The
Constitutional Process in the Autonomous
in the Context of Interethnic Relations and Conflict Settlement
By
Natalya Belitser
Pylyp Orlyk Institute for
Democracy
On
A Brief
History of the Crimean Separatism
To have a
deeper insight into the causes and circumstances of the current Crimean crisis,
and the means employed in attempts to resolve it, it is necessary to briefly
delve into the history of the post-W.W.II and post-soviet
This
decision was issued by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and then
approved unanimously by a law passed by the USSR SS on 26 April 1954. It is
important to stress that throughout the following period until late 80s, when
the Crimean peninsula still held a status of an oblast of the Ukr SSR, this status had never proven contentious either
within Crimea, Ukraine, or the USSR, or beyond.
During the
turbulent perestroika period, Crimea proved to be a stronghold of Communist
party diehards for several reasons. These included the composition of its
population, which consisted mainly of the post-W.W.II settlers, principally
ethnic Russians and so-called Russian-speaking people with generous share of
party, military and KGB pensioners. Strong links between the local authorities
and central (Moscow) government and nomenklatura, and
the military ambitions of the Black Sea Fleet added to the potential separatist
tensions. No organized pro-Ukrainian movement was then yet visible, and the
only political and social force emerging as an anti-regime opposition were the Crimean Tatars who had just begun large-scale
repatriation from exile, mainly from Central Asia. This nation, subjected to
genocidal deportation in 1944 under the allegations of collaboration with the
Nazis, was the last of the repressed peoples and nationalities of the USSR
allowed to return to their homeland, and only in the
very late stages of perestroika.
Therefore,
political and social unrest relating to the so-called constitutional process in
Crimea in fact began with the first recognizable signs of Ukrainian quest for
independence. From the very beginning, all claims, declared intentions and
actual events accompanying this process were characterized not so much by legal
considerations as by some rather highly politicized manipulations and maneuvers
by the actors involved. [3]
The story of
Crimean separatism in Ukraine could thus be perceived as beginning in September
1990, when the Soviet of People’s Deputies of Crimean oblast called for the
rescinding of the decree and corresponding law on the abolition of the Crimean
ASSR, and demanded the restoration of autonomy to the peninsula. This claim was
supported by the referendum held in Crimea on 20 January 1991, in which 93,3 percent of the participants voted for the restoration of
the Crimean ASSR not only as a subject of the USSR, but also as "a party
to the Union Treaty," i.e., a sovereign subject of the "renewed"
and "reformed" USSR proposed by the first and only Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev. After much heated debates and, perhaps, keeping in mind the
possible bloody and violent consequences of rejecting demands similar to those
made in other parts of the ailing Soviet Union, on 12 February 1991, the
Ukrainian Supreme Soviet adopted a law providing autonomous status for Crimea
within the borders of Ukraine. That this autonomy would have nothing to do with
restoring the pre-war situation, when the then Crimean ASSR could be considered
as a de-facto Crimean Tatars’ autonomy, had never been raised at the official
level by anybody but the Crimean Tatars themselves.
Following
the failed August 1991 coup which precipitated the collapse of the USSR, and
resulted in Ukrainian independence, all of the issues relating to Crimea’s
legal status, the mass repatriation of Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups
deported from Crimea, and the generally disquieting state of interethnic
relations on the peninsula became not only a deep problem for the fledgling
independent Ukrainian state, but to a large extent also a significant factor in
Ukrainian-Russian interstate relations.
The
principal issue fought over by different political forces has been the
sovereignty of (or over) Crimea. Three main options were debated. The first one
argued for the creation of an independent Crimean Republic. [4] The second option suggested a
fully-fledged autonomy within Ukraine (e.g., according to the Constitution of
the Crimean Republic of 6 May 1992). The third and most radical scenario was
propounded by pro-Russian forces which exerted pressure by threatening Crimean
secession from Ukraine and annexation to Russia. [5] The separatist trends seemed rather
successful during the first half of 90s. An anti-Ukrainian mood spread among
the majority of the Crimean population, while a hesitant and feeble policy
meant that the central authorities lagged behind the events, and no
comprehensive strategy for solving the whole complex of Crimean problems had
been elaborated.
