenegrins. Montenegrin intellectuals often reacted to those
statements. A publicist Novak Adžic was so outraged that he said that "the
Montenegrin state was not created by Serbs, but rather by local, indigenous
peoples living within the Montenegrin boundaries, peoples of Zeta and Duklja.
He also cautioned that Amfilohije's statements about non-existence of
Montenegrin people were untrue and "only one in a series of destructive
Greater Serbia attacks on the national identity and statehood of Montenegrin
people. Those attacks make part of the project and system expressing a
hegemony- and assimilation-minded policy and ideology towards Montenegro
bearing all hallmarks of centralism and unitarism, and aiming to discipline and
subjugate Montenegro." However in the Serb media such stances were never
disclosed or covered, unlike those advocated by Mitropolite Amfilohije (his
words usually receive wide coverage by daily "Politika").
4.
Patriotic associations at the service
of
the Serb nationalism
So-called patriotic associations are often
mouthpieces of official claims towards Montenegro. One of the most active ones
is the Association of Bokelji, which in its resolution warns that "Boka
Kotorska, in case of Montenegro's secession, shall leave Montenegro and unite
with Serbia."(11) Belgrade print media widely covered excerpts from that
resolution and highlighted that "Boka Kotorska is refusing to play the
role of the second fiddle and the one of a silent observer of the
secession-minded campaign of the current Montenegrin leadership….Before proclamation
of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Bokelji voted for the union with
Serbia…Montenegro annexed Boka in an unlawful, undemocratic and according to
many forcible way, as amply proved by historical facts." Nedeljko Zoric,
president of Bokelji Association in Belgrade, explicated the thesis about
"irregular annexation of Boka by Montenegro" on the basis of the
minutes of the District People's Liberation Bureau dated 8 April 1945 which
reads: " because of insistence of the Political Secretary of the
Provincial Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia for Montenegro
and Boka, the issue of Boka, which was not on agenda was forcibly tackled. And
then it was decided that Boka Kotorska be territorially annexed to the then
federal unit of Montenegro."(12)
Boka Kotorska is treated in the same way
by the Serb Popular Party of Montenegro. Nikola Mestrovic, president of the
SPP's regional committee for Boka Kotorska and Budva explains that "the
age-old aspirations of Bokelji were realised in 1918 and that Bokelji also this
time around shall "succeed to defend themselves from Duklja and
Montenegrin attacks" and if "Montenegro secedes we shall launch an
initiative for re-examination of relations between Boka and Montenegro, that is
for secession from Montenegro."(13)
Youth branches of those associations also
took part in a genuine campaign against referendum on independence. They kept
warning about "dangers awaiting Montenegrin students if Montenegro
seceded," namely "after possible secession tuition fees for about
14,000 students from Montenegro could be increased from the current $ 11,000 to
$70,000".(14)
Members of SAAS (Serb Academy of Arts and
Sciences) of Montenegrin descent are actively involved in the Montenegrin
developments, notably through various patriotic associations. Matija Beckovic,
academician, was particularly vocal in denying the Montenegrin identity. At a
conference he said: "the whole world has finally realised that Montenegro
cannot survive without the common state with Serbia….for if it could have
survived as an independent state it would have never united with Serbia or any
other state…like Boka it preserved its specific features thanks to having
Serbia and Serb people as its hinterland."(15)
Belgrade used its well-proven methods: it
threatened to create autonomous areas in Montenegro, notably in North of the
country. Belgrade media not only openly backed such ideas, but also raised the
issue of so-called Plevlje Republic. Added to that the Belgrade-based
Association of Plevljani received large media exposure. In its declaration the
association announced referendum for secession of Plevlje from Montenegro if
the latter opted for independence and highlighted "unbreakable ties with
our brethren in Serbia." Declaration also condemned Montenegrin
separatists who persistently endeavour to "isolate municipality of Plevlje
from Serbia, to turn Serbs into Montenegrins, and to de-Serbise
Montenegrins."(16)
During elections in 2001 the Fund for
Defence of Equal Rights of Citizens of Montenegro was set up with the idea to
empower Montenegrins living outside Montenegro, and not only citizens of
Montenegro, to vote in a referendum. The Fund spearheaded by academician
Ljubomir Tadic via church very aggressively called on Montenegrins to remain in
the common state. Through the Fund Montenegrins were invited "to join a
common prayer for salvation of state and people" at the Grand Easter Rally
organised by Mitropolite Amfilohije Radovic. Similar appeals were made by
President of the Yugoslav Movement of Montenegrins, Milija Zecevic, who
stressed that "Montenegrins in Serbia wish that Serbia and Montenegro live
for ever in a common state."(17) Čedomir Čupic was one of the
rare Montenegrin intellectuals in Serbia who raised his voice against
manipulations by patriotic associations and warned that no serious political
figure in Serbia condemned such statements of the Fund for Protection of Rights
of All Montenegrin Citizens.(18)
In addition to patriotic associations the
Serb diaspora also engaged itself in active monitoring of situation in
Montenegro. But its lack of understanding of the process of dissolution of the
SFRY and notably of situation in Serbia soon became manifest. It was frequently
more radical than the elite in the country and endeavoured very hard to ensure
its influence through the church. In criticising the official Montenegrin
