"Indigenous
Status" for the Crimean Tatars in
A History of a Political Debate
By Natalya Belitser
Pylyp Orlyk Institute for
Democracy
CONTENTS
Part I
Part II
Part I
...Crimean
Tatars are returning to
Mustafa Dzhemilev, MP of Ukraine, Chair of the
Mejlis of Crimean Tatar people,
speaking at a roundtable, Kyiv,
Currently, ...there is a
dangerous confrontation and growing ethno-political tension in the
Leonid Hrach, Speaker of the Crimean parliament, Head of the
Crimean branch of
the Communist Party of Ukraine. Statement at the session of
the PACE Committee
on Migration, Refugees and Demography,
Today,
The Emergence of the Issue of the Crimean Tatars as Indigenous People of
The topic of
special rights for the Crimean Tatars, who were returning to Crimea after their
forcible mass deportation of 1944 and the almost half a century of living in
exile, first surfaced as an important political issue during the debates in the
national legislature of Ukraine on 12 February 1991. That whole day the Supreme
Council (SC) of the
None of the
members of the Crimean Tatar delegation who came to Kyiv to present their view
on the restoration of Crimean autonomy was allowed to participate in either the
parliamentary sittings of 12 February, or in preceding discussions organized
jointly by several permanent Committees, though their appeal for admission was
supported by some MPs. During the two sittings, a total of 33 MPs took part in
the discussion, and almost every speaker referred to the Crimean Tatar factor
in the context of Crimean autonomy. But although the Crimean Tatar aspect was
constantly addressed, and the solution to be reached would, inevitably,
strongly affect the future of their community, this was not perceived at the
time as a strong enough argument for allowing the Crimean Tatars'
representatives to participate in the discussion.
The SC was
at that time very poorly politically structured and could be seen as consisting
of two opposed groups - a strong left majority (the so-called Group of 238) and
the national-democrats (the People's Rada, later the
Congress of National-Democratic forces). There were also a few
"independents" who moved between the groups
depending on circumstances. It was therefore no surprise that the very
rhetoric, even the specific terms and expressions used, displayed totally
different, incompatible views and approaches. In fact, these original
differences and the arguments presented by the two opposing sides persisted
over the next eleven years and can be recognized, with some modifications, in
current political debates.
The
stenographic report of the debates of
The essence
of the autonomy - in this instance, defined by the draft law as a
"territorial-administrative" arrangement - also caused heated debate
concerning the status and the rights to be provided (or not) by this autonomy
for the Crimean Tatars. Some deputies, for example, Mr. Volkovets'ky, ("Narodna Rada" faction) and Mr. Shcarban,
("Agrarians" group), proposed to solve this issue by establishing a
national territorial autonomy for Crimean Tatars to be named "The Crimean
Tatar Autonomous Republic." This proposal was rejected by the left
majority as completely unacceptable. Mr. Korneyev,
for example, argued that "Russians and Russian-speakers constitute a
majority of the population of Crimea" while Nikolai Bagrov,
the then Chair of the Crimean regional council, and the First Secretary of the
Crimean regional committee of Communist party, stressed that "the Crimean
Autonomous SSR, that has to be restored now, was formed in 1921 as a
territorial, not a national autonomous unit." Mr. Bagrov
also declared that for him and his allies, the very idea of Crimean Tatars as
an indigenous people of
The issue of
the Crimean Tatars was repeatedly raised not just by those MPs who seemed
genuinely concerned by a fate that would clearly depend on any solution
reached. It was also heavily exploited by the proponents of restoring Crimean
autonomy according to the proposed draft; they pleaded that this move would
also reverse the "historical injustice" of their deportation. But in
fact, the Crimean Tatar aspect of the debates was not the main issue at stake.
During the final vote, those cast by 253 MPs - more then the established left
majority of 238 - signified the emergence of a
The Next Stage: 1991-1996 [10]
Today, it
can only be speculated how much the events of February 1991 affected general
mood of the Crimean Tatar returnees and in particular, stimulated their
political mobilization under the guidance of the OKND. But it seemed plausible
that the traumatic experience of not being allowed, in any capacity, to have a
voice in a political decision-making process that would have been of paramount
importance to their future, as well as quite unfavourable
outcome of this process, had an impact on further developments. The law of 12
February 1991 "On the Restoration of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republic" was condemned by the OKND statement of 8 March,
because "the determination of the statehood of national territories could
not be done by a simple majority of a population that had been resettled from
other territories" [i.e., the Russian community]. The OKND appeal to the
International Helsinki Committee on human rights stated that one more
"Russian-speaking republic" has been created in the ancient Crimean
Tatar land, thus violating the rights of the indigenous Crimean Tatar people.
Such an assessment of the reanimated Crimean ASSR was fully shared by Rukh - the then most popular Ukrainian movement for
independence and democracy. In March 1991, Rukh's
Council of Nationalities issued a special Statement on the Situation in
One of the
most far-reaching reactions to the restoration of the Crimean ASSR was the
decision by OKND to convene, in June 1991, the Second Kurultay
(National Assembly) of the Crimean Tatar people. [12] The Kurultay
lasted for five days (June 26-30) and adopted a number of resolutions,
statements and other documents. [13] Perhaps, the most significant of these was
the "Declaration on the National Sovereignty of the Crimean Tatar People."
It announced the establishment of the Mejlis of
Crimean Tatar people - the principal representative body of the whole people
between the sessions of Kurultay. It also stated that
the only subject of self-determination within the territory of Crimea is the
Crimean Tatar people, whose "political, economic, spiritual, and cultural
rebirth is possible only in its national sovereign state" and that it
would be based on "mutual respect between Crimean Tatars and all other
national and ethnic groups" and a strict observance of the rights of
"all people irrespective of their ethnic origin." Such a state was
defined as the main aim of the Crimean Tatar people to be pursued "using
all means provided by the international law." In this and other documents,
the hurried restoration of the Crimean ASSR without consulting with the Crimean
Tatars was recognized as an attempt to affix by legal means the consequences of
the deportation. In the appeals directed to the highest authorities of the
Of course, -
as was easily predictable - there was no positive reaction from any of the
entities addressed. At the same time, these points of the Declaration have been
widely quoted by all of the opponents and adversaries who have rejected any
negotiations on special rights for Crimean Tatars relating to their
"indigenous status." Since then, the provisions of the Declaration,
deliberately taken out of their historical context, [14] have been effectively
used by anti-Crimean Tatar propaganda as confirmation of their sinister intentions
to establish an ethno-centric Crimean Tatar state, threatening the Slavic
population of the peninsula.
Therefore,
in retrospect, it could be assumed that not only the actual situation in the
Crimea during the late 80s and early 90s, but also the insensitive attitude of
the then highest Ukraine's authorities who had neglected the appeals and
demands of the Crimean Tatars, provoked a quick and effective mobilization and
self-organization of the community, and promoted a certain radicalization of
the Crimean Tatar political agenda.
Meanwhile,
on
It should be
noted that from the very beginning, the fledgling Ukrainian state has shared
the concerns of the Crimean Tatars about avoiding violent inter-ethnic conflict
in
Indeed, the
definition of national minorities provided by Art. 3 states that national
minorities are any groups of Ukrainian citizens who are not ethnically
Ukrainian, share a national self-identity, and (voluntarily) associate on this
basis. This definition is broader than that usually used in the legislation of
other countries because it does not take into consideration the length of time
the ethnic groups lived in the lands now under
An important
innovation introduced by this law was the creation of the Ministry on
Nationalities that would play the leading role in implementing state policy on
inter-ethnic relations. This Ministry initiated the drafting of a Concept of
Ethno-Politics in
In contrast
to the smoothly passed law on national minorities, this draft drew a
distinction between national minorities and indigenous peoples or, more
explicitly, the Crimean Tatar people, whose representatives actively
participated in the discussions on this matter during regular meetings of an
informal and expanded working group. Existing international legal standards
were taken into account, particularly, those provisions and definitions found
in the Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries (International Labour Organization (ILO)
Convention 169, 1989, that came into force on 05.09.1991). At the same time,
the Ukrainian version of "indigenousness" proceeded from the notion
that indigenous peoples are a kind of minority that differ from ordinary
national minorities because they have neither a kin-state nor another territory
on which they had formed and developed as an ethnos.
Regrettably,
these encouraging developments were halted in 1994 after the first President,
Leonid Kravchuk, failed to be re-elected, and his
successor Leonid Kuchma replaced most of the
high-ranking ministerial staff with loyalists. For the Crimean Tatars, the
dismissal of Oleksandr Yemets,
[20] Minister of Nationalities and Migration, and the subsequent appointment of
Mykola Shulga, [21] had
rather negative implications. All kinds of formal activities focused on
settling general Crimean and specifically Crimean Tatar issues (including
further discussions on the Draft Concept of Ethno-Politics in
However,
notwithstanding the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the officials responsible
for developing of the appropriate legal solutions, public interest in the issue
did not wane, and public debates on the possibility to provide some specific
"indigenous rights" for Crimean Tatars persisted. The matter acquired
a new impetus during vigorous discussions on various drafts of the Constitution
of Ukraine which proceeded with the active involvement of
Proceedings Following the Adoption of 1996 Constitution
The events
described above, particularly the continued, insistent demands of the Crimean
Tatars, and the public debates surrounding the different drafts of the
Constitution of Ukraine, did have some impact on the attitude of legislators.