The initial
responses to Crimean crisis on the part of the world community revealed its
principal preoccupation to be the rights and interests of the Russian majority,
because of the obvious fears of a "Balkanization" of the Crimea
problem.
As a result
of the above mentioned trends, the first versions of the Crimean Constitution
heavily exploited the notion of a "Crimean people" as being the
subject of the right to self-determination, including the right to determine
political future of the territory it occupied (and providing, in such a way,
every advantage to the Russian and Russian-speaking majority of residents of
the peninsula). The Russian language had to be made dominant, and any attempts
- no matter how mild or irresolute - to introduce the state (Ukrainian)
language as well as other measures perceived to be aiming at "Ukrainization" of Crimea, were readily resisted
"from below." At that time, even those provisions declared as
complying with Kyiv’s requirement to bring Crimea’s
Constitution and laws in line with those of Ukraine, still defined Crimea as
"a law-governed, democratic and secular state... which builds its
relations with Ukraine on mutually coordinated acts and agreements." [6]
Hostility to
Ukraine reached its peak in 1993 at a time of a hyperinflation and deep
economic crisis, that in Ukraine seemed much more
severe than in Russia. Manipulating this situation, the Crimean parliament
adopted a number of resolutions and laws strengthening its autonomy, including
the creation of a Crimean presidency, and scheduled presidential elections for
January 1994. At the same time, following acts of civil disobedience organized
by the Mejlis of Crimean Tatar people, and its
prolonged and complex negotiations with Crimean deputies, the Crimean Supreme Council
agreed to grant Crimean Tatars a quota of 14 seats in the republican
legislature. This decision also brought advantages to other groups of returnees
- the formerly deported Armenians, Bulgarians, Germans and Greeks - who
practically without any efforts or struggle on their own behalf were also
guaranteed representation in the peninsula’s legislature (one seat for each
group). The main drawback of this compromise was that it was adopted for one
term only, as a provisional measure to support ethnic groups suffering from the
consequences of deportation.
The
presidential elections in Crimea did take place on 16 January 1994. As a result
of a broad dissatisfaction with Ukraine, the winner was Yuri Meshkov who had based his electoral campaign on a platform of
union with Russia. One of his first steps was a decree on a referendum on
Crimean independence. Until the end of the year, there was a persistent turmoil
between Kyiv and Simferopol. Both the Ukrainian
parliament and President Leonid Kravchuk responded to
Crimean laws and presidential decrees with counter-resolutions and statements
denouncing those steps as contradicting the Ukrainian Constitution. Leonid Kuchma, President Kravchuk’s
successor in July 1994, did not come up to expectations of his Crimean electorate,
and continued to veto those Crimean laws that violated Ukrainian legislation.
This
situation resembled a legal vicious circle. At the same time, the very
indecisiveness of the national authorities and their unwillingness to take
drastic measures or use military force to curb separatist passions in Crimea
meant that violent clashes were avoided and the necessary time for finding more
acceptable solutions was gained. Thus, engagement in numerous negotiations
between central and Crimean authorities over the status of Crimea and the
separation of powers between Kyiv and Simferopol
obviously helped both sides to refrain from open violence and to pacify their
most aggressive elements who were demanding prompt and decisive measures to end
the crisis. Meanwhile, Meshkov’s popularity had been
rapidly declining as a result of his inability either to improve the economic
situation or to involve Russia decisively in support of the secessionist
movement. The power struggle between the executive and legislative branches in
Crimea loosened Meshkov’s grip further still.
Moreover, with the start of the Russian military operation in Chechnia in December 1994, pro-Russian sentiments among the
Crimean population clearly diminished. Ordinary people grew much more cautious
and restrained in their rhetoric, perhaps because that time, they were able to
appreciate possibly the greatest advantage of Ukrainian citizenship: not being
sent to fight in someone else’s land, with a big chance to be killed or become
a killer.