policy, diaspora maintained that "Serb Orthodox Church and the Serb
Academy of Science should draw up the Serb national program."(19)
Activities of "patriotic
associations" were sharply criticised by Montenegrin authorities, who also
stressed Serbia's behind-the-scene efforts to "compel Montenegro to remain
in the interest sphere of Serbia and to win over the obedient politicians in
Montenegro instead of respecting the will of democratic ones." Montenegrin
officials seized every opportunity to denounce Belgrade's covert actions in
Montenegro and kept stressing that "the political concept of Greater
Serbia cannot protect the Serb national interests… even Slobodan Milosevic
failed in that intent, for any such project was doomed due to it obsolete
character."(20)
Milo Đukanovic also cautioned against
the same danger and maintained that citizens on 22 April 2001 would have the
opportunity to choose "either the option offering continuous peace,
inter-ethnic harmony, referendum and integration into Europe, or a loss of
state and absorption by Serbia as its 27th region." (21)
Kostunica's insistence on "non-change
of borders" and pact-making with the pro-Serbs parties in Montenegro,
implied his advocacy of a strong and unitary state and a stiff opposition to
sovereignty of Montenegro. This provoked many Montenegrin politicians to accuse
him of "selectively honouring the FRY Constitution" and Milo
Đukanovic to argue that "18 times larger Serbia shows no
understanding for Montenegrin needs and deprives the latter of
equality."(22) Đukanovic went as far as to accuse Kostunica "of
interfering into the pre-election race in Montenegro….and is more interested in
the neighbouring republic than in Serbia proper."(23)
5. Belgrade's financial backing
of Montenegrin opposition
Leading Montenegrin politicians maintain
that as early as in 1997 "Belgrade dictatorship tried to establish control
over the Montenegrin state and civil interests and by the 6 July 2000 unlawful
amendments to the constitution the FRY was relegated to history." Hence
the position of democratic Montenegro that "after 6 July 2000 Yugoslavia
ceased to exist."
To preserve its positions in Montenegro
Belgrade generously bankrolled its partners-Coalition "Together for
Yugoslavia" from the federal budget, notably on the eve of Montenegrin
elections.(24)
According to sources from the Montenegrin
Democratic Party of Socialists, Belgrade transferred large quantity of foreign
currency to them on the eve of Montenegrin elections, and in early April 2001
"Bulatovic and Šoc were able to dispose of large quantities of illegally
transferred money." Podgorica branch office of "Ekos bank" also
engaged in such illegal transfers, by providing self-styled saviours of
Serbhood in Montenegro with large amounts of foreign currency.(25) The
foregoing was confirmed by Đinđic's Democratic Party. Its officials
admitted that the federal administration was very generous towards the
Montenegrin opposition and media under its control. DP officials also disclosed
that "Dan" (a daily under influence of Predrag Bulatovic's Socialist
Popular Party) was given gratis large quantities of paper worth DM 800,000 by
paper plant "Matroz."(26)
6.
International community actions play right into hands
of
the Serb project masterminds
Both Belgrade and international community
brought pressure to bear on Montenegro on the eve of elections in 2001.
Belgrade media gave much prominence to information relating to meetings with
international representatives and depicted their presence as a sign of support
to the survival of the FRY. Thus for example the Bijelo Polje meeting between
federal Prime Minister Žižic and the Russian Ambassador Jegoskin was hyped by
headline "Our victory preserves Yugoslavia".(27) At the pre-election
rally of Coalition "Together for Yugoslavia" the Russian Ambassador
stated: "it is in the interest of Montenegro, Serbia and Russia to
preserve the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." After the rally Žižic
announced his imminent visit to Moscow. At the same time the Contact Group
re-launched its formula on "the need for democratic Montenegro to remain
in democratic Yugoslavia." and suggested continuation of dialogue between
Serbia and Montenegro with the goal of re-definition of relations between the
two republics of the FRY.(28) EU called on Belgrade and Podgorica to
"reach acceptable constitutional solutions for Montenegro and Serbia by
dint of an open, democratic procedure."(29)
Such stances encouraged Montenegrin
opposition. For example federal Prime Minister Žižic then maintained that
"after 10 April EU shall warn Đukanovic to refrain from one-sided
moves aimed at effecting secession of Montenegro," and "Milo
Đukanovic is not in the position to integrate Montenegro, for he is sowing
hatred and discord in a bid to disintegrate the FRY."(30) Predrag
Bulatovic made similar claims and cautioned Muslims and Albanians against
backing Đukanovic "for he tried to sow division on religious grounds
among his people by establishing the Montenegrin Orthodox Sect."(31)
Position of the Contact Group
"Democratic Montenegro within democratic Yugoslavia" was condemned by
the Montenegrin authorities and caused a deep frustration among them. Milo
Đukanovic reiterated to foreign press agencies his disappointment with
such a stance of the international community and reminded them how independent
Montenegro enjoyed international backing while Slobodan Milosevic was at the
helm of Yugoslavia. He also stated that the aforementioned international stand
was tantamount to support to the Serb nationalism.(32) Other politicians were
frustrated too and oft maintained that "EU economic pressure on the
republic would be futile and nonsensical for it would be tantamount to pressure
on those who largely contributed to toppling of Milosevic and proved their
partnership to the international community in affirmation of democratic, multi-national
and multi-denominational tolerance and of economic reforms in this
territory."