As a result of a compromise reached by the left and right-centrist wings of the
parliament, the notion of "indigenous peoples" was, for the first
time, introduced into the Ukrainian legal terminology with the actual adoption
of the Constitution in the turbulent night session of
Very soon after the adoption of the Constitution, in compliance with
Art. 92 par. 3, [25] the Ministry of Justice
of
The Draft
Concept listed the following objective criteria for the determination of those
ethnic groups in Ukraine that could be regarded as indigenous peoples: (a)
descent from ancestors who had traditionally inhabited certain geographical
regions of Ukraine in its current state borders; (b) the preservation of a
cultural, linguistic, and/or religious group identity which differs from that
of the titular ethnos and the identities of national minorities of Ukraine, and
a desire to further maintain and develop this identity; (c) the existence of
distinct historical traditions, social institutions, a system and organs of
self-governance and other traditional institutions; and (d) the absence of an
ethnically related national state or motherland beyond Ukraine's borders. It
can be seen that apart from those criteria usually used by international law,
[27] the last point reflects an important addition justified by the existing
realities and differences in the situations of the various ethnic groups in
Reckoning
also with the subjective criterion, namely, the expressed wish of a given
ethnic group to identify with the community of indigenous peoples, [29] the
draft made it clear that in
The same
Working Group (WG) prepared also a draft law which, "in recognition of the
Crimean Tatar people's aspirations to preserve and further their ethnic identity,
traditional institutions, way of life, language, and creed within the
boundaries of the Ukrainian State where this people lives," embraced
practically all of the most urgent and topical issues raised repeatedly by the
Crimean Tatars throughout the history of their repatriation. It stated
unequivocally that "under this Law, the legal status of the Crimean Tatar
people shall be determined as that of an indigenous people of
Had these
drafts been immediately submitted to the VR Permanent Committees, considered in
a timely manner and, according to the optimistic scenario, approved at a
parliamentary session (as the Crimean Tatars and their supporters had hoped),
many subsequent developments and events would, perhaps, have proceeded in a
less confrontational manner. In particular, the problem of political
participation and representation in all branches of government might have been
legally resolved before the elections of March 1998, which were marred by
large-scale acts of protest undertaken by the Crimean Tatars, and reports of
clashes between groups of protesters and the local militia. [31] Since this did
not happen, most of the current sources of seething antagonism in
At the
official level, the only serious discussion addressing the legal and political
aspects of providing the formal status of "indigenous people" to the
Crimean Tatars, occurred at a roundtable organized by the State Committee on
Nationalities and Migration on 2 October, 1998 (at the initiative of the then
Vice-Prime Minister Volodymyr Smoliy).
[32] It is interesting to note that despite the differences in views and
approaches, the general balance of the presentations favoured
such a solution. This opinion was further strengthened by a conclusion to be
found in a formal review, provided by the
Moreover,
the situation of the Crimean Tatars deteriorated even further after 23 December
1998, when the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, seemingly
ending heated debates and power struggling between Kyiv and Simferopol
that raged for almost a decade, was eventually adopted. [34] This remarkable
event was pushed forward not only by the Crimean power holders, but also by
international organizations, in particular, by the OSCE, and was anticipated as
an ultimate solution to a long-lasted crisis. However, as was predicted during
the parliamentary debates on the issue and confirmed by later developments,
this Constitution did not solve any major problems existing in the relationship
between the Crimean autonomy and the central authorities, as well as between
the Crimean legislature and the government of the ARC. [35] At the same time,
it definitely aggravated the plight and dissatisfaction on the part of the
Crimean Tatars whose aspirations were totally ignored. In terms of general
ethno-politics in
Although the
detailed analysis of explicit and implicit reasons underlying the failure to
develop a legislative framework dealing with the Crimean Tatars (and other
minorities) is beyond the scope of the given paper, one should note the lack of
consistency or any definite strategy in state policy relating to integration of
the Crimean Tatars, as many political analysts and experts have pointed out.
[37] The regrettable absence of continuity between those activities that had
been performed by successive governments and deputies of the VR was also
identified as a cause of the unsatisfactory implementation of the decisions
once reached. [38] Characteristically, when the position of the same Ministry
of Justice that had initiated the endeavours of the
Working Group was evidently reversed, the aforementioned drafts were left
without the kind of lobbying support needed to ensure their submission to the
VR. Since the VR itself turned out rather reluctant to regard these issues as a
priority, or rather, to examine them at all, the work done by the WG seemed
futile, and Crimean Tatars' optimistic expectations of 1996-1997 were dashed.
In defiance
of the sad fact that the Crimean Tatar issues had virtually disappeared from
the VR agenda for several years following the adoption of the Basic Law of
Ukraine, at the level of civil society the efforts to reanimate public and
officials' interest in the unsolved Crimean Tatars problems continued. Some of
these activities have been rather successful, in particular, those of the
Ukrainian Centre for Independent Political Research that carried out in
1998-1999 a series of roundtables and seminars addressing, step by step, all
particular aspects of the Crimean Tatar situation. To ensure a comprehensive
discussion covering all of the existing views and approaches, executives, MPs,
NGOs, scholars and, of course, representatives of the Crimean Tatar community
were brought together. [39] In this way, positions of opponents and proponents
with regard to the indigenous status for the Crimean Tatars were reaffirmed but
more clearly formulated. And while the arguments of the supporters were mostly
focused on the international standards and experiences of other countries, and
repeated those stipulated by the draft documents mentioned above, the reasoning
of the contenders adhered to several quite diverse notions and stereotypes,
hardly exhibiting any internal coherence. [40] Their most widespread and
frequently used arguments can be grouped as follows:
Besides
these points, representatives of executive and legislative bodies often state
that in
From this brief
account it can be seen that apart from the decisively negative political
standpoint blankly rejecting any positive solution, a public unawareness on the
issue is also an essential element contributing to the resistance to such an
outcome. Poor understanding of the essence of the existing legal norms and
provisions is further aggravated by the evident gap between the legal criteria
and definitions of "indigenous peoples," and spontaneous perception
of the term by people who are far away from juridical theories and practices.
It follows that raising public awareness through wider informational campaigns
would be a substantial component of a strategy aimed to ensure, eventually, the
success of a sluggish legislative process concerning indigenous peoples and
their rights. Up to now, the publications addressing the issue, as well as
public discussions during seminars, conferences, roundtables etc. were engaging
a rather limited circle of the participants, and included only a few of MPs
whose ranks are entitled to pass a competent decision. A low level of
understanding of the very concept of "indigenous peoples,"
demonstrated sometimes by civil servants, MPs, and ordinary public alike, can
also be illustrated by a curious fact that many advocates of such a status to
apply for the Crimean Tatars believe, at the same time, that "in Ukraine,
there are two indigenous peoples, namely, Ukrainians and the Crimean
Tatars." [47]
Be it as it
may be, those vigorous and comprehensive public
discussions of 1998-1999 perhaps contributed to the re-surfacing of the issue
at the level of the national legislature. Indeed, when MP Roman Bezsmertny (People's Democratic Party) produced the second,
less assertive version of the "status law," that one was officially
registered on 10 September 1999 and soon transferred for the consideration of
the Committee on Human Rights, National Minorities and Interethnic Relations
(headed by Hennady Udovenko,
People's Rukh of Ukraine). After a year of
considering the draft by the Committee, on
It should be
acknowledged, however, that not so much public discussions and parliamentary
debates but, rather, protest actions of the Crimean Tatars resulted in certain
moves towards satisfying their demands. Let us recall that, for example, an
acceptance of providing for the Crimean Tatars a quota to the parliament of
After almost
a year of delays resulting from misinterpretations and discontent between the Mejlis and the Administration of President on some points
of the regulations on the Council's activities, an agreement was eventually
reached and approved by the next Presidential Decree dated
It should be
noted, however, that the establishment of the Council, though usually regarded
as a de-facto recognition of the Mejlis, [51] can in
fact be viewed as only a palliative, still far from securing a genuine legal
recognition of the plenipotentiary representative bodies of the Crimean Tatar
people. Nor has this step prevented further severe attacks on the Mejlis on the part of Crimean leadership and local Russian
nationalists' organizations. These continue to condemn it as an "illegal
power structure," representing "not the Crimean Tatars community but
Crimean Tatar extremists only." A pre-election period that is
characterized by, alas, already traditional aggravation of the inter-ethnic
tensions, brought even stronger charges, like the "organized criminal
group which calls itself "Mejlis." [52]
Despite the
continued manifestations of the overt malice and resentment, general attention
to and the respect for the self-governing bodies of the Crimean Tatars seem to
be on the rise. Convincing evidence for this is the Fourth Kurultay
that has been convened in
One more
important event, addressing Crimean Tatars needs and demands at the national
level, occurred on
Apart from
the VR deputies, representatives of the Crimean authorities, Ukrainian and
Crimean Tatar NGOs, as well as scholars and journalists interested in the
problem, were invited to participate. The main speaker to cover the issue was
the then Deputy Prime Minister Mycola Julinsky, while MP Refat Chubarov, Deputy Chair of the Mejlis,
was appointed as a co-rapporteur. Altogether, 16
speakers took part in the debates, addressing different aspects of the problems
faced by the returnees, and displaying already long-standing, politically
motivated differences in the opposing perceptions with regard to the
legal-political rights to be provided for the Crimean Tatars. In fact, no particularly
new points or approaches were raised by the speakers except, perhaps, a rather
harsh presentation by the member of the Communist faction, MP Petro Baulin. [56] This deputy
recalled what he named "the genocide perpetrated by Crimean Tatars in the
past centuries against the Orthodox South-West Rus,"
as well as "bloody offensive by the Crimean Tatar allies of Germans during
the Great Patriotic War." [57] A trend to avoid dealing with complicated
legal-political issues by focusing instead on the less controversial
socio-economic needs of the repatriates was easily observable, as well as the
attempts to regard the Crimean Tatars as the "(formerly) deported
people" rather than "indigenous people." [58] These trends were
exaggerated by the regrettably low turnout of the MPs [59] among whom the
Communists, as the most disciplined, prevailed. It is also noteworthy that the
general level of comprehension of such an abstruse legal notion as indigenous
peoples and their rights on the part of the MPs' ranks seemed even poorer than
that reached by the participants of the roundtables mentioned above. [60]
Over the two
weeks following the hearing, draft Recommendations were debated and eventually
agreed upon by the representatives of the different VR factions. On April 20,
this draft did not pass, and only after an additional concession made to the
leftists the Recommendations were finally approved by the vote of 291 deputies.