These
changes in the Crimean political environment were felt in March 1995 when the Verhovna Rada suddenly took
decisive steps to integrate the ARC into the legal space of Ukraine. The Law of
Ukraine on the Status of Crimea, adopted on 17 March 1995, abolished not only
the Crimean Constitution of 1992 and all laws and decrees contradicting those
of Ukraine, but also the very office of Crimean Presidency. The much feared
mass protests in Crimea failed to occur, and the reaction from Moscow was
relatively mild. The steps taken by Kyiv to draw Crimea and the City of
Sevastopol closer into the Ukrainian legal space rebounded negatively on the
negotiation of the Russia-Ukraine basic treaty, since some factions of the
Russian State Duma refused to sign it until more concessions,
particularly over the status of Sevastopol - "a city of Russian
glory" - were made. [7] But this obstacle was removed in 1997,
when this treaty was ratified by both sides, together with the agreement on the
division of the Black Sea fleet and its bases.
Though these
events represented a rare example of a peaceful curbing of rebellious
separatism in a post-Soviet state, the principal achievement of the Crimean
Tatars and the other formerly deported ethnic groups - namely, their guaranteed
representation in the republican legislature - was lost together with all of
the other legal points that were not to be found in Ukrainian national
legislation.
This loss
occurred despite the fact that a growing proportion of Crimean Tatar returnees
added a new element to the Ukrainian-Russian struggle over Crimea by actually
supporting Ukrainian state integrity, and thereby becoming a factor that all
the conflicting sides, as well as international bodies and organizations, were
compelled to reckon with.
The claims
of the Crimean Tatars in the documents adopted at the sessions of Kurultayi (National Assembly) or between the sessions, by
the Mejlis (the main representative body of the Crimean
Tatar people elected by the Kurultayi), underwent a
certain transformation in the period following the first session of the Second Kurultayi in June 1991. [8] Although the Declaration on the National
Sovereignty of the Crimean Tatar People, adopted in June 1991, is still being
used by some politicians as a tool of anti-Crimean Tatar propaganda, it is
crucial to remember that all of this occurred when the Soviet Union still
existed. After its collapse, the Crimean Tatars’ political elite demonstrated a
rare political wisdom and pragmatism by never supporting any claims threatening
the integrity of Ukraine or the inviolability of its borders, and by looking
for legal ways to establish their right for internal national
self-determination within Ukraine. These circumstances also explain the strong
Crimean Tatar drive to get an official status as an indigenous people rather
than one of the national minorities of Ukraine. This claim has been based on
international documents such as the ILO Convention N 169, and the UN Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (which is still under
consideration by the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations and has not yet
been presented to the General Assembly). The Crimean Tatars believe that
gaining indigenous people status, together with Ukraine’s joining the ILO
Convention N 169, would assist them in their quest to secure, for example, a
guaranteed proportional representation, at least commensurate with their
population, in legislative and executive bodies at all levels, the official
recognition of the Mejlis as the main representative
body of Crimean Tatar people, and the genuine protection of their cultural,
educational, linguistic, and religious traditions. [9]
Meanwhile,
new versions of the Crimean Constitution had been prepared, but none of them
regarded the need to re-establish the rights of the indigenous population of
Crimea as an issue. The only concession, for instance, in the version adopted
by the Crimean parliament on 21 September 1995, recognized the co-existence on
the territory of the Crimean Republic of three state languages: Ukrainian,
Russian, and Crimean Tatar (though only Russian was identified as an
"official" language to be used in offices). The same provisions were
carried over into the next draft of 1 November 1995. These versions of the
Crimean Constitution were then widely discussed between the working groups of
the VR of the ARC and the VR of Ukraine created to reconcile the positions of
the two sides. By the end of 1997, agreement was reached over the vast majority
of the articles (only 22 articles of the overall 136 remained disputed).
However, some key questions were still unresolved; among them Crimean internal
citizenship, as well as references to "Crimean people" and
"Crimean statehood" in several draft articles.