West put a special pressure on M.
Đukanovic by according him a less favourable treatment. For example in
February 2001 Colin Powell refused to see Đukanovic during his Washington
visit, and stated that the US would like to see Montenegro in the FRY.(33) That
stance was also taken by former US Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke,
though he made it clear that the US and EU would accept independence of
Montenegro if so chosen by Montenegro. He reminded of the fact that
Đukanovic bravely put up resistance to former FRY President Milosevic
during the Kosovo war and thus helped NATO. At the same time EU espoused a much
more rigid stance. Head of Austrian diplomacy Benita-Ferrero-Valdner opposed
independence of Montenegro and urged, like other EU member-countries a more
constructive dialogue between Belgrade and Podgorica.(34)
In the face of such international stances,
public opinion polls in Montenegro after the 2001 elections indicated that a
very large percentage of population would vote for independence. Added to that
a survey of the US NGO National Democratic Institute for International
Relations indicated that as many as 58% of citizens would say "yes"
to independence versus 31% refusing it. Moreover 40% of citizens would vote for
the union of the two internationally recognised state founded on the basis of
negotiations between Serb and Montenegrin governments, and 37% against it.(35)
Contrary to the Bush Administration, some
circles in the US favour the Montenegrin independence. One of prominent
Washington analysts James Hooper Director of the Group for International
Law(36) thinks that "democratic changes in Serbia and Montenegro would be
slowed down if they stayed together". He also thinks that "Kostunica
is bent on preserving the FRY for he believes that via federal institutions he
can slow down changes and weaken democratic forces in Serbia and
Montenegro." Hooper is also of opinion that "independence of
Montenegro would suspend anti-democratic federal institutions and thus provoke
liberation of Serbia and accelerate the latter's democratisation. In my mind
the Bush Administration should publicly voice its neutral stance on the issue
of Montenegrin independence."(37)
International Crisis Group voiced its
scepticism regarding sustainability of the new community, for "the
agreement which replaces the FRY with the new state community-union of states
called Serbia-Montenegro resulted from the EU resolve to halt the Montenegrin
separatism." However according to the ICG "the agreement did not live
to EU expectations for it failed to ensure the existence of the federal state
or end the debate on the status of Montenegro." ICG thinks that "the
agreement is incomplete, and its provisions failed to meet many demands made by
both republics." In its recommendations ICG states that "no Agreement
on Association and Stabilisation with EU is possible until the status of all
three entities, namely Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, is resolved."(38)
7. Army - a stumbling block
In recent years speculation was rife as to
a possible, army-assisted coup against the Montenegrin president. Most direct
confrontation between Đukanovic and Milosevic had happened during NATO
intervention, but a direct military influence on Montenegrin political developments was expected after
Đukanovic inauguration, in January 1998.
Then opposition tried to occupy the
parliament building and military aircraft were seen over Podgorica and other
Montenegrin towns for many days, as a specific form of threat. However that
attempt of army to intervene against the official authorities in Montenegro was
condemned by the international community. The Supreme Defence Council, the only
federal body in which Podgorica was only formally represented, somehow managed
to thwart an open engagement of the army. That is why Vojislav Kostunica
applied other means in disciplining Montenegro. In fact he reckoned that
unitary goals and creation of Greater Serbia with small Montenegro may be
attained by peaceful means.
Montenegro has been de facto independent for three years, it pursues and autonomous
foreign policy, has its own system of security and independent foreign trade
and customs systems. It lacks only the army to round its sovereignty. On the
other hand the Yugoslav Army is the only link between Serbia and Montenegro.
That is why announcement of Montenegrin officials that independence of the
republic would entail creation of Montenegrin army caused outrage among federal
military circles and among the ranks of the ruling coalition-DOS. As early as
in his pre-election campaign Milo Đukanovic announced formation of
"Montenegrin army" and "establishment" of control over
Montenegrin skies and airports.(39) Belgrade press highlighted his part of
statement on "Montenegrin defence ministry, national army ….Montenegrin
citizens shall serve the army in their own country."(40) That statement
was condemned notably by military circles. Milovan Čorugic, Federal
Defence Secretary, immediately stated "we don't fear Serbia, but
Montenegrin existence without Serbia" and "Montenegrins are proud of
the Yugoslav Army." He also maintained that "separatism is not in the
interest of people of Montenegro."