[61] The deputies turnout, higher than that during the hearing, presumably
helped to pass the Recommendations that admitted, inter alia,
a "dissatisfactory legal regulation of the process [of return and
integration], and low effectiveness of the practical measures applied by bodies
of the executive power for the solution of issues relating to the return and
resettlement of [former] deportees in Ukraine." The recommendations per se
have been addressed to the Parliament of Ukraine, the President, and the
Cabinet of Ministers. The first two points read as follows:
In
retrospect, it should be noted that while the first issue is still far from
being realized, the second one has indeed been resolved, in particular, by the adoption
on
Indigenous Status for the Crimean Tatars: An International Perspective
Many Crimean
Tatars, especially those engaged in active public life, firmly believe that
"the whole world recognizes us as the indigenous people of
There are
several international agencies involved in problems of the resettlement and
integration of former deportees in
Not
surprisingly, while the urgency of easing socio-economic plight of returnees,
and the necessity to satisfy their cultural and educational needs have been
easily recognized and shared by all of these entities, the political demands
put forward by the Crimean Tatars have usually encountered much cooler
response. Therefore, the activities and programmes of
the UNDP, with some contribution from the International Organization on
Migration (IOM), were mostly focused on assisting the government of
Regrettably,
since Rolf Ekeus' visit to Ukraine was postponed
until February 4, 2002, the opportunity to benefit from his valuable assistance
in order to amend timely the law on elections in the ARC has been missed.
Surprisingly, according to the information that appeared in Ukrainian
electronic and printed media, during his two-days stay in Ukraine and meetings
with the President, the Speaker of the VR, and the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, the HCNM seemed not pedaling the issue further - at least, in terms of
public record. [69] He expressed instead his deep appreciation of the Ukraine's
policy on minority rights and interethnic relations, and said that the OSCE is
seriously considering the projects that would provide for Ukraine financial aid
for the Crimean Tatar repatriates. [70] At the same time, Hennady
Udovenko, Head of the VR Committee on Human Rights,
National Minorities and Interethnic Relations, who also met with the OSCE HCNM,
did admit that Crimean Tatar issues remain to be a major concern of Ukrainian
ethno-politics. In particular, Mr. Udovenko referred
to the failure of solving legally a long-lasted dispute on the status of the
Crimean Tatars, of adopting a law on their political rehabilitation, and of
developing an appropriate legislation securing guaranteed representation of the
Crimean Tatars in the elective bodies of
As for the CoE, its interest in the Crimean Tatars, alerted by the
continued plight of the community and the appeals sent by the Mejlis, was first expressed by organizing in 1999 a
roundtable dedicated specifically to the return and reintegration of the
Crimean Tatars. That roundtable, initiated by the CoE
Directorate General for Social Affairs, included also visits to local
communities. [72] It is interesting to note that the problems identified as
those of major concern for returnees were then presented in the following
order:
This,
characteristically, set aside many of the legal-political issues claimed as
crucial by the Crimean Tatar community.
The next
step to address the issue of the Crimean Tatars was taken by the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). Before including it into the agenda
of the PACE regular session, its Committee on
Migration, Refugees and Demography was instructed to prepare a report on the
current situation, and to draft appropriate recommendations. The rapporteur appointed by the Committee was Lord Ponsonby (United Kingdom, Socialist Group), who visited
Kyiv and
This
particular point reveals that the Rapporteur, unlike
Crimean Tatar [74] and some of the Ukrainian experts, has not performed as
somebody sufficiently knowledgeable about this sensitive issue. No wonder, his
report has aroused strong criticisms on the part of the Mejlis
leaders [75] and, sometimes, rather sarcastic responses from the Crimean Tatar
community. [76] Regrettably, Lord Ponsonby's position
can also be regarded as undermining the justified attempts to implement
provisions of the Ukrainian Constitution. Nevertheless, concluding the debates
in Strasbourg, [77] run by a sheer coincidence on 5 April 2000, - the day of a
parliamentary hearing in Kyiv - an impressive Recommendation 1455, [78]
containing a number of concrete points shaping a strategy for further actions,
was adopted. Inter alia, it calls on international
community and its particular agencies like the Development Bank, also the
European Union and the CoE member states "to
contribute generously, at bilateral and multilateral levels, to assistance projects
targeting returnee Crimean Tatars." Moreover, the key words
"indigenous peoples," though used rather implicitly, can be found in
paragraph VIII of the Recommendation that says: "invite the Government of
Ukraine and the regional authorities of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to
study the experience of other member states of the Council of Europe concerning
the representation of minorities and indigenous peoples, with a view to
securing the effective representation of the Crimean Tatars in national, Crimean
and local public affairs."
As further
developments have shown, the attention paid by the CoE
to the Crimean Tatar issues is not withering, which is an encouraging sign. The
PACE debates were followed by the next study visit to Crimea on 20-29 September
2000, the results of which were discussed by the roundtable in Kyiv organized
jointly by the CoE, the Ukrainian Ministry of
Justice, the State Department for Nationalities and Migration, and the
International Renaissance Foundation. The report on a mission,
and its conclusions and recommendations have been presented by Marcel Zwamborn from the European Committee on Migration (one more
of the CoE structural units, dealing with social and
legal aspects of the integration process). This time, it was admitted that
"the return and integration of the formerly deported peoples of the
Compared
with the first CoE round table, the shift of the attention towards legal-political issues, and growing
recognition of their importance, are evident. This change could also be
assumed proceeding from the CoE Committee of
Ministers response to the Recommendation 1455, [80] and the presentations at
the third CoE roundtable held in
In general,
the CoE, like the OSCE, tends to regard the Crimean
Tatars as a national minority. Therefore, from this perspective the only
legally binding instrument to provide for their rights is the CoE Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities (FCNM), entered into force on 01.02.1998, of which
In contrast
to the CoE, the UNO is traditionally engaged in
issues of indigenous peoples' rights, and the governmental experts of the
Working Group, established by the UN Commission on Human Rights in March 1995,
continue to work on a draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
(The draft had in fact been prepared by the independent experts, representing
mostly the indigenous communities themselves, a few years before the WG was
commissioned to such a task). Since 1994, Nadir Bekirov,
a member of the Mejlis, has actively participated in
all sessions of the Working Group, including the last one taking place in
In
conclusion, it is important to emphasize that although political participation
and representation in both elective and executive governmental bodies, a formal
status of the Mejlis and Kurultay,
land issues and other matters of legal-political nature have eventually been
recognized by international community as urgent and topical, it has never been
proposed to solve them all together in a package. Accordingly, the initiative
to address these issues by a bill on indigenous status was never encouraged.
[84] Indeed, apart from some of the leaders of the Crimean Tatar diaspora, and a few independent experts from abroad favouring this idea [85], no support has so far been
provided for its implementation. Nor was the Ukrainian legislature ever
recommended by any international intergovernmental organization to at least
consider the "status law" drafts. Moreover, it should be heeded that
within
Part II
Current situation: The Crimean Tatars and Elections-2002 [89]
Nowadays,
the most urgent issue of all of the legal and political problems faced by the
Crimean Tatars concerns their representation in the elective bodies,
particularly in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Its actuality is stressed by
the fact that after the abolishment of a temporary quota for formerly deported
ethnic groups that was valid for a period between 1994-1998,
no one representative of the Crimean Tatar community was elected to the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) of
the ARC in March 1998. [90] Taking into account the realities of the Crimean
situation, the purely majoritarian electoral system
introduced instead could hardly have brought any other results. Such an outcome
may be explained by the fact that from the very beginning of the repatriation
process, the Crimean Tatars were deliberately settled in such a dispersed way
that in no one of the 100 constituencies they might have formed a majority, or
at least some 40 % of voters. [91] Besides this, unlike the situation of 1994,
in 1998 almost 100,000 Crimean Tatars, who were not yet citizens of Ukraine,
were not allowed to take part in the elections. This decision, perceived as
discriminatory by the Crimean Tatars has also attracted attention of some
international organizations, in particular, the OSCE and the Council of Europe.
The letters and recommendations developed by structural units of these
organizations address, inter alia, this particular
issue. [92] Therefore, the necessity to adopt a new law before the forthcoming
parliamentary elections in the ARC on 31 March 2002 (coinciding with the
elections to the VR of Ukraine and local bodies of self-governance) seemed
obvious. Therefore, following a resolution passed by Verkhovna
Rada in May 2001, several draft laws were prepared
and submitted for the consideration of the Ukrainian parliament.
One
of them, worked out by Jury Kliuchkovsky (People's Rukh of Ukraine faction), proceeded from the notion that
the new law should comply with the law on the elections to the VR of Ukraine,
but also guarantee for the Crimean Tatars at least some seats in the Crimean
parliament. According to this draft, elections in the Crimean autonomy were to
be based on the same mixed majoritarian/proportionate
system as that in force for all-national elections (50 deputies to be elected
in single-mandate constituencies, and 50 on party lists in a multi-mandate
constituency). The single-mandate constituencies should have been of two
different types: 41 - of ordinary majoritarian type
(covering the whole territory of Crimea), and the rest of the remaining nine to
be organized as national constituencies. Seven of the latter had to be for the
Crimean Tatars, one for the Karaits and Krymchaks (the two ethnic groups autochthonous for Crimea,
and potential candidates for the status of "indigenous peoples"), and
one more for formerly deported national minorities - Armenians, Bulgarians,
Greeks, and Germans. The right to nominate candidates for national
constituencies would be provided for the appropriate national assemblies; the
participation of a voter in a national constituency would have been determined
by his/her individual wish only (expressed by a personal written application).
In case of the absence of such an application, a voter was supposed to vote in
an ordinary majoritarian constituency (in this way,
the principle of "one person - one vote" would have been observed).