It should be
noted that at this stage, when the worst of the Crimean secessionist crisis of
early 1990s had passed, and the immediate danger of violent clashes had been
avoided, some international organizations and experts became more actively
involved in the Kyiv-Simferopol negotiations and
legal disputes. For example, OSCE offices were opened both in Kyiv and Simferopol at the end of 1994, although the results of
their efforts to settle the Crimean crisis were not always regarded as
successful. In fact, a speech on 31 May 1995, to Crimean deputies by the Swiss
diplomat, Andreas Kohlschutter (the then head of the
OSCE mission to Ukraine), provided full support for only one, i.e. the Crimean,
side of the conflict and charged "powerful radical forces in the Ukrainian
parliament" with vicious intentions to "punish and discipline the
Crimea, and to destroy Crimean autonomy." [10] This intervention evoked many protests
within Ukraine and was given sharply negative appraisal by some prominent
independent international experts. [11] More fruitful turned out to be the
activities of the OSCE Office of High Commissioner on National Minorities
established in 1993. Its head, Max van der Stoel, has focused much personal attention to Crimean
issues, particularly to the problems of repatriation and resettlement of
Crimean Tatars, citizenship, and, also, to some provisions of the draft Crimean
Constitution.
Thus, for
example, when the draft Constitution of 21 September 1995 that proposed Crimean
citizenship was considered, he correctly recommended that there is no need to
stipulate it in addition to Ukrainian citizenship. [12] High Commissioner also commented on the
delineation of powers between the Ukrainian national authorities and those of
the Republic of Crimea as laid down in the law of Ukraine of 30 June 1992, [13] the division of property in Crimea, and
a special status for Sevastopol. Recommendations were also given that the
resettlement of the Crimean Tatars should be decided in collaboration with
their representatives appointed by Mejlis and, most
important, "to continue the present quota system (for Crimean Tatars) as
long as the present electoral law of Crimea remains in effect... A continuation
of the quota system would not be justified if an electoral system will come
into being which would give them a near certainty of having a representation
broadly commensurate to their percentage of the total population of
Crimea." [14] Similar recommendations concerning,
inter alia, Mejlis
participation in the nomination of candidates for elected bodies and a
proportional representation of Crimean Tatars in the ARC parliament, were also
made in subsequent letters dated 19 March and 5 April 1996. [15]
It should be
noted that at that time Ukrainian governmental officials objected to any
special measures singling out Crimean Tatars from among the other returnees,
and intended to solve the whole complex of repatriation problems on the basis
of the criterion that they all belonged to the category of formerly deported
people rather than to a specific ethnic group. For example, Hennady
Udovenko, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, in
his letter to Max van der Stoel
expressed his belief that adopting such a course "may create an
undesirable precedent in the aspect of development of the constitutional system
in Ukraine." [16]
Thus,
Crimean Tatars who by that time had developed a strong sense of
self-identification as a coherent people or nation were equated with all other
returnees to Crimea, belonging to ethnicities (namely, Armenians, Bulgarians,
Greeks, and Germans) that already had their own firmly established kinstates. The same status - of them being just one of
among many national minorities of Ukraine - was earlier stipulated for the
Crimean Tatars by the Ukrainian law on national minorities adopted on 25 July
1992. All claims, draft proposals for the Crimean Constitutions suggested by Mejlis and later, by the Kurultayi
faction of the Crimean parliament, and statements and resolutions of the Mejlis and the Kurultayi were
neglected. [17]
This awkward
situation subsequently changed somewhat, especially after the new Constitution
of Ukraine was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on 28 June, 1996. For the first time, the term
"indigenous peoples" has been introduced into Ukrainian legal
terminology. Thus, Article 11 stipulates that "The State shall facilitate
the consolidation and development of the... ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and
religious attributes of all indigenous peoples and national minorities of
Ukraine." According to Article 92 p.3, the rights of indigenous peoples
and national minorities are to be determined by Ukrainian law, whereas Article
119 p.3 reads that programs of national-cultural development of indigenous
peoples and national minorities in areas of their compact residence must be
supported by local state administrations. [18]
At the same
time, the entire chapter of the Main Law of Ukraine dealing with the ARC bears
no mention of indigenous peoples or any kind of specific provisions to protect
their rights and/or ensure their sustainable development, referring only (among
the prerogatives of the ARC) to "participating in the development and
realization of state programs for the return of deported peoples" (Article
138, p.9). Accommodating the concept of Crimean autonomy into the principles
defining the state structure of Ukraine is also rather strange because Article
132 says that the territorial structure of Ukraine is based on the principles
of the unity and integrity of the State’s territory, whereas Article 133
declares that "the administrative and territorial structure of Ukraine consists
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, provinces (oblasts), regions, cities,
settlements, and villages." The Ukrainian Constitution also states that
"The Autonomous Republic of Crimea is an inseparable constituent part of
Ukraine and decides on the issues within its competence within the limits of
authority determined by the Constitution of Ukraine" (Article 134).