The need for formation of the Montenegrin
army was affirmed by the Montenegrin Prime Minister Filip Vujanovic. Namely he
promised that "Montenegro shall have its army, and shall not allow to be
without it, for there is no need for anyone else to determine the military
budget of Montenegro and appoint army commanders."(41) The Montenegrin
pro-sovereignty block always feared the army. Hence the statement of
Đukanovic that "Bulatovic, Šoc and Bojovic are planning to provoke
unrest and abuse of the Yugoslav army with DOS assistance" was not
surprising. Đukanovic also said that "the opposition might act as a
rabble-rouser, after its electoral defeat, in order to convincingly formulate
an alibi for that debacle."
On that occasion Vojislav Kostunica and
Zoran Đinđic issued a joint statement: "DOS shall in no way
interfere into Montenegrin elections. In case of Montenegrin decision to remain
in the common state with Serbia DOS shall promptly embark upon a dialogue on
re-arrangement of a federal state, as it is convinced that the concept of a
minimal, but functional federation is the best framework for a true prosperity
of Serbs and Montenegrins and other citizens of our country."(42)
At the peak of the 2001 pre-election
campaign, DOS offered a platform on re-definition of relations between Serbia
and Montenegro as a kind of "basis for a minimal and functional federation
with the joint authority in the provinces of defence, foreign policy,
transport, human rights, and economy." Montenegrin officials turned down
that offer with justification that it was of a political and not state nature,
and that only the two governments could agree on that redefinition. Statements
that after redefinition of those relations Montenegrin borders would be guarded
by the Yugoslav Army caused a veritable uproar. Montenegrin members of the
Commission maintained that "guarding of borders was not the topic of the
Constitutional Commission, but was nonetheless indirectly discussed. Nowhere in
the world army guards borders. It is the duty of police."(43) The federal
top leadership rejected the possibility that the said issue be deliberated by
the two republican governments, for according to Slobodan Samardžic, political
adviser to the FRY President Kostunica "behind the so-called political
proposal there is whole Serbia and part of Montenegro, while behind the
so-called political proposal is only part of Montenegro. And that point should
be taken into consideration."(44)
8 Unitary pressures on Montenegro
Re-definition of relations between
Montenegro and Serbia became the key topic of Belgrade media. In that informal
dialogue, which included coverage of statements of officials on both sides,
Belgrade's orientation towards a unitary arrangement of the new community was
crystallised. Dragan Marsicanin, Vice President of the Democratic Party of
Serbia, in espousing the DOS stance stated that "all talks on preservation
of relations between Serbia and Montenegro are possible only if they centre on
preservation of the common state." He also stated "Serbia does not
even ponder a kind of mock federal state imagined by Montenegrins for if
Montenegro secedes Serbia shall take time to decide with which neighbouring
states it shall co-operate. We care more about the railway line
Belgrade-Thessaloniki than about the Belgrade-Bar one. The FRY has not yet
collapsed and I don't think it shall happen. Like in the past, leaders of
Democratic Party of Socialists are likely to radically change their stances in
due course. We should wait for the Montenegrin election results, though I think
that whoever wins them is not likely to embark upon breaking up the federal
state." Čeda Jovanovic, an official of Democratic Party and head of MP
club of DOS, stated that "the coalition wants the state resting on
commonly pursued monetary policy, foreign policy, defence, and joint framework
for respect of human rights. If Montenegro finds it unacceptable, we shall
agree with its stance. There are no conditions for any confrontation. We shall
effect an amicable and civilised parting of the ways, or we shall build a
civilised new society."(45) Nebojsa Covic, Vice Prime Minister of
republican government, urged preservation of the joint state, but also admitted
that he was ready to accept "an amicable parting of the ways between the
two states, but not of the two peoples, for it is a dangerous historical
hypocrisy."(46)
Federal leadership and Kostunica's inner
circle tirelessly promoted the common state and in that propaganda used all the
media and other means available. Slobodan Samardžic (DPS) highlighted that
Serbia would renounce the common state "if there were an anti-federal
state mood in Montenegro." The media accused Montenegro of delegating responsibility
to the other side, and its offer to postpone talks on the union of the two
states until two chairs in the UN are granted, was rejected with the excuse
that "political forces in Serbia and federation urge the common
state."(47) Mlađan Dinkic, the NBY Governor, also thinks that
independence-gaining of Montenegro is not necessary, for "costs of
independence would be higher than the benefits thereof" in view of the
FRY's accelerated reforms and integration with the world.(48)
Zoran Zivkovic, Federal Interior
Secretary, stressed that "Serbia would accept any legitimate decision
taken at democratic elections, but in that case citizens of Serbia should have
a say too. All statements of Serb politicians had a negative charge and were
riddled with threats and warnings. Zoran Zivkovic also said " I personally
don't want to live in a union with a sovereign Montenegro, and would prefer a
union with some other countries. If Montenegro goes independent citizens of
Montenegro living in Serbia would become foreigners, and would have to apply
for citizenship of Serbia. That procedure would take a long time to resolve.
DOS shall respect the will of citizens of Montenegro."(49) Dragoljub
Micunovic, President of Federal Assembly, took a very hard-line stance on that
issue, and reiterated that "federal parliament shall exist as long as
Yugoslavia exists, and tensions shall stop in case of victory of Coalition
"Together for Yugoslavia. If the other side wins, then they will have to
start talks with the FRY and Serbia."(50)
After the April 2001 elections the
Montenegrin opposition "Together for Yugoslavia", backed by DOS,
continued its pro-Yugoslavia activities. The majority Montenegro and official
Podgorica were still not represented in any federal institution barring the
Supreme Defence Council. Such illegitimate state obviously suited DOS. Serb
hegemony-minded officials continued to pursue the same-means policy.