From
this brief description it can be seen that the mechanisms proposed by the
author would indeed secure the right of indigenous peoples, as well as of
formerly deported national minorities in (multinational) Crimea to get their
representation in the parliament of the ARC. In particular, this draft recognizes
the specific situation of the Crimean Tatars, for whom,
let us repeat, in contrast to other formerly deported ethnic groups, Crimea is
their only homeland. This principal difference makes their insistent demands
for political rights and equal participation in the decision-making processes
in the ARC quite understandable and fully justified.
From
the very beginning of negotiating new "rules of the game" for the
elections in Crimea, a vigorous campaign against any legal provisions to secure
Crimean Tatars representation in the VR of the ARC, headed and orchestrated by
its Speaker (and leader of the Crimean communists) Leonid Hrach,
started in Crimea. Any move in this direction was classified as a violation of
the Crimean and Ukrainian Constitutions, creating a dangerous precedent of
providing privileges for certain ethnic groups that would provoke violent
inter-ethnic clashes in
To
counter the endeavours to secure the Crimean Tatars'
representation, another draft law on elections in the ARC was prepared. [95] It
was presented by the MP from Crimea Lev Mirimsky
("Trudova Ukraina"
faction; in
The
third draft submitted by Nataliya Shtepa
(Communist party) provided that only proportionate system had to be used for
electing deputies to the VR of the ARC. The same idea has also been vigorously
supported and lobbied by the incumbent Communist leadership of the Crimean
parliament reckoning that their party - the one with the strongest position in
the ARC - would therefore take all the advantages in case of adopting a
proportionate system for the next elections. However, during the debates on all
of the draft laws submitted to the session of the VR of Ukraine on
Despite
rather convincing reasons and explanations of the necessity to ensure
representation in the Crimean parliament of the formerly deported Crimean Tatar
people and national minorities, that were presented during the meetings of
permanent Committees and later on the VR sittings, [97] on 5 July Mirimsky's draft passed the first reading. The second
reading, though included into the VR agenda for October, was postponed several
times. Those suggestions made by the VR Committee on State Building and Local
Self-Governance during the preparation for the second reading, rendered it
almost identical to the Law "On Elections of People's Deputies of
Ukraine" adopted on October 18. The proposals developed by MPs Chubarov and Kliuchkovsky to
ensure representation of the Crimean Tatars in the VR of the
ARC were turned down by the same Committee. [98]
Meanwhile,
on 18 October President of
Since
the President publicly committed not to sign a law containing even an element
of proportionality, a Working Group, consisting of the MPs and governmental
officials, was formed with a purpose to find a compromise acceptable for all
interested parties. Communist members of the group, however, have again
demonstrated their principal disagreement with the idea that Crimean Tatars
should participate in the Crimean elections on the "ethno-national
basis," and rejected all suggestions containing such kind of provisions.
After this, Refat Chubarov
resigned from the WG and prepared, in collaboration with the Ministry of
Justice of Ukraine, a draft law (two drafts actually) that he submitted to the
Presidential administration and other bodies responsible for bringing them to
the attention of the Parliament. Briefly, one of the drafts provided for the
establishment of several national electoral constituencies, whereas the other
proposed all-Crimean multi-mandate majoritarian
constituency for former deportees, with 12 candidates having the highest rating
to receive the deputies mandates. Commenting on this situation, Mr. Chubarov said that if the President of Ukraine would throw
behind the law on the Crimean elections the same weight that he puts behind
other important legal matters, the parliament would certainly pass the Crimean
electoral law in one of the versions acceptable to the Crimean Tatars.
Moreover, he believes that "the problem of introduction or
non-introduction of new mechanisms to ensure our representation in power bodies
is directly linked to the political will of the Ukrainian leadership."
[102]
Meanwhile,
the problem of representation in governmental bodies of
Regrettably,
the speeches by the President and the appeals of the Kurultay
did not influence the left-wing MPs, as was evidenced by further proceedings in
the VR and its permanent Committees.
Indeed,
several approaches were again proposed in order to avoid vetoing the draft by
the President and at the same time, ensuring the Crimean Tatars representation
in the VR of the ARC. One of them allowed the Crimean Election Commission to
form separate election constituencies for the returned deportees; another suggested
that while establishing ordinary election constituencies, the demographics of
returnees should be taken into account. However, when the VR session on
An
attempt to come back (contrary to parliamentary regulations) to the second
voting of this already rejected draft on 29 November had failed, too.
Therefore, the old, not amended, law on the elections in the ARC would formally
remain in effect, and as a result, election campaign in the Crimean autonomy
would have begun on
Since
the situation turned absurd indeed, and of course nothing was ready for such an
early start in the ARC, it became obvious that some urgent steps were needed to
overcome such a collision. Therefore, one more draft
"On Changes and Additions to the Law of
By
that time, this odd situation came into attention of Rolf Ekeus,
the new OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. As was mentioned above,
he stressed the necessity to introduce, through the new law, the mechanisms
ensuring guaranteed and proportionate representation of Crimean Tatars in the
parliament of the ARC. In the letter dated 4 December 2001, Mr. Ekeus expressed his concerns relating to the issue, and
offered the services of his office in assisting Ukrainian officials to consider
which of possible specific forms of such an arrangement may be the most
appropriate way forward, also expressed his intention to visit Ukraine as soon
as possible. While the visit was postponed, and the proposed intention not
realized, the draft mentioned above was submitted by MP Roman Bezsmertny (People's-Democratic Party) first to the
Committee, then to the VR session on 13 December 2001. As Mr. Bezsmertny explained, its urgent adoption would save time
for continuing to work on another, more substantial draft that was meant to
ensure the Crimean Tatar representation by proposing, once again, the
establishment of either all-Crimean constituency for former deportees, or a
number of national majoritarian (single-mandate)
constituencies. In parallel with these endavours, the
Communist faction insistently lobbied their own draft prepared by MP Anatoliy Drobotov and submitted
to the same sitting. This draft differed from that presented earlier by Myrymsky by only one position. Namely, the right to
nominate candidates would have been provided to public associations pursuing
development of national cultures. Though this amendment was claimed to be a
concession aimed at increasing chances of different ethnic groups of Crimea,
its opponents stated that it was just a trick to compel President to repeat the
previous objections against applying the mixed electoral system to local elections,
including those in the ARC, and to veto the whole draft. Nevertheless, this
draft passed the first reading on 13 December [106] but failed the second
reading on December 20. That meant that the old law would automatically remain
in effect, and that formally, the election campaign was already going on in the
Crimea beginning from 2 December. Though actually, nothing of this kind had yet
occurred, it was already clear that in all probability, the old majoritarian system would be preserved for the elections in
the ARC.
Indeed,
on 17 January 2002, the VR of Ukraine passed eventually the law on the
amendments to the law of Ukraine "On Elections of Deputies to the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea." Only insignificant changes concerning purely
organizational matters, and bringing them in line with the provisions of the
law on elections to the VR of Ukraine, were adopted. That meant that the
essence of the law of 12 February 1998, that had ignored any mechanisms to
ensure Crimean Tatar representation, remained unchanged. Moreover, the last
opportunity to ameliorate the situation by drawing the borders of the
constituencies in such a way as taking into account the places of Crimean Tatar
compact settlements was not used. It was not a surprise because after some
struggle, Leonid Hrach succeeded in forming the
Central Elective Commission (CEC) of Crimea, consisting of 15 members, almost
exclusively from his supporters. As a result, electoral districts have been
established and re-established in a manner favouring
the candidates from only one political force that caused immediate protest
statements from the Crimean Tatars [107], also from the "For Transparent
Power" and other political parties and blocks opposing the Communist
"Hrach's Block."[108] This
and a number of other flaws of the CEC were characterized as a "total
outlawry" by some other well-known public figures and politicians in
Crimea. [109] Not only the eventual establishment of the constituencies was
disputed; the very decision on the elections in Crimea and the establishment of
its Central Election Commission, adopted by the VR of the ARC on 19 December
2001, were questioned by many influential politicians and officials, among
them, by the Prime Minister of Crimean government, Valeriy
Gorbatov, and the Representative of President of
Ukraine in Crimea, Anatoliy Korniychuk.
It was stated, in particular, that the juridical service attached to Mr. Korniychuk's office considered as invalid the whole
Resolution of 19 December concerning elections in Crimea. Violations of many
regulations and legal acts were identified; besides, the very decision was
adopted by deputies' turnout too low to allow it to pass. [110] Some further decisions of the Crimean Electoral Commission,
in particular, that concerning the use in electoral ballots of Russian language
only, were also claimed illegal.
While
these protests might have become a matter for consideration of the
Constitutional Court, whatever the outcome, the crucial failure of Ukrainian
legislators to adopt in due time any legal mechanisms ensuring the Crimean
Tatar representation in the VR of the ARC and in the elective bodies at lower
levels, is already a matter of fact. The scale of this failure is further
augmented by the fact that all the recommendations and proposals issued by the
Council of Europe, [111] the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,
[112] the President, and a number of MPs concerned with finding a proper and
just solution to this problem have been ignored. This outcome also suggests
some undesirable trends within the Ukraine's parliament, where leftists proved
able to impose their will and mobilize a majority if not to vote for all of
their proposals, then at least to block those of the opponents. This situation
resembles to some extent that of 1991 (referred to by the first part of the
paper), thus raising doubts as to the actual advancement towards democracy and
European standards of minority protection reached over the years of Ukraine's
independence. Also, these developments compel the Crimean Tatar political elite
to believe that such a poor performance exhibits insufficient political will
rather than simply a weakness on the part of actors repeatedly declaring their
commitment to resolve the matter positively. This time, the consequences of
their disillusionment and disappointment may be much more far-reaching and
threatening than ever before.