Article 135 in fact confirmed that the ARC has its own Constitution, adopted by
the Verkhovna Rada of the
ARC and approved by the Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine by no less than one-half of its constitutional composition.
Following
the adoption of the Ukrainian Constitution and decrees of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, a joint working group was formed by the Ministry of
Justice and the VR’s Committee on Human Rights,
National Minorities and Interethnic Rrelations, with
the participation of the Law and Politics department of the Mejlis.
Its aim was to draft legislation dealing with the indigenous peoples of Ukraine.
In 1996-1997, a draft Concept of National Policy of Ukraine Relating to
Indigenous Peoples, as well as a draft Law on the Status of Crimean Tatar
People were developed and subjected to international review. Some positive
responses were received, and even Mr. Max van der Stoel who, quite understandably, would still prefer to
solve the Crimean Tatars’ problems within the framework of the rights of
national minorities, admitted that "When referring to international and
Ukrainian legal instruments regarding national minorities which are applicable
to indigenous peoples, I do not intend to suggest that no distinction can be
made between national minorities and indigenous peoples. An important
difference is, in my view, that in contrast to a national minority, an indigenous people does not have a kinstate."
[19] This passage can be regarded as granting
implicit support for Crimean Tatars’ claim concerning the uniqueness of their
situation. Unfortunately, neither draft prepared by the
working group has yet been accepted by the VR of Ukraine for further
consideration, and the high expectations raised by these developments
seem to be gradually petering out.
And indeed,
the worst predictions of the Crimean Tatars came true. Despite all their
protests, appeals and statements, in February 1998 the heated debates over the
electoral system in the Crimea and the functioning of its legislature concluded
in two laws adopted by the Verkhovna Rada and signed by the President. One of them, "On the
Elections to the Verkhovna Rada
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea," stipulated that the Crimean
Parliament, unlike the Parliament of Ukraine, [20] would be elected under a purely majority
system. The second law, "On the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea," stated
that all the 100 deputies are elected on the basis of universal, equal, and
direct suffrage (without any mention of the national electoral districts, or
quotas for either the Crimean Tatars, or other formerly deported groups, or
national minorities). Since the Crimean Tatars constituted a minority, though
sometimes a substantial one, in all of the electoral districts, this decision
practically stripped them of any chance to be represented in the Crimean
legislature. Besides, their opportunities to vote, or run in the elections,
were also sharply reduced because at that time (
As has been
anticipated, today approximately 270 000 Crimean Tatars, - an indigenous people
of
The Adoption
of the Crimean Constitution
Following
the 1998 elections, the situation deteriorated even further, especially after
Leonid Hrach, the leader of the Crimean Communists,
became the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of the ARC. A skillful and experienced politician, Hrach accomplished what his predecessors had failed to
achieve. Under his personal guidance, the fifth version of the Crimean
Constitution was prepared (without the participation of the Crimean Tatars) in
such a way that after eight days after the failed attempt of 15 December 1998,
the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine approved the Main Law of the ARC. This occurred under the heavy
prompting of the left-wing Speaker Oleksandr Tkachenko and other Left deputies who did not take into
consideration the valid arguments of the deputies from the right-centre
factions. The latter argued that though the most unacceptable notions like
Crimean citizenship, Crimean statehood etc. had been eliminated, a number of
articles still conflicted with the Ukrainian Constitution, also that the draft
Constitution of the ARC did not take into account the specificity of the legal
status of the Crimean Tatars as an indigenous people of the autonomy, in
particular, did not provide them with guaranteed representation in the
republican legislature. [23] There is also considerable evidence that
parliamentary procedure was seriously violated. For example, a
"fatal" step was taken during the discussion by Rukh
deputy Ivan Zayets, who proposed an amendment that in
the case of a collision between the provisions of the Crimean and national
Constitutions, the latter takes precedence. The inclusion of this amendment
(that Zayets later explained was more a question
addressed to the chairman of the Crimean parliament) added some votes in favour even though the Ukrainian deputies had no right to
introduce any changes into the text of the Constitution adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of the ARC, being
able only to approve or disapprove it as a whole. [24]
These legal
and political uncertainties urged a number of Ukrainian deputies to apply to
the Constitutional Court of Ukraine for a decision on whether the adopted
Crimean Constitution complies with national legislation. The submission, signed
by 50 M.P.s, had been accepted by the Court but its
consideration was delayed initially by the forthcoming presidential elections
and then under the pretext that more urgent issues were still unresolved.