After elections in 2001 almost all Serb
prime movers openly criticised the ideas of independence of Montenegro or a
state union with it. They advocated preservation of the federal state bereft of
federal features, because official Podgorica did not have its representatives
in any federal body. Citizens of Serbia continued to finance the existence of
the two Serb governments and both the federal and republican administration. In
alluding to that fact, Zoran Zivkovic, Federal Interior Secretary, argued:
"we need an alliance with the state which can help us, and not with the
state which we should help."
Other parties floated also an
anti-independence stand. For example Nada Kolundžija, Vice President of
Democratic Alternative (DA) stated: "It is not in our interest to have an
union of the two independent and internationally recognised states. If Serbia
were to take a responsible stand on its interests then we are not interested in
any union with Montenegro, at least not with that republic. We are interested
in survival of federation with the minimal authority, but union of
internationally recognised states is not something we would take into
consideration even within 50-100 years."(51) DPS representatives
reiterated that "after Montenegrin elections there shall be more room for
talks between federal and republican officials and Montenegrin representatives,
in order to lay the foundations of the new state."(52) Vojislav Kostunica
explained that the outcome of Montenegrin elections represented a clear message
and support to efforts of authorities in Serbia and the FRY to find "a
formula for togetherness of Serbia and Montenegro and high level of
independence of the state with a small, but efficient number of
functions." He urged a quick resolution to the issue and said " it is
clear that there is no danger of use of military force in resolution of
Serb-Montenegrin relations, for anyone who even ponders such a possibility
shall face something stronger than any force, namely, the will of
people."(53)
9. Independence-epilogue of the FRY disintegration
Serb elite does not want to face up to the
fact that the process of independence-gaining of Montenegro is underway.
Consequently it avoids an open dialogue with the winner of elections, Coalition
"Montenegro shall win." Serb elite is still trying to re-shape the
Montenegrin political scene and its territorial and state integrity in
collusion with the Montenegrin opposition. But official Podgorica refuses such
a "deal" as indicated by the following statement of Miodrag Vukovic:
"Text of the platform is of a unitary character. It is a proof that local
unitarists and nationalists still aspire to a unitary state. Their starting
point is an original sovereignty of Yugoslavia, and not an original sovereignty
of the two old states, Serbia and Montenegro."(54) Vukovic pointed out
that "Serbia and Montenegro have only things in common, the civilian air
traffic control and the army. Montenegro shall not accept any modern
federation, for Montenegro and Serbia cannot function as Yugoslavia."(55)
Milo Đukanovic additionally clarified that stand: "In the face of the
ruins of the two failed Yugoslavia and the illusion of the current one,
Montenegro cannot and does not want to join the community of European nations
in the way it had done in 1918, without its national name, and its Montenegrin
state. Yugoslavia cannot exist without all South-Slav peoples. There can be no
two-member Yugoslavhood, unless, as the 13th July rebels have put
it- it is formed under the dictate of the dominant member."(56)
Branko Lukovac, Montenegrin Foreign
Secretary, appealed to the international community to renounce the stand on
"democratic Montenegro within democratic FRY" and called on Group 8
to "abandon and forget that illusion for it has become nonsensical in view
of its non-feasibility. " He also stated that Montenegro viewed that
stand: "as an international recommendation for Montenegro to become part
of the Greater Serbia, and we don't plan any such thing." At the
US-Montenegrin forum in Washington Lukovac underlined that President
Đukanovic and government in Podgorica in their orientation towards independence
enjoyed the backing of parliamentary majority and of population of Montenegro.
He added that "the truth is that the FRY is just a second name for Serbia
and no-one has the right to ignore that fact. Montenegro is no longer part of
the FRY, for the April elections have practically resolved the dilemma whether
Montenegro should follow in the footsteps of former Yugoslav republics and
become an autonomous international-legal entity."(57)
Frustrated by failed attempts to compel
Montengro to remain in the federation, some Serb nationalist grew increasingly
intolerant of Montenegrins. Academician Dragoslav Mihajlovic thinks that
"Serbia has chosen the worst way of getting closer to Montenegro… because
of differences in our mind-set, size, economy, work ethics, and other features
we would better part the ways for we Serbs should keep in mind the fact that in
the past century we suffered so much because of the two Montenegrins at the
helm of our state: King Aleksandar and Slobodan Milosevic."(58)
The same line of thinking is recognisable
in the following statement of Prime Minister Đinđic: "crisis is
generated in Podgorica. Đukanovic should change his topic, for it
obviously polarises and divides the nation, and opt for the one which would
unite citizens."(59) DPS sharply condemns all Montenegrin demands relating
to independence. Its officials say that "Đukanovic is imagining some
things" and "the minimal federation is the condition on which DOS
insists when it comes to future of federation and relations with Montenegro."(60)
Vojislav Kostunica constantly warns
Podgorica that "Serbia cannot be the hostage to divisions in Montenegro.