Because,
as rightly noted Oxana Shevel,
[113] this was a déjà vu from the situation prior to 1998 elections, when the
parliament rejected presidential proposal for a Crimean Tatar quota, while the
president rejected parliamentary proposal for a proportional system, following
which a majoritarian system was introduced as a
compromise between the President and the Left. That situation had left Crimean
Tatars without their deputies in the VR of the ARC. It should also be
remembered that at that time, the situation was aggravated by the fact that
approximately 90 thousand of the Crimean Tatar repatriates lacked Ukrainian
citizenship, and therefore, were not allowed to participate in the election
process. This provided authorities with the argument that they were doing their
best to solve the problem, whereas the resistance from other (CIS) countries
was actually responsible for the unsettled election issues, and for the outcome
unfavourable for the Crimean Tatars. This time, the
repetition of the same situation with the elections in Crimea would most
probably demonstrate that the Ukrainian authorities and society as a whole bear
actual responsibility for leaving this urgent issue virtually unheeded.
Despite
the failure in finding a legal solution for guaranteeing the Crimean Tatar
representation in the elective bodies, this time, Mejlis
decided not to boycott the elections but to concentrate on active participation
instead. On 19 January 2002, the second session of the Fourth Kurultay of Crimean Tatar people approved nomination of 55
candidates in ordinary single-mandate constituencies of Crimea. According to MP
Refat Chubarov, the decision
to limit the number of candidates, instead of covering all of the 100
constituencies, was conditioned by the politically expedient intention to
cooperate with other partners in order to prevent a victory of the leftist
hardliners. Therefore, in other 45 constituencies the Crimean Tatars were going
to support candidates from other democratic blocks and teams. [114]
The
chances for the Crimean Tatars to reach sufficient representation in the next
composition of the Crimean parliament under ordinary majoritarian
system were usually estimated to be rather poor. (According to a leading
Crimean political analyst, in the best case they could count on 5-6 seats only)
[115]. Although the successful campaign for the acquisition of Ukrainian
citizenship, indeed, made a difference in comparison with the situation of 1998
elections, there was a number of other negative factors affecting the
probability of the Crimean Tatar candidates to win regional and local
elections. Among them, the lack of financial resources sufficient to compete on
equal grounds with the candidates supported by the Communist party or by
pro-Russian political movements, could be named. One more serious problem
appeared to be a dispersion of the anti-Communist opposition in Crimea that
would demand from its members a complicated and sophisticated political
maneuvering in order to reach a viable agreement on not competing with each
other's candidates. [116]
In
general, the electoral landscape-2002 in the ARC looked rather variegated
politically and ideologically. The main rivals on the scene were, by all means,
the "Hrach's Block" and the "Kunitsyn's Team," the latter headed by the ex-Prime
Minister of Crimea. [117] (Last summer, the dismissal of Serhiy
Kunitsyn seemed finalizing the protracted struggle
between the government and the parliament of the ARC, and Hrach's
previous unsuccessful attempts to get rid of this strong opponent. Entering the
election campaign, Kunitsyn has managed, however, to
recruit Crimean deputies and to form the biggest faction named "For the
United Crimea." He also organized, together with the incumbent Prime
Minister and the Representative of the President, a local branch of the
"For the United Ukraine" (pro-governmental) electoral block that was
now recognized as the most potent, highly professional, and having a good
chance to get no less than 40 seats in the newly elected legislature of the
ARC.) [118] Apart from the "Kunitsyn's
Team" as a probable partner, Public Committee "For a Transparent
Power" led by Andriy Senchenko
and Serhiy Velyzhansky
could also be named as potentially friendly for the Crimean Tatar candidates.
This entity was believed to ensure up to ten deputies, whereas approximately
the same number of seats was expected to be filled by the Social Democrats
(United), and by the Russian block. This evaluation predicted for the Hrach's block a much more modest accomplishment of around
25 % than it widely advertised. [119]
It
should be added, however, that the later events of the unprecedentedly
turbulent election campaign in Crimea have virtually toppled all analytical
prognoses and considerations. The new turn was started by a sensational
decision of the Tsentralny district court of Simferopol to cancel the registration of Leonid Hrach (who until that time was absolutely confident of his
being a "political master" and "leader of Crimea") for the
elections to the ARC legislature on the grounds of untruthful data submitted in
his declaration on income and possessions, also some other violations of the
enacted legal regulations. This happening, having raised a turmoil not only in
Crimea but in Russia as well, has been followed by the failed attempt to take
revenge by abolishing the registration of 34 of Hrach's
main rivals (including the two Crimean Tatar candidates), and the threats to
hold in Crimea a referendum on joining Russia, and to disrupt the whole
election campaign if the court's ruling remains in force. [120] All these developments drastically changed the political
landscape in Crimea and beyond. As a result, wide possibilities for harsh
statements, appeals, speculations, rallies, tent camps and other protest
actions appeared - this time, being realized not by the Crimean Tatars,
traditionally regarded as the main, if not only, source and cause of conflict
in Crimea, but by Hrach's Communist supporters. [121]
Although these public manifestations never proved able to engage more than
several hundreds of participants - mostly pensioners and a dozen of
sporting-looking youth - some alarmist reaction can be identified in media
responses to the development of the situation in Crimea. [122]
These
events were also accompanied by a number of strong statements issued by
influential Russian politicians. As has been reported, in particular, by the
RFE/RL, a group of prominent Russian political leaders, presenting a wide
spectrum of political orientations and preferences - Sergei
Shoigu, Yurii Luzhkov, Gennadii Zyuganov, Boris Nemtsov, and Gennadii Raikov - appealed to Kuchma. They called on him to "restore justice"
with regard to Hrach (meaning, evidently, that the
President should somehow abolish the court decision - an idea looking rather
odd in the context of "rule of law" rhetoric of the same
personalities). "The removal from the electoral campaign under invented
pretexts of Leonid Hrach, the chairman of the Supreme
Council of the Republic [of Crimea], is evidence of the activation of the
forces that intend to undermine the relations between Ukraine and Russia,"
they wrote in the appeal. [123] These and other serious complications
accompanying the election campaign in Crimea might have led to the eventual
derangement of the elections to the autonomous legislature, thus creating for
the Crimean Tatars - and not only for them - a new sort of challenges to cope
with.
The
situation looked somewhat better for the Crimean Tatars when it came to their
representation in the legislature of Ukraine. During the last session of the Kurultay, an agreement on political collaboration between Mejlis and People's Rukh of
Ukraine that had been signed on 31 July 2001 was confirmed. Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov were recommended as the candidates to be included
into (the "passable" part of) the Rukh
party list. [124] Soon it became clear that Rukh
would take part in all-Ukrainian elections not on its own but within the rather
potent block "Nasha Ukraina,"
headed by one of the most popular politician, former Prime Minister Victor Yuschenko. It meant that the promise to put the Crimean
Tatar candidates into the "guaranteed" part of the list converted
into a much more difficult task of preserving their positions on the list
common for the whole block. Indeed, at the "Nasha
Ukraina" conference convened on 16 January 2002,
general electoral list was eventually approved; on this list, Mustafa Dzhemilev ranked 28th, whereas Refat
Chubarov 60th. [125] The same conference also
nominated the candidates to be supported by the block in the single-mandate majoritarian constituencies; in ten of them covering the
whole territory of Crimea, six names were those of members of the Mejlis. [126]
As
to the elections to the local bodies of self-government, including city and
village councils, some competition for the Crimean Tatar votes was expected to
come from parties that were not "sanctioned" by the Kurultay. For example, Ahtem Chiigoz, the vice-Chairman of the Bakhchesaray
regional Mejlis, in private discussion noted that the
NDP (People's Democratic Party) and some other all-Ukrainian parties were
already trying to engage Crimean Tatar electorate on the lower local levels of
elections circumventing regional Mejlises and the
central Mejlis. [127]
Therefore,
it seemed that in the context of Elections-2002, the most important task for
the Crimean Tatars to gain at least proportionate representation in the
parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea remained the least likely to be
accomplished. Acknowledging this prospect, Mustafa Dzhemilev
told Rene Bibo, the Second Secretary of the USA
Embassy to Ukraine, that "The Crimean Tatar people is interested in
democratic majority in the parliament of the ARC, because even 20 Crimean Tatar
deputies would not be able to influence the decision-making process in such a
way as to make it favourable for us." [128]
Although
the whole story of the elections in Crimea on 31 March 2002, as well as all the
preceding and succeeding events, is beyond the scope of this paper, a brief on
actual results is worth including here. It is also interesting to compare the
actual outcome with expectations and prognostications made by many political
analysts, as well as with the results of the previous elections in 1998.
Concerning
the all-Ukrainian multi-mandate constituency electing half of the VR (225
deputies) according to proportionate system, the most important result is that
"Nasha Ukraina"
block headed by reformist ex-premier Viktor Yuschenko
has won 23.57 % of votes, or 6 108 088, thus leaving - for the first time - the
Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) at the second place with 19.98 % (5 178 074).
[129] Accordingly, the number of deputies from this block elected under
proportionate system, amounts to 70; this means that both Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov who ran for seats in the VR on this block list,
entered the Ukrainian parliament - in full compliance with the expectations of
practically all political analysts and sociologists. Though this time, the
exclusive rights of the Mejlis to represent (ethnic)
Crimean Tatars in Ukrainian parliament have been disrupted by Zarema Katusheva, elected on the
communist party ticket. [130] It should also be noted that national democrats
notably improved their position in Crimea, since there were 94.067 or 9.77 %
votes for "Nasha Ukraina"
in multi-mandate constituency. It accounts for additional 7,683 votes when
compared with results of elections in 1998 for all of the parties that can be
considered predecessors of the "Nasha Ukraina" block. [131]
Characterizing
the elections in
As
to the elections to the Crimean legislature and local councils, the best
outcome consists, perhaps, in the fact that the elections did occur in defiance
of the repeated endavours to block them by different
means, and to destabilize fragile political peace in the peninsula. Despite
blackmail, threats and protest actions organized by Hrach
and his supporters (with substantial financial and in-kind help for him coming
from abroad - mainly, from Russia) and many contradictory and controversial
appeals to and decisions of the courts and the Crimean Elective Commission, the
CEC eventually recognized elections valid in all of the 100 Crimean
constituencies. [134] (Although up to date, only 95 deputies are officially
registered, whereas five are still waiting for the eventual court decisions).