Today, it is still a pending case, and no date has been fixed for the review.
As regards
the reaction of the Crimean ethnos to the final version of the Crimean
Constitution, only two of them, namely, the Russians and the Crimean Tatars, expressed a clear-cut position. The former,
represented by the Russian Community of the Crimea and the regional branch of
the Slavic party, protested against it on the grounds that a "betrayal of
Russians in Crimea" had occurred (referring in particular to Article 10,
p.1 which stipulated that in parallel with the State (Ukrainian) language, the
functioning, development, usage and protection of the Russian, Crimean Tatar,
as well as the mother tongues of other nationalities, shall be protected in
Crimea). On
No wonder,
then, that there was a sharp, almost immediate reaction to this and other
provisions (neither of which contained any special measures for restoring and
securing the rights of the indigenous people of
Post-Adoption
Events and Developments
The negative
impact of the adopted Crimean Constitution for the Crimean Tatar community, as
well as the general deterioration of the interethnic situation in the
peninsula, soon became evident. As Bruce Pannier commented, "The adoption
of the new Constitution seems to have sparked a new round of violence against
Tatars." [27] During the night of
That day,
three plain-clothes militia officers entered the Mejlis
office and tried to confiscate the documents of the "Krym"
Foundation located in the same building, the latter being accused of
misappropriating public funds allocated for housing construction. 17 officers
of the "Berkut" special militia unit then
surrounded the building, and they left only after the intervention of Mustafa Djemilev. The whole incident lasted only 15 minutes. The
next day, Gennadiy Moskal,
the Chief of the Crimean militia forces, came to the Mejlis
with apologies, admitted that his officers acted illegally and promised to
conduct an investigation. Nevertheless, this event certainly added to the
rising confrontation and while being vigorously discussed on the Internet, was once even referred to as a "Stalinist
type" action. [28]
As regards
the recent interethnic situation in
Ukrainian
NGOs and the local branches of national-democratic parties support the demands
of the Crimean Tatar. Close links have been established between some Crimean
Tatar and Ukrainian NGOs for furthering effective collaboration. [29] As a result of the growing attention
paid by the Ukrainian community of
In the
context of Ukrainian-Crimean Tatar relations, it is especially interesting to
note the mutual support of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar communities on such
a sensitive issue as linguistic rights and their implementation in the
It would
therefore be a mistake to generalize a notion of hostile behaviour
on the part of the entire "Slavic population" of the peninsula as has
been done, for example, by the CoE Rapporteur Lord Ponsonby, who
stated that: "The local Slavic population displays a regrettable degree of
xenophobia vis-a-vis returnees and at best, is
disinterested in their plight." [32]
But it is
important to be aware that despite the rather high level of understanding and
support achieved by the Crimean Tatar political elite and NGOs in their
relations with national democratic forces, all the developments following the
adoption of the Crimean Constitution upset the precarious interethnic accord in
the peninsula and resulted in the further disillusionment of the Crimean Tatars
and their growing dissatisfaction with the positions and actions of not only
the local, but also the national authorities. [33] Accordingly, the scale of their protests
has been increasing. This was clearly revealed by the protest march preceding
the meeting of
Apart from
the disquieting events relating to the interethnic situation in
The
turbulent national events of 1999-2000, and especially the continuing
confrontation between the executive and legislative branches, and between the
pro-presidential majority and the left minority within the parliament itself at
the beginning of this year, further delayed the long-awaited parliamentary
hearings on the "Legal Solutions to the Problems of the Crimean Tatar
People." Preparations for these hearings actually began in mid-1999. [37] The hearings were initially scheduled
for September 1999. They were then rescheduled for December and again for the
beginning of 2000. Regrettably, considering the current overall political
situation, neither the parliamentary Committees nor any of the other interested
parties seem ready to organize hearings within the foreseeable future.