Resolution of the issue must be accelerated, but not in the way which puts on
the line the survival of the common state." He also underscored that
"referendum is a must for resolution of relations between Serbia and
Montenegro"(61), whereby he implied the two referendums, one in Serbia and
one in Montenegro. Official Montenegro opposed such a tack, and warned that
"Kostunica shall not schedule our referendum".(62)
Idea of referendum was backed also by
other Serb nationalists who think that Montenegro does not have any
"historical chance" to gain independence. In those terms Gavro
Perazic warns that "if a state vanishes, like Montenegro after its
unification with Yugoslavia in 1918, its possible, later date reconstruction as
an independent state, with elements once-possessed, does not mark the state
continuity with the vanished state."(63)
Though the Belgrade Agreement clearly
speaks about the union of two states, larger part of the Serb political elite
during talks on the Constitutional Charter continued to insist on a unitary
concept, notably with respect to economic aspect, that is a common central
bank, and manner of election of federal MPs. Most advocates of such concept
took a very hard-line stand and Montenegro was constantly faced with "all
or nothing" situation.
10. EU Proposals
Serb-Montenegrin political war (waged via
media) on the status of the state community and inability to reach a minimal
consensus on the character of the new state led to direct brokering of EU. But
the latter was guided by the idea to prevent referendum on independence of
Montenegro. EU was against further fragmentation of region for "it would
only destabilise the region and led to creation of economically unsustainable
small of states." However contents of Solana-brokered Belgrade Agreement
signed on 14 March 2002, indicate that EU was compelled to take a very flexible
stand on the agreement and notably its implementation. That Agreement de facto suspends the FRY and replaces
it with the new state community, a union called "Serbia and
Montenegro." The agreement is obviously against meddling with the reached
level of reforms notably in Montenegro and is observant of the level of
Montenegro's independence. It envisages a three-year moratorium on Montenegro
and rotating chairs in the UN. It is a loose union in which the two
member-states enjoy all elements of independence, barring the ones depending of
international subjectivity. Every state shall control its borders-including the
customs-and shall be responsible for its economic and internal security.
Republics shall finance institutions of union: parliament, president, Council
of Ministers, court of law and armed forces.
Neither side was satisfied with the
contents of the Belgrade Agreement. Branko Lukovac, Montenegrin Foreign
Secretary, on the eve of agreement-signing asked the US "to remain
consistent regarding its principles of justice and equality and to be maximally
cautious with respect to its support to the EU initiative aimed at resolution
of relations between the remaining two parts of the Yugoslav federation."
He stated that "Montenegro shall not renounce its ambition to create a
democratic society as a sovereign state which shall be an equitable member of
the world community." He added: "we express our readiness to consider
the EU proposal on the referendum deadline."(64)
In the face of an ever-increasing
resistance by Montenegro political elite in Serbia continued to openly or
covertly influence or meddle in developments in Montenegro. Such conduct
characterised the new-election campaign, that is preparations for the 20
October 2002 parliamentary elections, won by a landslide by Đukanovic's
coalition. According to coverage of Montenegrin Publika President Vojislav Kostunica allegedly tried to
"discipline Montenegro", that is issued new instructions for
activities on the ground to officials of Bulatovic's Socialist Popular
Party.(65)
Under the headline "Prime Movers in
Anti-Montenegrin Conspiracy" the paper ran a whole-page article dedicated
to "Instructions on political actions of pro-Yugoslav forces in
Montenegro." The document contains "special and conventional
activities, including obstruction of food production, causing of break-downs in
power supply, stage-managing incidents targeting pupils and guests from Serbia,
generation of social tensions, corruption of personnel, fanning of inter-ethnic
tensions, etc. Added to that the following activity is also envisaged:
"more coverage dedicated to "Nacional" scandal. In its
commentary the paper notes that "Yugoslavia no longer exists, but there
are still vestiges of some die-hard Yugoslav parties bent on destroying all
historical, state, and national achievements of Montenegro in the name of
fervent Yugoslavism."
11. Đukanovic's coalition landslide
in the face of pressures
Despite enormous pressures piled by
Belgrade, international community and opposition, majority of Montenegrin
citizens at the 20 October 2002 early parliamentary elections opted for
Đukanovic's coalition. "For European Montenegro" Coalition won
39 seats, which ensured its absolute majority in the 75-seat parliament. The
opposition coalition, headed by Predrag Bulatovic which changed its name to
"For Changes" won 30 seats, Liberal Party won 4 seats, and Albanian
parties won 2 seats. That victory of the pro-reform forces in Montenegro is
very important, for it strengthens Đukanovic's position vis a vis Belgrade
and international community.
After three failed rounds of Serbian
presidential elections, the international community is renewing its interest in
the status of Montenegro, for Đukanovic's coalition after October
elections may set up a stable government with a four-year mandate. This
represents a significant contribution to the factor of stability and security
in the region, for unitarism- and nationalism-minded forces in Serbia and their
Montenegrin partners now constitute a minority.