For
the Crimean Tatars, the results turned out better than it had been anticipated.
Six Crimean Tatars supported by Kurultay, and one
from the "Kunitsyn's team" were elected to
the VR of the ARC (one more ethnic Crimean Tatar, Lentun
Bezaziyev, entered the Crimean legislature as a
member of the pro-communist "Hrach's
block"). Since the election of Server Memedliayev,
one of the Crimean Tatar winners (constituency # 70, Kirovsky
region) was later cancelled by a court decision, this means that six officially
registered representatives of the Crimean Tatar people, or seven ethnic Crimean
Tatars (6 + 1 formula) are officially registered as deputies of the 100-seat
Crimean VR (currently, there are 93 members registered as deputies).
Remarkably, this time Crimean Tatars got more mandates than representatives of
the Russian block that gained only 5 seats. [135] General ethnic composition of
the Crimean deputies elected in 2002 is as follows: there are 41 Russians, 35
Ukrainians, seven Crimean Tatars, four Jews, two Gagauzians,
one Czech, one Greek, one Armenian, and one Abkhaz. [136] Apart from the
relatively successful outcome for the Crimean Tatars, another important feature
of the recent elections to the VR of the ARC consists of a significant drop of
the communists' popularity. [137] Overall failure of all of the tricks used by
the summoned (and well-paid) Russian "political technologists" to
secure their employers' victory, should also be noted. [138]
Moreover,
despite all endeavours to prevent registration of the
elected deputies and disrupt preparation for the first session of the VR of the
ARC scheduled for April 29, this session not only took place duly, but also
managed to elect the speaker and appoint the premier of the Crimean government.
At this session, crushing defeat of Hrach (who
received his deputy mandate in defiance of the latest of court decisions, and
personally participated in the voting) has become evident: Borys
Deich, proposed for speaker by non-communist majority,
obtained 52 votes, while his rival Leonid Hrach
received only 22. During the election of the Crimean premier, Serhiy Kunitsyn (former premier
dismissed in June 2001 by Hrach) received 64 votes.
On May 15, during the second session of the Crimean legislature, one more
important step forward has been done: Ilmi Umerov, an outstanding leader of the Crimean Tatar people,
Deputy Chair of the Mejlis, former (rather
successful) vice-Premier of the Crimean government headed by Anatoliy Franchuk, has been elected
as a vice-speaker. This occurred despite the violent resistance of the
communist faction, and in defiance of their previous strong statements about
the intention to prevent just such an outcome. Moreover, during the same two
"package" voting for the Presidium of the Crimean VR and for the
Crimean government, Crimean Tatars, having only six deputies, gained also quite
visible representation in the Cabinet of Ministers of the ARC. Now, Edip Gafarov (former head of the
Republican Committee on Nationalities and Former Deportees) became a
vice-Premier, whereas Aziz Abdullayev
is now Minister of Industry, and Server Saliyev
occupied the post vacated by Edip Gafarov.
All this occurred very smoothly, without any protracted or even brief
"battles," and demonstrating amazingly unanimous voting (for 15
members of the Presidium voted 79 deputies out of 94 present, whereas for the
government (consisting of 31 members) - 94 out of 95. [139] In
this context, a question may duly arise about communists participation and
their unexpectedly mild attitude towards persons that have been noisily and
repeatedly announced unacceptable "enemies." The answer could be find in a very pragmatic and prudent approach of satisfying
their curbed appetite for power by providing for them four seats in the
Presidium, and two posts in the government.
All
these events, clearly signifying the end of "Hrach's
era" in the
In
regard to the results pertaining to local elective bodies, Sinaver
Kadyrov, the Mejlis
coordinator for the elections in
In
general, the proposed solution for addressing all of the major problems of the
Crimean Tatars simultaneously by providing them with the legal status of
"indigenous people of
The
very uniqueness of the Crimean Tatars' case demands, however, innovative
approaches that may lie beyond the framework of standard legal and
administrative measures used to secure minority rights. This autochtonous people that once had their own well developed
state, the Crimean Khanate (lasted for over three centuries until the Russian
annexation of
The
shameful protracted story of the failed attempts to ensure the Crimean Tatars'
political participation by changing the election legislation can by itself
serve as convincing evidence for the need and urgency to adopt such a
comprehensive law. But even if some amendments were adopted, they could again
prove to be temporary. Since in trying to avoid the politically least
acceptable view that the Crimean Tatars are entitled to guaranteed
representation in governmental bodies on the basis of their
"indigenousness," the tactics chosen by the interested parties have
been to link this right to the consequences of deportation. It would inevitably
follow that had these consequences already been a part of the past (or simply
declared as such), the need for any kind of
affirmative action for the Crimean Tatar people could be regarded as
unnecessary. This, however, would leave intact the principal cause of conflict
between the Crimean Tatar minority and the majority of the Crimean population
imposing its will through "majority-based democracy" procedures and
therefore easily circumventing any Crimean Tatars objections not supported by
legal mechanisms. In this way, the Crimean vicious circle would endure.
Accordingly,
it can easily be predicted that without a "status law," any further
attempt to resolve any issue - be it representation, or the legalization of
self-elected bodies, or land rights, or language and education problems -
would, in all probability, face the same difficulties and the same resistance
(and the same poor prospects of success). The inevitable implications are that
precious time and human resources will continue to be wasted on fruitless and
dangerous confrontation, thus hampering the further harmonization of Crimean
Tatar-Ukrainian relations and the genuine integration of the Crimean Tatar
people into Ukrainian society. It is also clear that the attempts to implement
those decisions, decrees, and recommendations that have been adopted by the
executive authorities but not backed by the comprehensive legal framework,
always encounter serious difficulties essentially reducing their effectiveness.
[144]
One
additional reason for the adoption of a "status law" relates to
pending draft legislation on the rehabilitation of formerly deported ethnic
groups, as well as on the amendments to the law on national minorities. Their
processing - in fact, the whole process of furthering minority-related
legislation - is hampered by the major obstacle of the unresolved issue of a
legally defined difference between national minorities and indigenous peoples.
The impetus for this process had been expected to come from the Concept of
Ethno-Politics in
It
can be added that, in fact, the status of indigenous people for the Crimean
Tatars might rather be regarded as that of a "nation without its own
statehood." Since some special rights for this kind of ethnic entities are
not yet enshrined in international law (though already addressed by academics
and the research community, [145] this Ukrainian initiative seems worth more
serious attention and international support than it has received thus far. By
passing such a law, especially if combined with joining ILO Convention 169, an
agreement would be reached between the State and the most vulnerable ethnic
group of
Can
any better, more viable and realistic solution instead of the "status
law" be recommended? The whole history of Crimean
Tatars repatriation, which is also the history of their continued struggle for
recognition as a "people," with the ensuing right to internal
self-determination within the borders of today's
January-May
2002
End Notes
[1]
In: "The Role of International Organizations and Donor Institutions in
Solving Problems of Integration into Ukrainian Society of Persons Deported on
Account of their Ethnic Origin from the Territory of Crimea." Collection
of materials from the Round Table on
[2]
See: Kryms'ki Studii
# 3, 2000, pp.63-66.
[3]
This period is comprehensively covered by "Politics in and around
[4]
For broader context of the legislative proceedings on elections in the ARC, see
"Crimean Election Law and Formation of Political Climate in the
Autonomy," Research Update Vol. 8, # 4/252,
[5]
In addition to the three consecutive programmes on
repatriation and resettlement of former deportees, on
[6]
Four other groups of former deportees, namely, Armenians, Bulgarians, Germans,
and Greeks constitute, all together, less than 2 % of all the repatriates.
[7]
The repatriation of the Crimean Tatars was enormously delayed compared to that
of all other formerly deported nationalities of the
[8]
See speeches of the MPs Semenets, Koziarsky,
Shevchenko, Volkovets'ky et
al. Stenographic report of the two sittings of the SC of the Ukr.SSR on 12 February 1991, published (in Ukrainian) in Kryms'ki Studii, #
5-6, 2001, pp. 33-60.
[9]
Ibid.
[10]
This period is comprehensively covered by "Politics in and around
[11]
Published in the Collection of Documents by the Association "For
inter-ethnic peace and understanding in
[12]
The Kurultay of 1991 was named the Second in order to
memorize the First Kurultay of November 1917 that had
declared the establishment of the
[13]
Available (in Russian) at http://www.crimeatau.org.ua
[14]
It should be remembered that at that time, the situation in
[15]
About 92 % of voters supported the Act on
[16]
By that time, around 140,000 Crimean Tatars had returned, therefore, their
votes should have been an essential part of those 561,500 residents of
[17]
See, for example,"Who
Has a Right to
[18]
On this occasion, however, Refat Chubarov
was allowed to present Crimean Tatars' claims to the session of the VR.
[19]
Available (in Ukrainian) at http://www.rada.kiev.ua/cgi-bin/putfile.cgi
[20]
Oleksandr Yemets, Deputy of
the VR and member of the Reform and Order Party (PRP), from the very beginning
of his political career in the late 80s and until the tragic death after a car
crash on
[21]
To some extent, this might have been determined by personal views and
preferences of the new minister, who in his previous capacity of academics and
expert gained a reputation of a staunch opponent of indigenous status for
Crimean Tatars. Also, Professor Mykola Shulga, the highly competent sociologist and former member
of the Central Committee of the CPU, ideologically closely associated with the
left wing.
[22]
The last draft, submitted by the then Prime Minister Victor Yuschenko
on behalf of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and registered by the VR on
08.08.2000, is an abbreviated version of the earlier elaborations, containing
just a schematic outline of such categories as "national minorities"
and "indigenous peoples." Remarkably, in the draft's section listing
the priorities for further legislation strengthening a legal basis for
ethno-politics in
[23]
See, for example, the letters prepared by the Association "For
inter-ethnic peace and understanding in
[24]
See "The Constitutional Process in the Autonomous Republic of Crimean in
the Context of Interethnic Relations and Conflict Settlement" by Natalya Belitser and the
references therein, Kryms'ki Studii, # 2, 2000, pp. 45-59.