Therefore, a
great opportunity to implement timely a relatively "mild" solution to
the problems of the Crimean Tatars through passage of a law granting them the
special status of an indigenous people has been lost. As a result, the demands
of the Crimean Tatars have changed to the more radical claim of converting the
ARC into a national Crimean Tatar autonomy within
Conclusions
Proceeding
from the above account, it is possible to reach the conclusion that from the
very beginning, the principal aim of the entire constitutional process in
Crimea was not so much to find a proper legal solution that would take into
consideration all of the historic, ethnic, and cultural specifics of this
region and integrate them into the general texture of Ukrainian political and
economic life, but rather to appease the pro-Russian majority there, to pacify
its pronounced secessionist trends, and by doing so, to avoid more violent
scenarios. As a result, the Crimean peninsula has been turned into something
akin to a Russian national autonomy within
The main
problem of interethnic relations in
Having come
through so many ordeals in their recent history, the Crimean Tatars have
developed a strong sense of self-identification as a coherent nation with
distinct ethno-cultural and religious traditions to be restored, secured and
bequeathed to the next generations. Their claim to self-determination should
properly be understood and acknowledged as stemming mainly from an acute (and
to a certain extent quite justifiable) fear of losing this identity, if simply
through a gradual and apparently "natural" assimilation into the
Slavic majority of the peninsula. To relieve the resulting tensions, the self-identity
of the Crimean Tatars must be fully recognized, fully respected and meet with a
favourable response from both the national
authorities and society as a whole.
It seems
impossible to find successful solutions to the problems of the Crimean Tatars
by continuing to regard them as just one of the national minorities of
In contrast
to the Crimean Tatars, the Russian diaspora in
Crimea, especially (and this must be stressed) when not provoked from the
outside, has a much lower potential for mass mobilization and large-scale
protests, and, in reality, has no justified grounds for doing so. The problems
of national minorities in Crimea, including those belonging to the formerly
deported groups lack, as a rule, a political dimension as an obligatory
component for expressing their demands and therefore could be settled in
parallel with an improvement in the general socio-economic situation in
Ukraine.
It appears
that the international community, and especially the bureaucracies of some of
the international intergovernmental organizations, is often far from
understanding the plight of the Crimean Tatars beyond their socio-economic
conditions (even though these are indeed terrible). The political demands of
the Crimean Tatars are therefore perceived sometimes as a manifestation of
political extremism. It is highly desirable that a deeper insight into the
problem is achieved and that concerted actions aimed at preventing one more
ethno-political conflict in
End
Notes
[1] See also RFL/RL Watchlist,
v. 2, N 2,
[2] See, for
example, "Minority Rights in the Former Soviet Union" by Tim Potier, in: Law Journal, Special Issue, September 1999, p.
63.
[3] Some aspects of the Crimean crisis,
and chronology of events till April 1995 are covered by: "
[4] The name Crimean ASSR was changed
to
[5] They referenced the arguments made
repeatedly by the Russian Parliament and Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the
act of the 1954 transfer had been "illegal."
[6] See, for example, the version of
Crimean Constitution adopted by the Crimean Supreme Council on
[7] For more details, see "
[8] This first meeting of elected
delegates was named the Second Kurultayi to emphasize
the continuity of the democratic tradition of the Crimean Tatar system of
self-government. In 20th century, the first and only Kurultayi,
which proclaimed the restoration of Crimean Tatar statehood, was held in
November 1917. This attempt was brutally suppressed by the Soviets who used the
Red Army against the Crimean Tatars.