Victory of reform-minded and pro-European
forces in Montenegro paves the way for a swifter agreement-reaching between
Serbia and Montenegro on re-arrangement of their relations. Namely the work on
the Constitutional Charter was blocked for months because of hard-line
insistence of Serbia unitarists on direct elections for the parliament of the
future community of Serbia and Montenegro, totally contrary to the spirit of
the Belgrade Agreement. Some DOS leaders warned that attempts to overlook the
Montenegrin realities "may only make more difficult the process of
adoption of the charter" and "undermine relations between Serbia and
Montenegro, for disrespect and non-acceptance of election results would widen
the division between the republics. An increasing paternalistic stand of Serbia
shall exacerbate position on Montenegro and consequently admission to Council of
Europe."
Prime Minister Zoran Đinđic
showed more understanding for Montenegrin demands. This became manifest after
his 25 October Belgrade meeting with Đukanovic when the long-standing
dispute was settled. The latter paved the way for the early December adoption
of the Charter. But Đinđic's understanding for Montenegro is
undermined by his views on the Dayton Agreement. Namely in his interview to Der
Spiegel Đinđic solution for Albanians and Serbs was similar to the
one implemented in B&H Federation with respect to Muslims and Croats (every
community would have their own institutions). However if Albanians continued to
insist on independence which would constitute a "dangerous precedent for
other peoples in the Balkans, and a threat to peace in multi-ethnic Bosnia",
Đinđic would then favour a new Dayton-style conference dealing with
"a complete re-definition of borders in the region."(66) This
statement is in line with the Serb national program as defined the last time in
1995, as a last-ditch attempt to test the mood of the international community.
This statement was preceded by the extensive coverage of articles heralding new
Serbia's proposal on division of Kosovo and re-composition of the Balkans.
International reactions to this statement
were very negative, notably in B&H. High Representative for B&H Paddy
Ashdown stated that "borders in Europe are not subject of international
conferences" and "status of Kosovo shall not affect neighbouring,
sovereign states." Solana's cabinet issued a similar statement with the emphasis
on the fact that "the time of defining of the Balkans state borders is
over." Representatives of Republika Srpska however think that
"Djinđic's statement should be viewed only as an
initiative."(67)
In the broader regional context one should
bear in mind that EU insisted on preservation of at least loose state community
(the Belgrade Agreement), in view of absence of a final answer to the Kosovo
status. Montenegrin officials therefore keep warning that Montenegro has not
generated the Kosovo problem, nor taken part in its aggravation. The issue of
Kosovo may be resolved only through co-operation of Belgrade, Pristina and
Belgrade. Member of the Montenegrin constitutional commission Ferhad Dinoša
(from Democratic Union of Albanians) resigned after the stance that
"Kosovo is an constituent part of Serbia" was included in the
preamble of the Charter.
Serb elite has not relinquished the Serb
national program. It waged war for the "Serb state" and as a
historian Nikola Popovic says: "the core problem was the West's resistance
to the emergence of the Serb state within its natural boundaries and the West's
insistence on the resolution of the Yugo-problem by dint of implementation of
"the right to self-determination of Yugo-republics and not of Yugo-peoples"(68)
And the latter was the position taken up by Serbia in the 90's at the beginning
of the Yugoslav crisis in all inter-republican negotiations and in
international rallies on the Yugoslav crisis, including the Hague Conference.
The Serb national program was re-affirmed in 1994 when the Second Congress of
Intellectuals adopted the Resolution on the Current Serb Problem. In September
1995 the Declaration on the Serb State and National Issue was promoted by
several then opposition parties, and signed by Z. Djindjic, V. Kostunica,
Nikola Milosevic, Slobodan Rakitic, R. Ljusic, etc. That declaration inter alia
reads: "Since disintegration of the SFRY Serbs are facing two
not-so-easy-to-resolve problems. The first is the national and state one, and
it presupposes creations of the Serb state encompassing all our countries with
the majority Serb population, notably Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska
krajina, The second problem is of a political nature and its goal is
establishment of the multi-party system and the rule of democratic order."
After victory of 5 October 2000, DOS
managed to legitimise themselves as democratic authorities and to present to
the West its "civil nationalism" as liberal nationalism. That led to
shift in the West's position, notably EU's with respect to preservation of the
common state. But the initial euphoria over changes is slowly waning and
clearer signs of a more reserved attitude towards Serbia are emerging in view
of its non-fulfilment of sine qua non conditions
on which its admission to Euro-Atlantic integration hinges, notably its
unsatisfying co-operation with the Hague Tribunal and non-compliance with the
Dayton Accord. Thus Montenegro once again got the chance to preserve its
independence and as the Belgrade Agreement envisages formally have a say on its
independence within three years. Logic of disintegration of the FRY is
inevitable, and external pressures making more difficult the process of
emancipation of Montenegro indicate lack of readiness of relevant international
factors to respect the former. However recognition of the dominant process
would accelerate re-integration of the whole region on the new foundations.