[25]
This paragraph reads that the rights of indigenous peoples are determined by
the laws and legislative acts of
[26]
Both Ukrainian and English versions of the two drafts were later published in Kryms'ki Studii # 1
(7), 2001.
[27]
Fore more details on the existing definitions and criteria, see report by Natalya Belitser, in:
"Crimean Tatars: "National Minority or Indigenous People?," UNCPD, Kyiv,
[28]
The view on this criterion as suitable for the purpose of defining the Crimean
Tatars as an indigenous people seems shared by Max van der
Stoel, the OSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities. In his letter of
http://www.osce.org/inst/hcnm/recomm/ukraine/1997/44hc47.html.
Also, it could be noted that the approach proposed by the Draft as early as in
1996, does not look outdated if compared with the definitions and criteria
developed later. See, for example, "The Rights of Minorities: A
Declaration of Liberal Democratic Principles Concerning Ethnocultural
and National Minorities and Indigenous Peoples," adopted on
[29]
According to Art. 1 par. 2 of the ILO Convention 169,
"Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a
fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of
this Convention apply."
[30]
The actual language used by ILO Convention 169 (Art. 1 par. 3) reads as
follows: "The use of the term people in this Convention shall not be
construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to
the term under international law."
[31]
For more details, see "Repatriation of the Crimean Tatars: A Chronicle of
Events" by Julia Tyschenko and Vyacheslav Pikhovshek, published
by the Ukrainian Centre for Independent Political research (UNCPD), Kyiv, 1999,
pp. 195-215 (in Ukrainian).
[32]
See "Informational report on the roundtable
concerning the issues of indigenous peoples in
[33]
Ibid.
[34]
See "The Constitutional Process in the Autonomous Republic of Crimean in
the Context of Interethnic Relations and Conflict Settlement" by Natalya Belitser and the
references therein. In: Kryms'ki Studii, #2, 2000, pp.45-59, and "Crimean Tatars
and the
http://www.iccrimea.org/scholarly.html
[35]
See, for example, "Crimean Concerns" by Refat
Chubarov, Kryms'ki
Studii #4, 2001, pp. 30-42, and "Only Ten
Independent Steps: Tenth Anniversary of Ukraine's Independence and the
Crimea" by Mycola Semena,
ibid., pp. 20-29 (only Ukrainian versions yet available). For recent analysis,
see also "Sergeyi Kunitsyn
unites the democrats," Argumenty i Fakty, #5 (339), January
2002 (in Russian); and "
[36]
See also "The Role of International Organizations and Donor Institutions
in Solving Problems of Integration into Ukrainian Society of the Persons,
Deported on Account of their Ethnic Origin, from the Territory of Crimea,"
speech by Natalya Belitser
(Collection of the materials from the Round Table on September 28, 2000, Kyiv,
pp. 49-54).
[37]
This kind of criticism has been presented, for example, by Marcel Zwamborn, Consultant to the Council of Europe. (See:
"Integration of formerly deported peoples from the Crimea: report of a
mission from 20 to 29 September 2000," Council of Europe,
Mig\cdmg\docs\2000\33e, pp. 9-10); and by Oxana Shevel from Harvard University, "Crimean Tatars and
the Ukrainian State: the Challenge of Politics, the Use of Law, and the Meaning
of Rhetoric," Kryms'ki Studii, #1 (7), 2001, pp. 123-125).
[38]
See, for example, the speech by the Ex-Deputy Prime Minister Mykola Julinski on
[39]
Five relevant UNCPD publications covered the presentations and verbatim reports
of the discussions. In addition, in 1999 the same NGO compiled and edited a
book presenting for Ukrainian readers the information about all contemporary
Crimean Tatar public figures and political leaders.
[40]
Various positions presented by the advocates and opponents of special legal
status for Crimean Tatars can be found in the two publications by the UNCPD:
"Crimean Tatars: "National Minority or Indigenous People?,"
Kyiv, 5 February 1999, and "Legal Measures to Secure the rights of the
Crimean Tatars in Ukraine: Questions and Prospects," Kyiv, 3 June 1999.
[41]
Contrary to this "historical" substantiation of Crimean Tatars being
not autochthonous to
[42]
See, for example, the presentation by Valentina Subotenko, Head of the Section on Citizenship Issues of the
Administration of President of Ukraine, "Crimean Tatars: National Minority
or Indigenous People?" Proceedings of the Roundtable, a Publication
by the UNCPD, Kyiv, 5 February 1999, pp. 41-46; and that by Vyacheslav
Oleschenko, deputy head of the Department on State
and Legal Affairs of the Administration of president, "Legal Measures to
Secure the rights of the Crimean Tatars in Ukraine: Questions and
Prospects," Proceedings of the Roundtable, Kyiv, 3 June 1999, pp.
47-50.
[43]
These fears are in fact not substantiated because they do not take into account
the so-called "internal self-determination." For more details on the
issue, see "The right for self-determination in the Crimean Tatar
context" by Natalya Belitser,
"Legal Measures to Secure the rights of the Crimean Tatars in
[44]
This argument was provided, in particular, by Leonid Shklyar,
Head of the Department of Political Analysis and Prognosis at the
Administration of President of Ukraine ("Crimean Tatars: National Minority
or Indigenous People?" Proceedings of the Roundtable,
a publication by the UNCPD, Kyiv,
[45]
The argument provided by Leonid Shklyar, Head of the
Department of Political Analysis and Prognosis at the Administration of
President of Ukraine, see Footnote 30. Actually, the
land issue for Crimean Tatars turned out to be rather discriminative, because
as a consequence of deportation and living in exile, they were not members of
collective farms and therefore, unable to enjoy preferential rights for
participation in land privatization in Crimea. (For more
details, see: "New aspect of land reform - on opportunity to redistribute
lands in Crimea" by Valenina Telychenko,
Kryms'ki Studii,
# 4, 2000, pp. 84-86).
[46]
Presentation by Valentina Subotenko,
Head of the Section on Citizenship Issues of the Administration of President of
Ukraine, see footnote 28.
[47]
Incredibly, [but] the latter statement can be found in the Encyclopedia on
Migration Processes in a Contemporary World: Worldwide, Regional, and Domestic
Aspects (Yu. Rymarenko, ed.)
published by the National Academy of Sciences of
[48]
For comments and analysis of certain legal points addressed by this draft, see Ihor Koliushko, "Legal
Measures to Secure the rights of the Crimean Tatars in
[49]
Official recognition of Mejlis and Kurultay remained, after the Second Kurultay
of 1991, among the most acute of Crimean Tatars' problems. Although the necessity
of this was already recognized by the first President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk (speech presented in May 1994 on occasion of the
Days Crimean Tatar culture in Ukraine, referred to by M. Julinski,
1999), no implementation of either President's or Cabinet of Ministers'
intentions and recommendations occurred until May 1999.
[50]
Published in Kryms'ki Studii
#4, 2000, pp. 55-57.
[51]
The Council is composed of all 33 members of the Mejlis;
Mustafa Dzhemilev is Chairperson of both Mejlis and the Council, and Refat
Chubarov serves as his First Deputy in both bodies.
[52]
See, for example, an Appeal of the Russian Community of Crimea to Compatriots -
a leaflet that appeared on the streets of Bakhchisaray
in July 2001 (unofficial translation by Alim Memetov, distributed by the Crima-L
on
[53]
For the detailed reports on the Fourth Kurultay, see:
Research Update, v. 7, #42/243,
[54]
UNIAN,
[55]
For the report on the hearing and the adopted Recommendations, see Kryms'ki Studii #
3, 2000, pp. 51-59.
[56]
This notorious Communist deputy is known for his extreme xenophobia and anti-semitic hate speech (see, for example, Bigotry Monitor,
Vol 1, # 22, December 2001).
[57]
See the verbatim report (in Ukrainian) in Kryms'ki Studii #
3, 2000, pp. 23-24.
[58]
Such a view has been expressed, in particular, by Ivan Kuras,
Vice-President of the National Academy of Sciences of
[59]
Only 282 MPs were registered, whereas before the first sitting (morning of the
same day), the turnout of deputies amounted to 349.
[60]
For example, the absence of the universal definition for indigenous peoples as
an argument against regarding the status of the Crimean Tatar people, discussed earlier and agreed upon as being not
valid, was put forward during the parliamentary hearing by the opponents of the
indigenous status.
[61]
For an English translation of the full text of the Recommendations, see Kryms'ki Studii #
3, 2000, pp. 57-59.
[62]
Available at http://www.rada.gov.ua
[63]
See Holos Ukrainy,
[64]
See Press Release of the
[65]
A statement repeated by many participants of the meeting interviewed in
[66]
The references on these can be found in "Crimean Tatars and the
Kryms'ki Studii, #1 (7),
2001, pp. 123-125 (available also at:
http://www.iccrimea.org.scholarly/oshevel.html).
[67]
In this letter, available at:
http://www.osce.org/inst/hcnm/recomm/ukraine/1997/44hc47.html,
the OSCE HCNM, though emphasizing that "international and Ukrainian legal
instruments regarding national minorities... are applicable to indigenous
peoples," admitted also that "I do not suggest that no distinction
can be made between national minorities and indigenous peoples. An important
difference is, in my view, that in contrast to a national minority, an indigenous people does not have a kinstate."
(As can be seen, the quotation complies with the approach developed by draft
Ukrainian legislation on the issue).
[68]
Letter to Mr. Anatoliy Zlenko,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of
[69]
Although the HCNM did meet with the two leaders of the Crimean Tatars, Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov, on the second day of his stay in Kyiv, and
conferred with them for several hours, not a single word of information about
this meeting has appeared in either electronic or printed media.