[9] The texts of the most important
documents issued by the sessions and conferences of the Kurultayi
can be found in a Russian language publication by the Mejlis
of October 1999: "The Documents of the Kurultayi
of the Crimean Tatar People, 1991-1998."
[10] See "Conflicting Loyalties in
the
[11] See, for
example, "An OSCE Diplomat Bungles Diplomacy in
[12] OSCE REF.HC/10/95,
[13] This law granted
[14] OSCE REF.HC/10/95,
[15] See Ref.HC/7/96, Ref.500/R/L.
[16] See OSCE REF.HC/10/95.
[17] For more details, see:
"Politics in and around Crimea: A Difficult Homecoming" by Andrew
Wilson, in: The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland, Edward A.
Allworth, ed., Duke University Press, 1998, pp. 289-291, and The
Repatriation of the Crimean Tatars: A Chronicle of Events by Julia Tystchenko & Vyacheslav Pikhovshek, Kyiv, 1999, pp. 57-145.
[18] The English translation of the term
"indigenous peoples" instead of "people" or
"populations" fully complies here with its intended meaning in
Ukrainian. The appearance of this term within the text of the Constitution
reflected a compromise between different political views, following efforts to
explicitly designate the Crimean Tatars as an indigenous people of
[19] OSCE Ref.HC/4/97.
[20] At the national level the electoral
system is mixed; half of the deputies are to be elected under a majority
system, the remainder under a proportional system.
[21] The new law on Ukrainian
citizenship, which entered into force on
[22] For more details characterizing the
turbulent events surrounding the 1998 Crimean parliamentary elections, see The
Repatriation of the Crimean Tatars: A Chronicle of
Events by Julia Tystchenko & Vyacheslav Pikhovshek, Kyiv,
1999, pp. 204-215.
[23] See, for example, the Conclusion on
the draft Constitution of the ARC issued by the Rukh
faction of the VR on
[24] A detailed description of this
dramatic stage of the constitutional process is given in: "The
Repatriation of the Crimean Tatars: A Chronicle of Events" by Julia Tystchenko & Vyacheslav Pikhovshek, Kyiv, 1999, pp. 238-247.
[25] See "The Documents of the Kurultayi of the Crimean Tatar People, 1991-1998," pp.
117-125.
[26] For responses to the adoption of
the Constitution of the ARC see "Avdet," N
21, 24 November 1998, N 22, 8 December 1998, N 1, 20 January 1999;
"Today," 24 November 1998; "Voice of Ukraine," 11 December
1998; "Ukraine and the World," 15-21 January 1999, and many other
publications by the national and Crimean newspapers and magazines. See also The
Repatriation of the Crimean Tatars: A Chronicle of
Events by Julia Tystchenko & Vyacheslav Pikhovshek, Kyiv,
1999, pp. 254-267.
[27] "
[28] See, for example, the contributions
to the http://www.euronet.nl/users/sota/krimtatar.html, and
http://members.xoom.com/iccrimea, and also the
information distributed by the MINELRES and the CRIMEA-L: A Discussion List on
[29] Some examples of such a successful
collaboration can be found in: "Ulterior Integration" by Natalya Belitser, NGO News,
Freedom House, N 13, Summer 1999, p. 8.
[30] See, for
example, "Ukrainian-Russian-Crimean Tatar Relations in
[31] Vladimir Polyakov
is also a writer who published many articles in the local media, and a book:
[32] Preliminary Draft Report to the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of
[33] See, for example, the Parallel
Report Prepared by the Foundation for Research and Support of the Indigenous
Peoples of Crimea "About the Situation in
[34] The composition of the Council is
exactly the same as the list of the members of the Mejlis;
Mustafa Djemilev is its Chairman, and Refat Chubarov is his first
Deputy.
[35] See: "The Comparative Analysis
of the Economic Situation in
[36] See, for
example, RFE/RL Newsline, v.3, N 245, December 1999.
[37] A formal request to hold the
hearings had been submitted by Roman Bezsmertny, the
Permanent Representative of the President in the Parliament of Ukraine, to the
parliament’s chairman Oleksandr
Tkachenko. Every point addressed in his letter of