Conclusions
and recommendations
-
International
recognition of the FRY and signing of the Belgrade Agreement should not
jeopardise a democratic resolution of Serb-Montenegrin relations, even if that
resolution were to lead to separation of the two states; respect of sovereignty
of the two entities is not contrary to the dominant process of globalisation,
but is rather part of that process;
-
Process
of disintegration of the SFRY has it inevitable logic and completion of that
process is a pre-requisite for re-integration of the region, which is in the
interest of people in the region, but also in the interest of EU and the US;
-
Serbia
has specific problems, notably in facing up to the recent past, that is why it
should primarily address its own problems, and not those of its neighbours.
Unresolved internal problems of Serbia, notably those of internal order
(republic of monarchy), the issue of autonomy of Vojvodina, the Sandžak issue,
minorities and refugees-related issues, are specific problems which would only
encumber the transition of the state community of Serbia-Montenegro.
-
Independence
of Montenegro indirectly opens the issue of status of Kosovo, but that is not
at odds with regional interests; procrastination of resolution of status of the
three de facto independent
entities-Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, may additionally radicalise all sides and
slow down an already painful process of transition; the international
community's insistence on the Charter instead on transition, has already slowed
down the process of transition in Serbia and Montenegro;
-
Mutual
obstruction of the process of charter-adoption, based on different motives, is
not an expression of a true search for necessary compromise, but rather a
consequence of the fact that "the European model" of the future state
community was imposed on both sides which in fact don't have faith in its
survival. EU should stick to its role of monitor of this process, and continue
to proved logistic assistance, in view of immaturity of local elites, but in
full respect of regional logic;
-
Balkans
ethnic nationalism are still eroding the social fibre of region and in the long-term
divest it of potential for integrating process due to high degree of
intolerance, xenophobia, disrespect of minority rights and insistence on ethnic
states;
-
EU-offered
architecture for the Balkans to date proved to be insufficient; it should
include a comprehensive program for creation of new elites in the region, which
presupposes special EU and Council of Europe programs in their work with young
generations.
Belgrade, 10
January 2003
Notes:
1. Borba, 31 March-1 April 2001
2. Glas javnosti, 1 April 2001
3. Blic News, 4 April 2001
4. Danas, 7-8 April 2001
5. Glas javnosti, 17 April 2001
6. Danas, 6 April 2001
7. Glas javnosti, 6 April 2001 Dusan
Prorokovic: "If Montenegro opts for independence we shall face a very
problematic status of Kosovo and I fear that such a decision would lead to
increase in tensions in Montenegro proper…and we shall also turn off potential
investors in Montenegro."
8. Glas javnosti, 7 April 2001
9. Politika, 18 April 2001
10. Blic News 6-7 January 2002
11. Glas javnosti, 8 April 2001
12. Politika, 12 April 2001
13. Vecernje novosti, 8 April 2001
14. Vecernje novosti, 7 April 2001
15. Vecernje novosti, 22 February 200216
Glas javnosti, 14-16 April 2001
17. Borba, 10 April 2001
18. Danas, 19 April 2001
19. Glas javnosti, 19 April 2001
20. Danas, 7-8 April 2001
21. Politika, 8 April 2001
22. Blic, 8 April 2001
23. Večernje novosti, 17 April 2001
24. Svedok, 3 April 2001
25. Blic, 12 April 2001
26. Politika, 20 July 2001
27. Politika, 8 April 2001
28. Blic, 12 April 2001
29. 24 časa, 9 April 2001
30. Blic, 9 April 2001
31. Blic, 9 April 2001
32. Danas, 13 April 2001
33. Danas, 30 April 2001
34. Blic, 11 April 2001
35. Borba, 14-15 April 2001
36. Similar positions on Montenegro were
voiced also by some prominent Washington figures notably, Morton Abramowitz,
Janos Bugajski, Paul Williams, etc.
37. Danas, 17 January 2002
38. Novosti, 28 May 2002
39. Glas javnosti, 9 April 2001
40. Politika, 9 April 2001
41. Danas, 31 March-1 April 2001
42. Borba 14-16 April 2001
43. Danas, 8 October 2002
44. Borba, 14-16 April 2001
45. Blic, 10 April 2001
46. Glas javnosti, 11 April 2001
47. Borba, 14-16 April 2001
48. Danas, 17 April 2001
49. Politika, 18 April 2001
50. Vecernje Novosti, 19 April 2001
51. Blic, 10 May 2001
52. Blic, 10 May 2001
53. Borba, 5-6 May 2001
54. Glas javnosti, 1 September 2001
55. Glas javnosti, 4 July 2001
56. Blic, 14 July 2001
57. Danas 21-22 July 2001
58. Novi Ekspres, 18 May 2001
59. Glas javnosti, 26 May 2001
60. Blic, 26 May 2001
61. Glas javnosti, 30 September 2001
62. Svedok, 2 October 2001
63. Politika, 5 September 2001
64. Danas, 9-10 March, 2002
65. Publika, 22 April 2002
66. Der Spiegel, January 2003
67. From press review issued by the Office
of High Representative, 9 January 2003
68. Otadžbina, 30 September 2002.