[70]
See, for example, "Holos Ukrainy"
from
[71]
UNIAN On Line [04.02.2002
[72]
See the report by Eva Koprolin, Administrative
Officer of the DGSAH, "The Role of International Organizations and Donor
Institutions in Solving Problems of Integration in to Ukrainian Society of the
Persons, Deported on Account of their Ethnic Origin, from the Territory of
Crimea" (Collection of the materials frrom the
Round Table on 28 September 2000, Kyiv), pp. 15-25.
[73]
See "Repatriation and Integration of the Tatars of
[74]
The legal-political department of the Mejlis, and the
Fund for Research and Support of Indigenous Peoples of Crimea,
prepared and published a number of highly professional essays and papers
analyzing international experience in securing the rights of indigenous peoples
and its applicability to the situation of Crimean Tatars, also Krymchaks and Karaits. In
particular, three special issues of the Informational Bulletin "Altin Besik" covering all
aspects of the problem, were prepared for the
participants of the VR hearing on
[75]
See a Statement by Mustafa Dzhemilev from
[76]
See, for example, A Report (by Kemal Seitveliev) on Seminar on the repatriation and Integration
of the Tatars of Crimea, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, Yalta (Ukraine), 6-8 October
2001 (available at http://www.iccrimea.org/reports/coe-seminar.html).
[77] Verbatim report available at
http://stars.coe.fr./verbatim/20002/E/0002051500E.htm).
[78]
Repatriation and integration of the Tatars of Crimea, PACE Recommendation 1455
(2000).
[79]
See "Integration of formerly deported peoples from the
[80]
See CoE Doc. 9121 from
[81]
See the informal report by Kemal Seitveliev,
available at:
http://www.iccrimea.org/reports/coe-seminar.html.
[82]
See: Parallel Report "About the situation in Crimea (Ukraine),"
Prepared by the Foundation for Research and Support of the Indigenous Peoples
of Crimea on Behalf of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatar
People in accordance with the article 25 of the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe. In the preamble to
this document, it is said that though Crimean Tatars consider themselves not as
a national minority but as indigenous people, in the absence of other legally
binding international documents and national bills, the opportunity has been
used to scrutiny how Ukraine observed the rights of the Crimean Tatars
according to the Framework Convention. Available at:
http://www.riga.lv/minelres/reports/ukraine/Parallel_Report.htm
[83]
The Statements by Nadir Bekirov can be found in
Crimea-L mailings from
[84]
This prospect received also rather negative comments from some individual
experts studying the situation in
[85]
See, for example, "The rights of indigenous peoples: overview of the
international experience" by Bill Bowring, Migration Issues in
[86]
For the concise explanation of why Crimean Tatars should not be equated with
the Tatars, for example, from the
[87]
See the CoE Doc. 8655 from
[88]
See "Integration of formerly deported peoples from the
[89]
For broader context of the legislative proceedings on elections in the ARC, see
"Crimean Election Law and Formation of Political Climate in the
Autonomy," Research Update Vol. 8, # 4/252,
[90]
This was noted as one of the serious drawbacks of the Ukrainian election
campaign of 1998 by the OSCE and PACE observer mission (see
Holos Ukrainy,
[91]
Such a decision was adopted by the Council of the Crimean Oblast of the Ukr.SSR in September 1990; and it specified that in any of
the administrative-territorial units of the
[92]
See the previous part of the given paper.
[93]
See Research Update Vol. 7, # 42/243,.
[94]
Krymskaya Pravda,
[95]
For a detailed analysis of both drafts, see also "Crimean Concerns"
by Refat Chubarov, Kryms'ki Studii #4,
2001, pp. 30-42 (in Ukrainian).
[96]
Stenographic report of the VR sitting on
[97]
A strongest argument stressed that those deportations that had completely
destroyed the coherence of centuries-long national life of Crimean Tatar
people, and displaced also several other ethnic groups), were based on a
principle of ethnicity. Therefore, to redress effectively the resulted huge
losses and damages, some special measures or "affirmative actions"
are needed in regard to these groups.
[98]
See Election Update #26,
[99]
The main arguments to explain such a decision were as follows: all political
parties in
[100]
See Kryms'ki Studii
# 4, 2001, pp. 70-73.
[101]
Quoted from the speech of Mustafa Dzhemilev at the
1st session of the 4th Kurultay of Crimean Tatar
people,
[102]
Interview with Refat Chubarov,
Context, #6, 2001, pp.33-40.
[103]
An Appeal of the Fourth Kurultay of Crimean Tatar
people adopted on
[104] Stenographic report of the VR session on
[105]
For a positive decision, no less than 226 voices are
needed. To provide a clear picture of the different factions stand on the
issue, the result of voting by factions was as follows: Communist Party of
Ukraine - 106 votes, Socialist Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) - 16,
non-allied MPs - 16, Socialist Party of Ukraine - 15, Apple - 14, Fatherland -
9, Greens - 5, Labour Ukraine - 5, UNR - 2, NRU - 1. Democratic
[106] Stenographic report of the VR session on
[107] The Statement of the Mejlis
of Crimean Tatar people of
[108]
See, for example, "Sergey Kunitsyn Unites
Democrats" by Yevgeniy Tulub,
Argumanty i Fakty, #5 (339), January 2002
(in Russian).
[109]
See "What Takes Place in
[110]
These issues have been covered in more detail by Victor Khomenko
(Holos Ukrainy,
9 January 2002) and Mykyta Kas'yanenko
(Den, 9 January 2002).
[111]
See Recommendation 1455 (2000) "Repatriation and Integration of the Tatars
of Crimea" of the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE
adopted on
[112]
See "The Constitutional Process in the Autonomous Republic of Crimean in
the Context of Interethnic Relations and Conflict Settlement" by Natalya Belitser and the
references therein,Kryms'ki Studii #2, 2000, pp.45-59.
[113]
Letter to Crimea-L members of
[114]
Interfax-Ukraina,
[115]
"
[116]
According to media reports, some steps in this direction have already been
undertaken by the non-leftist electoral groupings. (See, for example, Ukrainian
Regional Report: Elections Newsletter-2002, Issue # 2,
[117] "Serhiy Kunitsyn Unites Democrats" by Yevgeniy
Tulub, Argumenty i Fakty v
[118]
See, for example, "
[119] Ibid.
[120] "Back and Forth in the
[121]
Both electronic and printed media of
http://uatoday.net.news, http://www.versii.com
http://part.org.ua
http://pravda.com.ua.index/htm
http://vybory2002.kiev.ua.
[122]
See, for example, "Hrach Calls for a Coup D'Etat?" by Nicolas Voitovsky,
http://part.org.ua, 26.02.2002, and "Hrach Takes
a Path of War, or the Crimea May Repeat the Fate of Kosovo" by Oleg Mitrofanov, http://part.org.us, 28.02.2002 (in Russian).
[123] RFE/RL, "
[124] Resolution of the Fourth Kurultay
of Crimean Tatar people adopted on
[125]
According to recent sociological surveys, "Nasha
Ukraina" has the highest rating, and is the
undoubted leader of the pre-election race, therefore, both positions in the
block's list seem ensuring deputies' mandates. (See, for example, "Our
Ukraine, CPU and SDPU(o) Lead the Rating -
Sociological Survey," 1.03.2002, at http://part.org.ua, and "Winners
and Losers of the Parliamentary Elections Are Already Known," 16.02.2002,
at http://www.razom.org.ua.
[126]
See "This is: 'Our
[127] See report by Kemal Seitveliev disseminated by Crimea-L in November 2001.
[128] Holos
Kryma, # 7 (431), 15 Febryary
2002.
[129] http://www.pravda.com.ua,
15.04.2002. For a detailed analysis of
Ukrainian elections see, for example, The Ukrainian List (UKL) # 171, 11 April
2002, and # 172, 5 May 2002; "Ukraine Takes Two Steps Forward and, One
Step Back" by Taras Kuzio,
RFE/RL Newsline, V. 6 # 64, 5 April 2002, and numeous analytical reviews on Ukrainian web-sites.
[130]
"The idea of quotas is no more actual" by Aleksey Nezhivoy,
Krymskoye vremia,
30 April 2002 (in Russian).
[131]
"Nasha Ukraina"
took the third place in Crimea following CPU and Social Democrats (united).
Interview with Refat Chubarov,
4 May 2002.
[132]
See, for example, Research Update, Vol. 8, No
17/265, 29 April 2002 (available at http://www.ucipr.kiev.ua).
[133]
Ibid., see also http://www..krym2002.com,
02.04.2002, and http://part.org.ua, 15.04.2002.
[134]
At http://part.org.ua, 29.04.2002
[135]
KrymTAU-Inform, 22.04.2002, at:
http://www.crimeatau.org.ua , see also Interfax-Ukraine, 05.04.2002 (in Ukrainian).
[136]
RFE/RL Newsline, V. 6, # 81, 30 April 2002.
[137]
Only 15 deputies are members of the CPU, whereas in 1998, there were 36 of them
(interview with Refat Chubarov,
4 May 2002).
[138] "The Day when the Strongest Turned Out
Helpless" by Mykola Semena,
Dzerkalo Tyzhnia
6-12 April 2002 (in Ukrainian).
[139]
"Honeymoon in Crimea" by Lilya Budzhurova, at http://www.pravda.com.ua, 16.05.2002.
[140]
"Hrach is 'Little Stalin' Today" by Mykola Semena, 30.04.2002, at
http://pravda.com.ua (in Russian).
[141] Krymskoye Vremya; 30 April 2002 (in Russian).
[142]
Interview with Refat Chubarov,
4 May 2002.
[143] Opinion by Mustafa Dzhemilev,
at http://aspects.crimeastar.net, 1.05.2002 (in Russian).
[144]
Several dozens of decrees and resolutions, addressing Crimean Tatar issues,
have been adopted by the executive bodies of Ukraine over the last decade, but
many important points remain nothing else but good intentions.
[145]
See, for example, "Nations Without States"
by Gidon Gottlieb, Foreign Affairs, May/June
1994, pp. 100-112.
©
2002 Natalya Belitser